WAR  ON  THE  SEA 


By  GABRIEL  DARRIEUS 

Translated  by 
PHILIP  R.  ALGER 


GIFT  OF 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS 


BY 


Gabriel  DARRIEUS 

CAPTAIN,  FRENCH  NAVY 
Professor  of  Strategy  and  Naval  Tactics  at  the  Naval  War  College 


Basic  Principles 


Experience  is  the  sole  test 
of  truth 


TRANSLATED  BY 

PHILIP  R.  ALGER 

PROFESSOR,  U.S.N. 


ANNAPOLIS,  MD. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  INSTITUTE 
1908 


COPYRIGHT,  1908,  BY 

PHILIP   R.   ALGER 

Secy,  and  Treas.  U.  S.  Naval  Institute 


:», 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 


In  translating  Captain  Darrieus'  interesting  work,  I  have  en- 
deavored to  adhere  as  closely  to  his  forms  of  expression  as  was 
compatible  with  the  conveyance  of  the  meaning  in  English.  It 
would  perhaps  have  been  better  to  have  merely  tried  to  put  into 
English  the  full  sense  of  the  French,  regardless  of  actual  phrases 
used ;  at  all  events  I  should  thus  have  avoided  sentences  which,  in 
English  at  least,  seem  unnecessarily  tautological. 

It  may  be  well  to  state  that  the  French  expression  which  I  have 
translated  "Basic  Principles"  is  "La  Doctrine."  "  The  Doctrine" 
would  perhaps  express  the  meaning  better,  but  that  seemed  to  have 
something  of  a  theological  flavor. 

With  two  or  three  minor  exceptions,  quotations  from  the  Eng- 
lish have  been  traced  to  their  source,  and  are  given  in  their  original 
form  instead  of  being  re-translated  from  the  French  into  English. 

My  attention  has  been  called  to  the  fact  that  the  author's  state- 
ment regarding  the  Minnesota  and  New  Ironsides  (page  87)  is 
incorrect;  those  two  vessels  were  injured  but  not  sunk  by  torpedo 
explosions. 

ANNAPOLIS,  MD.,  June,  1908. 


37965S 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 
OBJECT  OF  THE  COURSE.    STATEMENT  OF  ITS  PROGRAM < .      5 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  MILITARY  ART  OF  ALEXANDER,  OF  HANNIBAL,  OF  CESAR,  OF  FRED- 
ERICK THE  GREAT,  AND  OF  NAPOLEON;  THE  NAVAL  STRATEGY 

OF  NAPOLEON  26 

Alexander     27 

Hannibal   30 

Caesar   r 35 

Frederick  the  Great 38 

Napoleon 40 

Napoleon's  Naval  Strategy 45 

CHAPTER  II. 
AN  HISTORICAL  STUDY  OF  THE  STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  DUQUESNE, 

TOURVILLE,    SUFFREN,   AND   NELSON 55 

Duquesne    55 

Tourville '. 57 

Suffren     63 

Nelson   70 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  AMERICAN   CIVIL  WAR.     THE  ITALIAN   WAR   (LISSA).     CHILE 
AND  PERU.     ADMIRAL  COURBET'S  CHINA  CAMPAIGN.     CHINA 

AND  JAPAN  Si 

American  Civil  War 81 

Italian  War  (Lissa)    88 

War  between  Chile  and  Peru 94 

Admiral   Courbet's   Campaign 96 

War  between  China  and  Japan 102 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  SPAIN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 109 

Spain's  Strategic  Error 109 

The  Spanish  Forces 1 13 

Cervera's  Squadron  1 17 

Conduct  of  the  Americans 128 

Blockade  of  Santiago 132 

The  Spanish  Squadron's  Sortie 136 

Popular  Opinion  of  the  Function  of  Fleets 138 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  RUSSIA  AND  JAPAN 141 

Russia's  Political  Strategy 142 

The  Japanese  Offensive 151 

Events  at  Chemulpo 153 

Submarine  Mines  155 

Attempts  to  Bottle  up  the  Fleet  in  Port  Arthur. 156 

The  Vladivostok  Cruisers 157 

The  Sortie  of  August  10 162 

The  Second  Pacific  Squadron 175 

Battle  of  Tsushima 181 

CHAPTER  VI. 

RESUME  OF  THE  LESSONS  OF  HISTORY.    OBJECTIVES  OF  WARS.  THE  ROLE 
OF    FLEETS.      THE    VALUE    OF    THE    OFFENSIVE.      BLOCKADE. 

COMMAND  OF  THE  SEA 195 

The  Objectives  of  Wars 197 

The  Offensive 203 

Command  of  the  Sea 208 

Blockades    * 212 

The  Principal  Obj  ective 214 

CHAPTER  VII. 

PROOF  OF  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  A  BODY  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  DOCTRINES. 

OPINIONS  OF  MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  WRITERS 224 

Jomini    225 

Clausewitz    228 

Rustow 232 

Von   der  Goltz 239 

Mahan    244 

The  English  Tradition 248 

The  French  System 250 

Necessity  for  an  Initial  Doctrine 252 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

GENERAL  POLICY  OF  PEOPLES,  ITS  CLOSE  CONNECTION  WITH  STRATEGY. 

APPLICATION  TO  THE  FRENCH  NAVY.    HEREDITARY  ADVERSARIES. 

ENGLISH  POLICY.  GERMAN  POLICY.  NEW  NATIONS 255 

The  British  Policy 256 

The  Downfall  of  Spain - 258 

The  Rivalry  with  Holland 260 

The  Contest  with  France : 263 

The  Modern  Carthage \ 274 

The  Franco-German  Feq.d 277 

The  American  Cloud 281 

The  Yellow  Peril 285 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

PREPARATION   FOR   WAR;    ITS    PRINCIPAL   DIVISIONS.      WEAPONS    AND 
THEIR  EMPLOYMENT.    PROBLEM  OF  THE  FIGHTING  FLEET.    NAVY 

YARDS,  ETC 289 

-    The  Preparation  of  Weapons.    The  Gun 292 

The  Torpedo  295 

The  Ram 296 

The  Fighting  Ship 296 

Fleets   299 

Tactical  Exercises   303 

Navy  Yards 305 

Coast  Defence  308 

Advanced  Bases   310 

Plans  of  Operations 311 

Mobilization   317 

Combined  Operations   318 

Conclusions t 319 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

By  CAPTAIN  GABRIEL  DARRIEUS,  French  Navy, 
Translated  by  PHILIP  R.  ALGER,  Professor,  U.   S.  Navy. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Yielding  to  the  friendly  solicitations  of  a  very  large  number  of 
my  comrades  of  all  grades  in  the  navy,  I  have  decided  to  publish 
the  substance  of  the  general  ideas  which  I  have  already  set  forth 
at  the  Naval  War  College. 

in    mp>    trv   KA    o    r»twr»ifirkiic    fimo    fr-»    mol^ 


ERRATA. 

P.      9,     ist  line.  Read  its  for  his. 

P.     10,  30th  line.  Read  Clausewitz  for  Clausevitz. 

P.     17,  38th  line.  Insert  of  after  tactics. 

P.    63,  28th  line.  Read  Far  for  far. 

P.    68,  29th  line.  Read  advanced  base  for  "point  d'appui." 

P.    73,  I7th  line.  Read  Gibraltar  for  Gibralter. 

P.    83,  39th  line.  Read  rough  for  roughed. 

P.    87,  26th  line.  Read  "  guerre  de  course  "  for  "  commerce  destroying." 

P.  125,  2ist  line.  Read  exercised  for  experienced. 

P.  129,  Footnote.  Read  Suffren  for  Sufferen. 

P.  134,  nth  line.'  Read  torpedoes  for  torpedos. 

P.  153,  i6th  line.  Read  three  for  their. 


conferences  in  the  name  of  the  Naval  League,  Admiral  Charles 
Beresford  was  uttering  loud  protests  and  complaints  on  profes- 
sional subjects  in  the  journals  and  at  public  meetings  without  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Admiralty  to  interfere  in  the  slightest 
degree  with  his  freedom  of  speech. 

Such   an   attitude   is   justified  by   the   importance   which   the 
British  Admiralty  has  always  attached  to  the  education  of  public 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

By  CAPTAIN  GABRIEL  DARRIEUS,  French  Navy, 
Translated  by  PHILIP  R.  ALGER,  Professor,  U.   S.  Navy. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Yielding  to  the  friendly  solicitations  of  a  very  large  number  of 
my  comrades  of  all  grades  in  the  navy,  I  have  decided  to  publish 
the  substance  of  the  general  ideas  which  I  have  already  set  forth 
at  the  Naval  War  College. 

Furthermore,  it  seemed  to  me  to  be  a  propitious  time  to  make 
at  least  one  seaman's  voice  heard,  in  the  passionate  debate  now 
going  on  about  the  principles  of  naval  warfare.  It  is  curious, 
indeed,  to  note  that  officers  are  vainly  to  be  sought  among  the 
many  spokesmen  of  the  two  opposing  parties,  which  are  daily 
strengthened  by  new  recruits  and  sit  in  judgment  on  a  technical 
question  of  vital  concern  to  the  nation. 

Unless  it  can  be  shown  that  naval  men  are  incompetent  to  dis- 
cuss their  own  profession,  we  cannot  admit  that  they  alone  should 
remain  silent  in  regard  to  the  principles  which  ought  to  govern 
the  constitution  of  the  fleet. 

There  is  much  to  be  done  in  France  in  the  way  of  freeing  the 
voices  and  pens  of  naval  officers  from  the  strict  rules  which  limit 
them  in  the  great  field  of  discussion  of  naval  affairs.  The  English 
government  sets  us  a  very  good  example  in  this  respect,  as  it 
always  does  where  naval  matters  are  concerned.  At  the  very 
moment  when,  a  few  years  ago,  we  gave  to  certain  officers,  with 
extreme  parsimony  and  under  many  restrictions,  authority  to  hold 
conferences  in  the  name  of  the  Naval  League,  Admiral  Charles 
Beresford  was  uttering  loud  protests  and  complaints  on  profes- 
sional subjects  in  the  journals  and  at  public  meetings  without  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Admiralty  to  interfere  in  the  slightest 
degree  with  his  freedom  of  speech. 

Such  an  attitude  is  justified  by  the  importance  which  the 
British  Admiralty  has  always  attached  to  the  education  of  public 


\VAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

opinion  in  regard  to  all  maritime  questions,  and  also  by  the  very 
clear  perception  that  'the  ideas  expressed  by  an  officer,  however 
eminent,  commit  no  one  but  himself,  and  have  only  the  exact  value 
which  people  are  willing  to  give  to  them. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  we  must  attribute  to  the  fixed  rule  of 
silence,  imposed  even  now  upon  our  experts,  the  unfortunate  fact 
that,  in-  our  country  alone,  first  principles  are  constantly  being 
questioned  and  the  same  sterile  discussions  are  periodically 
renewed. 

Our  lack  of  method  is  the  only  possible  explanation  of  the  fact 
that  the  plainest  teachings  of  recent  naval  wars  are  interpreted  in 
France  differently  from  anywhere  else,  and  often  in  a  manner 
contrary  to  common  sense. 

And  perhaps  some  of  the  blame  must  be  placed  upon  the  navy 
itself,  on  account  of  its  confused  ideas  about  maritime  questions, 
its  mental  disunion,  and,  to  sum  all,  its  absolute  lack  of  a  body  of 
doctrine  in  regard  to  naval  warfare. 

Only  a  few  years  ago  it  was  a  common  saying  that  "  As  many 
naval  officers,  so  many  different  opinions  on  any  professional 
subject."  Very  recently,  relative  to  a  definite  establishment  of  the 
Torpedo  School,  two  reports,  made  at  short  intervals  to  explain 
requests  for  funds,  each  contained  a  phrase  intended  to  lay  down 
a  principle  of  fundamental  importance.  "  The  School  must  be  on 
board  ship  "  said  one ;  and  the  other,  a  few  months  later,  "  The 
School  must  be  on  shore." 

This  real  professional  anarchy,  which  alienated  much  of  the 
sympathy  naturally  belonging  to  the  navy,  was  due  to  two  princi- 
pal causes :  in  the  first  place,  naval  material  has  been  so  radically 
transformed  during  the  last  fifty  years  that  in  no  other  industrial 
development  has  there  been  such  an  overturning;  in  the  second 
place,  there  has  been  a  total  absence  of  instruction  in  the  art  of 
modern  war.  Actually,  we  may  consider  these  two  causes  to  be 
but  one.  Naval  constructions  have  been  altered  with  feverish 
haste  to  keep  pace  with  industrial  progress,  before  the  diverse 
conceptions  upon  which  they  were  built,  out  of  fashion  ere  used, 
could  find  justification  in  the  essential  basis  of  truth,  experience. 

From  the  beginning  of  modern  fleets  to  Tsushima  there  had 
been  few  or  no  naval  battles  worthy  of  the  name.  In  the  study 
here  undertaken,  leaving  out  of  account  the  Russo-Japanese  war, 
we  shall  be  able  to  develop  some  special  facts,  but  for  our  con- 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

elusions  we  shall  have  to  depend  at  least  as  much  upon  logical 
reasoning  and  common  sense  as  upon  experimental  data. 

This  explains  and  to  some  extent  justifies  the  lack  of  clearness 
of  naval  ideas — what  this  was  scarcely  ten  years  ago  can  best  be 
imagined  by  recalling  the  mental  state  of  those  in  command  of  our 
army  before  1870.  The  same  lack  of  a  theory  of  war ;  the  same 
misunderstanding  of  the  exigencies  of  modern  war  material  and 
of  the  management  of  large  forces  of  men ;  the  same  blind  and 
fatal  faith  in  the  disentanglement  of  affairs  on  the  battle  field. 

To  show  that  I  state  nothing  not  rigorously  true,  it  will  suffice 
to  recall  that  but  a  few  years  ago  our  signal  books  were  encum- 
bered with  chapters  relating  to  the  manoeuvers  of  fleets  under  sail, 
when  masts  had  long  been  discarded.  At  a  date  also  recent,  pro- 
vision was  made  at  general  quarters  for  calling  away  boarders, 
and  I  am  not  sure  but  what  exercises  are  still  carried  on  upon 
some  of  our  ships  to  meet  this  quite  impossible  contingency. 

Our  disasters  in  1870  have  at  least  taught  us  the  worth  of  long 
and  patient  preparation  for  war ;  that,  wanting  the  genius  of  a 
Napoleon,  the  untiring  work  of  a  Moltke,  based  on  reason  and 
method  .and  leaving  nothing  to  chance,  can  lead  to  victory.  The 
army  has  profited  by  the  lesson  of  that  terrible  year,  to  the  great 
good  of  our  country :  would  it  really  be  too  much  to  hope  that  the 
navy  may  obtain  as  favorable  a  result  without  a  naval  Sedan  ? 

That  same  Moltke  said,  towards  the  end  of  his  life,  "  Our  cam- 
paigns and  our  victories  have  instructed  the  French,  who,  like  us, 
have  numbers,  armament  and  courage.  Our  strength  will  be  in 
management,  in  leadership,  in  one  word  in  the  General  Staff. 
This  strength  France  may  envy  us,  she  does  not  possess  it!' 

The  creation  of  the  Naval  War  College  was  the  first  step 
towards  a  general  staff,  as  necessary  in  the  preparation  for  naval 
war  as  in  that  for  a  war  on  land,  and  which  must  be  realized  some 
day,  when  minds  are  better  prepared  for  it,  after  several  genera- 
tions of  officers  have  passed  through  the  college. 

The  most  pressing  need,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  to  co-ordinate 
ideas,  to  examine  rigorously  all  the  various  opinions  current  in 
regard  to  naval  affairs,  and  to  retain  the  very  small  number  of 
facts  which  can  be  admitted  to  be  true,  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  a 
doctrine  which  the  future  and  a  better  established  teaching  should 
little  by  little  enrich.  Thus  we  can  each  contribute  to  the  common 
work  which,  growing  little  by  little,  will  in  the  near  future  be  so 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

mighty  as  to  overcome  all  opposition  and  destroy  even  the  memory 
of  the  obscurities  of  the  past. 

To  make  every  one  perceive  as  strongly  as  I  do  the  necessity  for 
this  great  work  of  unifying  professional  ideas  in  our  navy  and 
making  them  precise,  it  will  be  enough  to  cite  a  single  instance. 

At  the  beginning  of  1898,  the  Superior  Naval  Council,  come 
together  to  draw  up  a  shipbuilding  program,  decided  that  France 
needed,  besides  battleships,  a  fleet  of  twelve  armored  cruisers. 
Why  twelve?  The  minutes  of  the  meeting  are  silent  as  to  the 
reasons  for  this  conclusion.  Some  months,  I  might  even  say  some 
weeks  later,  at  a  new  meeting  of  the  Council,  held  for  quite 
another  purpose,  a  member  observed  that  the  number  of  armored 
cruisers  formerly  voted  seemed  to  him  insufficient,  especially  in 
view  of  the  exigencies  of  our  colonial  policy,  and  he  proposed  to 
increase  the  number  to  twenty-four.  After  a  confused  discussion, 
the  Council  pronounced  for  eighteen.  No  serious  argument  was 
advanced  for  that  number  any  more  than  for  the  others. 

Although  I  have  not  yet  touched  upon  even  the  most  elementary 
notions  of  strategy  and  tactics,  which  are  to  be  the  subjects  of  my 
work,  it  must  be  apparent  that  questions  of  warfare  should  not  be 
settled  by  sentiment.  And  let  it  here  be  said,  once  for  all,  that 
there  is  no  question  of  persons.  Men  are  nothing,  ideas  alone 
concern  us. 

This  example  shows  better  than  any  argument  how  much  we 
lacked  even  elementary  knowledge  of  naval  affairs  only  a  few 
years  ago.  Among  the  complex  problems  to  which  the  idea  of 
strategy  gives  rise,  there  is  none  more  important  than  that  of  the 
constitution  of  a  fleet,  and  it  goes  without  saying  that  every  pro- 
ject which  takes  account  neither  of  the  foreign  relations  of  a  great 
nation  nor  of  the  material  limit  fixed  by  its  resources,  of  necessity 
rests  upon  a  weak  and  unstable  base. 

The  end  and  aim  of  the  War  College,  as  well  as  of  this  work, 
is  to  build  up  a  military  system  upon  solid  and  enduring  founda- 
tions. Surely  to  attain  this  result,  a  lofty  aim  is  necessary ;  more- 
over, to  repeat  a  happy  phrase  used  elsewhere,  I  shall  take  care  to 
exclude  from  the  subjects  treated  everything  which  does  not  have 
war  for  its  object.  It  was  in  obedience  to  this  precise  thought  that 
the  founder  of  the  college,  M.  E.  Lockroy,  the  Minister  of  1895- 
1896,  gave  it  the  name  of  Naval  War  College.  He  wished  thus  to 
indicate  the  primary  importance  which  he  attached  to  making  the 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

great  and  fruitful  concept  of  war  the  ever  guiding  star  ot  his 
labors. 

Whatever  may  be  the  interest  attaching  to  the  different  prob- 
lems raised  by  naval  questions,  the  aggregation  of  which  gives  to 
the  naval  organization  its  complex  character,  I  utter  only  the  exact 
truth  when  I  affirm  that  those  of  strategy  and  of  naval  tactics  are 
its  master  key  and  best  express  its  essence.  We  can  foresee  that 
still  far  off  moment  when,  by  an  at  last  realized  general  agreement 
of  ideas,  all  other  problems  will  lend  themselves  to  the  solution  of 
this  fundamental  problem  of  the  military  art.  It  is  that  which  will 
form  the  strong  roots  by  which  the  general  growth  will  be 
nourished. 

And,  first,  let  it  be  well  understood  that  there  can  be  no  question 
of  defining  by  rules  the  means  of  obtaining  victory.  I  fully  agree 
with  Commander  Rouyer's  words,  "  Victory  is  not  taught,  any 
more  than  genius  is  acquired  by  study." 

But,  by  resting  satisfied  with  this  somewhat  deceptive  truth — 
and  far  too  long  we  have  been  content  to  accept  it  as  an  excuse  for 
culpable  negligence  and  detestable  lack  of  energy — a  people  hypno- 
tized into  expecting  the  providential  appearance  of  a  saving  genius 
runs  the  risk  of  being  almost  certainly  haled  to  defeat.  Genius  is 
not  needed  to  prepare  for  war ;  to  concentrate  the  national  forces ; 
to  provide,  in  time  of  peace,  arms,  ships,  personnel,  the  necessary 
stores ;  in  a  word,  to  study,  without  leaving  anything  to  chance, 
how  best  to  use  these  resources  so  that  at  the  hour  of  danger,  and 
at  the  point  of  danger,  there  shall  be  the  greatest  number  of 
favorable  chances.  If,  other  things  being  equal,  a  great  military 
leader  then  appears,  he  will  be  welcome,  but  he  will  be  so  much 
the  more  sure  of  victory  as,  in  the  matter  of  improvisations,  none 
are  demanded  of  him  but  those  of  the  battle  itself. 

The  present  work  has  for  its  object  the  exposition  of  the 
rational  general  method  which  should  guide  us  in  preparing  for 
war.  And,  in  the  first  place,  what  signification  should  we  give  to 
the  words  strategy  and  tactics? 

If  one  considers  their  etymologies,  the  Greek  word 
means  "  military  expedition,"  "  campaign " ;  from 
"  ruse  de  guerre,''  a  French  word  having  the  same  meaning  has 
been  made,  "  stratageme,"  and  this  corresponds  to  the  intuitive 
idea  which  we  attach  to  the  word  strategy.  TGKTIKT),  tactics,  is 
derived  from  TUKTIK.OS,  "  regulated,"  ''regular,"  that  which  re- 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

lates  to  regulated  movements,  to  manceuvers  on  the  field  of  battle. 
TaKTiKbi  'apiQpot,  regular  lines  of  battle  (Xenophon). 

In  fact,  and  without  arguing  from  examples  in  the  animal  king- 
dom, where  "  ruses  de  guerre  "  are  the  general  rule,  the  ideas  of 
strategy  and  of  tactics  are  as  old  as  humanity  itself. 

From  the  day  when  two  men  of  unequal  muscular  strength  en- 
gaged in  a  struggle  to  settle  their  quarrel,  arms  were  invented. 
To  compensate  for  his  natural  inferiority,  the  weaker  naturally 
seized  a  weapon,  the  first  thing  to  hand,  a  stone,  the  branch  of  a 
tree,  and  that  not  being  enough  to  re-establish  an  equality  of  force, 
he  has  been  obliged  to  surprise  the  secret  weaknesses  of  his  adver- 
sary; to  endeavor  to  attack  him  at  the  moment  most  unfavorable 
for  him,  in  a  word,  to  use  stratagem  with  him. 

If,  with  the  constant  progress  of  human  industry,  the  material 
conditions  of  strife  have  changed,  causes  and  principles  have  re- 
mained the  same.  And,  when  one  examines  the  facts  to  discover 
their  philosophy,  it  appears  that  the  continued  improvements  in 
war  material  throughout  the  ages  have  had  no  other  origin  and  no 
other  motive  than  the  natural  desire  of  the  weak  to  sustain  himself 
against  the  degrading  and  odious  tyranny  of  brute  strength. 

There  is  no  general  agreement  as  to  the  line  of  demarcation 
between  the  two  fundamental  divisions  of  the  military  art.  Where 
does  strategy  end,  and  where  begins  tactics  ? 

In  the  1892-1893  conferences  at  the  Army  War  College,  General 
Bonnal  called  attention  to  the  definitions,  unlike  in  words  rather 
than  in  sense,  adopted  by  military  writers  of  authority  in  such 
matters.  Napoleon  never  used  the  word  strategy;  sometimes  he 
used  the  expression  grand  tactics,  sometimes  the  term  higher 
branches  of  war. 

Clausevitz  defined  strategy  as  the  use  of  battle  in  war;  tactics 
as  the  use  of  troops  in  battle. 

For  Jomini,  strategy  includes  all  that  goes  on  in  the  theater  of 
war,  while  tactics  is  the  art  of  fighting  on  a  field  of  battle. 

According  to  Moltke,  strategy  shows  the  best  way  leading  to  the 
battle;  it  tells  WHERE  and  WHEN  one  ought  to  fight.  Tactics 
teaches  how  to  use  the  different  arms  in  fighting;  it  tells  HOW  one 
ought  to  fight. 

General  Bonnal  summed  up  these  different  views  in  the  follow- 
ing excellent  definitions :  Strategy  is  the  art  of  conceiving;  tac- 
tics is  the  science  of  executing. 

10 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

If  thus  far  we  have  considered  only  definitions  relating  to  the 
manoeuvers  of  armies,  there  is  hardly  need  to  point  out  that  they 
apply  equally  well  to  the  operations  of  fleets.  The  terms  of 
strategy  and  tactics  are  connected  with  abstract  ideas,  true  what- 
ever may  be  the  means  of  execution. 

Thus  Mahan,  in  agreement  with  most  military  writers,  fixed 
the  line  of  separation  between  strategy  and  tactics  at  the  point 
where  the  two  hostile  forces  come  into  contact.  But  it  must  be 
clearly  understood  that  the  expression  "  contact "  is  not  to  be 
taken  literally,  implying  within  sight,  at  short  distance,  etc.  There 
is  really  contact  between  two  hostile  warlike  forces  when  they 
know  each  other's  positions  with  such  exactness  that  their  encoun- 
ter, the  final  object  of  the  war,  is  unavoidable. 

I  shall  not  linger  over  discussions  of  words,  and  if  I  have 
thought  it  well  to  recall  the  various  opinions  on  this  subject,  it  is 
because  it  is  above  all  important  to  thoroughly  understand  each 
other. 

Adopting  from  now  on  language  as  concise  and  exact  as  pos- 
sible, and  remembering  that  in  the  main  the  etymology  of  the 
words  expresses  their  sense,  the  word  strategy  henceforth  will 
convey  the  idea  of  preparation  for  fighting,  and  the  word  tactics 
that  of  the  execution  of  the  fighting. 

I  shall  begin  with  the  study  of  strategy :  if  I  have  succeeded 
in  well  expressing  my  thoughts,  in  the  matter  of  definitions,  it  will 
at  once  be  apparent  that  this  will  form  the  most  important  part  of 
the  work.  The  tragic  facts  of  real  life,  to  which  we  shall  refer  in 
detail  further  on,  show  us  that  if  the  wisest  tactical  combinations 
of  the  battle  field  can  be  destroyed  or  crowned  with  success  in  a 
few  hours,  if  that  success  is  most  often  dependent  upon  the  spon- 
taneous inspirations  of  a  leader,  the  strategical  preparation  for 
war  cannot  be  improvised.  It  is  the  fruit  of  long  and  patient 
meditations,  of  far  sighted  measures  taken  long  in  advance  and 
requiring  slow  but  unbroken  effort  through  many  years. 

In  fact,  strategy  touches  upon  all  the  problems  of  war;  it  is 
their  very  soul ;  its  field  of  action  is  unlimited,  and  many  volumes 
could  be  devoted  to  it  without  coming  near  to  exhausting  the 
subject. 

Before  examining  in  detail,  in  a  book  intended  for  publication, 
all  the  points  which  strategy  bears  upon,  I  quite  naturally  put  to 
myself  the  question :  Hozv  ought  one  to  conceive  the  strategy  of 

ii 


WAR  ox  THE  SEA. 

modern  fleets?  For  a  reply,  I  remembered  those  words  of  an 
illustrious  philosopher,  Taine,  in  his  admirable  work  on  the  Ori- 
gins of  Contemporary  France :  "  What  is  Contemporary  France? 
To  reply  to  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to  know  how  this  France 
arose,  or,  what  is  better,  to  assist  as  a  spectator  at  its  formation." 

It  is  just  so  of  strategy,  as  well  as  of  general  tictics :  these  two 
foundations  of  the  military  art  being  as  old  as  the  world,  if  we 
wish  to  understand  their  actual  requirements,  it  is  impossible  to 
leave  out  of  consideration  their  past,  their  evolution  through  the 
ages,  and  their  adaptation  to  incessantly  changing  weapons. 

This  study  is  so  much  the  more  necessary  in  France,  and  par- 
ticularly in  the  French  navy,  because,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in 
the  absence  of  any  continuity  of  action  and  of  clear  sighted  direc- 
tion, our  preparation  for  war  has  most  often  been  the  work  of 
pure  chance. 

It  is  to  the  teachings  of  history,  then,  that  I  shall  have  recourse 
in  beginning  the  study  of  strategy.  This  method  is  legitimate, 
for  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that,  besides  their  flashes  of  genius, 
the  great  captains  of  all  times  have  owed  their  victories  to  some 
general  rules,  some  wise  dispositions,  which  we  may  well  hope  to 
be  able  to  apply  to  modern  wars. 

Understand  once  again  that  it  is  not  at  all  my  idea  to  develop  a 
code,  consisting  of  a  certain  number  of  precise  rules,  by  the  strict 
application  of  which  upon  the  field  of  battle  victory  may  be  surely 
won.  My  aim  is  more  modest  and  not  less  useful ;  it  is  to  seek  in 
the  past  some  general  indications  capable  of  guiding  a  great  leader, 
other  things  being  equal,  to  success. 

Those  who  are  able  to  perceive  all  the  profit  which  may  be  de- 
rived from  the  study  of  the  history  of  great  wars  will  have  a  well 
founded  confidence  in  the  success  of  this  endeavor. 

"  The  value  of  troops  actually  depends  more  upon  the  value  of 
their  chiefs  than  it  used  to,"  writes  Von  der  Goltz.  And  he  adds : 
"  It  is  not  only  important  to  inquire  what  qualities  a  man  must 
have  to  do  great  things,  as  a  commander-in-chief,  but  it  is  needful 
also  to  inquire  what  the  conditions  surrounding  the  army  and  the 
military  organisation  must  be  in  order  that  it  may  be  possible  for 
great  war  leaders  to  appear." 

To  decide  what  these  conditions  are,  we  must  go  back  to  the 
beginnings,  to  the  very  sources  of  military  history. 

"  The  principles  of  war,"  said  Napoleon,  fc  are  those  which  liave 

12 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

guided  the  great  captains  of  whom  history  has  handed  down  to  us 
the  high  deeds."  And  did  he  not  also  write,  "  Knowledge  of  the 
higher  branches  of  war  is  only  to  be  acquired  by  experience  and  by 
the  study  of  the  history  of  the  wars  and  battles  of  great  captains." 

Are  not  the  important  works  of  Clausewitz  and  of  Jomini  wholly 
based  upon  the  study  of  the  great  Napoleonic  drama  ? 

The  latter  military  writer  expressed  himself  as  follows :  "  In 
great  strategic  operations,  as  well  as  in  great  battle  combinations, 
victory  would  result  to-day,  as  it  always  has  resulted,  from  the 
application  of  the  principles  which  led  to  success  the  great  cap- 
tains of  all  times,  Alexander  or  Ccesar,  Frederick  or  Napoleon." 
Similarly,  referring  more  particularly  to  naval  affairs,  Mahan 
says :  <f  There  is  a  substantial*,  agreement  among  professional 
writers  that,  while  many  of  the  conditions  of  war  vary  from  age 
to  age  with  the  progress  of  weapons,  there  are  certain  teachings 
in  the  school  of  history  which  remain  constant,  and  being,  there- 
fore, of  universal  application,  can  be  elevated  to  the  rank  of 
general  principles." 

Without  for  an  instant  losing  sight  of  our  higher  aim,  which  is 
and  always  will  be  zvar,  we  shall  seek  in  history  for  the  ensemble 
of  those  general  principles  of  the  military  art  to  which  the  writers 
cited  above  allude.  After  a  hasty  sketch  of  the  military  campaigns 
of  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar  and  Napoleon,  we  shall  look  for 
guidance  more  particularly  in  maritime  wars.  Those  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution  and  of  the  first  Empire,  on  account  of  the  great 
seamen  who  made  them  illustrious,  will  in  the  first  place  engage 
our  attention.  In  modern  times,  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  that  of 
Italy  in  which  Lissa  took  place,  the  Chili- Peruvian  wars,  Admiral 
Courbet's  campaign,  the  China- Japan  conflict,  and  that  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States,  will  furnish  material  for  very  inter- 
esting conclusions,  because  the  material  used  in  these  successive 
wars  comes  much  nearer  to  what  is  now  used  than  that  of  older 
times.  Finally,  after  this  rapid  view,  we  shall  devote  an  entire 
chapter  to  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  not  so  much  because  of  its 
actual  events,  as  on  account  of  the  valuable  lessons  of  all  sorts 
that  it  furnishes.  Imperfectly  known  as  it  still  is,  at  least  in 
details,  its  general  character  is  already  sufficiently  well  outlined  to 
enable  us  to  state  that  very  few  among  the  wars  of  the  past  can 
furnish  a  more  ample  harvest  of  lessons  to  be  pondered.  And 
when  I  speak  of  profitable  lessons,  I  am  not  thinking  of  models 

13 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

to  be  followed,  but  much  rather  of  accumulated  errors  which  it 
would  be  well  for  us  to  be  able  to  avoid  committing  in  our  turn. 

May  we,  above  all  we  of  the  French  navy,  be  able  to  draw  profit 
from  the  faults  of  all  sorts  committed  by  Russia !  And  it  is 
because  this  war,  a  veritable  lesson  in  affairs,  offers  us  instruction 
in  strategy  and  tactics  by  practical  examples,  that  I  give  to  it  a 
special  importance. 

To  prevent  this  study  of  the  past  from  remaining  sterile,  we 
must  sum  up  the  conclusions  at  which  we  gradually  arrive,  and 
provide  ourselves  as  it  were  with  a  compact  vade  mecum  of  the 
small  number  of  doctrines  which  the  sequence  of  events  shall  not 
have  invalidated. 

Then  will  begin  our  much  more  difficult  task,  as  well  as  most 
interesting :  to  apply  the  teachings  of  the  past  to  actual  navies,  and 
especially  to  the  French  navy.  And  I  feel  so  much  the  importance 
of  this  problem  that  I  would  not  have  hesitated  to  attack  it  in  the 
first  chapter,  if  I  had  not  been  fully  convinced  that  thus  treated, 
and  without  previous  knowledge  of  derivations,  this  study  would 
have  been  too  artificial.  If  the  satisfaction  felt  in  it  is  postponed 
for  a  few  short  chapters,  the  results  will  be  the  better. 

But  from  the  moment  that  the  problem  of  war,  thus  far  ab- 
stractly viewed,  resolves  itself  into  a  concrete  case,  that  of  the 
French  navy  for  example,  the  mind  necessarily  reverts  to  given 
facts  which  seem  to  have  a  prejudicial  character.  Common  sense 
and  reason  indicate  that  a  given  nation,  a  given  navy,  ought  to 
foresee,  to  prepare  its  forces  in  view  of  well  determined  aims.  The 
general  problem  of  war  admits  only  of  a  series  of  solutions  appli- 
cable to  well  defined  concrete  cases  rather  than  a  single  solution 
good  for  all  possible  conflicts.  It  is  evident  that,  between  the 
extreme  cases  where  the  adversaries  are  respectively  an  exclu- 
sively naval  power  and  another  having  only  land  forces,  there  is 
room  for  all  the  combinations  of  the  preparation  for  naval  war. 

Thus  is  revealed  the  clear  conception  of  the  necessity  of  a 
foreign  policy  which  shall  be  the  inspiring  cause  of  strategy,  and, 
actually,  the  latter,  with  the  operations  which  it  entails,  is  so 
closely  tied  to  the  former  that  it  is  not  possible  to  sketch  the  least 
plan  of  war  without  a  perfect  knowledge  of  political  objectives,  of 
ends  pursued,  of  possible  alliances,  etc. ;  the  field  is  immense. 

And  it  is  precisely  because  the  field  is  so  vast,  that  strategy  must 

14 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

have  an  initial  point  of  departure  and  a  final  end,  that  there  is  an 
imperative  moral  obligation  upon  those  in  power  to  point  them  out. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  insist  upon  the  fact  that,  being  in  no 
way  the  recipient  of  such  confidences,  I  shall  be  unable  to  indicate 
with  precision  the  point  of  departure  and  that  of  arrival  of  French 
foreign  policy.  As  we  must  nevertheless  reason  about  concrete 
examples,  we  shall  be  forced  to  make  hypotheses.  And  in  order 
to  give  the  maximum  likelihood  to  the  choice  of  these  examples, 
I  shall  devote  a  chapter  to  the  discussion  of  the  political  situation 
of  France,  first  as  related  to  what  we  may  call  her  traditional  ene- 
mies, by  reason  of  the  numerous  wars  or  quarrels  with  them 
throughout  the  past,  like  England  and  Germany,  and  then  as  re- 
lated to  new  nations,  active  and  restless,  whose  desires  of  all  kinds 
are  becoming  disquieting,  the  United  States,  Japan,  etc.  Nor  shall 
we  forget,  among  the  prime  causes  of  war,  the  bitter  commercial 
strife  in  which  all  civilized  nations  are  now  engaged  for  the  con- 
quest of  the  world's  trade,  and  the  pacific  appearance  of  which 
masks  a  threatening  future. 

It  is  chiefly  when  thinking  of  this  chapter  of  the  book  that  I 
feel  my  total  incompetence ;  much  time,  and  above  all  more  ability 
than  I  possess,  would  be  required  to  succeed  in  convincing  all 
Frenchmen,  and  especially  officers,  that  the  two  terms,  foreign 
policy  and  strategy,  are  bound  together  by  an  indestructible  link. 

However  weak  and  hypothetical  may  be  the  ideas  that  I  shall 
develop,  they  will  at  least  have  the  advantage  of  furnishing  a  solid 
ground  for  discussion,  allowing  a  precise  demonstration  of  how 
the  objectives  of  a  war  are  connected  with  the  projects  of  the 
government.  I  shall  have  shown  the  method,  and  that  will  do  for 
the  moment. 

The  first  question  that  suggests  itself  is  evidently  that  of  the 
tool  to  be  used,  that  is  to  say  of  the  fighting  fleet  which  best 
corresponds  to  the  chosen  and  definitely  adopted  policy.  It  is 
moreover  clear  that  this  problem  of  the  constitution  of  the  fighting 
fleet,  the  most  important  of  all  which  are  raised  by  the  study  of 
preparation  for  war,  allows  of  an  infinity  of  solutions,  among 
which  two  different  nations  will  choose  according  to  their  needs  or 
their  special  tastes. 

We  are  concerned,  then,  with  a  study  than  which  there  is  none 
more  serious  or  more  profound,  and  the  combined  efforts  of  all 
the  people  of  a  country  would  not  be  too  much  properly  to 
conduct  it. 

is 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

In  the  first  place,  and  before  any  other  inquiry,  it  is  essential 
to  determine  the  conditions  which  should  be  fulfilled  by  the 
different  arms  which  the  developments  of  modern  industries  place 
at  the  seaman's  disposal. 

On  this  subject,  I  recall  a  remark,  which  I  noted  as  particularly 
suggestive,  among  the  numerous  questions  asked  of  me,  regarding 
my  way  of  understanding  a  study  of  strategy.  "  You  will  evi- 
dently not  have  to  concern  yourself  with  ordnance,"  was  said  to 
me  incidentally.  I  confess  that  this  proposition  quite  struck  me 
dumb.  Who  then  should  be  concerned  about  ordnance,  if  not 
the  writer  who  proposes  to  elucidate  for  naval  officers  the  require- 
ments of  strategy  and  of  tactics  ? 

The  art  of  preparation  for  war  does  not  consist  solely  of  putting 
to  work  and  utilizing  existing  military  resources ;  one  of  its 
branches,  and  not  the  least,  consists  of  a  complete  study  of  future 
resources,  which  measure  up  to  military  needs  in  proportion  as  we 
exert  ourselves  to  meet  them. 

Who  then  should  be  qualified  to  set  the  problem,  if  not  the  office 
charged  with  this  preparation  for  war,  the  one  which  we  at  once 
think  of  in  connection  with  the  idea  of  strategy  and  tactics,  the 
General  Staff? 

I  am  aware  that  a  certain  school,  having  quite  a  large  number  of 
adherents  in  France,  conceives  of  the  directing  military  authority 
as  an  assemblage  of  little  groups,  independent  of  one  another, 
each  charged  with  a  fraction  of  the  military  task,  but  without  any 
unifying  principle  to  co-ordinate  the  fractions  and  give  life  to  the 
whole.  If  this  conception  pleases  so  many  minds,  enamored  of 
individualism,  it  is  because  they  see  in  it  an  ideal  sort  of  classifi- 
cation, each  question  thoroughly  and  separately  considered,  by  a 
special  office,  with  no  other  thought  than  the  constant  perfecting 
of  each'  arm  or  each  tool,  and  then,  as  it  were,  methodically  cata- 
logued in  an  always  open  index. 

This  bureaucratic  idea  is  not  mine,  because  the  cultivation  of 
general  ideas,  which  alone  are  fruitful  and  vivifying,  is  wanting 
to  it ;  but  the  question  is  a  higher  one.  Does  it  respond  exactly 
and  faithfully  to  the  set  military  problem?  And,  turning  to  the 
constructor,  I  ask  of  him :  "  Have  you  been  furnished  with  the 
list  of  requirements  which  must  be  satisfied ?  "  And  going  further : 
"  Have  you  demanded  it  of  the  sole  directing  office,  qualified  to 
furnish  it?  If  this  has  not  been  done,  then  the  solution  of  the 

16 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

. 

problem  is  bad,  whatever  may  be  the  skill  and  ingenuity  of  your 
work  as  a  specialist." 

What  I  say  of  ordnance  applies  equally  to  torpedoes  and  the 
constructor's  work. 

The  only  reasonable  and  logical  organization  is  one  which  is 
modeled  upon  the  processes  of  nature  ;  in  the  study  of  living  organ- 
izations, it  is  very  quickly  seen  that  while  they  are  provided  with 
acting  members,  they  have  above  all  a  brain  of  which  the  function 
of  command  and  impulse  is  so  essential  that  without  it  equilibrium 
could  not  possibly  exist  and  for  an  harmonious  adjustment  of 
forces  there  would  be  substituted  an  impotent  anarchy. 

The  classic  experiment  in  physiology  is  well  known,  of  the 
pigeon  from  which  the  cerebral  "hemispheres  have  been  removed ; 
the  animal  eats,  drinks,  walks,  flies,  performs  separately  each  of 
its  separate  functions,  by  reflex  action ;  there  is  no  doubt  that  this 
is  not  death,  but  it  is  very  far  from  life  in  the  whole  sense  of  the 
word. 

It  is  from  the  absence  of  this  directing  and  impelling  organ  that 
the  navy  really  suffers,  and  has  suffered  for  too  long  a  time,  and 
it  is  because  every  study  of  strategy  and  tactics  ought  to  con- 
stantly have  war  in  mind,  that  the  need  of  a  general  staff  must  be 
here  urged. 

It  is  well  from  time  to  time  to  examine  our  consciences,  and  in 
looking  back  over  the  last  thirty  years,  we  can  say  with  all 
sincerity  it  is  our  very  own  fault  that  the  French  navy  has  been 
given  a  "  patchwork  "  fleet ;  it  is  also  and  always  our  fault  that  we 
have  so  many  ships  without  military  value,  without  counting  all 
our  other  mistakes. 

The  eminent  engineers  who  have  charge  of  the  construction  of 
our  ships,  and  whose  scientific  knowledge  fully  equals  that  of 
their  foreign  colleagues,  would  have  given  us,  I  am  sure,  magnifi- 
cent implements  of  war,  if  we  had  put  our  problems  before  them 
otherwise  than  in  indefinite  terms,  most  frequently  contradictory, 
and  in  words  whose  vagueness  often  concealed  lack  of  sense. 

It  is  full  time  to  break  with  this  school  of  irresponsibility,  and 
if  I  have  called  attention,  once  more,  to  the  object  of  a  higher 
teaching  of  war  in  the  navy,  it  is  to  justify  the  introduction  into 
every  program  of  strategy  and  tactics  the  study  of  weapons. 

That  this  primary  role  of  directing  should  be  vested  in  our 
corps  is  natural,  it  is  the  consequence  of  our  profession,  which  is 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

war;  moreover  it  requires  but  little  reflection  to  see  that  while  we 
may  very  well  conceive  of  a  navy  without  engineers,  constructors, 
mechanicians  or  paymasters,  we  cannot  imagine  one  without  line 
officers. 

Let  us  then  henceforth  resolutely  assume  all  the  responsibility ; 
the  lesson  will  bear  fruit.  If  we  begin  hesitatingly,  at  least  we  will 
safeguard  the  principle,  and  we  shall  be  able  to  blame  none  but 
ourselves  for  the  result.  Younger  and  abler  men  will  follow  in 
our  path,  who  will  have  all  the  authority  necessary,  aided  by  the 
beneficent  effect  of  the  doctrines  and  the  tradition  drawn  from 
these  patient  studies  of  war. 

And  there  are  still  other  thoughts  which  have  led  me  to  chose 
the  form  under  which  I  present  my  book,  so  necessary  has  it 
seemed  to  me  to  show  the  close  connection  between  the  constitu- 
tion of  a  projected  fleet  and  the  initial  military  conception. 

The  study  of  weapons,  of  the  gun,  the  torpedo,  the  ram,  etc., 
not  going  at  all  into  details  of  their  manufacture  or  mechanism, 
is  a  necessary  part  of  the  art  of  war.  It  is  important  to  ascertain 
what  conditions  these  weapons  must  satisfy  with  a  view  to  their 
use  in  fighting ;  the  improvements  which  we  greatly  wish  them  to 
have  and  the  circumstances  which  favor  their  use.  And  it  is 
apparent  that  any  study  of  this  kind  would  be  purely  speculative 
if  it  Mid  not  take  account  of  what  other  nations  are  doing  and  par- 
ticularly of  what  sort  of  hostile  ships  these  weapons  are  to  be 
used  against. 

These  same  weapons  are  carried  by  the  fighting  ship,  a  mobile 
gun  platform,  the  determination  of  whose  characteristics  is  one 
of  the  most  important  problems  that  exists ;  there  are  none  which, 
in  .France,  have  had  such  fantastic  and  various  solutions.  Its 
powerful  interest,  as  well  as  the  anxious  wish  to  find  the  unity 
which  best  suits  the  needs  of  French  naval  policy  justify  the 
laborious  attention  which  should  be  given  to  it. 

When  we  endeavor  to  solve  the  particular,  much  disputed,  ques- 
tion of  armor,  of  the  protection  of  the  vital  parts  of  the  ship  and 
the  most  reasonable  distribution  of  the  weight  allotted  to  that  pro- 
tection, what  we  must  definitely  ask  military  ideas  and  exigencies 
to  fix  for  us,  and  they  alone  can  do  so,  is  the  right  balance  between 
the  conflicting  elements  of  the  complex  design  of  the  fighting  ship. 
And  the  same  is  true  as  regards  speed  and  other  qualities. 

However  perfect  we  may  suppose  a  fighting  unit,  it  has  no 

18 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

raison  d'etre,  nor  even  any  practical  value,  unless  other  similar 
units  exist;  hence  proceeds  the  idea  of  naval  forces.  A  nation's 
fleets  are  the  realization  of  its  naval  policy;  and  at  once  there 
again  appears  the  close  bond  between  the  execution  of  a  naval 
program  and  the  foreign  policy  of  a  country. 

At  every  step  in  the  logical  developments  of  strategy  we  meet 
new  affirmations  of  the  necessity  of  definite  problems,  connected 
together  naturally  and  in  sequence,  in  a  perfect  harmony  of  con- 
ceptions and  thoughts.  The  political  problem,  having  received  a 
precise  and  clear  solution  on  the  part  of  the  governmental  authori- 
ties, allows  strategy,  represented  by  the  General  Staff,  in  its  turn 
to  clearly  define,  without  any  obscurity  of  principle,  the  military 
problem,  with  all  its  data.  The  constructor  can  then  go  on,  with- 
out groping  in  the  dark,  and  furnish,  without  appeal,  a  practical 
solution,  in  the  responsibility  for  which  each  competent  authority 
will  have  his  definite  share.  Any  other  method,  and  to  this  day 
the  one  I  point  out  has  been  systematically  disregarded  in  France, 
can  only  lead  to  anarchy  and  to  strategic  and  tactical  disorder. 

There  is  scarcely  need  to  say  that  I  shall  have  to  formulate  my 
own  hypotheses,  since  I  am  not  in  any  way  in  possession  of  the 
government's  thoughts.  But  that  matters  little,  since  the  essential 
is  to  study  a  method,  and  this  study  involves  the  examination  of 
concrete  cases. 

How  many  squadrons  ought  France  to  possess,  and  what  should 
be  their  composition?  Such  are  questions  which,  to  be  answered 
otherwise  than  at  haphazard,  must  be  rigorously  submitted  to  the 
control  of  military  aims.  They  enter  of  their  very  essence  into  the 
subject  under  consideration. 

The  squadrons  once  constituted,  it  is  necessary  to  put  them  in 
motion  with  a  view  to  a  naval  action,  to  determine  in  consequence 
the  conditions  of  their  navigation,  and  to  ascertain  if  its  safety,  or 
the  dispositions  to  be  taken  in  view  of  the  battle  which  is  our  final 
aim,  lead  to  adding  to  the  fleet  ships  other  than  fighting  ships 
properly  so-called.  The  very  interesting  problems  of  scouting  and 
search  must  naturally  be  faced,  with  care  to  accept  only  such  facts 
as  have  been  verified  by  experience. 

Thus  far  we  have  disregarded  all  but  purely  technical  considera- 
tions. We  have  given  as  it  were  a  unique  solution  of  an  abstract 
problem ;  but  things  are  very  far  from  happening  so  in  real  life, 
and  any  naval  strategy  and  tactics  would  be  vain  and  illusory 

19 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

which  assumed  that  there  are  no  restrictions  upon  professional 
ideas.  Financial  necessities  fix  impassable  bounds  to  the  total 
expenditure  for  naval  forces,  and  those  who  have  the  important 
duty  of  preparing  for  war  cannot  ignore  them. 

I  have  only  too  often  heard  fine  programs  set  forth,  which  had 
the  sole  fault  of  depending  upon  some  magic  purse,  inexhaustible 
and  bottomless,  in  which  the  minister  of  marine  must  find  limitless 
resources.  Strategy  would  be  an  easy  game  were  this  not  absurd 
and  impossible. 

Actually,  military  resources  are  limited  in  every  country  in  the 
world,  and  the  limits  are  particularly  narrow  in  France,  where  the 
expense  of  a  powerful  army  must  be  met  as  well  as  that  of  a 
strong  navy. 

We  have  no  right  whatever  then  to  ignore  these  special  diffi- 
culties in  our  study  of  war. 

And  the  expenses  involved  in  constituting  fleets  do  not  stop 
with  the  construction  of  the  fighting  ships  which  form  them. 
Stores  of  all  sorts  are  necessary  to  'allow  the  fleets  to  navigate ; 
still  more  needed  to  replenish  them,  when  they  return  to  their  home 
ports,  after  an  operatioti  of  war,  and  to  make  them  ready  to  set 
forth  again.  Arsenals  provided  with  all  the  latest  patterns  of 
material,  repair  shops,  dry  docks,  etc.,  must  be  organized  in 
advance  so  that  at  their  departure  the  said  squadrons  may  be 
perfectly  prepared,  or.  to  use  a  vulgar  but  expressive  term,  in 
form,  and  that,  on  their  return  from  cruising  or  from  battle,  they 
may  be  put  in  good  condition  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  question  of  supplies  for  the  fleet  and  of  arsenals  is  thus 
closely  connected  with  strategy,  and  it  will  easily  be  made  apparent 
what  an  immense  capital,  in  stores  of  every  kind,  ought  to  be 
accumulated  in  time  of  peace  by  every  maritime  nation  which 
does  not  wish  to  itself  experience  such  grievous  awakenings  as 
those  which  the  improvidence  of  the  Spanish  and  Russian  govern- 
ments prepared  for  their  unhappy  countries  in  the  course  of  the 
two  recent  wars. 

However  ample  the  expenditures  for  this  purpose,  they  are  truly 
economical  when  compared  with  the  great  and  unproductive  ex- 
pense which  an  unfortunate  war  forces  upon  a  conquered  nation. 
And  this  is  not  all !  Under  penalty  of  accumulating  for  an  adver- 
sary's use  all  these  spoils  of  war,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 

20 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

shelter  and  defend  them.  The  study  of  coast  defence  derives 
thence,  and  forms  one  of  the  most  important  branches  of  strategy. 

To  strategy  equally  belongs  the  right  to  fix  the  conditions  which 
should  govern  the  defence  of  the  coast,  the  number  of  points  to  be 
defended,  the  means  to  employ,  etc. 

Always  in  the  same  spirit,  and  never  losing  sight  of  our  guiding 
light,  there  is  occasion  to  define  the  elements  of  naval  defence,  in 
combination  with  that  of  the  coast,  with  a  view  to  the  necessary 
unity  of  action.  Torpedo-boats,  their  especial  utilization,  their 
future  role,  the  raison  d'etre  of  their  employment,  furnish  ample 
matter  for  interesting  developments  which  greatly  justify  the  im- 
portant place  given  to  these  little  boats  in  the  scheme  of  defence. 

Submarines,  and  submarine  navigation  in  general,  are  a  not  less 
important  subject. 

I  shall  tell  no  secrets  in  saying  that  during  the  last  sixteen  years 
the  French  navy  has  been  presented  with  too  many  submarines  of 
different  designs,  veritable  laboratory  instruments,  incapable  of 
any  useful  war  service  at  sea ;  it  has  been  too  often  forgotten  that 
the  naval  engineer's  art,  even  in  its  greatest  perfection,  is  not 
sufficient  of  itself,  and  that  to  give  life  to  his  work  he  needs  to  be 
inspired  by  the  military  idea. 

And  it  is  because  of  this  fundamental  error  that  our  flotilla  of 
submarines,  outside  of  certain  types  of  which  we  possess  too  few, 
is  quite  unsuited  to  our  military  needs,  and  that,  if  we  continue  in 
the  same  path,  we  shall  risk  losing  our  lead  of  rival  navies. 

Having  come  to  the  end  of  the  dryest,  if  not  the  least  interesting 
part  of  our  long  expose,  we  have  to  take  up  that  which  treats  of 
the  practical  use  of  military  studies  and  organization,  certainly  the 
part  most  open  to  prejudice,  because  we  now  draw  near  to  our 
goal. 

Advancing  step  by  step,  we  have  organized  naval  forces,  and 
have  provided  for  their  upkeep  and  defence :  the  country  possesses 
powerful  means  of  action  for  any  naval  enterprise ;  how  shall  they 
be  used? 

It  will  at  once  be  apparent,  even  to  those  of  least  competence  in 
naval  affairs,  that  the  method  of  using  this  power  will  be  quite 
different  with  different  adversaries,  depending  upon  their  military 
resources  and  their  remoteness  from  the  original  scene  of  war. 

There  is  but  a  step  from  this  conception  to  that  of  different 
eventualities,  of  variable  combinations,  in  a  word  of  war  plans,  or, 

21 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

to  use  a  happy  phrase  of  Von  der  Goltz,  plans  of  operations, 
worked  out  beforehand  with  a  view  to  each  particular  case. 
Understand  me  well ;  it  is  not  purposed  to  elaborate  in  the  silence 
of  the  study  plans  based  upon  fixed  and  unvarying  conjectures, 
in  the  chimerical  hope  that  things  will  happen  exactly  so.  I  strive 
to  accomplish  something  of  real  and  lasting  value,  and  am  well 
aware  that  in  war,  as  in  a  duel,  attacks  and  replies  are  closely 
dependent  upon  each  other.  Consequently,  in  the  field  of  war, 
even  at  the  instant  of  effective  movements,  all  previsions  may  be 
upset  by  some  unexpected  threat  of  the  enemy.  But,  strategically 
speaking,  it  is  indispensable  to  foresee  in  advance  the  principal 
lines  of  action,  and,  in  consequence,  to  elaborate  plans. 

The  German  General  Staff's  opinion  on  this  point  is  very  clearly 
expressed  in  its  work  on  the  war  of  1870: 

"It  is  scarcely  possible  in  the  whole  course  of  a  campaign  to 
repair  errors  made  at  its  beginning,  when  the  armies  are  being 
concentrated." 

We  shall  see,  in  our  study  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  a  striking 
confirmation  of  these  words,  Russia  having  really  carried  through- 
out the  whole  campaign  the  crushing  burden  of  strategical  errors 
made  at  its  beginning. 

Common  sense  alone  should  tell  us  that  in  all  cases  the  method 
of  prevision  is  infinitely  superior  to  that  of  trusting  to  chance. 
With  all  due  respect  to  the  memory  of  a  former  French  Minister 
of  Marine,  it  makes  one  shiver  to  think  that  at  an  anxious  time  in 
our  recent  history,  at  a  moment  of  such  political  tension  as  might 
at  any  instant  plunge  us  into  war  with  England,  this  Minister 
found  no  better  instructions  to  give  to  the  commander-in-chief  of 
our  principal  naval  force  than  these  vague  words,  ff  Take  your 
whole  squadron  and  cruise  off  Algiers."  We  may  esteem  our- 
selves fortunate  that  war  was  spared  to  us,  for  we  should  certainly 
have  been  beaten. 

Once  more  let  me  say  that  it  is  not  any  individual  that  I  incrimi- 
nate, and  no  word  of  blame  will  be  found  in  my  speech  or  writings 
for  those  who  without  doubt  knew  not  that  they  were  wrong. 
But  I  do  protest  most  forcibly  against  such  methods,  and  I  shall 
struggle  against  the  school  of  heedlessness  and  opportunism  with* 
an  energy  which  arises  from  my  profound  belief  that  war  is  not  a 
subject  for  improvisation.  Should  I  have  only  succeeded  at  the 
end  of  this  work  in  making  all  share  in  this  belief,  I  shall  feel 

22 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

repaid  for  my  efforts  by  the  perception  that  I  have  contributed 
something  new  and  useful  to  the  work  of  my  predecessors. 

Even  a  summary  draft  of  plans  of  operations  is  not  only  instruc- 
tive, but  indispensable,  whenever  strategy  and  tactics  are  discussed. 
And  quite  naturally,  the  application  of  these  projects  to  special 
cases,  to  assumed  adversaries,  is  indicated  as  the  next  step  in 
logical  sequence. 

Such  a  study  is  particularly  interesting  because  it  permits  us  to 
pass  in  review  the  resources  of  every  kind  which  a  country  has  at 
its  disposal,  or  which  it  ought  to  command — the  facilities  which 
its  shores  offer  as  a  basis  for  its  operations. 

Thus,  if  considering  our  own  case,  the  part  which  our  naval 
forces  might  be  called  upon  to  pla"y  in  a  war  with  England,  with 
Germany,  or  with  other  lesser  powers,  may  be  surveyed.  The 
pr6per  disposition  of  materials  and  men  with  a  view  to  the  prompt 
mobilization  of  the  fleets,  their  concentration  and  distribution,  and 
finally  the  proper  objectives  of  the  war,  form  so  many  subjects 
for  discussion  and  for  lessons  of  the  highest  interest. 

Such  a  study  is  only  possible,  let  us  not  forget,  with  concrete 
examples. 

Once  again  I  borrow  from  Von  der  Goltz,  these  profound  and 
true  words :  "  Whoever  writes  on  strategy  and  tactics  ought  not 
in  his  theories  to  neglect  the  point  of  view  of  his  own  people;  he 
should  give  us  a  national  strategy,  a  national  tactics.  Only  thus 
unll  he  render  real  service  to  his  country/' 

In  these  thoughts  I  have  found  a  new  justification  for  the 
method  which  by  intuition  I  had  adopted  for  the  development  of 
ideas. 

The  plan  of  operations  ought  to  foresee,  besides  the  movements 
and  concentrations  of  naval  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  arsenals, 
those  which  take  place  afar  off.  New  needs  arise ;  bases  of  opera- 
tion, points  of  support,  depots  from  which  stores  may  be  replen- 
ished, are  necessary  to  these  fleets. 

Principal  bases,  secondary  bases,  so  many  means  of  action  with- 
out which  modern  fleets  cannot  do,  and  the  proper  appreciation  of 
which  demands  above  all  a  far  sighted  policy,  then  stable  military 
institutions  ruled  by  a  spirit  tenacious  and  foreseeing.  What 
patient  labor,  continuous  and  persevering  effort,  this  part  of  the 
preparation  for  war  exacts,  under  penalty  of  suffering  the  bitter 
and  cruel  trials  of  Spain  and  Russia,  may  already  be  imagined. 

23 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

All  the  preparations  for  war  are  made  with  a  single  end  in  view, 
battle,  and  all  the  elements  necessary  for  its  fruitful  discussion  are 
in  our  possession  at  this  point  in  our  study. 

Here  we  enter  more  particularly  into  the  realm  of  tactics. 
Assuming  the  opposing  fleets  in  contact,  that  is  to  say  where,  hav- 
ing knowledge  of  each  other's  positions,  they  are  manceuvering 
with  a  view  to  a  meeting,  the  first  thing  in  order  is  to  inquire  what 
means  are  employed  to  move  them. 

The  evolutions  or  formations,  all  combined  movements  in  close 
order  on  the  field  of  action,  the  signals  used  to  order  those  move- 
ments, in  a  word  the  whole  aggregate  of  diverse  precepts  so  im- 
properly grouped  under  the  false  title  tactics — which  should  not  at 
all  be  confounded  with  the  art  of  engaging  or  sustaining  battle — 
these  multitudinous  subjects  contain  inexhaustible  mines  of  useful 
knowledge. 

I  will  even  say  that  the  interest  which  attaches  to  all  phases  of 
the  fighting  which  is  the  true  goal  of  war  is  so  intense  that  it 
would  be  much  more  logical  to  attack  the  problem  analytically  in- 
stead of  treating  it  by  synthesis,  as  I  have  done.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  all  conceptions  of  war,  fully  to  meet  its  real  conditions,  must 
rest  upon  the  deductions  drawn  from  the  study  of  battles  and  take 
account  of  their  least  incidents.  But  such  a  method  falls  within 
the  province  of  the  General  Staff,  since,  to  be  fruitful,  it  needs 
special  knowledge  not  yet  possessed  by  a  great  number  of  the 
officers  for  whom  this  book  is  intended. 

After  the  battle  waged  to  assure  the  conquest  of  what  we  shall 
see  later  on  in  detail  to  be  the  final  and  highest  objective  of  every 
naval  war,  namely,  command  of  the  sea,  operations  of  a  special 
kind  may  take  place.  I  refer  to  what  are  generally  called  com- 
bined operations,  such  as  occur  in  the  case  of  the  invasion  of  a 
hostile  country,  and  in  which  the  navy's  role  is  to  convoy  the 
transports,  to  assist  in  the  disembarkation  of  the  army  and  to  pro- 
tect its  lines  of  communication. 

There  necessarily  exist,  then,  certain  conditions  which  make 
possible  this  sort  of  operations,  and.  certain  measures  which  it  is 
wise  to  take  in  order  to  insure  their  success. 

Have  I  thus  completed  the  exposition  of  the  program  of  a  com- 
plete study  of  naval  strategy  and  tactics  ?  No,  there  remains  one 
last  subject,  and  not  the  least  important;  for  if  I  have  thus  far 
spoken  exclusively  of  the  material  forces  with  which  preparations 

24 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

for  war  must  reckon,  there  is  still  a  word  to  be  said  of  moral 
forces,  at  least  as  essential  as  the  others ;  history  shows  the  influ- 
ence upon  the  fortune  of  war  of  the  professional  instruction  of 
crews  and  of  officers,  of  their  power  of  endurance  and  of  their 
faith  in  a  successful  issue. 

"An  important  condition,"  says  Von  der  Goltz  again,  "is  that 
the  morale  of  the  army  be  good"  arid  also:  "It  is  essential  that 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  as  well  as  the  troops,  shall  have  the  firm 
will  to  conquer/' 

After  Tsushima,  we  may  well  consider  these  words  prophetic. 

Doubtless  some  will  think  that  I  have  dwelt  too  long  on  the  pro- 
gram. I  do  not  think  it  time  wasted,  if  I  have  succeeded  in  open- 
ing to  view  the  philosophy  of  a  complete  study  of  naval  strategy 
and  tactics,  and  finally  and  above  all  because  we  now  know  exactly 
what  we  seek  and  whither  we  go. 

A  good  program  is  the  skeleton  upon  which  the  substance  of  a 
book  must  be  moulded  into  shape,  and  the  labor  of  erecting  it  first 
of  all  is  a  useful  one.  In  glancing  hastily  over  this  vast  and  com- 
plicated program  I  cannot  help  thinking  of  the  imperishable  rules 
of  the  wonderful  Discourse  on  Method,  of  which  a  better  applica- 
tion than  to  the  work  of  preparation  for  war  could  not  be  found : 
"  (i)  Never  to  accept  anything  as  true  which  we  do  not  clearly 
perceive  to  be  so ;  to  carefully  avoid  precipitation  and  pre judgment, 
and  to  include  in  our  judgments  nothing  more  than  that  which 
presents  itself  so  clearly  and  distinctly  to  our  minds  that  we  have 
no  reason  to  doubt  it;  (2)  to  divide  the  difficult  questions  which 
we  have  to  decide  into  as  many  parts  as  may  be  possible,  and  as 
may  be  required  in  order  to  better  solve  them  ;  (3)  to  arrange  our 
thoughts  in  order,  beginning  with  the  simplest  objects  and  those 
easiest  to  understand,  rising  little  by  little,  as  by  degrees,  to  the 
understanding  of  the  most  complicated,  and  even  assuming  that 
there  is  order  among  those  which  do  not  at  all  naturally  flow  one 
from  the  other ;  (4)  finally  to  everywhere  make  enumerations  so 
full  and  reviews  so  complete  that  we  may  be  assured  that  we  have 
left  nothing  out  of  consideration." 

As  I  began  by  saying,  the  present  work  is  devoted  solely  to  that 
part  of  this  vast  study  which  concerns  the  expose  of  principles. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  MILITARY  ART  OF  ALEXANDER,  OF  HANNIBAL,  OF  CESAR,  OF 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT  AND  OF  NAPOLEON  ;  THE  NAVAL 

STRATEGY  OF  NAPOLEON. 

In  taking  up  the  historical  study  of  the  great  wars  of  the  past,  I 
think  it  useful  to  insist  upon  the  important  point  that  my  aim  is 
not  to  teach  this  history ;  others  more  competent  than  I  have  done 
that.  I  shall  suppose  it  to  be  wholly  known,  and  shall  devote 
myself  solely  to  pointing  out  the  useful  lessons  which  can  be 
drawn  from  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  military  art. 

As  soon  as  this  study  is  undertaken  with  this  objective,  it  is 
impossible  not  to  be  struck  by  the  fact  that  at  every  epoch,  what- 
ever the  surroundings  and  the  instruments,  the  same  faults  have 
brought  on  the  same  disasters,  as  also  identical  precautions  have 
always  insured  success.  It  is  on  this  account  above  all  that  the 
study  of  history  is  fruitful ;  it  is  so  much  so,  as  I  hope  to  demon- 
strate, that  it  does  not  seem  possible  that  any  military  organization 
should  fail  to  take  account  of  it.  Rightly  has  it  been  said,  History 
repeats  itself. 

If  I  begin  by  examining  the  campaigns  of  great  warriors,  it  is 
because,  despite  the  differences,  more  apparent  than  real,  between 
armies  and  fleets,  there  is  truly  but  one  strategy  and  its  principles 
are  of  general  application.  It  is  in  tactics  particularly  that  the 
differences  are  emphasized,  since  by  its  very  nature  tactics  is 
influenced  by  weapons  and  their  multiple  variations. 

Two  very  different  methods  may  be  pursued  in  the  application 
of  history  to  research  for  the  principles  of  war;  either  some  war 
may  be  taken  as  a  type  and  analyzed  in  all  its  details  to  extract 
from  its  successes- and  its  failures  a  lesson  of  general  application, 
or,  on  the  contrary,  a  large  number  of  examples,  taken  in  all  ages, 
may  be  examined  more  superficially  and  having  regard  only  to  the 
general  plan. 

I  have  deliberately  chosen  the  second  of  these  methods  because 
of  its  undoubted  superiority  from  the  teacher's  point  of  view.  If 
the  first  is  really  more  satisfying  to  a  specially  cultured  mind — and 

26 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

I  cannot  too  strongly  advise  officers  to  practice  it  perseveringly — 
the  second  is  better  adapted  to  teach  basic  principles  from  the  fact 
that  it  furnishes  proof  of  their  universality. 

ALEXANDER. 

The  primordial  interest  of  historical  documents  in  the  study  of 
war  is  amply  proved  by  the  absorbing  interest  which  they  have 
had  for  the  great  soldiers  of  all  ages. 

We  read  in  the  Life  of  Alexander  by  Quintus  Curtius:  "He 
invariably  carried  with  him  the  works  of  Homer;  according  to  his 
own  words,  they  were  his  stores  for  the  campaign;  they  were  the 
school  to  which  he  went  for  lessons  in  warfare,  and  he  was  often 
heard  to  envy  the  good  fortune  of^  Achilles,  who  had  such  a  herald 
of  his  glory."  What  were  the  special  characteristics  of  the  genius 
of  this  great  warrior?  All  historians  agree  upon  this  point;  he 
was  gifted  above  all  with  extraordinary  activity  and  rare  deter- 
mination. (( He  himself  recognized  that  he  owed  success  to  his 
activity.  When  he  was  asked  by  what  means  he  had  been  enabled 
to  conquer  Greece  he  replied — By  losing  no  time" 

To  this  same  activity  Alexander,  who  feared  nothing  so  much 
as  delays,  Quintus  Curtius  says,  owed  his  unbroken  series  of  vic- 
tories, won  with  a  handful  of  men  over  innumerable  hosts  of  bar- 
barians, and  that  marvelous  conquest  of  Persia. 

We  shall  find  this  essential  quality  of  a  leader  in  all  the  great 
men  who  have  made  their  names  famous  on  battle  fields;  Napo- 
leon, Suffren,  and  particularly  Nelson.  It  is  inseparable  from 
victory. 

But  whatever  may  be  the  value  of  this  moral  factor,  in  studying 
Alexander's  campaigns  we  shall  seek  something  else ;  we  must 
find  in  his  conduct  the  military  principle  which  guided  him. 

We  shall  find  it  in  its  entirety  in  an  incident  of  the  battle  of 
Arbella.  At  the  height  of  this  hot  action,  Parmenion  sends  to 
warn  the  king  that  the  Persian  general,  Magius,  is  attacking  the 
baggage  trains,  and  he  asks"  orders  to  go  to  their  protection.  Alex- 
ander replies  :  "  //  we  carry  off  the  victory,  we  shall  recover  what 
belongs  to  us  and  moreover  become  masters  of  all  the  enemy's 
possessions.  Let  him  take  care  then  not  to  separate  the  least  part 
of  his  forces  from  the  field  of  battle,  but  rather,  in  a  spirit  worthy 
of  my  father  Philip  and  myself,  let  him  fight  valiantly  and  despise 
the  loss  of  a  little  baggage" 

27 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Thus,  for  the  Macedonian  king,  the  principal  objective,  to  which 
all  others  ought  to  be  subordinated,  was  the  defeat  of  the  hostile 
army,  in  one  word,  battle.  He  calculated  that  the  surest  way  to 
attain  the  ends  of  the  war  is  to  destroy  the  main  forces  of  the 
adversary. 

And  he  carried  this  conception  of  war  to  its  extreme  logical  con- 
clusion when,  after  a  victory  won,  he  pursued  the  enemy  with  inde- 
fatigable activity  to  complete  his  overthrow.  After  the  victory  of 
Issus,  he  chased  Darius  and  his  scattered  forces  with  savage 
energy,  without  giving  them  truce  or  respite,  and  only  stopped 
when  his  own  troops  were  worn  out.  He  rightly  estimated  that 
in  war  there  ought  not  to  be  any  half  victories  and  that  it  can  only 
cease  with  the  complete  crushing  of  the  enemy. 

These  statements  appear  like  arrant  commonplaces,  they  are  so 
agreeable  to  common  sense,  and  yet,  as  we  shall  see  later,  our 
country  has  suffered  its  most  grievous  defeats  through  having  too 
often  forgotten  them. 

Alexander  had,  moreover,  a  profound  belief  in  the  superiority 
of  the  attack  over  the  defence.  In  an  address  to  his  soldiers 
before  the  expedition  against  the  Persians,  he  expresses  himself 
as  follows  :  "  Promptitude  has  a  thousand  advantages  which  pass 
over  to  our  enemy  if  we  waste  time  in  sluggishness.  The  first 
impression  is  a  great  point  in  affairs  of  this  kind,  and  that  is 
always  in  favor  of  the  one  who  attacks  ....  The  strongest,  in 
the  common  view,  is  he  who  makes  war,  not  he  who  awaits  it." 

In  these  words  lies  the  germ  of  a  doctrine  attaching  special 
value  to  the  offensive,  which,  after  twenty-two  centuries,  has  in 
nowise  become  obsolete.  Besides  the  sure  moral  effect  which 
places  the  one  attacked  in  a  state  of  undoubted  inferiority,  the 
ignorance  in  which  the  latter  necessarily  is  as  to  the  progress  of 
the  aggressor  constitutes  a  new  cause  of  disadvantage. 

Nor  was  Alexander  the  only  one  convinced  of  the  high  military 
value  of  the  offensive.  The  Persian  general  Memnon,  deeming 
that  it  is  a  truth  which  no  one  doubts  that  it  is  better  to  wage  war 
in  a  foreign  country  than  in  one's  own,  had  proposed  to  invade 
Macedonia.  The  plan  was  rejected,  with  what  result  one  knows. 

Among  the  qualities  from  which  Alexander  drew  great  advan- 
tage, his  perfect  understanding  of  the  weak  points  of  the  enemy 
must  be  cited.  If  he  dared  to  launch  himself  with  a  small  army 
against  the  innumerable  troops  of  the  Persians,  if  he  never  re- 

28 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

coiled  from  enterprises  as  bold  as  the  passages  of  the  Granicus,  of 
the  defiles  of  Cilicia  and  of  the  Tigris,  always  in  the  presence  of 
an  enemy  much  stronger  than  himself,  it  is  because  he  understood 
the  latter's  customs,  his  indecision  and  his  inactivity,  all  factors  of 
which  the  greatest  account  should  be  taken.  And  this  is  the  more 
important  to  us  because  we  shall  see  later  on  other  great  warriors, 
Nelson  for  example,  plunge  into  enterprises  so  audacious  as  to  be 
almost  blameworthy,  if  the  certainty  that  the  adversary  would  not 
know  how  to  oppose  himself  to  them  had  not  made  them 
legitimate. 

The  fine  discipline  which  he  instilled  into  his  phalanxes  per- 
mitted him,  moreover,  to  balance  their  numerical  inferiority  by 
the  exceptional  quality  of  his  troops.  "  The  men,  attentive  to  the 
least  sign  from  their  leader,  have  learned  to  follow  their  flags  and 
to  preserve  their  formation.  Whatever  is  ordered,  all  execute: 
to  face  the  enemy,  to  outflank  him,  to  attack  one  wing  or  the  other, 
to  change  the  order  of  battle,  are  maneuvers  as  familiar  to  the 
soldiers  as  to  the  captains.  He  also  counted  upon  the  worth  of  his 
soldiers,  accustomed  to  victory,  whom  courage  and  experience  in 
arms  made  invincible." 

In  these  citations  are  condensed,  in  reality,  several  main  factors 
of  the  important  formula  of  preparation  for  war. 

Trained  armies,  accustomed  to  all  drills,  broken  to  the  ways  of 
their  chief,  in  which  the  men  touch  elbows,  are  half  the  victory, 
but  such  results  cannot  be  attained  for  the  first  time  on  the  battle- 
field ;  preliminary  training  is  necessary,  the  patient  labor  of  a  time 
of  peace. 

Finally  these  same  citations  contain  valuable  indications  of  the 
fighting  tactics  of  Alexander  the  Great:  to  attack  one  wing  or 
the  other,  to  outflank  the  enemy;  would  one  not  suppose  in  hear- 
ing these  words,  that  they  referred  to  the  operations  of  poignant 
reality  of  which  but  yesterday  Manchuria  was  the  bloody  theater  ? 

To  manoeuver  his  troops  so  as  to  be  stronger  at  one  point  of  the 
field  of  battle  than  these  who  opposed  him  at  that  point,  such  is 
the  great  principle  of  war  wrhich  the  King  of  Macedonia  constantly 
applied  and  to  which  he  owed  his  persistent  triumphs.  It  is  by  this 
same  tactics,  although  with  different  means,  that  in  the  course  of 
history  the  great  generals  and  also  great  admirals  will  carry  off 
with  a  high  hand  their  victories,  despite  being  in  most  cases  the 
inferior  in  point  of  numbers. 

29 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

HANNIBAL. 

The  study  of  the  Punic  Wars,  a  century  later,  will  furnish  us 
with  an  ample  harvest  of  interesting  documents,  especially  from 
the  naval  point  of  view.  Mahan,  in  his  remarkable  work,  the 
Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  has  already  made  it  quite 
clear  that  Hannibal's  final  defeat  in  his  titanic  war  against  Rome 
was  solely  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  not  master  of  the  sea.  But 
the  American  historian,  in  my  opinion,  has  treated  only  one  side  of 
the  question,  and  it  does  not  seem  superfluous  to  reconsider  it. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Hannibal's  part,  which  was  during  the 
second  Punic  War,  was  only  one  phase  of  a  deadly  strife,  which 
began  before  him  and  lasted  till  after  his  time,  for  the  conquest  of 
trade  supremacy.  For  it  was  truly  trade  rivalry  which  brought 
face  to  face  the  great  commercial  city  of  Carthage  and  her  rival  in 
the  path  of  expansion,  ambitious  and  insatiable  Rome,  in  a  field 
too  narrow  to  satisfy  both  at  once. 

Do  we  not  find  in  Suetonius  this  thought :  No  commerce  will 
be  possible  between  Italy  and  Africa  until  Carthage  has  been 
destroyed. 

In  recalling  this  memory  of  far  off  times,  we  cannot  help  con- 
necting it  with  the  doings  which  at  this  moment  are  being  disclosed 
to  us  and  which,  from  identical  economic  causes,  are  arming  for 
approaching  strife  two  great  European  powers.  Is  it  not  true 
once  more  that  history  repeats  itself  ? 

In  a  memoir  rewarded  by  the  Academic  des  Inscriptions  et 
Belles-lettres  in  1784,  and  having  for  subject:  The  Influence  of 
Naval  Strength  upon  the  Power  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  the 
author  says : 

"But  for  fear  of  Carthage,  the  Romans  would  perhaps  never 
have  had  a  navy.  The  colony  of  a  race  of  seamen,  the  Cartha- 
ginians were  scarcely  established  before  they  became  traders. 
Commerce  gave  them  birth,  commerce  supported  them  and  facili- 
tated their  growth,  commerce  alone  gave  .them  strength  and  riches 
....  It  was  against  them  that  Rome  undertook  her  first  naval 
ventures.  After  having  subdued  the  Tuscans,  the  Latins,  the  Sam- 
nites  and  all  the  neighboring  peoples,  she  sought  further  con- 
quests, and  Sicily  became  the  object  of  her  desires.  Fortune 
served  her  useful  ambition;  I  say  useful,  for  without  it  not  only 
would  the  Romans  never  have  raised  themselves  to  a  height  of 
greatness  which  astonishes  posterity,  but  the  products  of  their 

30 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

country  would  not  have  sufficed  for  the  rapidly  increasing  number 
of  its  inhabitants. 

"  Among  all  the  scenes  of  battle  which  history  displays  with  so 
much  prodigality,  there  is  none  more  interesting  than  that  of  the 
Punic  Wars;  at  least  there  is  none  which  has  had  more  influence 
upon  the  happiness  of  the  world.  There  may  be  seen  two  powerful 
nations,  whose  successes  have  increased  their  desires,  attempting 
to  make  everything  yield  to  their  conquering  arms.  Conquerors 
and  conquered,  by  turn,  these  worthy  rivals  fight  for,  seize,  and 
take  back  again  the  empire  of  the  seas;  and  this  astonishing  spec- 
tacle becomes  still  more  so  when,  as  leaders  in  it,  are  seen  the 
greatest  generals  that  ancient  times  have  known.  Nature  might 
be  said  to  have  been  under  the  orders  of  fortune  and  to  have  been 
eager  to  serve  ambition.  »V 

"  The  Romans  had  the  better  luck.  A  Carthaginian  galley,  cast 
by  a  storm  upon  the  shores  of  Italy,  furnished  them  with  a  model, 
and  within  two  months  they  had  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships, 
sailors  and  rowers. 

"  Victory  suddenly  crowns  their  zealous  industry.  Scarcely 
launched  upon  the  sea,  they  make  its  masters  tremble.  Mylce, 
Ecnomos,  the  whole  of  Sicily,  are  witnesses  of  their  success,  and 
Africa  will  soon  have  new  rulers." 

This  quotation  will  not  appear  too  long  to  those  who  consider  it 
well  and  think  of  the  same  causes  which,  to-day  or  to-morrow,  will 
bring  to  blows,  in  a  struggle  of  life  and  death,  England  and  Ger- 
many, just  as  they  armed,  one  against  the  other,  more  than  two 
centuries  ago,  England  and  Holland. 

The  Punic  Wars,  then,  were  born  of  a  reciprocal  feeling  that 
Rome  and  Carthage  could  not  live  side  by  side  and  that  one  of 
them  must  disappear. 

They  had  Sicily  for  their  first  field  of  operations,  and  its  con- 
quest for  their  first  objective.  But  Rome  was  not  slow  to  per- 
ceive that  she  would  never  be  able  to  take  the  island  from  her 
rival  so  long  as  the  powerful  Carthaginian  fleet  could,  with  im- 
punity, traverse  the  seas,  supplying  her  forces  with  stores  or  bring- 
ing re-enforcements. 

There  was  only  one  logical  and  reasonable  solution ;  since  the 
Punic  navy  constituted  the  principal  force  of  the  enemy,  it  was 
that  which  must  be  destroyed.  The  Roman  Senate  understood 
this,  and  as  they  had  no  fleet,  caused  one  to  be  built,  thus  showing 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

remarkable  intuition  in  matters  of  war.  We  shall  see  later  that, 
owing  to  their  not  having  the  same  good  sense  in  analogous  cir- 
cumstances, the  government  of  the  unhappy  Russian  people  drew 
upon  their  country  the  most  lamentable  disasters. 

Happily  not  so  much  time  was  required  three  centuries  before 
the  beginning  of  our  era  as  would  be  now  to  build  a  navy ;  at  the 
end  of  a  few  months  it  was  fully  equipped  and  ready. 

Then  began  an  eager  pursuit  of  the  Punic  naval  forces,  ending 
in  their  defeat  at  Ecnomus,  and  in  the  Romans'  securing  for  a 
time  the  command  of  the  sea.  I  say  for  a  time,  because  this  com- 
mand of  the  sea  was  a  veritable  barometer  of  victory  during  the 
first  Punic  War.  In  Sicily,  as  in  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  the  many 
battles  fought  by  the  armies  of  the  two  rival  cities  were  never 
decisive.  No  sooner  would  Rome,  having  won  an  advantage, 
seek  rest  in  fancied  security,  or  allow  her  fleet  to  fall  into  danger, 
than  Carthage  would  again  seize  command  of  the  sea  and  throw 
new  forces  into  the  islands,  and  vice  versa. 

The  famous  Hamilcar,  holding  thus  in  check  all  the  legions 
sent  to  Sicily  to  rout  him,  the  Roman  Senate  once  more  per- 
ceived that  the  only  possible  way  to  conquer  him  was  by  cutting 
him  off  from  his  base  of  operations,  Carthage,  by  regaining  com- 
mand of  the  sea. 

The  time  was  propitious,  for,  as  the  historian  Polybius  says, 
"  The  Carthaginians,  convinced  that  the  Romans  would  never 
think  of  building  up  again  their  navy,  in  their  contemptuous  feel- 
ing of  security,  had  greatly  neglected  their  own" 

The  reconstructed  Roman  fleet  soon  afterwards  met  the  Cartha- 
ginian fleet  at  Aegates  and  destroyed  it;  Hamilcar,  cut  off  from 
Carthage  and  starving  in  Sicily,  had  to  surrender,  and  his  van- 
quished country  to  agree  to  peace  with  humiliating  terms. 

These  facts,  far  removed  from  our  times  as  they  are,  clearly 
foreshadow  the  importance  which  naval  supremacy  will  assume  in 
later  times,  and  for  that  reason  we  could  not  pass  them  by 
unnoticed. 

Rome  has  now  to  reckon  with  a  redoubtable  adversary,  Hanni- 
bal, one  of  the  greatest  captains  of  all  time,  of  whom  Thiers  could 
say,  "  Napoleon,  a  greater  soldier  than  Casar,  first  by  being  more 
of  a  specialist  in  the  profession  of  war  and  then  by  his  boldness, 
depth  of  insight  and  inexhaustible  fertility  in  combinations,  has 
had  in  these  respects  but  one  equal,  or,  if  one  may  dare  to  say  it, 
superior,  Hannibal" 

32 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

But  the  culpable  carelessness  of  Carthage,  which  allowed  the 
Punic  naval  power  to  be  endangered,  while  that  of  Rome  con- 
tinued to  increase,  deprived  her  general  of  a  primary  element  of 
strength  in  the  ardent  and  merciless  struggle  which  now  began  for 
the  conquest  of  leadership  in  the  Mediterranean. 

Like  the  great  warrior  that  he  was,  Hannibal  understood  that 
it  is  necessary  to  strike  at  the  very  heart  of  a  strong  nation  in  order 
to  overthrow  it ;  to  conquer  the  Roman  Empire,  war  must  be  car- 
ried to  the  doors  of  Rome  herself.  But  Rome  was  mistress  of  the 
sea,  and  undisputed  mistress,  since,  after  the  battle  of  Aegates, 
only  a  memory  remained  of  the  powerful  Punic  navy. 

The  way  by  land  alone  was  left  for  Hannibal  to  take,  and  this 
led  him  through  Spain  and  Gaul,  across  the  Alps  into  Italy.  Fol- 
lowed that  great  drama,  so  well  known,  which  after  so  many  cen- 
turies still  evokes  our  admiration,  for  nothing  greater  from  the 
military  point  of  view  has  ever  been  done.  His  idea  in  adopting 
this  strategic  plan  was  to  keep  in  constant  touch  with  his  base  of 
operations,  Carthage,  by  land  communications  wholly,  except  at 
the  narrow  strait  of  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  into  which  he  did  not 
think  the  Roman  fleets  would  dare  to  venture.  But  this  was  an 
idle  dream.  After  his  memorable  passage  of  the  Alps,  his  inva- 
sion of  Italy  was  an  uninterrupted  succession  of  triumphs  and 
loosed  against  the  power  of  Rome  the  most  terrible  storm  which 
ever  menaced  that  republic.  The  great  victories  of  Trebbia, 
Trasimenus  and  Cannae  were  its  three  bursts  of  thunder,  which, 
however,  by  their  very  violence,  caused  an  abatement  of  the  storm. 
Such  successes  were  not  purchased  without  losses  felt  by  the 
victor ;  his  effective  forces,  already  weakened  by  the  difficult  pas- 
sage of  the  Alps,  diminished  at  each  battle,  and  to  maintain  his 
strength  reinforcements  from  home  were  necessary. 

These  could  come  to  him  by  two  routes  only;  the  most  direct, 
by  sea,  was  almost  continuously  closed  to  him,  the  various 
attempts  at  revictualing  by  fleet  and  convoy  during  this  war  hav- 
ing, with  very  few  exceptions,  failed,  owing  to  the  superior  Roman 
fleet  barring  the  way :  by  the  second,  the  land  way,  the  communi- 
cation was  slow  and  difficult,  and  its  only  serious  trial  failed,  just 
at  the  point  of  success,  with  the  defeat  of  Hasdrubal  in  Cisalpine 
Gaul.  Supposing  the  junction  of  the  two  brothers  to  have  taken 
place,  Hannibal  would  have  doubtless  been  able  to  prolong  his 
resistance,  but  the  final  result  would  have  been  the  same. 

33 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Energy  uses  itself  up  when  it  is  not  replenished :  but  Rome  at 
the  critical  time  found  a  man  who,  taking  inspiration  from  the 
principles  of  war  of  Hannibal-  himself,  went  on  to  apply  them 
with  means  of  action  which  his  rival  did  not  possess.  Scipio  Afri- 
canus  first  drove  the  Carthaginians  from  Spain,  and  thus  with  the 
same  blow  cut  the  bond,  so  attenuated,  so  fragile,  so  long,  and 
consequently  so  precarious,  which  connected  the  invading  army 
with  its  base;  then,  assembling  an  expeditionary  force  in  Sicily, 
he  threw  it  into  Africa  and  thus  threatening  the  heart  of  Carthage 
consummated  at  Zama  the  defeat  of  Hannibal,  whom  his  country 
in  desperation  had  recalled,  arid  the  complete  overthrow  of  the 
Punic  power. 

Thus  it  was  of  no  use  to  a  great  nation  to  have  in  its  service  one 
of  the  greatest  geniuses  of  the  human  race,  so  great  that  by  a  veri- 
table military  paradox  he  succeeded  for  fourteen  years  in  main- 
taining himself  on  Roman  territory  and,  although  weakened  and 
almost  stripped  of  everything,  in  terrorizing  Rome.  That  nation 
had  not  given  him  the  means  of  conserving  the  fruits  of  his  vic- 
tories by  assuring  a  permanent  connection  with  the  source  of  his 
life,  his  mother  country.  She  could  not  but  be  vanquished.  Her 
rival  had  but  one  good  general,  who  copied  the  military  processes 
of  the  great  leader ;  but  he  always  had  assured  communications 
and  the  certainty  of  being  kept  reinforced.  He  finally  won  the 
victory,  and  we  shall  see  later  on  that  all  similar  historical  situa- 
tions have  the  same  denouements.  What  would  not  Hannibal  have 
accomplished  with  the  same  facilities?  Rome  would  have  been 
conquered  and  the  destinies  of  the  word  changed. 

The  retrospects  of  the  Punic  Wars  furnish  us  with  other  not 
less  valuable  lessons :  the  Roman  fleets  did  not  at  once  attain  to  the 
high  degree  of  efficiency  which  gave  them  the  final  victory  over 
those  of  Carthage.  They  began  with  painful  experiences  and 
severe  trials;  their  crews  were  not  inured  to  the  hardships  of  sea 
life,  and  repeatedly  numerous  ships  were  totally  lost  on  the  coast 
of  Sicily  as  a  result  of  the  inexperience  of  the  Roman  sailors.  So 
true  it  is  that  in  no  age  of  the  world  can  a  navy  be  improvised, 
that  being  always  the  work  of  time. 

Among  the  characteristics  of  the  genius  of  Hannibal,  his  per- 
fect understanding  of  the  human  heart  served  him  well  in  all  his 
warlike  undertakings.  A  profound  politician,  he  knew  how  to  use 
to  his  own  advantage  the  hatred  of  the  peoples  subject  to  Rome, 

34 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

as  well  as  to  acquire  over  his  own  troops  a  prestige  and  an  ascen- 
dancy which  inflamed  them  with  zeal. 

CAESAR. 

Caesar  himself  also  showed  unwearying  activity  in  war,  as  well 
as  many  other  of  the  qualities  of  his  illustrious  predecessors.  We 
read  in  his  Commentaries:  That  he  surprised  the  Helvetii, 
"  astounded  at  his  sudden  approach  and  to  learn  that  he  had 
crossed  the  Saone  in  a  single  day,  zvhich  they  had  scarcely  done  in 
ten" 

To  prevent  the  Suevi  from  getting  possession  of  Besangon,  he 
hastened  there  by  forced  marches  day  and  night  and  seized  it 
himself.  We  also  find  in  him  that  peculiar  aptitude  of  the  warrior 
to  seize  every  occasion  to  profit  by  the  weaknesses  of  an  adver- 
sary. After  his  first  skirmish  with  Ariovistus,  "  Ccesar,  having 
asked  the  prisoners  why  the  king  did  not  accept  battle,  learned 
that  according  to  the,customs  of  the  Germani  the  matrons  had  to 
decide,  by  spells  and  omens,  whether  or  not  it  was  propitious  to 
engage  in  battle:  but  they  had  declared  that  the  Germani  could  not 
win  if  they  fought  before  the  new  moon."  Without  loss  of  time, 
on  the  following  day  he  attacked,  despite  the  disproportion  of 
forces,  and  victory  rewarded  his  boldness. 

In  our  own  time  there  always  exist  causes  of  demoralization 
which,  though  quite  other  than  those  of  ancient  times,  are  not  less 
real,  as  the  war  in  the  East  proves :  they  will  have  a  considerable 
influence  in  the  final  fate  of  future  wars,  for  the  strength  of  an 
armed  nation  is  made  not  only  of  its  own  force  but  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  one  which  is  opposed  to  it. 

It  is  in  the  course  of  the  same  action  that  the  fighting  tactics 
commonly  used  by  Caesar  are  revealed  to  us :  "  having  observed 
that  the  enemy's  left  was  his  weak  side,  he  himself  attacked  with 
his  right  wing." 

On  the  other  hand,  he  knew  too  well  the  importance  of  a  care- 
ful preparation  of  the  soldiers  to  have  sacrificed  this  indispensable 
gage  of  victory :  the  proof  of  this  is  found  in  the  Commentaries, 
apropos  of  a  battle  with  the  Nervii.  "In  this  difficult  position 
there  were  two  resources:  the  first  was  the  .experience  and  skill 
of  the  soldier  who,  instructed  by  previous  engagements,  knew  as 
well  what  to  do  himself  as  if  orders  were  given  to  him,  .... 

35 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Each  lieutenant,  without  asking  for  orders  from  the  general,  him- 
self took  the  best  practicable  dispositions." 

And  this  calls  attention  to  the  very  great  value  of  an  armed 
force  which  has  undergone  long  and  patient  training,  and  in 
which  each  important  unit  thoroughly  understands  the  ideas  of 
the  chief.  We  shall  meet  with  this  invaluable  element  in  many 
circumstances  of  war,  but  always  on  the  successful  side. 

One  episode  in  the  course  of  this  memorable  Gallic  War  is  of 
quite  special  interest  to  us :  I  refer  to  the  campaign  against  the 
Venetii.  These  latter  had  a  numerous  fleet  of  strong  vessels  with 
lofty  bows"  and  equipped  with  very  substantial  sails  made  from 
skins,  built  to  withstand  the  stormy  weather  of  the  inhospitable 
coasts  of  Britain.  The  Romans  had  only  galleys  too  slightly  built 
for  the  heavy  seas  of  that  vicinity.  And  yet  Caesar,  with  his  clear 
understanding  of  the  principles  of  war,  did  not  hesitate  to  attack 
the  fleet  of  the  Venetii,  because  he  well  knew  that  this  fleet  con- 
stituted the  main  force  of  the  enemy  and  that  by  destroying  it  he 
would  take  the  surest  means  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  towns  of  the  Venetii  were  built  at  the 
ends  of  promontories,  and,  surrounded  by  the  sea  at  high  tide  or 
by  wide  marshes  at  low  tide,  were  quite  inaccessible.  Only  by  the 
long  and  laborious  construction  of  works  such  as  dykes  could  they 
be  approached,  and  their  inhabitants  only  abandoned  them  one  by 
one,  escaping  in  their  vessels,  and  thus  prolonging  their  resistance. 

If  I  seem  to  linger  unduly  over  deeds  of  twenty  centuries  ago, 
it  is  because  similar  ones  occur  in  every  military  enterprise,  al- 
though the  ending  is  not  always  quite  the  same.  But,  let  me 
hasten  to  add,  that,  as  we  shall  see,  victorious  generals  always  do 
as  Caesar  did. 

The  aim  of  every  war  is  to  bring  one's  adversary  to  his  knees 
completely  and  as  quickly  as  possible :  there  is  no  more  certain  way 
of  reaching  this  end  than  by  destroying  his  principal  forces. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  favorable  circumstance  of  calm 
weather,  which  deprived  the  Venetii's  fleet  of  its  natural  superi- 
ority, Caesar  completely  defeated  it,  and  that  people  soon  made  its 
submission. 

One  of  the  translators  of  Caesar's  Commentaries  has  well  de- 
fined his  many  and  remarkable  qualities :  "  He  had  moreover  all 
the  qualities  which  go  to  make  a  good  general:  prudence,  coolness, 
activity,  boldness,  a  mind  fertile  in  resources,  a  sure  and  clear 

36 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

sight  which  covered  the  general  features  of  the  vastest  project  and 
comprehended  all  its  details,  a  wise  restlessness  which  made  him 

feel  THAT    HE   HAD  DONE    NOTHING   SO    LONG   AS   THERE   REMAINED 

ANYTHING  TO  DO,  a  courage  to  surmount  all  obstacles,  great  under- 
standing of  men,  the  art  of  making  himself  loved  and  respected  by 
his  soldiers." 

I  have  made  this  quotation  because  it  includes  not  only  the 
definition  of  the  great  military  chief,  but  also  and  primarily  the 
formula  of  the  art  of  war  in  its  broadest  sense  and  for  all  times. 
I  have  purposely  underlined  one  phrase  which  contains  the  secret 
of  many  historical  triumphs ;  to  speak  only  of  Suffren  and  Nelson, 
they  also  never  thought  their  task  finished  so  long  as  the  end 
which  they  had  fixed  for  themselves  was  not  attained. 

It  is  opportune  to  here  recall  a  word  of  Napoleon's  of  striking 
truth :  "  No  great  continuous  actions"  said  he,  "  are  the  results 
of  chance  and  fortune.  Rarely  are  great  men  seen  to  fail  in  their 
enterprises  ....  Look  at  Alexander,  Ccesar,  Hannibal  .  .  .  . 
they  always  succeeded.  Is  it  because  they  were  lucky  that  they 
thus  became  great  men?  No,  but  because,  being  great  men,  they 
knew  how  to  master  fortune.  When  we  study  the  causes  of  their 
sue c ess j  we  are  astonished  to  find  that  they  did  everything  to 
obtain  it." 

The  transition  from  these  ancient  wars  to  those  of  times  nearer 
our  own  may,  without  disadvantage,  be  very  brief.  Lieut.-Colonel 
Hennebert  has  covered  the  ground  very  well  when,  speaking  of 
Hamilcar,  father  of  Hannibal,  he  expressed  himself  as  follows: 
"  The  great  Carthaginian  understood  all  the  importance  of 
marches,  and  it  may  be  said  that  he  invented  them.  Till  then  only 
wars  of  siege  and  place  had  been  waged,  and  the  singularly  timid 
movements  of  armies  consisted  only  in  queer  rotations  about  one 
or  several  places  taken  as  pivots.  The  shrewd  Barca  resolutely 
broke  with  these  slow  and  monotonous  methods.  His  son  Hanni- 
bal, who  twenty  years  later  surprised  the  Romans  by  so  many 
unexpected  and  rapid  movements,  was  to  carry  on  this  revolution 
in  the  military  art,  which  Julius  Ccesar  will  bring  to  its  climax. 
These  three  great  men  once  vanished  from  the  scene,  an  insur- 
mountable routine  will  again  bring  into  favor  the  old  methods, 
which  will  remain  solely  in  use  in  Europe  until  the  time  of  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus:  then  only  will  Hamilcar  and  his  son  Hannibal  be 
remembered,  and  modern  peoples  will  see  the  phases  of  a  new 

37 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

revolution  develop.  At  the  time  of  this  renaissance,  Turenne> 
Conde  and  Vauban  will  lay  down  principles,  of  which  the  great 
Frederick  will  make  the  most  successful  application,  and  from 
which  the  Emperor  Napoleon  will  gloriously  deduce  all  the 
consequences." 

Let  us  note  in  passing,  in  the  preceding  lines,  the  precise  idea  of 
the  strategic  importance  of  speed. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT. 

The  great  Frederick's  campaigns  are  an  interesting  study,  at 
least  in  their  broad  outlines :  the  first  of  his  reign  are  characterized 
by  a  constant  regard  for  the  offensive,  so  far  at  least  as  it  was 
permitted  by  the  ideas  of  that  time  and  by  the  difficulty  of 
revictualing  armies  due  to  the  system  of  storehouses. 

To  make  this  offensive  action  possible,  seasoned  troops  were 
needed,  practised  in  marching  and  manoeuvering,  under  rigid  dis- 
cipline, all  matters  to  which  the  Prussian  king  attached  great 
importance  and  which  he  endeavored  by  every  possible  means  to 
obtain. 

He  prepared,  in  this  manner,  the  maneuvering  armies  which 
were  necessary  for  the  application,  on  the  field  of  battle,  of  his 
favorite  tactics  of  concentration  against  the  weak  point  of  the 
enemy's  army,  most  frequently  one  of  its  flanks.  The  successful 
use  of  this  plan  required  an  oblique  march,  out  of  sight  of  the 
enemy,  carrying  the  main  body  of  his  forces  against  one  wing  of 
the  enemy,  a  delicate  manceuver  which  only  rapidity  of  execution 
and  the  endurance  of  soldiers  inured  to  warlike  exercises  could 
make  successful. 

Frederick's  tactics  in  reality  amount  to  nothing  more  than  this 
extremely  simple  plan  of  battle ;  to  it  he  owed  his  wonderful  suc- 
cesses in  the  first  four  campaigns  of  the  Seven  Years  War,  despite 
the  notable  inferiority  in  numbers  of  his  armies  relative  to  the 
allied  forces.  The  frequency  of  his  victories  over  more  numerous 
enemies  can  only  be  explained  by  the  excellence  of  a  simple  plan 
in  which  the  idea  of  the  superiority  of  forces  concentrated  at  one 
point  of  the  battle  field  is  disclosed. 

This  simple  tactics  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  manceuvers 
and  complicated  exercises  of  the  drill  ground,  which  came  so  into 
fashion  after  the  Seven  Years  War  under  the  name  Prussian 
Exercises,  which  the  Prussian  king  never  really  used  on  the 

38 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

battle  field,  and  which  served  him  rather  as  a  "  bluff  "  to  frighten 
Europe  and  so  avoid  new  wars  in  which  he  feared  to  compromise 
his  successes. 

Here  a  comparison  is  forced  upon  the  seaman,  who  in  every 
military  idea  naturally  seeks  to  find  an  application  to  naval  affairs. 
At  sea,  even  more  than  on  shore  perhaps,  the  need  of  well  drilled 
forces  appears  evident.  It  is  on  a  liquid  plain,  with  no  inequalities 
of  ground  to  conceal  one's  movements  from  the  enemy,  that  a 
fleet  must  be  manoeuvered  so  as  to  bring  its  whole  weight  to  bear 
upon  a  weak  point.  How  could  one  hope  to  accomplish  this  with- 
out a  long  and  methodical  preliminary  training  in  time  of  peace, 
accustoming  the  ships  to  navigate  and  to  evolute  in  close  order 
with  the  maximum  precision  atid  rapidity?  The  concerted 
manceuvers  which  alone  can  give  to  an  armed  force  that  unity 
which  will  enable  its  chief  to  obtain  the  greatest  results  from  the 
war  machine  which  it  really  is  cannot  be  improvised  on  the  field ; 
they  are  the  fruit  of  a  long  and  patient  preparation  which  cannot 
be  too  particular  of  details. 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  evolutions  and  formations  of 
squadrons,  which  some  superficial  minds  rather  hastily  condemn 
as  useless,  have  an  indisputable  value,  even  if  we  see  in  them 
nothing  more  than  a  system  of  naval  gymnastics,  giving  to  the 
personnel  a  flexibility  and  a  cohesion  in  manoeuvering  together, 
from  which  a  sure  benefit  will  be  derived  on  the  naval  battle  field. 

I  seize  this  opportunity  to  condemn  the  strange  opinion  of  those 
who  refuse  to  see  in  the  exercises,  voyages  or  periodical  manoeu- 
vers  of  squadrons  anything  but  pretexts  for  throwing  away  money 
in  smoke;  profound  ignorance  of  the  requirements  of  war  can 
alone  explain  this  point  of  view. 

The  great  Frederick's  method  must  be  regarded  as  a  good  one, 
but  with  the  condition  that  Prussian  Exercises  be  rigorously  pro- 
scribed upon  the.  sea  still  more  than  on  shore ;  that  is  to  say  all 
too  complicated  movements  or  evolutions  requiring  excessive  use 
of  signals. 

In  this  connection,  we  refuse  to  accept  those  more  or  less 
learned  combinations  which  under  the  pompous  title  of  tactics  are 
really  only  applications  of  a  purely  speculative  geometry.  Actual 
war  on  the  field  of  battle  has  no  relation  with  the  theoretical 
figures  which  a  complacent  imagination  conceives  on  paper  or 
executes  when  guns  are  silent. 

39 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

NAPOLEON. 

Still  more  admirable  in  their  simplicity  were  the  methods  of 
warfare  of  Napoleon,  "  the  master  of  masters  "  as  General  Bonnal 
has  called  him. 

The  great  Emperor's  method  he  himself  described  when  he 
summarized, it  in  the  phrase,  "  To  march  ten  hours  a  day,  to  fight 
and  then  to  rest" 

This  brief  formula  really  contains  a  whole  system  of  strategy. 
In  the  first  place  it  postulates  the  immutable  principle  of  rapidity, 
accepted  by  all  great  leaders  as  an  article  of  faith  of  the  military 
gospel  throughout  all  ages,  and  so  well  known  as  such  that  it  is 
astonishing  to  see  it  again  brought  into  discussion  in  our  own 
times.  In  the  second  place,  it  sets  forth  with  precision  the  idea 
that  fighting  is  of  primary  importance  and  the  principal  objective. 

Bonaparte  made  the  first  application  of  his  fine  conception  of 
war  in  the  immortal  campaign  of  Italy.  He  knew  marvelously 
well  how  to  draw  advantage  from  the  customs  of  his  epoch, 
according  to  which  the  armies  opposed  to  him,  greatly  superior 
in  numbers  to  his  own,  occupied  very  extended  fronts,  with  a  view 
to  increase  the  development  of  their  fire.  These  forces  thus  dis- 
posed, and  necessarily  manceuvered  very  little,  offered  numerous 
points  of  weakness  against  which  the  young  general  directed  the 
whole  effort  of  his  troops  animated  with  the  tremendous  activity 
which  he  knew  how  to  inspire  in  them. 

He  also  might  have  said,  as  Alexander  the  Great  did,  that  he 
won  his  battles  by  not  losing  time. 

Though  his  armies  were  almost  always  inferior  in  numbers  to 
those  of  his  adversaries,  still  he  constantly  beat  them  by  securing 
a  numerical  superiority  at  one  point  at  a  given  moment.  No  one 
better  than  he  has  known  how  to  show  the  exact  meaning  of 
superiority  of  military  force. 

It  is  fair  to  note  that  his  genius  benefited  greatly  by  the  radical 
transformation  which  took  place  in  the  composition  and  spirit  of 
the  French  armies  from  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The 
powerful  inspiration  of  the  Revolution  had  animated  the  hearts 
of  the  soldiers  and  implanted  in  their  minds  the  profound  senti- 
ment of  a  struggle  for  the  fatherland,  an  ideal  thenceforth  sacred. 
The  armed  nation  was  about  to  supersede,  for  the  first  time,  pro- 
fessional armies,  composed  of  mercenaries.  This  great  moral  force 

40 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

was  to  be  one  of  the  most  efficient  instruments  by  which  the 
genius  of  Bonaparte  won  victories. 

Carnot  had  really  already  laid  down  the  laws  of  the  equilibrium 
of  military  forces  and  stated  the  principle  of  concentration  against 
a  weak  point  of  the  enemy  so  as  to  obtain  superiority  at  that  point. 
But  the  instrument  for  applying  this  fruitful  principle  was  lacking, 
or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  that  instrument  was  not  yet 
sharpened. 

Another  of  the  great  elements  of  strength  in  Napoleon's  military 
power  was  his  constant  and  judicious  economy  in  the  use  of  forces. 
The  word  economy  must  not  be  here  taken  in  the  sense  of  parsi- 
mony, for,  quite  to  the  contrary,  Jie  himself  laid  it  down  as  an 
axiom  "  that  the  very  last  man  ought  to  be  expended,  if  needful, 
on  the  day  of  battle,  because  on  the  day  after  a  complete  success 
there  are  no  more  obstacles  to  surmount  and  public  opinion  by 
itself  alone  assures  new  victories  to  the  conqueror."  Economizing 
here  signifies  holding  in  reserve  ready  to  make  the  decisive  effort 
at  the  selected  time  and  place. 

"  Have  no  lines  at  all,  but  keep  all  your  troops  united  and 
grouped  together  around  Genoa,  zvith  your  depots  in  Savona"  he 
wrote  to  Massena  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of  1800,  and 
he  added  :  "  Such  are  the  true  military  principles;  by  acting  thus 
you  will  beat  fifty  thousand  men  with  thirty  thousand  and  will 
cover  yourself  with  an  immortal  glory." 

This  campaign  of  1800  offers  a  fine  example  of  the  primary 
importance  of  strategic  combinations  prior  to  any  other  operation 
of  war.  France  was  about  to  face  two  armies,  operating  upon 
two  very  different  fields,  the  Rhine  and  Italy.  Under  penalty  of 
scattered  efforts  resulting  in  sure  inferiority  everywhere,  a  choice 
had  to  be  made  between  the  two  objectives  according  to  their 
relative  importance. 

Napoleon,  in  his  Memoirs,  has  himself  explained  the  motives  of 
choice  and  the  reasons  which  led  him  to  regard  the  German  fron- 
tier as  of  predominating  importance  and  that  of  Italy  as  secondary. 

"  If  the  army  of  the  Republic  had  been  beaten  on  the  Rhine" 
said  he,  "and  had  conquered  in  Italy,  the  Austrian  army  could 
have  entered  Alsace,  Franche-Comte  or  Belgium,  and  have  fol- 
lowed up  its  successes  without  the  French  army,  victorious  in 
Italy,  being  able  to  make  any  diversion  capable  of  stopping  it, 
since  to  establish  itself  in  the  valley  of  the  Po  would  have  necessi- 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fated  the  capture  of  Alexandria,  Tortona  and  Mantua,  which 
would  have  needed  an  entire  season." 

"  If  the  French  army  on  the  principal  frontier,  the  Rhine,  was 
victorious,  while  that  on  the  secondary  frontier,  that  of  Italy,  was 
beaten,  all  that  need  be  feared  was  the  capture  of  Genoa,  an  entry 
into  Provence  or  perhaps  the  siege  of  Toulon.  But  a  detachment 
of  the  French  army  of  Germany,  descending  from  Switzerland 
into  the  valley  of  the  Po,  could  stop  short  the  enemy's  victorious 
army  in  Italy  and  Provence" 

I  have  cited  this  case  because  it  shows  better  than  any  amount 
of  reasoning  how  important  it  is  in  war'  to  prepare  operations ; 
this  task,  as  essential  on  the  sea  as  on  land,  belongs  to  strategy. 
This  example  also  indicates  the  necessity  of  making  a  rational 
choice  from  all  the  possible  operations,  and  above  all  of  not  leav- 
ing the  decision  to  chance;  the  part  played  by  fortune  in  the 
events  of  war  is  too  important  already  for  us  not  to  try  to  limit 
it  as  much  as  possible. 

It  is  extremely  fortunate  that  any  dominant  conception  which  is 
sought  for  in  the  military  acts  of  Napoleon,  can  be  learned  at  first 
hand,  since  he  himself  took  care  to  make  it  known.  For  those  of 
us  especially  who  wish  above  all  to  discover  the  philosophy  of  the 
principles  of  war  of  all  times,  this  method  of  letting  the  authors 
themselves  tell  what  motives  they  obeyed,  is  much  more  fruitful 
than  any  other  based  upon  a  dry  and  often  arbitrary  description 
of  battles. 

"  The  force  of  an  army,"  wrote  he  in  his  Memoirs,  "  like 
momentum  in  mechanics  is  measured  by  the  mass  multiplied  by 
the  velocity  "  How  unmistakably  suggestive  it  is  to  observe  the 
unanimity  of  great  warriors  in  taking  speed  to  be  one  of  the  essen- 
tial means  of  action.  This  fundamental  idea  ought  to  be  pointed 
out  on  every  occasion,  for,  despite  the  preponderant  part  which  it 
has  played  in  all  the  wars  of  the  past,  some  still  contest  it  in  our 
time.  As  to  the  mass,  that  is  to  be  taken  in  the  sense  of  the  supe- 
riority of  effort  at  a  given  point,  and  to  quite  enter  into  Napoleon's 
idea,  his  decisive  acts  in  war  give  us  the  right  to  affirm  that  he  gave 
greater  weight  to  velocity  than  to  mass  in  the  product  in  question. 
That  is  what  enabled  him  to  beat  armies  much  greater  in  numbers 
than  his  own  with  troops  endowed  with  extreme  mobility. 

In  that  inexhaustible  mine  of  able  thoughts,  the  Memoirs  of 
Napoleon,  we  find  this  too:  "A  great  captain  ought  to  say  to 

42 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

himself,  several  times  a  day:  If  the  enemy's  army  appeared  in 
front,  on  my  right  or  on  my  left,  what  should  I  do?  If  he  finds 
himself  embarrassed,  he  is  badly  stationed,  he  is  not  according  to 
the  rules,  he  ought  to  seek  a  remedy/' 

Thus  has  he  laid  down  the  principle  of  prevision  in  matters  of 
war,  and  at  the  same  time  the  condemnation  of  the  formula, 
"  The  future  will  take  care  of  itself,"  in  accordance  with  which 
too  often  in  our  history  affairs  have  been  left  to  the  guidance  of 
chance.  And,  moreover,  this  plan  has  been  too  unsuccessful  at  all 
times  not  to  be  vehemently  rejected  to-day,  not  to  cause  us  to 
combat  with  energy  the  opinion,  too  often  countenanced,  that,  in 
the  absence  of  incontestable  doctrines  in  military,  and  especially 
naval,  affairs,  leave  everything  to  the  inspiration  of  the  moment 
should  be  the  only  rule.  Such  reasoning  conducts  inevitably  to 
defeat. 

Yet  an  analogous  principle  is  very  familiar  to  those  of  us  who 
are  seamen.  The  officer  is  taught,  as  the  very  grammar  of  his 
profession,  that  his  first  thought  on  taking  the  watch  at  sea 
should  be  to  review  mentally  the  possible  contingencies,  the  meet- 
ing with  ships,  the  saving  of  a  man  overboard,  etc.,  so  as  to 
have  clearly  in  his  mind  what  should  be  done  in  the  existing  state 
of  weather  and  sea.  This  excellent  professional  habit,  which 
leaves  nothing  to  the  uncertainty  and  hesitation  of  unpre- 
paredness,  appears  so  natural  to  us  merely  because  our  naval 
education  has  changed  it  from  a  conscious  to  a  reflex  action. 

Therefore  this  same  principle  can  have  only  fortunate  results  in 
that  so  much  more  important  and  vast  sphere  of  war. 

"Every  war  conducted  according  to  the  rules  of  the  art  is  a 
systematic  war,  because  every  war  ought  to  be  conducted  in  con- 
formity with  the  principles  and  rules  of  the  art  and  to  have  an 
objective;  it  ought  to  be  carried  on  with  forces  proportioned  to 
the  obstacles  which  are  foreseen,"  said  Napoleon ;  and  again : 
"Alexander,  scarcely  more  than  a  boy,  with  a  handful  of  men 
conquers  a  large  part  of  the  world,  but  was  this  a  mere  onslaught 
on  his  part,  a  sort  of  rush?  No,  all  is  profoundly  calculated, 
boldly  executed,  wisely  conducted. 

CcEsar  conquered  the  Gauls  and  overthrew  the  laws  of  his 
native  land;  but  were  his  great  deeds  of  war  the  result  of  chance 
and  mere  luck? 

Will  it  be  believed  that  Hannibal  owed  his  career  and  so  many 

43 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

great  actions  only  to  the  caprices  of  hazard,  to  the  favor  of 
fortune? 

"  All  these  great  captains  of  ancient  times,  and  those  who  later 
on  have  worthily  followed  in  their  steps,  only  did  great  things  by 
conforming  to  the  rules  and  natural  principles  of  the  art;  that  is 
to  say,  by  .the  correctness  of  their  combinations  and  the  logical 
relation  of  means  to  ends,  of  efforts  to  obstacles;  they  only  suc- 
ceeded by  obeying  correct  principles,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
audacity  of  their  enterprises  and  the  extent  of  their  successes. 
They  never  failed  to  treat  war  as  a  true  science.  It  is  in  virtue  of 
this  alone  that  they  are  great  models,  and  it  is  only  by  imitating 
them  that  we  can  hope  to  rival  them." 

That  success  in  war  cannot  be  the  result  of  chance  stands  out 
from  these  words  with  repeated  and  intentional  emphasis,  and  es- 
tablishes itself  as  their  logical  conclusion.  A  truth  so  funda- 
mental, from  the  pen  of  such  a  man,  ought  already  to  have  the 
force  of  a  law ;  the  most  recent  facts  of  military  and  naval  history 
have  just  shown  us  what  the  cost  is  to  nations  which,  ignoring  it, 
have  foreseen  nothing  and  prepared  nothing. 

Clausewitz  has  defined  Napoleon's  method  of  war  in  these 
terms :  "  To  begin  by  striking  hard,  to  take  advantage  of  his 
successes  to  strike  again,  to  always  and  unceasingly  stake  all  he 
has  on  a  single  card  till  the  bank  breaks:  such  was  Bonaparte's 
way  and  it  is  precisely  to  this  correct  conception  of  war  that  he 
owes  his  incredible  triumphs." 

This  judgment  of  a  military  writer  of  distinction  shows  how 
great  a  place  fighting  had  in  Napoleon's  military  designs ;  he 
surely  assigned  to  it  the  principal  role.  If  we  add  that  his  perfect 
understanding  of  the  military  customs  of  his  epoch  always  per- 
mitted him  to  foresee  the  faults  which  his  adversaries  would  com- 
mit, and  to  take  advantage  of  them,  we  shall  have  a  view,  succinct 
but  as  complete  as  possible,  of  the  simple  means  which  constituted 
his  method.  It  may  well  be  thought  that  the  constant  study  which 
he  made  of  the  history  of  great  captains  was  not  lost  upon  him. 

However  powerful  the  interest  which  would  attach  to  a  more 
complete  study,  entering  more  into  the  details  of  the  life  and  acts 
of  this  great  military  figure,  even  from  our  special  naval  point  of 
view,  I  must  here  close  this  brief  survey  in  order  to  take  up  another 
subject,  of  more  direct  interest  because  it  affects  us  more  nearly. 
I  refer  to  what  has  been  called  Napoleon  s  Naval  Strategy. 

44 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

THE   NAVAL   STRATEGY    OF    NAPOLEON. 

This  matter  is  of  special  importance  to  us  because  its  discussion 
will  bring  out  the  essential  differences  which  exist  between  war  on 
the  sea  and  war  on  land. 

There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  Napoleon  had  a  naval  strategy, 
for  he  was  too  much  a  soldier  not  to  feel  profoundly  that  certain 
fundamental  laws  are  true,  whatever  the  circumstances,  and  that, 
in  particular,  naval  operations  are  no  more  amenable  to  chance 
alone  than  land  campaigns  are.  Moreover,  to  learn  what  his  con- 
ceptions of  naval  strategy  were,  we  have  only  to  take  his  own 
words,  which  will  greatly  facilitate  the  investigation. 

Possessed,  ever  after  the  campaign  of  Italy,  by  the  fixed  idea 
of  overthrowing  the  English  powe*,  and  too  deeply  penetrated  by 
the  true  principles  of  war  not  to  seek  to  strike  at  her  very  heart, 
he  cherished  the  plan  of  an  invasion  of  England. 

On  November  5,  1797,  he  wrote  from  Milan  to  the  Directory: 
"  To  undertake,  with  some  probability  of  success,  the  English, 
expedition,  there  would  be  required:  d)  good  naval  officers;  (2j 
a  large  number  of  well  led  troops  in  order  to  be  able  to  threaten 
several  points  and  to  re-inforce  the  landing  party ;  (3)  an  intel- 
ligent and  vigorous  admiral.  I  think  Truguet  the  best  .  .  .  " 

Later  he  returns  to  the  subject,  this  time  specifying  the  most 
serious  difficulties  of  the  enterprise :  "  Whatever  efforts  we  may 
make,"  he  writes  from  Paris  on  February  23,  1798,  to  the  same 
Directory,  "  we  shall  not  acquire  superior  force  on  the  seas  for 
several  years  yet.  An  invasion  of  England  without  having  com- 
mand of  the  sea  is  the  most  difficult  operation  which  has  ever 
been  undertaken.  It  is  only  possible  by  surprising  a  passage, 
either  evading  the  squadron  blockading  Brest  or  the  Tex  el,  or 
crossing  at  night  in  small  boats  and  arriving  somewhere  in  Kent 
or  Sussex  after  a  passage  of  seven  or  eight  hours.  To  do  this  we 
need  long  nights  and  therefore  winter.  April  past,  it  is  no  longer 
possible  to  do  anything.  Any  operation  which  might  be  attempted 
with  boats  during  the  summer,  to  take  advantage  of  calms,  would 
be  impracticable,  because  the  enemy  would  offer  insurmountable 
obstacles  to  a  landing  and  above  all  to  a  passage.  Our  Navy  is  as 
little  prepared  to-day  as  when  the  army  of  England  was  created, 
four  months  ago  ....  If,  in  view  of  the  actual  condition  of  our 
Navy,  it  is  thought  impossible  to  secure  the  prompt  action  which 
circumstances  require,  we  must  then  give  up  all  idea  of  an  English 

45 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

expedition,  and  be  satisfied,  zvhile  continuing  to  threaten  one,  to 
•fix  our  whole  attention,  and  direct  all  our  resources,  upon  the 
Rhine,  in  order  to  try  to  snatch  Hannover  and  Hamiburg  from 
England — or  even  to  make  an  expedition  into  the  East  which 
might  endanger  the  commerce  of  India.  And,  if  none  of  these 
three  plans  is  possible,  I  see  nothing  else  to  be  done  except  to  make 
peace  with' England" 

How  then  can  it  be  pretended  that,  in  preparing  his  plan  of  an 
invasion  of  England,  Napoleon  ignored  its  difficulties  ?  The  fore- 
going letter  proves,  on  the  contrary,  that  none  of  them  escaped 
his  notice.  He  lays  down  clearly,  first  of  all  the  principle  of  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  a  principle  whose  consequences  are  of  incalcu- 
lable importance  to  the  student  of  the  philosophy  of  naval  history. 
Doubtless,  despairing  of  being  able  to  meet  this  requirement,  he 
does  seek  to  escape  from  it  by  proposing  a  possible  surprise ;  but 
in  his  case  this  is  rather  a  consequence  of  his  fixed  idea,  the  de- 
struction of  the  English  power.  Nurtured  upon  the  study  of  Han- 
nibal's method,  he  too  wished  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  his  enemy, 
by  attacking  him  on  his  own  hearth,  at  the  very  source  of  his  life. 
But  if,  for  a  moment,  yielding  to  his  impatience  to  obtain  results, 
he  cherishes  the  chimerical  plan  of  violating  the  true  principles 
of  war  and  avoiding  battle,  when,  a  little  later,  the  time  for  action 
comes,  he  returns  of  his  own  accord  to  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  he,  more  than  anyone  else,  has  helped  to  make  uni- 
versally accepted. 

The  proof  may  be  found  in  a  note  from  Napoleon  to  the  Min- 
ister of  Marine,  dated  September,  1805. 

"  What  zvas  my  intention  in  creating  the  flotilla  of  Boulogne? 
I  intended  to  assemble  forty  or  fifty  war  ships  in  the  harbor  of 
Martinique  by  combined  movements  from  Toulon,  Cadis,  Ferrol 
and  Brest;  to  have  them  return  suddenly  to  Boulogne;  to  find 
myself  master  of  the  sea  for  a  fortnight;  to  have  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men  and  ten  thousand  horses  encamped  on  this 
coast,  a  flotilla  of  three  or  four  thousand  boats,  and,  when  the  arri- 
val of  my  fleet  was  signalled,  to  land  in  England  and  seize  London 
and  Trinity  House.  This  plan  just  missed  success.  If  Admiral 
Villeneuve,  instead  of  entering  Ferrol,  had  been  satisfied  to  unite 
with  the  Spanish  squadron,  and  had  then  made  sail  for  Brest  to 
join  forces  with  Admiral  Ganteaume,  my  army  would  have  landed 
and  it  would  have  been  all  up  with  England. 

46 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

"  To  make  this  project  succeed,  it  was  necessary  to  assemble  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  at  Boulogne,  to  have  four  thou- 
sand boats  there  and  an  immense  quantity  of  stores,  to  embark  all 
these,  and  yet  to  keep  the  enemy  from  suspecting  my  plans.  I  owe 
my  success  in  this  to  my  doing  the  opposite  of  what  it  seemed  nec- 
essary for  me  to  do.  If  fifty  ships  of  the  line  were  to  come  to  pro- 
tect the  army's  passage  to  England,  transports  alone  were  needed 
at  Boulogne,  and  the  profusion  of  galleys,  gunboats,  fiatboats,  shal- 
lops, etc.,  all  armed  vessels,  was  quite  useless.  If  I  had  thus 
assembled  four  thousand  vessels  of  transport,  the  enemy  would 
without  any  doubt  have  seen  that  I  expected  my  squadrvn  to  be 
present  before  attempting  the  passage.  But  by  constructing  gal- 
leys and  gunboats,  by  arming  all  these  vessels,  I  opposed  cannon 
to  cannon,  war  vessel  to  war  vessel,  and  the  enemy  was  deceived. 

"  He  believed  that  I  intended  to  force  a  passage  by  the  sole  use 
of  the  military  strength  of  the  fiotilla.  The  idea  of  my  true  plan 
did  not  occur  to  him  at  all,  and  when,  the  movements  of  my  squad- 
rons having  failed,  he  perceived  the  danger  he  had  run,  fear  fell 
upon  the  councils  of  London,  and  all  intelligent  people  admitted 
that  never  had  England  been  so  near  to  destruction" 

The  quotation,  as  may  be  seen,  is  well  worth  being  given  in  full, 
for  it  is  an  example  of  magnificent  strategy ;  its  principles  are 
faultless,  and  this  gigantic  plan  might  and  ought  to  have  suc- 
ceeded. The  necessity  of  command  of  the  sea  is  set  forth  this 
time  precisely  and  clearly.  It  is  to  obtain  it,  which  can  only  be 
by  actually  having  superior  forces  at  the  selected  point,  that  he 
directed  his  squadrons  for  a  time  to  avoid  action,  in  order  to  bring 
about  their  concentration  prior  to  the  decisive  operation. 

Another  advantage  of  this  combination  was  that  it  divided  the 
English  naval  forces  sent  forth  in  pursuit  of  different  French 
squadrons  of  whose  destination  they  were  ignorant,  and  thus 
doubly  inclined  the  balance  of  power  to  the  side  of  France.  This 
plan  of  operation  also  drew  strength  from  its  distinctly  offensive 
character,  and  from  the  many  advantages  assured  to  the  one  of 
two  adversaries  who  knows  what  he  wants  and  whither  he  goes. 

It  suffices  to  call  to  mind  the  events  of  this  year  1805,  so  justly 
celebrated  in  naval  annals,  to  be  sure  that  the  Emperor  was  under 
no  delusion  when  he  hoped  to  keep  his  true  design  hidden  from 
his  enemies.  Among  the  proofs  of  this  there  is  none  more  decisive 
than  the  furious  pursuit  of  Villeneuve's  squadron  by  Nelson. 

47 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Would  the  illustrious  English  admiral  have  sought  for  traces  of 
his  enemy  first  upon  the  coasts  of  Africa,  then  in  the  Antilles,  if 
he  had  so  much  as  suspected  his  real  destination?  His  letter  to 
the  Admiralty,  after  Villeneuve's  first  sortie,  leaves  no  doubt  as  to 
his  ignorance  of  the  intentions  of  his  adversary.  "  Of  two  things 
one  must  be  true,"  wrote  he,  "  either  this  squadron  has  returned  to 
port  disabled,  or  it  has  held  its  course  to  the  East,  and  probably 
towards  Egypt" 

The  incident  of  the  brig  Curieux  meeting  by  chance  the  squad- 
ron of  Villeneuve  at  sea  and  on  her  arrival  in  England  causing, 
by  the  sensational  news  which  she  brought,  important  changes  in 
the  distribution  of  the  English  forces,  ordered  at  once  by  the 
Admiralty,  is  further  evidence. 

Napoleon's  strategic  plan,  then,  was  perfectly  conceived ;  I 
have  said  that  it  ought  to  have  succeeded,  and,  in  fact,  if  the 
success  did  not  equal  the  ingenuity  of  the  combination,  there  are 
many  causes  worth  examination  to  which  it  may  be  imputed. 

In  reality,  although  unaltered  in  its  main  features,  this  plan 
under  pressure  of  circumstances  undergoes  some  modifications  in 
detail,  at  least  during  the  time  of  its  execution. 

At  the  beginning  the  principal  role  fell  to  Latouche-Treville, 
who  was  equal  to  it ;  this  flag  officer  was  to  set  sail  from  Toulon 
with  his  ten  ships,  to  join  to  them  at  Cadiz  the  ship  Aigle,  to  free 
from  the  blockade  before  Rochefort  the  five  ships  assembled  there, 
and  to  enter  the  channel  with  these  sixteen  ships  while  Ganteaume 
held  Cornwallis  before  Brest.  The  English  at  this  moment  had 
only  seven  or  eight  ships  in  the  channel  to  oppose  to  this  French 
naval  force,  their  squadron  of  the  Texel  being  unavailable  on 
account  of  the  necessity  of  blockading  the  Dutch  squadron. 

The  concentration  of  superior  forces  in  the  channel  was  then 
not  only  possible,  but  probable ;  the  death  of  Latouche-Treville 
took  from  this  plan  its  greatest  chance  of  success. 

Napoleon  then  changed  the  details  of  execution  of  his  plan  and 
conceived  the  ingenious  scheme  of  concentrating  his  squadron  in 
the  Antilles,  Villeneuve  was  to  sail  from  Toulon,  this  time  to  make 
a  junction  with  the  Spanish  Admiral  Gravina,  and  to  steer  for 
America.  Missiessy  and  Ganteaume  had  been  instructed  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  same  destination,  the  first  starting  from  Rochefort  and 
the  second  from  Brest.  Why  this  concentration  could  not  be 
effected  is  known.  On  the  one  hand,  Villeneuve,  after  a  first  un- 

48 


\V.\R    ON    THE    SEA. 

fortunate  sortie  on  January  18,  had  been  obliged  to  delay  his  de- 
parture for  two  months  in  order  to  repair  the  damages  done  to 
his  ships  by  storms,  so  that,  when  he  reached  the  Antilles,  Mis- 
siessy,  recalled  to  Europe,  had  already  gone.  On  the  other  hand, 
Ganteaume  had  been  unable  to  find  a  single  favorable  occasion  for 
breaking  Cornwallis'  strict  blockade. 

And  yet,  the  master  thought  which  directed  the  plan  still  retained 
all  its  value.  In  default  of  the  reunion  of  all  the  French  forces 
prior  to  any  operation,  numerical  superiority,  the  end  aimed  at, 
could  still  be  obtained.  Villeneuve,  setting  out  from  the  Antilles 
in  his  turn,  was  ordered  to  return  to  Ferrol,  to  take  the  fifteen 
ships  which  were  to  be  there,  and  to  proceed  to  Brest  with  a  fleet 
then  composed  of  thirty-five  ships. 

Cornwallis'  fleet  comprising  but  eighteen  ships,  the  certain  co- 
operation of  Ganteaume  in  the  attempt  to  break  the  blockade,  gave 
to  the  French-Spanish  forces  a  superiority  so  crushing  as  to  enable 
them  to  count  upon  success.  The  entry  into  the  channel  of  the 
fifty-five  ships  thus  united  was  awaited  by  the  Emperor  with 
feverish  impatience.  The  success  of  this  strategic  plan  was  prob- 
able this  time  again  because  the  English  continued  unsuspicious  of 
the  exact  objective  at  which  he  aimed.  Even  after  the  indecisive 
battle  of  Cape  Finisterre,  even  after  the  delays  at  Vigo  and 
Coruna,  Napoleon's  strategic  concept  retained  its  high  value. 
"Set  forth''  he  wrote  Villeneuve,  "your  passage  by  itself  alone 
makes  us  with  certainty  masters  of  England." 

At  that  very  moment  Villeneuve  could  still  make  a  junction  with 
Allemand,  Missiessy's  successor  in  command  of  the  Rochefort  di- 
vision, descend  upon  Brest  with  thirty-three  ships,  and  beat  Corn- 
wallis, who  had  but  eighteen.  And  to  do  so,  the  French  com- 
mander-in-chief  need  only  have  had  a  tithe  of  that  wonderful  mili- 
tary judgment  of  his  emperor,  or  indeed  of  Nelson,  which  urged 
those  two  great  warriors  to  seek  battle  instead  of  avoiding  it,  to 
risk  a  few  cards  to  win  the  game.  We  well  know  how  on  the  con- 
trary this  game  was  irretrievably  lost  by  Villeneuve's  timidity  and 
his  retreat  to  Cadiz. 

This  study  of  Napoleon's  strategy  is  an  admirable  lesson  in 
affairs  and  furnishes  matter  for  very  valuable  instruction  from 
which  at  the  present  time  we  can  derive  benefit. 

Thus,  behold  a  remarkable  plan  of  operations,  conceived  in 
accordance  with  the  best  principle's  of  war,  by  a  man  of  genius  for 

49 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

whom  strategy  has  no  secrets,  and  the  execution  of  which  is 
favored  by  the  ignorance  of  adversaries  who  have  failed  to  under- 
stand it.  And  yet  it  ends  in  a  complete  failure,  and,  still  worse, 
in  disaster. 

This  fact,  inexplicable  in  the  eyes  of  the  uninstructed,  results 
from  causes,  many  in  appearance,  but  really  included  in  one  single 
error  committed  by  the  emperor,  and  due  to  his  ignorance  of 
maritime  affairs. 

Without  any  doubt  he  lacked  "  the  seaman  "  of  the  situation, 
capable  of  comprehending  his  views,  of  perceiving  their  greatness 
and  assimilating  them  to  the  point  of  making  them  his  own,  a 
man  sufficiently  imbued  with  the  true  principles  of  warfare  to 
assure  success  in  their  execution. 

All  the  French  admirals  of  the  time  were,  without  exception, 
second  rate  men,  and  the  great  master  could  not  be  near  them 
to  inspire  them  with  his  own  ardor  as  he  did  in  the  case  of  his 
lieutenants  in  his  campaigns  on  land. 

"  The  great  weakness  of  our  navy,"  he  himself  wrote  to  Lauris- 
ton  on  February  i,  1805,  "is  that  the  men  who  command  it  are 
inexperienced  in  all  the  hazards  of  command." 

But  the  absence  of  a  faithful  and  intelligent  interpreter  of  his 
military  ideas  is  not  enough  to  explain  so  great  a  failure.  In  his 
hour  of  exile,  when  Napoleon  scrutinized  his  glorious  past  and 
sought  the  reason  for  the  happenings  of  his  reign,  he  made  his 
full  views  known  in  the  following  statement  which  I  have  taken 
from  the  Memorial  de  Sainte  Helene :  "  I  looked  unceasingly  for 
the  right  naval  officer  without  being  able  to  find  him.  In  that  pro- 
fession there  is  a  speciality,  a  technicality,  which  put  a  limit  to  all 
my  conceptions.  No  sooner  did  I  propose  a  new  idea  than  I  had 
Ganteaume  and  the  Navy  Department  on  my  back.  '  Sire,  that  is 
impossible.  And  whyf  Sire,  the  winds  do  not  permit  of  it;  and 
then  the  calms,  the  currents'  and  I  was  stopped  short. 

"If,  instead  of  having  to  combat  obstacles,  I  had  met  some  one 
who  agreed  with  me  and  furthered  my  views,  what  results  might 
we  not  have  obtained?  But,  during  my  reign,  there  never  appeared 
in  the  Navy  a  single  man  who  deviated  from  routine  and  knew 
how  to  originate." 

Yes,  it  is  very  certain,  he  always  lacked  the  true  seaman,  the 
necessary  man  of  action,  and  this  waste  of  energy  upon  the  ordi- 
nary and  inevitable  difficulties  of  the  profession,  which  a  great 

50 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

chief  must  accept  as  the  consequence  of  the  inseparable  circum- 
stances of  this  calling,  superabundantly  reveals  it. 

But  there  was  something  else.  The  letters  in  which  the  unfor- 
tunate Villeneuve  complained  of  the  deplorable  condition  of  his 
squadron  were  not  wholly  the  lamentations  of  a  timid  mind  which 
responsibility  crushes.  It  is  only  too  certain  that  the  crews  were 
incomplete,  that  for  want  of  money  they  lacked  stores  of  the  most 
urgent  necessity,  that  the  ships  themselves  were  badly  armed  and 
badly  equipped. 

After  the  futile  sortie  of  January  18,  1805,  Villeneuve  wrote : 
"  Ships  thus  equipped,  ill  manned,  encumbered  with  troops,  having 
rigging  which  is  old  and  of  bad  quality,  which,  with  the  least  wind, 
carry  away  their  masts  and  tear  their  sails,  which,  in  fine  weather, 
spend  the  time  in  repairing  the  damages  done  by  the  wind,  by  the 
feebleness  or  the  inexperience  of  their  sailors;  such  ships,  I  say, 
are  unfit  for  any  undertaking."  And,  at  the  end  of  the  campaign, 
he  wrote  again  from  Coruna,  "  Never  did  such  miserable  ships  put 
to  sea.  That  is  the  primary  cause  of  all  our  misfortunes/' 

And  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  characterize  the  Spanish  fleet, 
composed  of  "  the  poorest  ships  that  ever  were  sent  to  sea,"  and 
so  well  known  to  be  such  that  Nelson,  in  a  famous  act  of  bravado 
ordered  each  of  his  captains  to  attack  a  French  ship  and  took 
upon  himself  alone  the  charge  of  all  the  Spanish  vessels. 

The  real  error  of  Napoleon,  then,  was  believing  that  great  de- 
signs could  be  accomplished  with  so  poor  a  naval  instrument. 
Accustomed  to  improvise  armies,  to  recruit  heterogeneous  bodies 
of  men  whom  he  galvanized  by  the  all  powerful  influence  of  his 
command,  he  always  fancied  that  the  same  would  do  in  the  navy. 

On  May  9,  1798,  he  directed  the  commandant  at  Toulon  to  sup- 
ply the  deficiency  of  sailors  by  putting  on  board  the  vessels  of  the 
fleet  what  remained  of  the  sixth  half  brigade  of  artillery.  On 
June  1 6  of  the  same  year,  he  likewise  embarked  five  hundred  Tur- 
kish slaves  at  Malta,  for  service  in  the  fleet.  He  never  really  under- 
stood the  quite  peculiar  needs  of  a  great  navy,  the  wise  and 
methodical  preparation,  an  important  work  absolutely  requiring 
time,  which  is  needed  to  bring  the  personnel  and  material  of  a 
fleet  to  the  point  of  being  ready  to  fight.  It  is  possible  to  imagine 
an  army  composed  of  recruits  hastily  levied  and  combined,  and  to 
admit  that  under  the  impulse  of  an  inspired  general,  it  may  do 
great  things.  A  navy  cannot  be  improvised ;  the  mere  habituation 

5i 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

to  the  abnormal  medium  in  which  it  moves,  the  struggle  against 
the  fierce  elements,  which  singularly  complicates  that  against  men, 
themselves  demand  a  special  and  lengthy  education  of  those  who 
compose  it.  And  this  is  still  more  true  now  when  more  compli- 
cated ships,  filled  with  machinery,  have  pressing  need  of  a  trained 
personnel. 

It  was  very  far  from  rigorously  correct,  then,  to  trust  the  suc- 
cess of  Napoleon's  strategic  plan  to  a  simple  arithmetical  com- 
parison. Really,  the  idea  of  "  superiority  of  forces  "  in  war  is 
very  far  from  being  so  simple  a  matter.  And  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  the  fifty  or  fifty-five  French  and  Spanish  ships,  had 
they  succeeded  in  getting  together,  would  have  beaten  the  eighteen 
or  twenty  admirably  prepared  English  ships  which  guarded  the 
channel. 

Nelson  had  but  ten  ships,  Villeneuve  had  eighteen,  and  yet 
the  former  did  not  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  pursue  the  latter  to 
fight  him.  He  knew  his  adversary  and  was  sure  that  the  superior 
worth  of  his  own  forces,  moral  and  material,  would  more  than 
compensate  for  his  numerical  inferiority.  All  these  factors  have 
weight  in  the  true  balance  of  forces. 

The  strategical  lesson  we  have  just  learned  is  too  important  to 
us,  even  in  its  exposition  of  errors  committed,  for  me  not  to  an- 
ticipate a  possible  objection  based  upon  a  legend  originated  in  the 
camp  at  Boulogne  and  tending  to  show  that  Napoleon's  prepara- 
tion was  a  mere  feint.  The  emperor  himself  did  justice  to  this 
story  in  his  Memoires:  "  The  invasion  of  England  has  always 
been  thought  possible,  and  the  landing  once  effected,  the  capture 
of  London  was  inevitable.  Master  of  London,  a  very  powerful 
party  would  have  risen  against  the  oligarchy.  Did  Hannibal 
crossing  the  Alps,  or  Caesar  landing  in  Epirus  or  Africa,  look 
backward?  London  is  but  a  little  way  from  Calais;  and  the 
English  army,  scattered  for  the  defence  of  the  coast,  would  not  be 
concentrated  in  time,  the  landing  once  accomplished.  Doubtless 
this  expedition  could  not  have  been  made  with  one  army  corps; 
but  it  was  sure  with  one  hundred  and.  sixty  thousand  men,  who 
would  hwve  been  at  London's  gates  five  days  after  their  disem- 
barkation. The  flotillas  were  merely  intended  to  land  these  one 
hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men,  and  to  get  possession  of  all  the 
shallow  places.  The  passage  was  to  have  been  made  under  the 
protection  of  a  squadron  assembled  at  Martinique  and  coming 

52 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

thence  under  a  press  of  sail  to  Boulogne;  if  this  plan  of  assemb- 
ling the  squadron  failed  one  year,  it  would  succeed  another  time. 
Fifty  ships  setting  out  from  Toulon,  from  Brest,  from  Rochefort, 
from  Lorient  and  from  Cadiz,  meeting  at  Martinique,  could  appear 
off  Boulogne  and  assure  the  landing  in  England  while  the  English 
squadrons  were  sailing  the  seas  to  cover  the  two  Indies" 

Napoleon  has  made  his  conception  still  clearer  in  the  following 
declarations,  found  in  the  Memorial  de  Sainte-Helene :  "Some 
thought  my  invasion  was  a  foolish  threat,  because  they  saw  no 
reasonable  means  of  attempting  it;  but  I  had  set  about  it  from  far 
off,  amd  operated  without  being  seen.  I  had  scattered  all  our 
ships;  the  English  had  to  follow  them  over  the  world;  but  ours 
had  the  single  object  of  coming  btick  unexpectedly,  all  together, 
to  meet  in  one  body  on  our  coast.  I  was  to  have  seventy  or  eighty 
French  or  Spanish  ships  in  the  channel;  I  had  reckoned  that  I 
should  remain  THE  MASTER  DURING  TWO  MONTHS.  /  had  three  or 
four  thousand  small  vessels  which  only  awaited  the  signal;  my 
hundred  thousand  men  every  day  went  through  the  exercise  of 
embarking  and  disembarking,  like  all  the  other  drills;  they  were 
zealous  and  willing  .  .  .  ." 

I  have  purposely  underlined  certain  words  of  this  statement, 
because  they  show  the  evolution  which  had  taken  place  in  the 
Emperor's  mind  since  June  9,  1805,  when  he  wrote  in  these  terms : 
"  I  really  do  not  know  what  sort  of  precaution  England  can  take 
to  shelter  herself  from  the  terrible  risk  she  is  in.  A  nation  is  very 
foolish,  when  she  has  no  fortifications  and  no  army,  to  expose  her- 
self to  the  chance  of  having  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
picked  men  and  veterans  descend  upon  her.  That  is  what  the 
flotilla  is  really  for;  it  costs  money,  but  it  is  only  necessary  to  be 
MASTER  OF  THE  SEA  FOR  six  HOURS  that  England  may  cease  to 
live." 

The  comparison  of  the  underlined  words  in  the  two  quotations 
indicates  the  evolution  I  just  spoke  of.  When  he  wrote  the 
earlier,  Napoleon  was  under  the  dominating  impression  of  his  hot 
fight  with  his  implacable  enemy ;  the  desire  to  reach  her  at  any 
cost,  the  impatience  to  strike  to  her  heart,  obscured  his  judgment, 
and  so  much  the  more  so  that  his  ignorance  of  the  essential  needs 
of  preparation  for  naval  war  concealed  from  him  the  real  difficul- 
ties of  his  undertaking. 

How  otherwise  can  we  explain  his  astonishment  and  disdain  of 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

a  people  who,  contrary  to  the  established  rules,  pretended  to 
defend  itself  by  other  means  than  troops  and  fortifications  ? 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  in  fact,  that  this  same  man  had  taught, 
better  than  anyone  else,  to  a  conquered  world,  that  the  best  of  all 
defences  for  a  nation  was  the  vigorous  attack  of  victorious  armies. 

Later,  on  the  rock  of  Saint  Helena,  reviewing  his  whole  life  and 
pondering  the  lessons  of  experience,  he  had  had,  on  the  contrary, 
the  clear  'vision  of  the  great  primary  role  which  freedom  of  the 
seas  plays  in  naval  operations ;  he  had  thus  understood  that  on  the 
sea,  as  well  as  on  land,  the  protection  of  acting  forces  is  the  best 
of  all,  and  that  on  this  point  there  is  real  unity  of  military  concept. 

It  is  not  during  a  few  hours  only  that  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  be  master  of  the  sea,  nor  even  during  a  few  weeks ;  it  was 
necessary  to  conquer  this  command  of  the  sea  definitely,  by  the 
energetic  action  of  a  powerful  fleet,  superior  in  moral  and  material 
force  to  that  of  England.  This  result  accomplished  would  have 
made  any  landing  in  England  useless,  for  the  government  of  that 
country  would  have  humbly  sued  for  peace. 

It  is  altogether  interesting  to  observe,  in  ending,  that  Napoleon, 
great  admirer  of  Hannibal,  imbued  with  the  military  ideas  of  the 
Carthaginian  general,  was  like  him  to  succumb  from  lack  of  naval 
forces,  and  to  lose  the  empire  of  the  world  because  he  had  lost 
that  of  the  seas. 

Waterloo  was  but  the  coup  de  grace ;  Trafalgar  was  really  the 
mortal  wound. 


54 


CHAPTER  II. 
AN  HISTORICAL  STUDY  OF  THE  STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF 

DUQUESNE,  TOURVILLE,  SUFFREN  AND  NELSON. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  sought,  in  the  history  of  great 
military  wars,  the  principles  which  generals  have  obeyed  in  the 
pursuit  of  success ;  we  now  take  up  a  similar  study  for  naval  wars, 
and  it  would  be  superfluous  to  enlarge  upon  the  exceptional 
interest  of  the  latter  to  naval  officer^. 

The  interest  will  be  so  much  the  more  engrossing  as  we  shall 
draw  our  documents  from  original  sources,  and  shall  take  their 
thoughts  from  the  very  lips  of  famous  seamen. 

Assuming  once  more  that  the  facts  of  history  are  known  to  all 
of  us,  I  shall  limit  myself  to  recalling  that,  although  the  history 
of  the  French  navy  registers  many  reverses,  it  also  contains  many 
glorious  pages.  Victories  and  defeats  alike  will  serve  to  bring  out 
precious  lessons  in  military  precepts. 

DUQUESNE. 

In  a  letter  from  the  celebrated  Duquesne  to  M.  de  Vivonne, 
that  great  seaman  develops  his  views  upon  war  with  a  conciseness 
which  makes  them  worthy  of  reproduction.  Charged  with  carry- 
ing to  Messina,  with  a  squadron  of  twenty-four  ships,  troops  to 
re-enforce  M.  de  Vivonne,  Duquesne  had  brought  his  fleet  to  the 
south  of  Italy,  when,  on  August  13,  1676,  the  lookouts  reported  a 
number  of  sails  which,  on  getting  nearer,  were  recognized  to  be 
those  of  the  Dutch  squadron,  also  of  twenty-four  ships.  Duquesne 
at  once  prepared  for  combat,  but,  favored  by  night,  the  enemy's 
fleet  disappeared. 

In  the  letter  referred  to,  Duquesne  thus  expresses  himself: 
((  They  planned  to  avoid  us;  nevertheless,  had  I  not  been  burdened 
with  this  infantry,  of  whom  a  large  number  are  taken  sick  every 
day,  and  with  this  convoy  of  provisions  for  the  galleys,  I  would 
have  followed  and  looked  everywhere  for  that  fleet  until  I  came 
up  with  it  or  drove  it  from  the  seas.  It  being  an  important  consid- 
eration to  save  this  infantry,  who  would  destroy  our  crews  by  the 

55 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

dysentery  and  bloody  Hux  which  are  among  them,  and  to  prevent 
our  being  obliged  within  a  few  days  to  abandon  the  sea  for  lack 
of  water,  I  thereupon  assembled  the  general  officers  and  decided 
that  we  would  take  advantage  of  the  wind  to  reach  the  light  house, 
send  the  convoy  in  and  land  the  infantry  there  ....  and  in  the 
meantime  that  the  neet  shall  keep  under  sail  or  at  anchor,  in  order 
afterivards,  if  you  approve  of  it,  immediately  to  put  to  sea  and 
catch  up  with  that  neet  of  the  enemy,  to  fight  them  or  drive  them 
wholly  from  these  seas,  according  to  the  orders  of  His  Majesty." 

Thus  we  have  it  precise  and  clear.  Despite  the  unfavorable  con- 
ditions resulting  from  the  use  of  his  ships  as  transports — and  we 
know  that,  too  often  alas,  the  exclusively  fighting  role  of  a  naval 
force  has  been  ignored — the  great  seaman  does  not  hesitate  to 
seek  battle.  He  feels  that  no  more  certain  method  of  fulfilling 
his  mission  exists  than  to  destroy  the  hostile  naval  force.  And 
when  circumstances  independent  of  his  will  have  lost  him  the 
opportunity,  he  wishes,  like  the  great  warrior  that  he  is,  to  seize 
upon  it  again  and,  dropping  everything  else,  to  hasten  in  search  of 
the  Dutch  squadron  to  destroy  it.  That  was  the  principal 
objective. 

The  battles  of  Stromboli  and  of  Agosta,  against  an  adversary  in 
all  respects  worthy  of  him,  Ruyter,  had  already  shown  Duquesne's 
exceptional  worth  and  how  well  he  understood  war. 

Thus,  as  his  faithful  historian  Jal  very  judiciously  observes, 
Duquesne  disapproved  of  homoeopathic  doses,  of  operations 
timidly  prepared  with  insufficient  means.  He  wished  "  strong 
squadrons,  serious  demonstrations,  enterprises  greatly  conceived 
and  carried  out  with  the  energy  which  facilitates  and  assures 
success," 

In  the  struggle  against  the  Barbary  States,  he  advised  the  sub- 
stitution for  small  armaments  of  others  capable,  by  the  fear  they 
would  inspire  or  by  the  force  they  could  display,  of  forcing  the 
Moors  to  respect  treaties.  He  had  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
fact  that  the  idea  of  force  dominates  the  entire  philosophy  of  war ; 
it  is  its  reason,  its  object  and  its  success. 

In  a  letter  written  from  Messina  to  Colbert,  on  May  7,  1676,  the 
Chevalier  de  Tourville  paid  a  notable  compliment  to  Duquesne  in 
these  terms  :  "  I  must  tell  you,  though  as  regards  my  own  affairs 
I  complain  of  no  one,  that  there  are  pests  in  this  corps  who  turn 
every  thing  upside  down,  and  who  are  such  great  blunderers  that 

56 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

if  we  pay  any  attention  to  them  we  shall  find  the  best  acts  of  M. 
de  Quesne,  and  those  of  the  greater  part  of  the  navy,  will  come  to 
nothing  at  a  time  when  he  is  doing  extraordinary  deeds  for  the 
King's  service." 

In  another  letter  of  August  26  of  the  same  year,  also  addressed 
to  Colbert,  the  same  Tourville  says  again :  "  You  will  have 
learned  that  we  have  been  unfortunate,  that  fourteen  Dutch  ships 
escaped  from  our  hands  by  fleeing  without  pause.  M.  du  Quesne 
took  every  imaginable  care  and  missed  doing  nothing  which  could 
possibly  be  done  in  order  to  catch  them,  but  their  good  luck  saved 
them  during  the  night  without  our  being  able  to  get  near  enough 
to  observe  them,  although  M.  du  Quesne  stood  for  them  under  a 
press  of  sail.  If  we  had  not  been  burdened  with  troops,  and  most 
of  the  ships  wanting  zvater,  M.  du  Quesne  would  have  been  seek- 
ing them  everywhere." 

TOURVILLE. 

No  one  could  be  better  fitted  than  Tourville  to  express  an 
appreciation  of  a  great  captain  like  Duquesne,  whom  he  saw  at 
work  and  under  whose  orders  he  served.  Perhaps  no  admiral 
ever  had  to  a  higher  degree  than  himself  the  profound  perception 
of  the  rules  of  war  and  of  the  necessity  of  destroying  the  principal 
forces  of  the  adversary  in  order  to  fully  accomplish  the  objects  of 
a  war. 

The  study  of  Tourville's  campaigns  is  particularly  profitable  and 
interesting  on  this  account ;  it  justifies  the  important  place  we  are 
going  to  give  him,  and  the  more  so  because  his  very  active  corres- 
pondence, still  in  existence,  lets  us  learn  all  his  strategic  ideas ;  it 
is,  consequently,  a  real  lesson  in  affairs. 

Tourville  had  the  exceptional  good  fortune  to  unite  in  himself 
almost  all  the  qualities  of  a  great  seaman ;  sea  knowledge,  quick 
perception,  coolness,  judgment,  intuition  of  the  right  thing  to  do, 
profound  sense  of  opportunities,  etc.,  not  to  speak  of  native 
courage.  He  gave  the  measure  of  these  remarkable  gifts  when, 
in  1689,  setting  out  from  Toulon  with  a  fleet  of  twenty  vessels,  he 
brought  about  its  junction  at  Brest  with  the  fleet  of  Chateau- 
Renaud,  in  spite  of  the  blockade  of  that  port  by  the  English  forces. 

The  immense  superiority  of  the  latter,  who  mustered  seventy 
sails,  made  any  plan  of  forcing  a  passage  impossible ;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  junction  with  Chateau-Renaud's  squadron  alone  could  re- 

57 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

establish  the  balance  of  forces.  Tourville  solved  this  difficult 
problem  by  his  skillful  seamanship.  Counting  on  its  being  impos- 
sible for  a  blockading  squadron  to  hold  on  at  sea  off  the  island  of 
Ouessant  with  wind  from  the  southwest,  he  waited  patiently, 
standing  back  and  forth  off  that  island,  notwithstanding  the 
fatigues  of  a  passage  already  long,  with  badly  armed  and  scantily 
provisioned  ships,  until  the  wind  came  out  as  he  wished.  After 
six  days'  waiting,  the  breeze  settled  at  southwest.  Tourville  imme- 
diately stood  for  the  Iroise  passage  and  entered  Brest  with  a  fair 
wind  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  English  squadron  well  to  leeward. 
A  complete  success  thus  crowned  his  intelligent  previsions. 
Objection  might  be  made  to  this  interesting  example  of  military 
synthesis  on  the  ground  that  the  conditions  of  modern  naval  wars 
are  quite  different,  and  that  steamships  are  no  longer  dependent 
upon  the  wind.  I  do  not  deny  it;  but  however  powerful  the 
machinery  of  modern  battle  ships,  there  will  always  be  conditions 
of  the  sea  in  which  they  will  not  be  sufficiently  so  to  overcome  all 
difficulties.  After  a  heavy  blow  from  the  southwest,  such  as  fre- 
quently occur  on  the  coast  of  Brittany  for  example,  we  can  foresee 
that  the  circle  of  a  naval  force  blockading  Brest  would  be  very 
considerably  opened  out ;  an  energetic  and  resolute  chief  will  know 
as  well  to-day  as  in  Tourville's  lime  how  to  profit  by  the  aid  of 
the  elements  under  similar  circumstances.  The  example,  there- 
fore, has  in  no  way  lost  its  value. 

The  best  known,  because  in  common  eyes  apparently  the  most 
brilliant,  episode,  of  Tourville's  military  career,  is  the  naval  victory 
of  Beachy  Head,  won  over  the  English-Dutch  fleet  commanded 
by  Torrington. 

Tourville  had  the  advantage  of  numbers,  seventy  ships  against 
fifty,  but  was  to  leeward,  an  unfavorable  position  which,  during  the 
fortnight's  pursuit  of  the  allied  fleet,  had  as  yet  given  him  no 
opportunity  of  engaging  it.  The  day  of  the  battle,  Torrington 
having  decided  to  bear  down  upon  the  French  squadron,  it  became 
possible  to  fight.  In  spite  of  the  loss  of  six  Dutch  ships,  the  action 
might  seem  to  have  been  indecisive,  since  the  two  fleets,  English 
and  French,  separated  without  serious  loss  to  either.  But  such 
was  not  the  case,  and  we  must  modify  this  superficial  view  when 
we  note,  with  Father  lioste,  who  was  present  by  Tourville's  side, 
that  for  a  fortnight  after  this  indecisive  battle  Tourville  pursued 
the  hostile  forces  with  passionate  ardor  from  anchorage  to  anchor- 

58 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

age,  and  burned  and  drove  on  shore  thirteen  of  their  ships  of  the 
line.  Do  we  not  there  see  the  certain  proof  of  disorder  spread 
through  the  English  fleet,  a  consequence  of  their  defeat?  And 
should  another  proof  be  needed,  the  mere  fact  of  the  court-martial 
of  Admiral  Torrington  in  England  would  suffice  to  prove  that  the 
English  people  were  far  from  satisfied  with  the  results  of  the 
engagement. 

However,  this  result  in  itself  is  of  little  importance  to  us ;  we 
find  the  outline  of  the  true  doctrine  which  we  are  looking  for  in  a 
letter  from  Tourville  to  Seignelay,  of  July  13,  1690. 

"  Since  our  fight,"  writes  Tourville,  "  we  have  not  lost  sight  of 
the  enemy,  getting  under  weigh  with  every  tide;  but  for  the  calms 
we  would  have  had  twelve  or  fourteen-  Dutch  ships.  Most  of  them 
being  dismasted,  they  are  the  more  easily  towed  by  their  boats; 
nevertheless  the  night  of  the  loth  and  nth,  they  had  to  set  fire  to 
two  of  their  ships,  one  a  Dutch  flagship  of  eighty  guns  and  another 
of  seventy  guns.  I  detached  some  ships  to  follow  a  great  Dutch 
three-decker  ^vhich,  having  only  a  foremast,  stood  down  the  coast 
before  the  wind;  I  also  sent  others  to  try  to  catch  six  vessels  which 
remained  to  leeward  of  the  enemy's  fleet;  I  am  still  pursuing  them 
regardless  of  the  fatigue  of  the  men  and  of  the  weakened  condition 
of  our  own  masts.  Like  us  they  take  advantage  of  the  tides  and  of 
the  wind,  which  has  all  along  been  favorable  to  their  drawing 
close  in  to  the  dunes;  I  am  persuaded  that  if  I  had  been  to  wind- 
ward of  them  after  the  fight,  I  should  have  wholly  destroyed 
them/' 

Here  we  find  a  doctrine  which  begins  to  be  familiar  to  us,  and 
to  stand  forth  from  the  study  of  the  wars  of  the  past  with  the  force 
of  a  principle.  Like  Duquesne,  Tourville  regarded  the  destruction 
of  the  enemy's  forces  as  a  necessity,  and  having  laid  this  down  as 
his  objective,  he  pursued  its  realization  with  his  whole  energy 
and  with  all  his  resources.  He  could  not  be  content  with  an  incom- 
plete success,  and  used  all  the  ardor  and  activity  necessary  to 
make  it  decisive  in  harassing  the  enemy  without  a  moment's 
respite.  Nothing  but  the  circumstances  of  unfavorable  weather 
could  snatch  from  him  the  complete  victory  he  sought;  he  had 
done  everything  to  obtain  it. 

If  Tourville's  strategy  can  justly  be  considered  a  model,  it  is 
because,  in  the  very  circumstances  where  he  himself  knew  defeat, 
it  was  precisely  owing  to  his  unwillingness  to  follow  the  counsels 

59 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

of  his  own  genius  and  experience ;  and  it  is  also  because  of  having 
imposed  upon  him  absurd  plans  that  the  government  of  France 
was  beaten. 

By  an  order  dated  May  26,  1691,  Tourville  was  instructed  to  set 
sail  with  his  squadron  and  to  cruise  at  the  mouth  of  the  Channel 
with  a  view  to  the  capture  of  a  rich  Dutch-English  convoy  from 
Smyrna.  The  principal  objective  imperatively  assigned  to  Tour- 
ville by  these  orders  was 'the  capture  of  this  convoy,  for,  according 
to  their  words :  "  His  Majesty  graciously  informed  him  that  the 
service  he  would  render  by  the  capture  of  this  fleet,  which  is  worth 
thirty  millions,  would  be  more  important  for  the  execution  of  his 
Majesty's  designs  than  if  he  should  ivin  a  second  victory  over  the 
enemy's  naval  forces.'' 

The  poverty  of  this  conception  confounds  us.  Supposing  that  it 
was  possible,  would  not  the  destruction  of  the  hostile  naval  forces 
plainly  have  made  the  capture  of  the  convoy,  thenceforth  defence- 
less, more  certain  than  an  attempt  to  surprise  it  possibly  could  ? 

To  still  further  specify  the  unfortunate  ideas  of  the  naval 
authorities  and  to  narrow  still  further  the  bounds  set  to  Tour- 
ville's  spirit,  the  order  contained  the  following  directions : 

"  Should  the  enemy  go  out  of  the  Channel  and  should  they  be  in 
superior  numbers,  His  Majesty  forbids  his  attacking  them;  he 
orders  him,  on  the  contrary,  to  avoid  them,  sparing  as  far  as  pos- 
sible the  reputation  of  his  fleet,  and  taking  advantage  of  any 
favorable  opportunities  which  his  capacity  and  experience  may 
bring  about,  it  being  certain  that  there  can  be  such  conditions  at 
sea  as  will  cause  the  lesser  number  to  become  superior  to  the 
greater." 

I  refrain  from  formulating  any  opinion  on  this  dictum ;  for 
Tourville  took  it  upon  himself  to  do  so  in  a  masterly  manner  in  a 
marginal  note,  written  by  his  own  hand  beneath  the  above  quoted 
instructions. 

"  We  should  be  informed,"  says  he,  "  as  to  the  number  and 
strength  of  the  war  vessels  in  the  enemy's  fleet;  we  need  not  hesi- 
tate to  attack  them  if  their  forces  are  only  greater  than  ours  by  a 
small  number  of  ships,  six,  seven  or  even  eight.  As  I  have  already 
had  the  honor  to  say  to  the  king,  from  the  moment  that  two  fleets 
are  in  sight  of  one  another,  so  as  to  be  able  to  recognize  each 
other,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  a  fight.  Should  one  hostile  fleet, 
being  to  windward,  wish  to  engage  the  other,  at  a  season  when  the 

60 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

night  is  only  three  or  four  hours  long  and  no  sudden  storm  will 
occur  to  facilitate  escape,  the  latter  would  have  nothing  to  do  but 
abandon  all  his  ships  except  the  very  fast  ones,  a  procedure  quite 
inadmissible  because  it  would  demoralize  the  crews  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  make  it  very  difficult  to  reassure  them  when  it  became 
necessary  to  fight;  All  flag  officers  and  those  who  have  sea  expe- 
rience will  accept  this  as  a  fact,  and  that  the  better  part  (although 
inferior)  is  to  await  the  enemy  in  gaod  order  and  with  firm 
countenance." 

"  Only  people  who  have  no  knowledge  of  the  profession,"  he 
further  says,  "  can  suppose  that  two  fleets,  during  a  campaign,  can 
be  in  sight  of  one  another  without  engaging,  unless  they  so  wish, 
and  if  any  dare  to  maintain  such  a  vieiv,  I  think  them  very  pre- 
sumptuous and  that  they  greatly  compromise  the  king's  service." 

These  few  lines  contain  some  of-  the  essential  elements  of  an 
entire  doctrine  of  naval  war ;  the  primary  importance  of  the  battle ; 
the  impossibility  of  refusing  it  when  one  of  two  squadrons  in 
sight  of  one  another  seeks  it,  the  necessity  of  securing  a  homo- 
geneous force  by  grouping  together  ships  of  the  same  speed,  the 
influence  of  the  moral  factor  upon  the  personnel,  etc. ;  all  these 
measure  the  chasm  which  separates  the  bureaucratic  conception  of 
war,  which  prescribes  the  avoidance  of  battle,  from  that  wholly 
military  one  which,  the  contrary,  faces  it  as  the  ultimate  aim. 

Let  us  be  very  clear%on  this  point,  for  though  Tourville's  note 
might  seem  to  make  further  emphasis  unnecessary,  we  must  avoid 
even  the  possibility  of  a  misunderstanding  on  this  subject. 

To  seek  action,  as  the  illustrious  seaman  explicitly  states,  does 
not  at  all  mean  to  engage  blindly,  in  any  case,  whatever  the  cir- 
cumstances or  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing  forces.  It  was 
precisely  because  he  fully  understood  the  impossibility  of  holding 
his  own  with  fifty-five  ships  against  the  ninety  of  the  English  fleet 
that  he  tried  to  make  plain  the  inanity  of  this  idea  of  capturing  a 
convoy  without  running  the  risk  of  battle.  For  the  same  reason, 
when  urged  to  order  all  his  forces  to  put  into  Belle  Isle,  he 
vehemently  objected.  That  place  seemed  to  him  badly  chosen  for 
such  an  assemblage:  "It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the 
entire  fleet  be  kept  together  when  they  put  into  port  on  account  of 
the  disadvantages  which  may  result  from  a  separation." 

Under  such  unfavorable  conditions,  only  his  consummate  skill 
as  a  seaman  enabled  him  to  Keep  the  sea  for  fifty  days  in  that 

61 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

immortal  deep  sea  campaign  and  to  bring  his  fleet  back  uninjured 
to  Brest  despite  the  pursuit  and  constant  nearness  of  the  enemy. 

The  narrow  and  despicable  object  sought  by  Pontchartrain,  the 
capture  of  the  convoy  from  Smyrna,  failed  of  accomplishment,  as 
Tourville  had  predicted. 

To  the  reproach  of  the  head  of  the  navy  department  on  the  sub- 
ject of  his  putting  in  to  Bertheaume  after  the  campaign,  though 
formally  forbidden  to  do  so,  he  replies  :  "  It  would  be  much  more 
agreeable  to  me  to  fight  the  enemy  than  to  avoid  him,  which  latter 
course  has  not  a  few  difficulties/'  And  again  he  says :  "  To  be 
able  to  prevent  a  hostile  fleet  from  accomplishing  its  purpose,  we 
must  be  in  condition  to  follow  without  losing  sight  of  it  and  to 
fight  it." 

Events  were  close  at  hand  which  would  show  how  entirely  the 
naval  administration  of  1692  -misconceived  the  admirable  war  in- 
strument which  it  possessed  in  Tourville.  How  could  it  be  other- 
wise when  the  destinies  of  the  navy  were  confined  to  a  man  like 
Pontchartrain,  who  joined  with  Louvois  in  proposing  to  the  king 
to  replace  this  navy  which  cost  too  much  and  was  good  for  nothing 
but  defending  the  coast  by  troops.  Such  ideas,  as  false  as  fatal, 
explain  the  naval  disasters  which  were  their  natural  outcome. 

New  instructions  announced  to  Tourville  what  was  expected  of 
him.  The  matter  under  consideration  was  one  of  those  numerous 
plans  for  an  invasion  of  England  which  mark  the  history  of  the 
French-English  wars  and  of  which  the  result  was  always  negative, 
because  the  conditions  which,  before  any  trial,  made  them  chimer- 
ical were  never  recognized. 

His  orders  directed  him  to  set  sail  from  Brest  even  should  he 
have  information  that  the  enemy  was  outside  with  a  greater  num- 
ber of  ships  than  those  which  were  capable  of  following  him; 
they  added -that  in  the  case  of  a  meeting  an  imperative  order  was 
given  to  him  to  engage  them  no  matter  what  their  numbers.  It  is 
best  to  quote  the  text  of  what  followed:  "If  when  he  has  con- 
ducted his  ships  to  the  place  of  landing  or  when  it  has  begun,  the 
enemy  comes  to  attack  him  with  a  greater  number  of  vessels  than 
are  under  his  command,  His  Majesty  directs  him  to  fight  them  and 
to  persist  in  fighting,  so  that,  even  should  he  be  worsted,  the  enemy 
may  not  be  able  to  prevent  finishing  the  landing." 

One  need  not  be  greatly  learned  in  naval  matters  to  perceive  all 
the  folly  and  impotence  of  these  strange  ideas.  Those  who 

62 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

assumed  to  order  battle  under  conditions  of  immense  inferiority 
had  scarcely  any  conception  of  what  force  means.  Nor  had  they 
any  understanding  of  naval  war  when  they  evoked  the  possibility 
of  finishing  the  operations  of  a  disembarkation  under  the  fire  of 
an  enemy  of  superior  strength.  What  the  logical  result  of  this 
governmental  anarchy  was  is  well  known ;  the  disaster  of  La 
Hogue,  when  Tourville  saved  at  least  the  honor  of  the  French 
navy,  despite  the  extraordinary  disproportion  of  the  opposing 
fleets,  forty- four  French  vessels  against  ninety  English-Dutch. 

But  a  new  and  very  instructive  lesson  is  to  be  drawn  from  these 
events  ;  it  is  the  disastrous  influence  upon  the  results  of  a  war  cam- 
paign exercised  by  the  remote,  narrow  and  vexatious  action  of  an 
ignorant  and  altogether  incompetent  administration. 

As  Tourville  himself  said:  "I  beg  you  to  believe  that  none 
wishes  more  than  I  to  accomplish  something,  but  my  professional 
knowledge  has  compelled  me  to  take  precautions,  and  I  have  al- 
ways noticed  that  officers  who  in  Paris  arranged  the  finest  enter- 
prises in  the  world  became  of  quite  a  different  opinion  when  here." 

The  restrictions  placed  upon  the  military  operations  of  great 
leaders  by  too  strict  instructions,  most  often  formulated  without 
knowledge  of  technical  or  fortuitous  necessities,  have  never  led,  so 
far  as  I  know,  to  fortunate  results.  The  history  of  the  wars  of  all 
times  and  all  countries  furnishes,  on  the  contrary,  numerous  ex- 
amples of  the  unhappy  part  played  in  final  failure  by  the  untimely 
interference  of  the  controlling  powers  in  the  operations  in  the 
field. 

The  Spanish-American  war,  that  which  recently  took  place  in 
the  far  East,  without  counting  many  others,  will  allow  us  to  sus- 
tain this  conclusion. 

This  would  be  the  proper  place  to  discuss  the  American  War  of 
Independence,  interesting  in  so  many  respects ;  but  I  think  it  more 
profitable  to  postpone  its  examination  to  the  chapter  on  authors, 
when  we  shall  set  forth  Captain  Mahan's  theories. 

SUFFREN. 

The  transition  from  Tourville  to  Suffren  is  quite  natural :  the 
two  great  seamen  really  based  their  strategy  on  almost  identical 
rules,  deriving  always  from  the  same  principles,  for  it  was  above 
all  by  the  incomparable  flashes  of  genius  of  his  strategy  that 
Suffren  has  made  his  name  famous  in  all  the  navies  of  the  world 

63 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

and  has  left  to  us,  French  naval  officers,  imperishable  memories. 
It  is  not  unnecessary  to  insist  upon  this  important  point,  for  in  a 
book  on  naval  strategy,  which  I  should  not  mention  were  it  not 
by  a  former  naval  officer,  this  astonishing  opinion  may  be  read : 
" Suffren  was  above  all  a  tactician!!!"  Such  a  remarkable  con- 
clusion can  only  be  explained  by  a  complete  misunderstanding  of 
history  or  by  a  much  too  superficial  interpretation  of  facts. 

If  Suffren  was  actually  ahead  of  his  times  in  tactics ;  if  he 
blazed  the  way  in  which  Nelson,  following  him,  found  on  the  field 
of  battle  his  most  glorious  successes,  as  we  shall  soon  see  in  detail, 
we  must  repeat  that  it  is  above  all  by  his  magnificent  conception  of 
the  art  of  high  war  that  he  became  immortal. 

Even  before  an  important  command  had  permitted  him  to  dis- 
play the  full  measure  of  his  military  genius,  he  had  shown  on  many 
occasions  how  well  he  understood  war,  and  his  method,  as  we  are 
about  to  demonstrate,  resembles  that  which  is  already  familiar 
to  us. 

In  1778,  as  captain  of  a  ship  in  d'Estaing's  squadron,  he  spent 
the  whole  time  of  that  campaign  in  America,  in  chafing  like  a 
blooded  horse  under  the  direction  of  an  incapable  hand.  The 
many  echos  of  his  discontent  may  be  found  in  his  correspondence. 

During  the  expedition  against  Saint  Lucia,  the  English  Admiral 
Harrington  is  surprised  at  anchor  with  seven  ships ;  d'Estaing 
could  easily  have  finished  him,  for  he  had  twelve.  But  he  pre- 
ferred to  attempt  a  landing,  which  failed ;  yet  Suffren  had  written 
to  him  on  this  occasion:  "Let  us  destroy  this  squadron;  their 
army,  ill  supplied,  in  a  difficult  country,  would  surely  be  forced  to 
surrender;  let  Byron  come  afterwards,  he  will  then  be  welcome/' 

And  thereupon  appears,  with  startling  clearness,  the  superiority 
of  this  conception  of  war,  which  fixes  as  its  principal  objective  the 
destruction  of  the  naval  forces  of  the  enemy.  In  this  example  of 
Saint  Lucia,  was  it  not  absolutely  sure  that,  Harrington's  fleet 
once  annihilated,  nothing  could  relieve  the  island  from  the  neces- 
sity of  surrender,  in  the  absence  of  any  possible  help  ?  Better  still, 
after  Harrington's  defeat,  the  French  fleet  could  and  must  have 
conquered  that  of  Byron ;  it  would  then  have  been  mistress  of  the 
sea.  Having  failed  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  two  English 
admirals,  it  let  slip  the  victory  which  was  in  its  grasp.  The  pre- 
cise significance  of  superior  forces  is  here  exemplified,  and  the 
lesson  to  be  learned  is  that  in  war  it  is  not  necessary  to  try  to  have 

64 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

absolute  superiority  all  the  time  and  everywhere.  Such  an  endea- 
vor would  usually  be  in  vain ;  but  from  the  classic  fight  of  the 
Horatii  and  the  Curiatii  till  now,  it  is  relative  superiority,  at  one 
place  and  under  fixed  conditions,  that  it  is  important  to  secure. 
If  d'Estaing  had  understood  this  he  would  have  beaten  the  English 
in  detail,  Byron  after  Barrington,  despite  his  inferiority  relative  to 
their  joint  forces.  As  for  Suffren,  he  understood  it,  and  already 
he  was  giving  proof  of  the  marvelous  intuition  in  matters  of  war 
which  was  to  immortalize  his  name  and  the  campaign  of  India. 

"  Our  campaign  has  been  a  succession  of  vicissitudes,  of  good 
fortune,  of  evil  fortune,  and  of  follies,"  he  wrote  after  the  Saint 
Lucia  affair,  where  his  counsels  had  been  so  little  attended  to, 
"  During  my  thirty-five  years  of^service  I  have  seen  many  acts  of 
folly,  but  never  so  great  a  concourse  of  them  .  .  .  .  the  foolish 
maneuvers  that  have  been  made,  the  silly  and  treacherous  coun- 
sels that  have  been  given,  could  hardly  be  imagined.  Finally,  I 
have  fallen  into  disfavor  for  advising  the  attack  of  seven  small 
ships  with  twelve  big  ones,  because  some  of  them  were  defended 
by  some  shore  batteries." 

After  the  junction  of  the  two  English  squadrons,  which  it  had 
not  depended  upon  him  to  prevent,  he  wrote  further :  "  What  is 
very  much  to  be  zvished  is  that  all  this  should  be  finished.  A  cam- 
paign a  year  long  is  very  tiresome,  especially  when,  having  had 
ten  chances  to  accomplish  great  things,  zve  have  done  only  what 
is  foolish  .  .  .  .  /  am  full  of  disgust  .  .  .  /' 

In  another  letter  he  also  said :  "  Otherwise  led,  we  would  have 
been  loaded  with  glory  and  riches,  but  we  shall  get  neither  one  nor 
the  other  .  .  .  ." 

The  opportunity  was  close  at  hand  for  this  ardent  and  energetic 
nature  to  show  the  full  scope  of  its  military  worth. 

Two  years  later  he  sailed  from  Brest,  with  six  ships  and  eight 
transports  under  his  command,  commissioned  to  proceed  to  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to  there  disembark  the  troops  and  prevent 
the  occupation  of  that  Dutch  colony  by  the  fleet  of  Commodore 
Johnston,  sent  there  by  England. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  this  campaign,  a  war  problem  of  the 
greatest  importance  presented  itself  without  warning  to  Suffren ; 
I  refer  to  the  incident  known  as  the  battle  of  Porto  Praya.  The 
adversary  whom  he  expected  to  find  south  of  Africa  unexpectedly 
appeared  before  him,  and  he  had  to  choose  between  two  courses : 

65 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

either  to  take  advantage  of  his  momentary  delay  at  anchor  by  pro- 
ceeding with  all  haste  and  reaching  the  destination  before  him,  or 
to  attack  and  endeavor  to  destroy  him. 

For  a  man  like  Suffren,  the  choice  could  not  be  doubtful ;  since 
the  only  possible  obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  mission  was 
Johnston's  squadron,  the  plan  of  suppressing  that  obstacle  could 
not  but  enforce  itself  upon  his  mind. 

The  occasion  was  truly  too  favorable  not  to  be  seized,  and  that 
is  why  Suffren  attacked.  He  even  attacked  with  a  little  too  much 
impetuosity,  and  if  the  strategical  conception  is  without  flaw,  his 
tactical  plan  is  far  from  meriting  such  praise.  His  orders,  ill 
understood  or  badly  executed  by  his  captains,  did  not  allow  him 
to  derive  from  the  battle  all  the  profit  he  had  a  right  to  expect. 
But,  though  the  English  squadron  was  not  annihilated,  it  was  at 
least  sufficiently  injured  no  longer  to  be  in  condition  to  proceed  to 
the  Cape  until  after  serious  repairs.  Suffren's  mission  was  then 
successfully  accomplished,  and  that  is  the  really  important  matter. 

But  this  incomplete  result  could  not  measure  up  to  the  genius  of 
Suffren.  "Porto  Praya  could  and  should  have  immortalised  me" 
he  wrote;  if I  have  missed,  or  have  been  made  to  miss,  a  unique 
chance.  With  my  five  ships  I  was  able  to  make  peace,  and  a 
glorious  peace.  But  it  was  not  so;  that  battle  is  of  those  which 
decide  nothing,  which  are  soon  forgotten." 

This  letter  tells  more  than  many  facts  how  Suffren  understood 
war  ;  in  another  he  added  :  "  I  have  missed  a  chance  to  do  great 
things  with  small  means;  I  am  inconsolable"  Later  on  he  was 
greatly  to  rehabilitate  himself. 

Thus,  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  career  as  a  military  com- 
mander, his  conception  of  war  appears  clearly  and  can  be  summed 
up  in  a  brief  formula :  to  consider  the  fleets  of  the  enemy  as  the 
principal  force  which  must  be  destroyed  and  reduced  to  impotence 
in  order  the  more  surely  to  accomplish  the  object  of  the  war. 

His  wonderful  Indian  campaign  afforded  him  means  of  apply- 
ing his  formula  and  of  bringing  out  all  its  remarkable  value. 

To  understand  the  full  importance  of  the  admirable  lesson  in 
naval  matters  which  Suffren  has  bequeathed  for  our  meditation, 
it  is  indispensable  to  make  a  rapid  survey  of  all  the  difficulties  with 
which  he  had  to  grapple. 

Set  forth  from  the  Isle  of  France  with  his  fleet,  to  carry  on  war 
on  a  coast  wholly  in  possession  of  the  English,  he  had  at  his  dispo- 

66 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA.. 

sition  neither  a  harbor,  nor  a  place  of  shelter  against  bad  weather, 
nor  any  base  of  operations  where  he  could  repair  or  revictual. 

And  yet  he  did  not  hesitate,  despite  these  unfavorable  condi- 
tions, to  push  resolutely  in  pursuit  of  the  English  fleet  under 
Hughes. 

Sadras,  Providien,  Negapatam,  Trincomalee,  and  Cuddalore, 
so  many  desperate  and  glorious  combats,  are  the  landmarks  of  a 
memorable  campaign,  infinitely  more  fruitful  in  the  lessons  of  a 
wise  system  of  war  than  in  immediate  results.  Not  one  of  these 
engagements  was  really  decisive ;  but  if  Suffren  did  not  succeed 
in  satisfying  his  tenacious  desire  to  ruin  completely  the  English 
naval  power  in  the  Indian  ocean,  it  was  always  the  fault  of  his 
captains.  It  was  this  great  seaman's  fate  never  to  have  under  his 
orders  lieutenants  capable  of  understanding  his  ideas,  which  were 
of  too  high  an  order  for  them,  and  which  moreover  shocked  the 
timid  traditions  of  the  French  navy  of  that  period.  He  must  have 
seemed,  in  their  eyes,  a  sort  of  naval  revolutionary. 

Thus,  in  his  correspondence,  he  gives  vent,  after  each  of  his 
battles,  to  bitter  complaints  against  his  captains  who,  whether  be- 
cause they  did  not  understand  his  orders  or  his  signals,  or  because 
they  wished  to  protest,  in  a  truly  unworthy  manner,  against  the 
exceptional  fatigues  that  their  terrible  chief  imposed  upon  them, 
took  but  an  indifferent  and  backward  part  in  those  battles. 

His  orders  and  his  signals,  nevertheless,  deserved  better ;  for  in 
tactics,  especially  in  its  fundamental  conceptions,  Suffren  was  be- 
fore all  an  originator  and  inaugurated  the  method  of  fighting 
which  Nelson  adopted  and  by  which  he  obtained  his  greatest  re- 
sults. Until  Suffren's  time,  in  fact,  battles  were  fought  in  what 
may  be  called  the  classic  style,  ship  opposed  to  ship,  in  two  parallel 
lines,  and  were  nothing  more  than  aggregations  of  duels. 

Suffren  overturns  this  tradition,  pushing  to  its  logical  conclusion 
the  profound  sense  which  he  has  of  the  idea  of  force.  He  seeks 
to  bring  the  whole  strength  of  all  his  forces  to  bear  together 
against  only  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  Thereby  he  merely 
carries  out  upon  the  sea  the  principles  already  applied  by  great 
military  leaders  on  the  land. 

The  English  historian  Clerk  wrote  on  this  subject:  " M.  Suff- 
ren not  having  had  the  hoped  for  success  in  the  attack  upon  the 
rear  of  the  British  squadron  the  i/th  February,  his  attempt  upon 

67 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  van,  equally  well  concerted  on  this  occasion,  evidently  proves 
him  to  be  an  officer  of  genius  and  great  enterprise." 

"  If  M.  SufFren  had  wind  enough  first  to  bring  down  the  van  of 
his  neet  to  the  attack  of  the  British,  and  afterwards  to  bring  up 
the  rear  division  to  support  it,  even  within  pistol  shot  of  the 
British  center;  and  if  the  ships  in  the  British  rear  could  not  in  time 
get  up  to  annoy  a  crippled  enemy,  this  the  more  particularly  illus- 
trates the  propriety  and  practicability  of  bringing  up  and  direct- 
ing the  whole,  or  any  part  of  a  force,  against  a  smaller  part  of  the 
force  of  an  enemy;  and  that  the  effect  ought  to  have  important 
consequences,  in  battles  at  sea,  as  well  as  in  battles  at  land." 

It  is  true  then  that  Suffren  had  the  making  of  an  incomparable 
tactician,  because  he  felt  the  necessity  of  revolutionizing  manceu- 
vers  which  were  too  much  regulated,  too  confined,  but  it  is  also 
exact  to  say  that  he  was  not  complete  as  a  tactician,  whereas  he 
will  always  be  a  model,  without  blemish,  in  the  matter  of  strategy. 
He  did  not  take  enough  account,  in  fact,  of  the  inexperience  of  his 
captains,  and  he  did  not  take  enough  care  to  make  them  understand 
his  plans  before  battle.  That  alone  explains  the  persistence  with 
which  those  captains  held  back  from  full  co-operation  with  him  in 
all  his  battles,  without  exception,  and  thus  compromised  his 
success. 

After  having  noted  that  Suffren's  military  genius  lacked  nothing 
in  knowledge  of  principles,  his  unerring  strategy  above  all  de- 
mands our  attention. 

Among  the  deeds  of  that  fine  campaign  of  India,  the  taking  of 
Trincomalee  is  particularly  interesting.  To  be  able  to  carry  on  a 
war  to  the  death,  the  French  fleet  had  to  have  what  is  nowadays 
called  a  "  point  d'appui,"  and  has  always  been  a  base  of  opera- 
tions. Profiting  by  the  absence  of  the  English  fleet,  which  had 
taken  shelter  in  Madras  for  repairs  after  the  battle  of  Negapatam, 
while  he  did  the  same  in  the  open  roadstead  of  Cuddalore,  and 
also  speculating  upon  the  advantage  which  the  southwest  monsoon 
gave  him  by  putting  his  adversary  to  leeward,  Suffren  appeared 
before  Trincomalee,  disembarked  his  troops,  and  within  six  days, 
by  the  activity  and  vigor  of  his  attack,  as  well  as  by  the  mildness 
of  the  terms  he  offered,  brought  about  the  surrender  of  the  place. 
This  activity  and  this  suavity  were  explained  by  Suffren's  feeling 
that  such  an  enterprise  could  only  be  justified  in  a  military  sense 
on  the  strict  condition  of  being  carried  on  out  of  sight  of  a  hostile 

68 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fleet.  On  the  eighth  day  the  latter  actually  appeared,  but  found 
the  place  taken.  And  this  time  once  more  the  great  French  seaman 
had  accomplished  a  masterpiece  of  war. 

He  had  shown,  on  another  occasion,  to  what  an  extent  he  real- 
ized the  high  responsibilities  of  a  great  military  chief's  mission. 
Called  back,  by  instructions  received  from  the  minister,  to  the  Isle 
of  France,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  disregard  them,  for  he  would 
have  considered  it  desertion  to  abandon  a  cruise  which  already  had 
raised  so  high  the  prestige  of  French  arms  and  shown  to  our 
enemies,  as  well  to  our  allies  in  India,  that  there  still  existed  a 
French  navy. 

This  example  of  a  courage  unfortunately  too  rare,  the  courage 
to  assume  responsibilities,  is  worthy  of  much  meditation ;  we  must 
not  be  astonished  at  finding  it  in  the  great  seaman  we  are  dis- 
cussing, for  it  has  been  one  of  the  principal  virtues  of  all  the  great 
warriors  of  all  ages. 

After  the  battle  of  Trincomalee,  which  followed  the  capture  of 
that  place,  Suffren  wrote  to  de  Castries :  "  I  have  just  lost  the 
chance  of  destroying  the  English  squadron  .  ...  It  is  frightful 
to  have  been  four  times  in  a  position  to  destroy  the  English  squad- 
ron and  that  it  still  exists" 

These  few  words  contain  in  condensed  form  the  whole  theory  of 
war;  for  us  they  now  no  longer  express  new  ideas.  We  shall 
come  upon  them  again  more  than  once. 

Suffren,  as  well  as  others,  understood  the  whole  importance  of 
speed,  when  in  his  letters  he  did  not  cease  to  advocate  copper 
sheathing  ships  and  also  to  complain  of  the  lack  of  frigates  which 
prevented  his  pursuing  the  enemy ;  nor  did  he  deplore  less  the  lack 
of  homogeneousness  of  his  squadron,  made  up  of  unlike  unities, 
a  capital  defect  which  was  the  most  frequent  cause  of  his  ships 
going  into  action  in  disorder. 

The  results  of  this  marvelous  campaign  have  been  summed  up 
in  the  inscription  upon  the  pedestal  of  the  statue  erected  to  Suff- 
ren :  "The  Cape  protected,  Trincomalee  captured,  Cuddalore  de- 
livered, India  defended,  six  glorious  battles." 

We  seem  to  be  dreaming,  after  that,  when  we  recall  that  scarcely 
a  few  years  ago  a  minister  of  marine,  questioned  as  to  the  theories 
of  war  then  favored  by  the  Naval  General  Staff,  replied  :  "  On  no 
account  will  we  recommence  Suffren's  campaign"  Which 
amounted  to  saying  that  we  refused  in  advance  to  add  another  to 

69 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

what  is  incontestably  one  of  the  most  glorious  pages  of  French 
naval  history. 

To  keep  the  sea  without  let -up,  to  winter  on  an  inhospitable 
coast,  to  fall  upon  the  naval  enemy  to  fight  him  to  a  finish  and 
destroy  him,  finally  to  win  command  of  the  sea,  such  were  Suff- 
ren's  deeds.  Few  laurels  can  be  compared  with  his. 

NELSON. 

The  distinction  between  Suffren  and  Nelson  lies  in  the  different 
instruments  at  their  disposal  and,  to  a  notable  degree,  in  their 
luck.  While  the  former  was  the  misunderstood  leader  of  a  poorly 
armed  and  badly  trained  fleet,  and  had  at  his  disposal  only  pre- 
carious resources,  and  under  his  orders  only  mediocre  and  undis- 
ciplined officers ;  the  latter  had  the  good  fortune  to  command 
homogeneous  squadrons,  wonderfully  prepared  by  his  prede- 
cessors, crews  accustomed  by  very  hard  cruising  to  all  the  sur- 
prises of  the  sea,  subordinates,  all  fine  sailors,  who  could  under- 
stand and  assimilate  all  his  war  plans. 

But  if  the  instruments  differ,  the  principles  are  identical,  and 
the  rules  which  both  obeyed  were  in  all  respects  comparable. 

Even  before  he  had  assumed  the  heavy  responsibilities  of  chief 
command,  Nelson  also  had  made  known,  on  many  occasions,  how 
he  understood  war.  After  the  naval  battle  of  March  14,  1795,  in 
the  Gulf  of  Genoa,  in  which  he  had  taken  part  under  Admiral 
Hotham,  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  pursuing  without  rest 
the  French  squadron  which,  if  not  completely  beaten,  was  at  least 
demoralized  as  the  result  of  an  indecisive  battle,  Nelson  went  to 
see  his  chief  to  induce  him  to  order  the  pursuit.  The  English 
admiral,  satisfied  with  his  partial  success — with  what  he  considered 
a  good  day's  work — refused  to  consent  to  it.  Regarding  which 
Nelson  wrote :  "  Now,  had  we  taken  ten  sail,  and  had  allowed  the 
eleventh  to  escape  when  it  had  been  possible  to  have  got  at  her,  I 
could  never  have  called  it  well  done.  In  short,  I  wish  to  be  an 
Admiral  and  in  command  of  the  English  fleet;  I  should  very  soon 
either  do  much,  or  be  ruined.  My  disposition  cannot  bear  tame 
and  slow  measures.  Sure  I  am,  had  I  commanded  our  fleet  on  the 
iqth,  that  either  the  whole  French  fleet  would  have  graced  my 
triumph,  or  I  should  have  been  in  a  confounded  scrape." 

These  words  are  a  veritable  confession  of  faith  on  the  part  of 
the  great  leader,  the  exposition  of  a  doctrine  which  he  was  later 

70 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

on  to  apply  with  so  great  a  mastery,  and  which  he  had  drawn 
from  the  very  sources  of  military  history.  They  include  more- 
over an  idea  which  cannot  be  too  much  pondered,  that  is  so  say 
that  war  is  not  to  be  waged  without  risks.  For  what  is  war  in 
reality,  if  not  a  game,  the  most  terrible  of  all,  since  the  stakes  are 
human  lives,  the  destinies  of  entire  races  ?  One  might  as  well  say 
that  he  would  never  take  any  chance  when  he  gambled. 

Activity  was  also  Nelson's  chief  characteristic :  "  Time  is  our 
best  ally,  and  I  hope  we  shall  not  soon  give  her  up,  as  all  our 
allies  have  given  us  up.  Time  is  everything;  five  minutes  makes 
the  difference  between  victory  and  defeat." 

He  had  also  to  the  highest  degree  the  courage  to  assume  respon- 
sibilities. Who  does  not  know  of  his- celebrated  act  of  disobedience 
to  Admiral  Parker's  signals  at  Copenhagen?  If  he  had  obeyed 
those  orders,  which  directed  him  to  cease  firing  and  withdraw,  he 
would  certainly  have  endangered  his  squadron,  forced  to  pass 
through  a  narrow  channel  under  the  fire  of  the  coast  batteries. 
The  intuition  of  his  military  genius  must  then  have  enjoined  upon 
him  as  a  necessity  what,  taken  in  its  narrowest  sense,  was  an  in- 
fraction of  discipline. 

But  it  is  above  all  in  his  operations  against  the  French  fleets 
that  his  deeds  of  war  shine  most  brightly. 

In  the  first  phase  of  this  naval  struggle,  in  furious  chase  after 
the  French  squadron  which  carried  Bonaparte  and  his  fortunes  to 
Egypt,  he  reaches  Alexandria  before  it,  puts  to  sea  again  at  once, 
in  the  belief  that  he  is  on  the  wrong  scent,  cruises  back  and  forth 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  finally  meets  it  at  Aboukir,  where  he 
destroys  it. 

Vainly  would  one  seek  in  naval  history  for  a  more  striking 
example  of  the  importance  of  speed  in  the  pursuit  of  an  objective, 
and,  in  Nelson's  eyes,  all  other  considerations  were  secondary  and 
lost  sight  of  in  comparison  with  this  objective.  To  ruin  the 
French  naval  power  and  strangle  at  their  birth  the  projects  of 
Bonaparte,  one  measure  only  seemed  to  him  efficacious,  and  that 
was  the  annihilation  of  the  fleet.  And  in  his  tenacious  purpose  to 
attain  this  object  there  is  to  be  found,  besides  its  faultless  princi- 
ple, the  marvel  of  the  great  English  admiral's  naval  strategy. 
His  tactics  is  no  less  remarkable.  Appearing  unexpectedly  before 
the  French  fleet,  which  was  at  anchor,  unguarded,  in  Aboukir  bay, 
and,  with  culpable  carelessness,  was  absorbed  in  taking  in  water, 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

he  attacks  it  without  hesitation,  and,  to  better'  crush  it,  brings  half 
the  French  ships  between  two  fires  by  anchoring  a  number  of  his 
own  ships  inshore  of  the  leading  ones.  By  this  bold  manoeuver,  he 
gave  a  new  demonstration  of  the  naval  theorem  of  superior  forces. 
But  it  is  especially  in  the  second  phase  of  this  struggle,  that 
which  ended  in  the  disaster  of  Trafalgar,  that  Nelson's  military 
conceptions  offer  us  the  largest  field  from  which  to  gather  a  rich 
and  interesting  harvest ;  on  that  sad  page  there  is  much  for  us  to 
learn. 

In  the  strict  blockade  of  Toulon  and  the  coast  of  Provence, 
maintained  through  s cress  of  weather,  he  already  points  out  to  us 
a  lesson  by  which  we  can  profit  even  now.  Men  and  officers 
inured  to  hardships,  ready  for  all  the  trials  of  the  most  difficult 
seafaring,  must  be  trained  at  sea,  in  conflict  with  its  thousand 
changing  phases,  and  nowhere  else.  Villeneuve's  men,  relaxed  by 
too  long  a  stay  in  the  harbor  of  Toulon,  were  no  match  for  those 
of  Nelson. 

Note  this  well,  for  in  the  game  of  war  no  cards  are  negligible. 

The  French  fleet,  having  effected  a  first  sortie,  is  obliged  to 
return  to  port,  partially  disabled  and  much  tried  by  a  violent  storm 
which  Nelson  had  sustained  in  the  excellent  state  which  the  sea 
habit  alone  can  give. 

Convinced  that  the  French  squadron  on  leaving  Toulon  had 
stood  for  the  eastern  part  of  the  Mediterranean,  the  English  ad- 
miral hastens  in  pursuit.  There  were  two  contingencies  to  be 
faced :  either  the  French  squadron,  scattered  by  the  storm,  had 
returned  to  port,  or,  in  spite  of  the  damages  of  some  ships,  it  had 
continued  on  its  course  towards  a  destination  which  he  guessed  to 
be  the  Levant. 

Thus  was  laid  before  him  for  action  one  of  the  many  war  prob- 
lems that  a  military  chief  has  to  solve  with  no  other  aid  than  his 
own  sagacity. 

He  seized  upon  the  solution  of  pursuit  as  the  one  with  the  maxi- 
mum of  chances  in  its  favor,  being  very  certain  that  in  case  the 
fleet  he  was  harassing  had  taken  refuge  in  port  he  would  be  able 
quickly  to  find  it  there.  And,  actually,  Nelson  pressed  on  to 
Alexandria,  and  learning  that  the  French  fleet  had  not  appeared 
there,  without  delay  started  back  to  Toulon. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  which  is  the  more  admirable,  the  promptness 
of  decision  of  the  illustrious  seaman,  or  his  uncommon  tenacity  in 

'   72 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

carrying  out  his  projects.  He  surely  was  a  type  of  the  great  sea- 
man, who  perceived  that  a  fleet  is  made  to  traverse  the  seas  and 
not  to  rest  in  harbors. 

A  fortnight  after  his  return  from  the  Levant  and  his  renewal 
of  the  blockade  of  the  coast  of  Provence,  the  French  fleet  under 
Villeneuve's  command  again  set  sail  and,  this  time  favored  by 
weather,  escaped  his  watchfulness  and  stood  for  the  Strait  with  a 
view  to  reach  the  West  Indies. 

Nelson,  informed  of  this  object  within  a  few  days,  hesitates  no 
more  than  on  the  previous  occasion  to  launch  himself  in  pursuit  of 
a  naval  force,  which  he  has  never  failed  to  regard  as  a  fit  prey  for 
him  to  capture  and  destroy.  But,  retarded  in  his  voyage  by  in- 
cessant contrary  winds  and  weather,  he  loses  long  days  which  the 
hostile  squadron  puts  to  good  use.  While  he  grieves  over  the 
good  fortune  which  has  deserted  him,  nothing  disheartens  him. 
"  The  luck  may  turn,"  he  writes ;  "  patience  and  perseverance  can 
accomplish  wonders."  Informed,  after  reaching  Gibralter,  of  the 
route  followed  by  Villeneuve,  he  also,  without  any  hesitation, 
steers  for  the  Antilles. 

It  is  well  worth  while  to  observe  that  no  instructions  authorized 
him  to  leave  the  Mediterranean,  which  was  under  his  care,  nor 
even  could  his  doing  so  have  been  thought  of.  And  yet,  in  taking 
upon  himself  the  whole  responsibility  for  abandoning  the  field  of 
operations  which  had  been  assigned  to  him,  for  the  purpose  of 
furiously  chasing  Villeneuve,  Nelson  gives  us  a  wonderful  ex- 
ample of  that  rigorous  solution  of  the  problems  of  war  which 
attributes  to  the  hostile  naval  force  the  chief  role.  Why  did 
England  maintain  a  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean?  Surely  to 
destroy  the  power  of  the  French  fleet  and  to  assure  to  herself  the 
command  of  that  sea.  This  fleet,  though  it  had  escaped  from  that 
sea,  was  still  the  only  proper  object  of  pursuit,  and  by  destroying 
it,  even  at  the  Antipodes,  the  freedom  of  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  supremacy  of  the  English  naval  power  were  assured  by  the 
same  blow.  Guided  by  this  powerful  and  faultless  logic,  Nelson 
made  sail  for  the  Antilles  in  obstinate  pursuit  of  that  fleet  which 
he  zealously  called  HIS  fleet.  This  has  generally  been  considered 
an  arrogant  expression,  but  for  my  part  I  am  tempted  to  regard 
it  as  the  very  elegant  formula  in  which  he  condensed  his  whole 
theory  of  war. 

And  this  was  so  much  his  idea  that,  having  learned,  on  his 

73 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

arrival  in  the  Antilles,  the  departure  for  Europe  of  that  ever  van- 
ishing fleet,  he  also  turned  back  to  Cadiz  and  the  Mediterranean, 
energetically  resolved  to  present  it  from  regaining  superiority  in 
that  sea,  and  disquieting  Sicily. 

The  events  which  then  developed  are  known  to  all:  his  arrival 
at  Cadiz,  where  no  news  of  the  French  fleet  had  yet  been  received  ; 
the  indecisive  meeting  of  Villeneuve  and  Calder  off  Cape  Finis- 
terre;  the  French  admiral's  abandonment  of  Napoleon's  magnifi- 
cent plan  of  war,  his  retreat  to  Cadiz,  and  finally  the  disaster  of 
Trafalgar. 

To  make  us  understand  what  Nelson's  tactical  method  was 
under  these  circumstances,  nothing  could  serve  so  well  as  knowl- 
edge of  the  great  English  admiral's  real  thoughts.  By  comparing 
results  with  his  anticipations,  we  may  judge  the  value  of  his  pro- 
ceedings. Nelson's  military  idea  on  this  special  point  is  set  forth 
in  full  in  two  memoranda  of  great  enough  importance  to  merit 
reproduction. 

In  the  first,  a  real  plan  of  battle  intended  for  the  captains  under 
his  command,  before  the  memorable  chase  after  Villeneuve's  fleet, 
Nelson  thus  expresses  himself : 

"  The  business  of  an  English  Commander-in-chief  being  first  to 
bring  an  enemy's  fleet  to  battle  on  the  most  advantageous  terms  to 
himself  (I  mean  that  of  laying  his  ships  close  on  board  the  enemy 
as  expeditiously  as  possible),  and  secondly  to  continue  them  there, 
without  separating,  until  the  business  is  decided;  I  am  sensible 
beyond  this  object  it  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  say  a  word, 
being  fully  assured  that  the  admirals  and  captains  of  the  fleet  I 
have  the  honour  to  command  will,  knowing  my  precise  object, 
that  of  a  close  and  decisive  battle,  supply  any  deficiency  in  my  not 
making  signals;  ^vhich  may,  if  not  extended  beyond  these  objects, 
either  be  misunderstood,  or,  if  waited  for,  very  probably,  from 
various  causes,  be  impossible  for  the  commander-in-chief  to  make. 
Therefore  it  will  only  be  requisite  for  me  to  state,  in  as  few  words 
as  possible,  the  various  modes  in  which  it  may  be  necessary  for  me 
to  obtain  my  object,  on  which  depends  not  only  the  honour  and 
glory  of  our  country,  but  possibly  its  safety,  and  with  it  that  of  all 
Europe,  from  French  tyranny  and  oppression. 

"  If  the  two  fleets  are  both  willing  to  fight,  but  little  manceuver- 
ing  is  necessary;  the  less  the  better — a  day  is  soon  lost  in  that 
business.  Therefore  I  will  only  suppose  that  the  enemy's  fleet 

74 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

being  to  leeward,  standing  close  upon  a  wind  on  the  starboard 
tack,  and  that  I  am  nearly  ahead  of  them,  standing  on  the  larboard 
tack;  of  course  I  should  weather  them.  The  weather  must  be 
supposed  to  be  moderate,  for  if  it  be  a  gale  of  wind,  the  maneuver- 
ing of  both  fleets  is  but  of  little  avail,  and  probably  no  decisive 
action  would  take  place  with  the  whole  fleet.  Two  modes  present 
themselves.  One  to  stand  on  just  out  of  gunshot,  until  the  van 
ship  of  my  line  would  be  about  the  centre  ship  of  the  enemy,  then 
make  the  signal  to  wear  together,  then  bear  up,  engage  with  all 
our  force  the  six  or  five  van-ships  of  the  enemy,  passing,  cer- 
tainly, if  opportunity  offered,  through  their  line.  This  would 
prevent  their  bearing  up,  and  the  action,  from  the  known  bravery 
and  conduct  of  the  admirals  ancT  captains,  would  certainly  be 
decisive;  the  (two  or  three)  rear-ships  of  the  enemy  would  act  as 
they  please,  and  our  ships  would  give  a  good  account  of  them 
should  they  persist  in  mixing  with  our  ships.  The  other  mode 
would  be  to  stand  under  an  easy  but  commanding  sail,  directly 
for  their  headmost  ship,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  knowing 
whether  I  should  pass  to  leeward  or  windward  of  him.  In  that 
situation  I  would  make  the  signal  to  engage  the  enemy  to  leeward, 
and  to  cut  through  their  fleet  about  the  sixth  ship  from  the  van, 
passing  very  close;  they  being  on  a  wind  and  you  going  large, 
could  cut  their  line  when  you  please.  The  van-ships  of  the  enemy 
would,  by  the  time  our  rear  came  abreast  of  the  van-ship,  be 
severely  cut  up,  and  our  van  could  not  expect  to  escape  damage. 
I  would  then  have  our  rear-ship,  and  every  ship  in  succession, 
wear,  continue  the  action  with  either  the  van-ship  or  second  ship, 
as  it  might  appear  most  eligible  from  her  crippled  state ;  and  this 
mode  pursued,  I  see  nothing  to  prevent  the  capture  of  the  five  or 
six  ships  of  the  enemy's  van.  The  two  or  three  ships  of  the 
enemy's  rear  must  either  bear  up  or  wear,  and  in  either  case, 
although  they  would  be  in  a  better  plight  probably  than  our  two 
van-ships  (now  the  rear)  yet  they  would  be  separated,  and  at  a 
distance  to  leeward,  so  as  to  give  our  ships  time  to  refit;  and  by 
that  time,  I  believe,  the  battle  would,  from  the  judgment  of  the 
admiral  and  captains,  be  over  with  the  rest  of  them.  Signals  from 
these  moments  are  useless,  when  every  man  is  disposed  to  do  his 
duty.  The  great  object  is  for  us  to  support  each  other,  and  to  keep 
close  to  the  enemy,  and  to  leeward  of  him. 

"  If  the  enemy  are  running  away,  then  the  only  signals  necessary 

75 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

will  be,  to  engage  the  enemy  as  arriving  up  with  them;  and  the 
other  ships  to  pass  on  for  the  second,  third,  etc.,  giving,  if  possi- 
ble, a  close  fire  into  the  enemy  in  passing,  taking  care  to  give  our 
ships  engaged  notice  of  your  intention." 

This  first  plan  is  a  veritable  discourse  on  tactics,  for  it  would  be 
difficult  to  express  more  fundamental  ideas  in  fewer  phrases. 
Everything  is  to  be  found  there ;  in  the  way  of  theory,  conviction 
of  the  necessity  of  forcing  the  enemy  to  fight,  full  and  entire  con- 
fidence in  his  subordinates,  admirals  and  captains,  based  upon 
their  complete  understanding  of  the  chief's  plans,  worthlessness 
of  signals  during  battle,  exposition  of  the  principle  of  simplicity 
of  methods  in  war.  In  what  concerns  execution,  endeavor  to 
crush  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  by  the  whole  of  one's  own  forces, 
and  breaking  up  that  line  by  passing  through  it ;  finally  putting 
the  finishing  touch  to  victory  by  chasing  the  routed  ships. 

This  enumeration  would  be  incomplete,  were  it  not  added  that 
Nelson  declared,  once  more,  that  war  cannot  be  made  without 
running  risks,  nor  battle  engaged  without  expectation  of  injuries, 
and  that  he  reminded  all  of  the  profit  to  be  derived  from  a  strict 
mutual  dependence,  all  having  a  common  aim.  Having  taken 
care  to  develop  these  sentiments  in  his  subordinates,  he  could 
afford  to  announce  that  signals  were  useless.  Not  one  of  his 
principles  has  become  obsolete ;  they  are  as  eternal  as  the  change- 
less truth. 

The  second  plan  of  combat  is  better  known  than  the  first  and 
has  become  famous  under  the  name  of  Nelson's  Memorandum;  it 
is  the  one  which  was  devised  before  Trafalgar;  much  may  be 
learned  from  it: 

"  Thinking  it  almost  impossible  to  bring  a  -fleet  of  forty  sail  of 
the  line  into  a  line  of  battle  in  variable  winds,  thick  weather,  and 
other  circumstances  which  must  occur,  without  such  a  loss  of  time 
that  the  opportunity  vvould  probably  be  lost  of  bringing  the  enemy 
to  battle  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  the  business  decisive,  I  have 
therefore  made  up  my  mind  to  keep  the  fleet  in  that  position  of 
sailing  (with  the  exception  of  the  first  and  second  in  command) 
that  the  order  of  sailing  is  to  be  the  order  of  battle,  placing  the 
Heet  in  two  lines  of  sixteen  ships  each,  with  an  advance  squadron 
of  eight  of  the  fastest  sailing  two-decked  ships,  which  will  always 
make,  if  wanted,  a  line  of  twenty-four  sail,  on  whichever  line  the 
commander-in-chief  may  direct. 

76 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

"  The  second  in  command  will,  after  my  intentions  are  made 
known  to  him,  have  the  entire  direction  of  his  line  to  make  the 
attack  upon  the  enemy,  and  to  follow  up  the  blow  until  they  are 
captured  or  destroyed. 

"If  the  enemy's  Heel  should  be  seen  to  windward  in  line  of 
battle,  and  that  the  two  lines  and  the  advance  squadron  can  fetch 
them,  they  will  probably  be  so  extended  that  their  van  could  not 
succour  their  rear.  I  should  therefore  probably  make  the  second  in 
command's  signal  to  lead  through  about  their  twelfth  ship  from 
their  rear  (or  wherever  he  could  fetch,  if  not  able  to  get  so  far 
advanced) ;  my  line  would  lead  through  about  their  center,  and 
the  advance  squadron  to  cut  two  or  three  or  four  ships  ahead  of 
their  center,  so  as  to  ensure  getting  at  their  commander-in-chief, 
on  whom  every  effort  must  be  made  to  capture. 

"  The  zvhole  impression  of  the  British  fleet  must  be  to  overpower 
from  two  or  three  ships  ahead  of  their  commander-in-chief,  sup- 
posed to  be  in  the  center,  to  the  rear  of  their  fleet.  I  will  suppose 
twenty  sail  of  the  enemy's  line  to  be  untouched;  it  must  be  some 
time  before  they  could  perform  a  manceuver  to  bring  their  force 
compact  to  attack  any  part  of -the  British  fleet  engaged,  or  to 
succour  their  own  ships,  which  indeed  would  be  impossible  without 
mixing  with  the  ships  engaged.  The  enemy's  fleet  is  supposed  to 
consist  of  forty-six  sail  of  the  line,  British  fleet  of  forty.  If  either 
is  less,  only  a  proportionate  number  of  enemy's  ships  are  to  be  cut 
off;  British  to  be  one-fourth  superior  to  the  enemy  cut  off. 

"Something  must  be  left  to  chance;  nothing  is  sure  in  a  sea 
fight  beyond  all  others.  Shot  will  carry  away  the  masts  and  yards 
of  friends  as  well  as  foes,  but  I  look  with  confidence  to  a  victory 
before  the  van  of  the  enemy  could  succour  their  rear,  and  then 
that  the  British  fleet  would  most  of  them  be  ready  to  receive  their 
twenty  sail  of  the  line  or  to  pursue  them  should  they  endeavor  to 
make  off. 

"  If  the  van  of  the  enemy  tacks,  the  captured  ships  must  run  to 
leeward  of  the  British  fleet;  if  the  enemy  wears,  the  British  must 
place  themselves  between  the  enemy  and  the  captured  and  dis- 
abled British  ships;  and  should  the  enemy  close,  I  have  no  fears 
as  to  the  result. 

"  The  second  in  command  will  in  all  possible  things  direct  the 
movements  of  his  line  by  keeping  them  as  compact  as  the  nature 
of  the  circumstances  will  admit.  Captains  are  to  look  to  their 

77 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

particular  line  as  their  rallying  point.  But,  in  case  signals  can 
neither  be  seen  or  perfectly  understood,  no  captain  can  do  very 
wrong  if  he  places  his  ship  alongside  that  of  an  enemy. 

"  Of  the  intended  attack  from  to  windward,  the  enemy  in  line 
of  battle  ready  to  receive  an  attack : 

"  The  divisions  of  the  British  neet  will  be  brought  nearly  within 
gunshot  of  the  enemy's  center.  The  signal  will  most  probably  then 
be  made  for  the  lee  line  to  bear  up  together,  to  set  all  their  sails, 
even  steering  sails,  in  order  to  get  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the 
enemy's  line,  and  to  cut  through,  beginning  from  the  twelfth  ship 
from  the  enemy's  rear.  Some  ships  may  not  get  through  their 
exact  place,  but  they  will  always  be  at  hand  to  assist  their  friends, 
and  if  any  are  thrown  round  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  they  will 
effectually  complete  the  business  of  twelve  sail  of  the  enemy. 

"Should  the  enemy  wear  together,  or  bear  up  and  sail  large, 
still  the  twelve  ships  composing,  in  the  first  position,  the  enemy's 
rear,  are  to  be  the  object  of  attack  of  the  lee  line,  unless  otherwise 
directed  from  the  commander-in-chief,  which  is  scarcely  to  be  ex- 
pected, as  the  entire  management  of  the  lee  line,  after  the  inten- 
tions of  the  commander-in-chief  (are)  signified,  is  intended  to  be 
left  to  the  judgment  of  the  admiral  commanding  that  line. 

"  The  remainder  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  thirty-four  sail,  are  to  be 
left  to  the  management  of  the  commander-in-chief,  who  will  en- 
deavor to  take  care  that  the  movements  of  the  second  in  command 
are  as  little  interrupted  as  is  possible." 

The  worth  of  this  document  justifies  its  exceptional  celebrity. 
The  order  of  sailing  will  be  the  order  of  battle ;  it  is  with  this 
admirable  statement  of  principles  that  this  incomparable  seaman 
begyis  his  instructions.  It  shows  in  the  fewest  possible  words, 
that  it  would  be  the  most  dangerous  of  illusions  to  believe  it 
practicable  to  perform  on  the  very  field  of  battle,  face  to  face  with 
the  enemy,  this  or  that  complicated  manceuver.  From  the  moment 
that  there  appears  any  chance  of  an  impending  encounter,  a  naval 
force  ought  to  take  formation  ready  at  any  instant  to  open  fire. 
In  commenting  on  this  exposition  of  principles,  we  cannot  help 
thinking  of  the  latest  fact  in  universal  naval  history,  of  the  battle 
of  Tsushima,  where  the  Russians  were  overwhelmed,  principally 
because  they  were  surprised  in  a  cruising  formation  which  bore 
no  resemblance  to  a  judicious  battle  formation. 

In  this  memorandum  two  points  of  incontestable  importance  are 

78 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

touched  upon :  the  reunion  of  two  forces  of  sufficient  numbers  to 
constitute  a  real  fleet,  necessitating  division  into  several  squadrons, 
and  the  composition  of  a  reserve  force  on  the  battle  field.  Thus  is 
set  forth  the  problem  of  bringing  into  action  great  fleets. 

The  memorandum  specifies,  still  more  than  the  first  plan,  a 
tactics  based  upon  the  attack  of  a  portion  of  the  hostile  fleet  by 
the  whole  weight  of  the  naval  force.  Thus  it  sets  forth  with  re- 
markable clearness  the  principle  of  the  superiority  of  forces,  and 
of  relative  superiority,  at  one  or  several  points  of  the  field  of 
battle.  We  already  know  the  method,  for  it  is  that  of  SufTren. 
The  manoeuver  by  which  Nelson,  wishing  to  cut  the  extended  line 
of  the  French-Spanish  fleet,  exposed  the  bows  of  his  ships  to  the 
fire  of  that  long  line,  has  been  much  and  often  criticized  since 
Trafalgar,  on  the  ground  that  this  audacious  manceuver  would 
have  ended  in  disaster  against  an  adversary  as  well  trained  as  the 
English  fleet,  provided  with  as  good  crews,  above  all  with  as  good 
gunners  as  they. 

The  argument  has  no  weight:  there  cannot,  in  fact,  be  any 
rigid  and  absolute  rule  in  war;  everything  is  there,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  question  of  degree.  Knowledge  of  the  moral  qualities  of 
the  adversary  is  one  of  the  most  essential  factors  of  war ;  it  is 
necessary  to  the  commander-in-chief  all  the  time  and  under  all 
circumstances.  And  it  is  precisely  because  Nelson  knew  thor- 
oughly the  moral  and  material  situation  of  HIS  fleet,  the  demoral- 
ization of  its  crews,  the  precarious  condition  of  the  armament  of 
its  ships,  the  undoubted  inefficiency  of  its  gunners,  the  deplorable 
gunnery  methods  used  on  the  French  ships,  and  finally  and  above 
all  the  timid  and  undecided  spirit  of  Villeneuve ;  it  is  because  of 
all  that,  I  say,  that  he  could  and  should  have  permitted  himself 
the  audacious  manoeuver  under  discussion. 

It  may  well  be  that  in  the  sight  of  I  know  not  what  academy  of 
war,  learnedly  laying  down  the  law  on  paper,  he  was  wrong ;  on 
the  field  of  action,  and  under  the  conditions,  he  was  fully  right, 
and  the  facts  have  overabundantly  demonstrated  it. 

The  memorandum  further  accentuates  the  principles  af  mutual 
confidence  and  self  trust  in  battle,  without  which  there  could  not 
be  any  decisive  action ;  that  which  he  accorded  to  his  second  in 
command,  Collingwood,  honors  the  latter  as  much  as  the  chief 
himself.  It  was  the  very  sign  of  Nelson's  sagacity ;  a  commander- 
in-chief  cannot  have  confidence  in  his  subordinates  when  he  has 

79 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

not  confidence  in  himself.  Another  truth  of  all  times  and  of  all 
countries.  There  is  the  same  conviction  of  the  uselessness  of  sig- 
nals, once  the  action  has  begun.  If  a  captain  is  under  fire,  he  is 
at  his  station !  This  is  worth  remembering  and  meditating  upon. 

Finally  the  most  admirable  thing  about  the  famous  memorandum 
is  the  precision  of  the  ideas  developed  in  it  and  the  care  which 
Nelson  takes  to  make  his  captains  understand  his  thoughts,  the 
whole  idea  of  their  chief,  in  order  that  they  may  themselves  bring 
to  the  battle  one  and  the  same  conception,  and  supply  what  is 
needed  in  the  solution  of  unforeseen  cases,  inseparable  from  every 
battle,  in  the  absence  of  new  detailed  orders,  of  signals,  and  of 
what  may  be  termed  intuition. 

That  the  principles  of  the  memorandum  were  faithfully  and 
wholly  carried  out  is  a  matter  of  quite  secondary  importance ;  its 
author  might  die  and  disappear  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
battle :  he  had  breathed  into  the  minds  and  into  the  very  souls  of 
his  captains  the  principles  and  elements  of  victory ;  thenceforth 
victory  was  assured,  and,  despite  his  untimely  exit  from  the  battle 
field,  it  was  Nelson  who  won  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  not 
Collingwood. 

These  conclusions  acquire  new  force  when  we  compare  with 
these  wise,  concise  and  logical  previsions  the  indecision  and  real 
demoralization  of  Villeneuve.  Even  when  he  set  out  from  Cadiz, 
he  was  marked  for  defeat. 

And  now  we  understand  and  share  in  Admiral  Bouet-Villau- 
mez's  appreciation:  "  One  does  not  know  which  to  admire  most 
in  Nelson's  memorandum:  the  spirit  of  foresight  or  the  clearness 
of  exposition  of  the  plan,  which  covers  all  general  cases  without 
going  beyond  the  limits  of  a  quite  military  conciseness.  Only 
at  this  cost  are  great  successes  won.  How  few  know  anything  of 
the  necessary  preliminaries,  and  how  many  disasters  are  due  to 
the  ignorant  or  lazy  spirit  of  leaders  who  do  not  think  themselves 
called  upon  to  play  their  real  parts  till  the  very  day  of  a  battle ! " 


80 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR.    THE  ITALIAN  WAR  (LISSA)  .    CHILE 

AND  PERU.    ADMIRAL  COURBET'S  CHINA  CAMPAIGN. 

CHINA  AND  JAPAN. 

THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR. 

In  taking  up  the  study  of  the  American  War  of  Secession,  we 
begin  a  series  having  a  new  and  considerable  interest  due  to  the 
fact  that  they  will  show  us,  for  thafirst  time,  modern  war  material 
in  use,  steamships,  armor-clads,  etc.,  even  submarines.  For  this 
reason  alone,  it  deserves  our  careful  attention,  though  we  shall 
not  be  able  to  derive  as  many  profitable  lessons  from  it  as  from 
the  great  naval  wars  between  France  and  England  in  the  early 
part  of  the  century  and  in  the  preceding  century.  In  this  conflict 
between  parts  of  a  single  nation,  those  encounters  of  large  forces, 
engagements  of  great  fleets,  which  in  the  past  have  been  not  only 
the  object  but  the  principal  method  of  great  naval  wars,  are  not 
to  be  expected. 

Accordingly  I  shall  give  only  a  very  brief  resume  of  this 
famous  civil  war.  And  I  do  this  only  because,  despite  its  narrow 
scope,  it  affords  material  for  interesting  observations.  One  pri- 
mary strategical  principle  dominates,  in  effect,  the  whole  conduct 
of  the  war,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  Federals'  final  success  was 
entirely  due  to  its  faithful  and  stubborn  execution.  It  is  true  that 
the  very  conditions  of  the  opposing  sides  imposed  this  principle 
upon  them,  yet  we  must  recognize  that  the  one  which  had  assumed 
the  burden  of  maintaining  the  union  knew  how  to  profit  from  it. 
We  have  too  often  seen,  we  shall  too  often  again  see,  the  neces- 
sity of  a  general  strategical  plan  in  the  conduct  of  a  war,  not  to 
note  in  passing  an  evidence  of  good  judgment  on  the  part  of  a 
government/ 

The  struggle  was  not  one  between  two  mere  factions,  differing 
apparently  over  the  best  solution  of  a  social  problem,  like  that  of 
the  maintenance  or  the  suppression  of  slavery,  but  really  over  the 
question  of  political  supremacy;  it  was,  above  all,  a  struggle 
between  two  peoples  diametrically  opposed  in  ideas,  customs  and 
modes  of  life. 

81 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

While  the  Union  States  were  more  particularly  industrial,  those 
of  the  South  were  almost  wholly  agricultural.  From  this  essen- 
tial difference  dissimilar  interests  were  bound  to  result,  and  for 
that  very  reason  quite  different  resources  for  making  and  sustain- 
ing a  war. 

If  the  Federals  had  many  manufacturing  establishments,  a  great 
industrial  population,  permitting  them  to  construct  rapidly  w^ar 
material,  armaments,  equipment,  ships,  etc.,  the  Confederates  on 
the  other  hand  had  little  or  no  mineral  wealth  and  available  labor. 
The  latter's  wealth,  principally  based  on  the  exportation  of  cotton 
to  Europe,  could  only  give  them  the  means  of  compensating  for 
their  original  inferiority  by  the  purchase,  from  abroad,  of  war 
material.  But  this  necessitated  the  introduction  of  this  material 
by  way  of  the  sea. 

It  was  precisely  the  intuition  of  this  real  weakness  which  gave 
rise  in  their  adversaries  to  the  idea  of  the  strategic  plan  of  which 
I  have  spoken,  and  the  realization  of  which  by  itself  alone  assured 
the  success  of  the  Federalist  cause. 

To  prevent  the  Confederates  from  supplying  themselves  with 
material  and  arms,  the  most  certain  method  must  be  a  strict  block- 
ade of  the  southern  coast.  By  this  means  two  advantages  were  to 
be  gained :  first,  the  suppression  of  cotton  exports,  and  conse- 
quently the  drying  up  of  the  most  important  source  of  revenue  of 
the  Southerners ;  second,  as  an  immediate  consequence,  the  im- 
possibility of  their  supplying  themselves  with  arms  for  continuing 
the  war.  And  such  actually  was  the  result  of  the  blockade;  for 
if,  after  several  years  of  desperate  and  glorious  resistance,  the 
Southerners  laid  down  their  arms,  it  was  because,  lacking  every- 
thing, a  prey  to  the  most  frightful  destitution  and  completely 
isolated,  further  resistance  had  become  impossible. 
.  To  understand  how  very  closely  the  success  of  the  Confederate 
cause  was  connected  with  freedom  of  the  sea,  we  need  only  recall 
that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  seceding  states  lacked  cannon, 
small  arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  such  an  extent  that  churches 
of  all  denominations,  as  well  as  individuals,  gave  their  bells  to  be 
used  in  making  them. 

Under  these  conditions,  they  had  to  take  what  they  could  get  as 
contraband  of  war  from  foreign  countries,  and  as  a  result,  at  the 
end  of  the  war,  nearly  forty  different  models  of  small  arms  were 
to  be  found  in  their  equipment. 

82 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Blockade  alone  could  stop  this  nourishment  of  the  forces  of 
resistance,  and  from  the  beginning  the  Federal  government  re- 
solved upon  the  establishment  of  this  blockade. 

Beyond  doubt  it  was  not  very  strict  at  first ;  the  navy,  although 
almost  wholly  adhering  to  the  Federal  side,  was  not  sufficiently 
numerous  to  exercise  an  effective  guard  at  all  points  of  a  coast  of 
great  extent;  a  guard  which  was  rendered  very  difficult  by  bad 
weather,  fogs,  etc.  Thus  the  exploits  of  the  blockade  runners — a 
veritable  industry  and  almost  wholly  English — which,  laden  with 
war  materials,  entered  the  Southern  ports,  and  left  them  again 
laden  with  cotton,  have  become  justly  celebrated. 

But  little  by  little  the  Federal  government,  realizing  the  full 
importance  of  naval  effort,  increases  its  naval  strength.  Its  fleet, 
which  comprised  less  than  a  hundred  ships  at  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities, was  of  more  than  four  hundred  in  the  middle  and  nearly 
seven-  hundred  ships  at  the  end  of  the  war.  The  progressive 
increase  of  the  number  of  ships  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the 
strategic  plan  as  well  as  its  continuous  development.  And  this 
incessant  growth  equally  marks  the  tightening  of  the  grip  which 
closes  each  day  more  on  the  revolt  of  the  Southern  states,  until  it 
ends  by  strangling  it. 

These  special  circumstances  dictate  to  each  of  the  two  bellige- 
rents alike  a  particular  system  of  war. 

The  Federal  navy,  having  on  its  side  the  uncontested  mastery, 
the  superiority  of  numbers  and  of  force,  will  naturally  take  the 
offensive,  carrying,  according  to  a  well  known  phrase,  its  own 
frontiers  to  the  enemy's  coasts.  The  operations  which  it  will 
undertake,  all  arising  from  this  single  general  principle,  will  not 
have  the  sole  object  of  neutralizing  the  riches  of  the  South  by  a 
more  and  more  strict  blockade ;  they  will  also  have  the  result  of 
taking  from  the  South,  one  by  one,  its  forces  of  resistance,  and 
finally  of  killing  that  resistance  itself  by  penetrating  to  the  very 
heart  of  the  country,  by  the  Mississippi. 

For  the  Confederate  States,  on  the  other  hand,  who  dispose  only 
of  precarious  means,  who  have  no  navy,  or  so  little  of  one,  and  are 
not  able  to  improvise  one  (for  a  navy  cannot  be  improvised),  a 
single  way  is  open,  that  of  the  defensive.  And  then,  under  the 
impulse  of  imperious  necessity,  there  appear,  in  the  theater  of  war, 
new  engines,  as  yet  scarcely  roughed  outlined,  but  for  which  bril- 
liant future  destinies  are  reserved :  torpedoes  and  submarines. 

83 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Yet  this  is  not  all,  an  unarmed  country,  surprised  by  war,  without 
having  foreseen  all  its  consequences,  without  having  prepared  its 
forces  for  that  war,  is  driven  to  the  necessity  of  seeking  help  from 
all  means,  from  every  expedient.  Thus  will  arise  the  thought  of 
attacking  the  maritime  commerce  of  the  Northern  States,  since 
nothing  can  be  done  against  their  war  ships,  and  the  cruiser 
Alabama  will  become  the  most  justly  celebrated  of  commerce 
destroyers. 

But  all  this  will  serve  only  to  prolong  the  resistance  of  the  side 
condemned  in  advance  to  defeat  because  it  did  not  have  that  com- 
mand of  the  sea  which  was  the  sole  source  from  which  its  life 
could  be  sustained.  All  the  ingenuity  displayed  in  the  invention 
and  use  of  mines,  the  marvelous  bravery  of  the  Confederate  sailors 
in  their  attempts  with  submarines,  the  activity  used  in  attacking 
maritime  commerce,  all  these  were  of  necessity  unavailing. 

It  could  not  be  otherwise ;  for,  even  putting  aside  historical 
examples,  which  have  always  condemned  the  defensive  method 
with  a  persistence  not  to  be  attributed  solely  to  chance,  simple 
reflection  indicates  that  a  system  of  war  based  on  the  attack  of  one 
or  several  of  the  enemy's  partial  forces,  without  menace  to  the 
totality  of  those  forces  and  notably  the  principal  one  of  them, 
could  not  give  decisive  results. 

In  spite  of  all  Robert  Lee's  genius,  and  Jefferson  Davis'  politi- 
cal skill  and  activity,  the  South  of  necessity  was  to  succumb,  for 
lack  of  a  powerful  navy. 

No  other  war  could  furnish  Captain  Mahan  a  more  valuable  and 
suggestive  contribution  to  his  fine  book  The  Influence  of  Sea 
Power  upon  History. 

Such,  outlined  in  brief,  is  the  character  of  this  war  of  secession. 
From  our  special  point  of  view,  this  broad  outline  will  be  sufficient, 
for  it  includes  all  that  can  interest  us  so  far  as  the  general  princi- 
ples of  war  are  concerned.  In  effect,  it  contains  all :  the  irre- 
sistible action  of  fleets ;  the  superior  value  of  the  offensive ;  the 
insufficiency  of  the  pure  defensive  and  commerce  destroying,  em- 
ployed by  themselves  alone,  to  reduce  the  antagonistic  forces  and 
thus  fulfil  the  object  of  war. 

If,  therefore,  we  study  some  of  the  details  of  this  war,  which 
might  appear  needless,  it  is  because  they  furnish  more  than  one 
opportunity  for  profitable  observations. 

The  action  of  the  Federals  was  favored  not  alone  by  the  adop- 

84 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tion  of  a  logical  and  fertile  strategical  idea ;  it  also  benefited  by 
the  energy  and  special  ability  of  men  like  Farragut  and  Porter, 
to  name  only  the  most  farrious,  who  had  to  carry  it  into  execution. 
Their  methodical  operations  against  the  shore  defences  all  had  for 
objective  not  only  the  weakening  of  centers  of  resistance  by  the 
overthrow  of  forts  or  batteries,  but  also  the  acquiring  of  safe  har- 
bors and  bases  for  the  Federal  fleet,  to  facilitate  the  maintenance 
of  a  more  and  more  strict  blockade  by  the  shelter  they  would 
afford  to  the  blockading  vessels  against  the  frequent  storms  of 
that  coast.  So  too  they  served  on  many  occasions  to  assure  the 
landing,  at  fixed  points,  of  the  Federal  armies  intended  for  offen- 
sive turning  movements  against  the  Confederate  troops. 

From  this  long  succession  of  operations,  I  shall  recall  only  cer- 
tain facts  relating  directly  to  the  object  of  my  book,  and,  at  the 
very  first  an  event  not  at  all  important  in  its  immediate  conse- 
quences but  having  a  great  after  effect  upon  naval  ideas  and  upon 
the  path  of  development  of  naval  tactics  till  the  end  of  the  iQth 
century.  I  refer  to  the  battle  of  Hampton  Roads,  where  on  each 
side  appeared,  for  the  first  time,  in  action,  the  armor-clad,  whether 
improvised  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  by  building  upon  the 
hull  of  a  frigate  burned  by  the  Federals,  the  Merrimac,  a  casemate 
armored  with  railway  iron,  or  constructed  in  all  its  parts  by  Erics- 
son, with  armor  of  thick  plating,  like  the  Union  Monitor,  the  con- 
sequence was  the  same.  This  simultaneous  appearance  brought 
to  view,  for  the  first  time,  two  ships  provided  with  armor  impen- 
etrable by  the  projectiles  of  the  period,  and  that  is  why  the  fight  at 
Hampton  Roads  marks  an  epoch  in  naval  history.  On  that  date 
not  only  there  appeared  a  new  fighting  unity,  but  also  there  was 
restored  to  use  a  new  weapon,  or,  more  exactly,  an  ancient  method 
of  single  combat,  as  old  as  the  invention  of  galleys.  I  allude  to 
the  use  of  the  ram,  by  which  the  Merrimac  sank  two  Federal 
frigates  before  the  arrival  of  the  Monitor.  The  two  adversaries 
tried  to  use  it  on  the  following  day,  but  without  success. 

This  resurrection  of  a  method  of  fighting  which  could  well  be 
supposed  forever  abandoned,  powerfully  supported  some  years 
later  by  the  similar  occurrence  of  a  war  which  we  shall  have  occa- 
sion to  study  further  on,  has  exercised  a  considerable  influence 
upon  naval  minds,  and,  in  our  time  still,  few  officers  escape  its 
influence.  The  undeniable  trace  of  this  influence  may  be  found  in 

85 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

naval  constructions,  for  the  most  modern  and  most  perfected  right- 
ing ships  in  all  navies  are  still  equipped  with  rams. 

Later  on  we  shall  have  to  discuss  thoroughly  the  question  of  the 
efficiency  of  this  weapon ;  let  us  now  limit  ourselves  to  the  state- 
ment that  the  artillery  of  the  combatants  was  composed  of  smooth 
bores,  and  that  the  two  rams  were  not  equipped  with  weapons  of 
long  range,  capable  of  preventing  a  close  engagement. 

A  second  event,  big  with  consequences,  the  whole  importance  of 
which  nevertheless  was  only  appreciated  twenty-five  years  later, 
took  place  February  17,  1864,  before  Charleston.  The  Federal 
corvette  Housatonic  was  at  anchor  off  the  city  when,  at  night  fall, 
an  object  like  a  plank  gliding  over  the  water  was  suddenly  per- 
ceived. A  few  minutes  later  the  object  was  alongside,  and  before 
the  ship  could  escape  by  veering  chain  and  backing  her  engines, 
there  was  an  explosion,  sinking  the  Federal  vessel.  The  Houses- 
tonic  had  been  attacked  by  a  submarine,  the  David,  commanded 
by  Lieutenant  Dixon,  who  in  triumphing  buried  himself  and  his 
crew. 

This  pioneer  is  well  worth  naming ;  for  if  the  naval  art  has  had 
to  wait  a  quarter  century  to  realize  all  the  profit  of  an  invention 
destined  to  once  more  modify  tactics,  none  the  less  this  example 
shows  the  brilliant  result  which  could  already  be  obtained  with  an 
instrument  of  war  incomplete,  and  even  in  the  rudimentary  state. 

Of  a  submarine,  the  David  really  had  but  the  name  and  the 
possibilities,  for  the  accidents  of  previous  trials  show  that  the 
problem  of  stable  underwater  navigation  had  not  been  solved  by 
it ;  the  day  of  its  attack  on  the  Housatonic,  it  navigated  on  the 
surface.  The  principle  alone,  however,  is  of  consequence ;  and 
to  tell  the  whole  story,  the  David,  as  a  submarine,  was  much  in 
accord  with  the  degree  of  perfection  of  all  the  other  engines  of 
war  of  the  period. 

That  deadly  strife  between  hostile  brothers,  the  war  of  secession, 
brought  forth  not  the  submarine  alone ;  it  gave  birth  also  to  an 
engine  formidable  in  its  effects,  of  uncertain  action  to  be  sure, 
but  so  much  the  more  redoubtable  as  all  its  hits  gave  mortal 
wounds.  I  speak  of  the  torpedo,  of  which  so  great  a  use  was  to 
be  made  in  later  wars,  notably  in  that  which  we  have  just  seen 
taking  place  in  the  Far  East. 

The  successes  to  be  ascribed  to  the  agency  of  the  torpedo  in  the 
war  of  secession  are  many  and  various.  Counting  ground  mines 

86 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

anchored  in  channels  and  floating  mines,  no  less  than  eighteen 
vessels  of  war,  monitors  or  gunboats,  were  destroyed  by  it  during 
the  war.  The  best  known  of  these  exploits  is  the  destruction  of 
the  Tecumseh,  an  armored  monitor  sunk  in  a  few  moments  in 
the  attacks  on  Mobile. 

To  this  brilliant  showing  must  be  added  the  victims  of  the  tor- 
pedo borne  by  steam  launches  right  up  against  the  sides  of  hostile 
ships,  a  bold  plan  which  proved  that  anything  can  be  expected 
from  resolute  men  who  are  inspired  by  a  high  ideal. 

Besides  the  Housatonic;  the  armor-clad  New  Ironsides,  the 
frigate  Minnesota  and  finally,  the  most  noted,  the  armor-clad  Albe- 
marle  in  the  Roanoke  river,  were  thus  sunk. 

It  will  be  recognized  that  more*"  numerous  and  more  complete 
successes  could  hardly  be  expected,  and  the  weapon  by  which  they 
were  accomplished  certainly  yields  to  no  other  in  power.  And  it  is 
all  the  more  instructive  to  note  that  these  results,  remarkable  as 
they  were  in  their  essential  value,  did  not  in  the  least  alter  the 
logical  conclusion  of  the  war.  They  could  grievously  wound  the 
adversary,  but,  having  no  effect  upon  his  principal  force,  they 
could  have  no  serious  effect  upon  his  destiny. 

The  same  thing  was  true  of  the  attempts  against  the  enemy's 
commerce.  If  I  pause  for  a  moment  to  consider  this  question,  it 
is  because  the  war  of  secession  has  most  often  been  used  as  an 
example  by  stubborn  advocates  of  commerce  destroying,  as  a  sole 
method  of  war,  to  defend  their  opinion.  In  the  example  before  us, 
the  expression  "  commerce  destroying  "  is  moreover  unsuitable. 
"  Commercial  war  "  would  be  a  more  exact  expression,  for  the 
pursuit  of  merchant  ships  was  carried  on  by  regular  or  auxiliary 
war  vessels  which  had  nothing  in  common  .with  the  privateers  of 
former  times,  like  Surcouf,  for  example. 

We  must  not  forget  that  the  Federal  commercial  marine  of  that 
time  consisted  almost  entirely  of  sailing  vessels,  which  very 
greatly  simplified  the  task  of  the  commerce  destroyers ;  finally  and 
above  all  that  the  cruisers  found  in  all  countries,  on  every  coast, 
facilities  of  every  sort  for  replenishing  their  supplies,  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  obtain  to-day.  Besides  which  there  is  the 
quite  modern  question,  so  delicate  and  complex,  of  neutrality, 
which,  in  the  famous  voyagings  of  the  Alabama,  forty  years  ago, 
did  not  excite  any  of  the  suspicious  susceptibilities  so  prompt  to 
be  aroused  in  our  time. 

87 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Without  this,  how  could  Captain  Semmes  have  cruised  in  the 
Alabama  for  nearly  two  years  undisturbed  in  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Indian  Ocean  before  yielding  to  the  blows  of  the  Kearsarge  off 
Cherbourg.  And  the  prolongation  of  this  period  of  immunity  was 
due  to  the  Federal  naval  vessels  being  fully  occupied  in  main- 
taining the.  blockade  of  the  southern  coast. 

This  time  again,  exceptionally  favorable  circumstances  per- 
mitted a  particular  system  of  war  to  develop  its  action ;  neverthe- 
less it  did  not  cause  the  march  of  events  to  deviate  in  the  least. 
Like  the  torpedoes,  and,  in  a  general  way,  all  engines  of  the 
defence,  it  served  to  defeat  only  one  of  the  partial  forces  of  the 
enemy ;  powerless,  as  I  continue  to  repeat,  against  the  totality  of 
those  partial  forces,  and  especially  against  the  principal  force 
represented  by  the  Federal  fleet,  its  action  was  bound  to  be 
negligible. 

It  is  for  this  great  lesson,  much  more  than  for  its  comparatively 
unimportant  facts,  that  this  war  is  of  value  to  us. 

THE  ITALIAN  WAR   (LISSA). 

The  conflict  of  1866  between  Austria  and  Italy  has  exercised  no 
little  influence  upon  the  naval  history  of  the  latter  part  of  the  igth 
century,  and,  even  to  this  day,  upon  opinions  regarding  the  conduct 
of  naval  war,  battle  tactics  and  the  preparation  of  naval  material. 
The  memories  of  the  battle  of  Lissa  are  still  so  alive  that  their 
effect  upon  very  recent  exercises  of  our  squadrons  can  easily  be 
seen.  For  this  reason  alone  it  would  not  do  at  all  to  pass  it  by 
without  mention. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  war  the  belligerents  appeared  in  very 
unlike  conditions.  The  superiority  in  material,  ships  and  guns,  as 
well  as  in  numbers,  undoubtedly  belonged  to  Italy,  which  had 
spared  no  sacrifice  to  prepare  a  strong  navy ;  but  she  too,  like  so 
many  others,  had  forgotten  that  strength  resides  not  in  excel- 
lence of  weapons  alone  but  also  in  the  training  and  quality  of  the 
personnel  called  upon  to  use  them ;  in  short  that  military  power  is 
not  made  wholly  of  physical  force,  but  equally  includes  a  moral 
force ;  perhaps  the  more  important  of  the  two,  since  it  alone  can 
overcome  the  inertia  of  the  first  and  inspire  it. 

And  it  is  quite  thus  that  Tegethoff,  the  Austrian  admiral,  under- 
stood the  matter  when  he  pronounced  those  famous  words :  "  If 
you  have  no  cannon,  still  give  me  ships,  I  ^vill  do  the  best  I  can 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

with  them."     Like  all  good  workmen,  he  would  not  blame  his 
tools. 

Circumstances  still  greatly  favored  the  Italian  fleet.  Its  chief, 
Admiral  Persano,  had  had  the  rare,  and  so  much  the  more  valu- 
able, good  fortune  to  receive  from  his  government  clear  and  pre- 
cise instructions,  based  upon  a  faultless  strategical  plan.  On  June 
9,  that  is  to  say  more  than  ten  days  before  the  opening  of  hostili- 
ties, the  admiral  already  knew  the  firm  intentions  of  the  central 
power,  which  could  be  resumed  in  the  brief  formula:  "Prepare 
to  chase  the  enemy  from  the  Adriatic,  to  blockade  him,  or  to  attack 
him,  wherever  you  may  find  him." 

The  search  for  the  enemy  afloat^and  his  destruction  were  beyond 
any  doubt  the  principal  ends  to  be  attained,  in  order  to  insure  con- 
quest of  the  command  of  the  sea ;  they  must  in  any  case  have  so 
seemed  to  the  Italian  government,  which  believed  that  it  could 
surely  count  upon  a  superiority  of  forces. 

We  are  obliged  to  suppose  that  this  simple  conception  of  war 
was  completely  strange  to  Persano,  for  a  month  later  he  was  still 
asking  explanations  from  his  Minister.  The  latter  gave  them  to 
him  with  a  precision  which  left  no  room  for  equivocation :  "  The 
principal  objective,  before  anything  else,  must  be  to  become  master 
of  the  Adriatic  by  clearing  that  sea  of  the  Austrian  Squadron." 

It  would  be  difficult  to  explain  how  so  clear  and  logical  a  pro- 
gram could  have  led  to  such  a  grievous  strategical  error  as  Lissa, 
were  it  not  that  history  has  taught  a  hundred  times  already  how 
much  the  instinctive,  unreasonable  fear  of  action  has  been  and  still 
is  ineradicable  in  the  minds  of  some  leaders.  Finally,  after  multiple 
delays,  caused  very  much  more  by  the  waverings  of  his  mind  than 
by  his  alleged  desire  for  a  better  preparation  of  his  ships,  Persano, 
having  obtained  authority  to  do  so,  resolved  to  make  a  tentative 
attack  on  the  island  of  Lissa. 

At  noon  of  July  16  the  Italian  squadron,  composed  of  twelve 
armored  ships  of  a  total  displacement  of  forty-six  thousand  tons 
and  of  twenty-three  wooden  ships,  frigates,  dispatch  vessels  or 
transports,  of  twenty-eight  thousand  tons  displacement  altogether, 
set  sail  from  Ancona  for  its  destination,  where,  after  delays  and 
hesitations  of  all  sorts,  it  only  got  into  position  to  attack  the  shore 
batteries  forty-eight  hours  after  its  setting  out. 

To  undertake  operations  against  fortified  works  on  shore,  while 
freedom  of  the  sea  was  not  assured,  was  in  itself  a  grave  error, 

89 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

since  the  inopportune  arrival  of  the  hostile  squadron  in  the  midst 
of  the  enterprise  was  always  to  be  feared,  and  since  a  dangerous 
position  was  thus  voluntarily  occupied ;  but,  if  undertaken,  they 
should  have  been  carried  on  with  the  greatest  vigor,  in  order  to 
reduce  to  a  minimum  the  adverse  chances. 

And  this,  puts  us  strongly  in  mind  of  a  similar  operation,  Suff- 
ren's  attack  on  Trincomalee,  with  which  a  comparison  is  timely. 

No  more  than  Persano,  did  our  most  famous  seaman  have  com- 
mand of  the  sea  when  he  made  his  bold  attempt  against  Trinco- 
malee ;  but  at  least  he  had  already  made  his  adversary,  the  English 
Admiral  Hughes,  feel  the  whole  strength  of  his  aggressive  ardor ; 
he  knew  moreover  that  his  enemy  was  temporarily  held  up  at 
Madras,  and  he  recognized  the  whole  value  of  activity.  We  have 
already  seen  how  he  took  Trincomalee  before  Hughes  could  return 
to  his  attack. 

Persano,  for  his  part,  had  no  idea  of  the  prime  importance  of 
time,  of  the  influence  of  rapidity  of  execution  upon  the  attainment 
of  success  ;  in  a  word,  of  speed. 

Thus,  when  on  July  20,  four  days  after  his  departure  from 
Ancona,  he  saw  the  Austrian  squadron  appear,  not  one  of  his 
attempts  against  the  batteries  of  the  island  had  been  crowned  with 
success.  Furthermore,  this  event  found  his  forces  in  the  most 
complete  disorder ;  for,  hoping  more  certainly  to  reduce  the  shore 
defences,  he  had  thought  it  necessary  to  divide  his  forces  into 
three  portions,  respectively  opposed  to  three  different  points  of  the 
island. 

And  yet,  four  long  days  having  gone  by,  how  could  he  have 
hoped  that  the  Austrian  squadron  would  not  have  learned  of  his 
venture  against  Lissa? 

Thus  it  was  in  the  enemy's  presence  that  the  Italian  squadron 
had  to  concentrate  again,  rallying  to  the  commander-in-chief's 
flag,  and  it  is  perfectly  self  evident  that  such  conditions  could  not 
but  be  eminently  unfavorable.  And  they  were  the  more  so  because 
that  enemy,  himself  having  a  clear  conception  of  affairs  of  war  as 
well  as  a  profound  sense  of  the  simplicity  of  its  methods,  had 
adopted  for  cruising  the  order  of  battle. 

Tegethoff,  then  on  reaching  the  field  of  battle,  had  behind  him 
a  naval  force  every  element  of  which  had  but  one  thought  in  mind  ; 
to  fight. 

Quite  different  was  the  thought  of  the  Italian  commanders,  or 

90 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

at  least  it  was  more  complex,  for  to  anxiety  concerning  the 
approaching  engagement  was  added  that  of  the  necessity  of  re- 
forming as  quickly  as  possible. 

In  fact,  the  reunion  could  not  be  completed ;  at  the  moment  when 
the  battle  opened,  only  nine  Italian  armor-clads,  stretched  out  in 
a  column  over  six  miles  long,  were  able  to  confront  the  whole 
Austrian  squadron  formed  in  close  order.  The  precipitancy  with 
which,  owing  to  the  surprise,  the  Italians  had  taken  formation,  had 
furthermore  the  result  of  offering  to  the  immediate  attack  of  the 
mass  of  TegethofFs  squadron  a  partially  isolated  head  of  column. 
The  breaking  up  of  the  Italian  line  could  not  help  resulting,  and 
that  is  what  actually  happened. 

The  most  interesting  lesson,  in  my  opinion,  to  be  derived  from 
the  battle  of  Lissa  is  the  exact  meaning  which  should  be  given  to 
the  term  superiority  of  forces.  Like  Nelson  at  Trafalgar,  Teget- 
hoff  was  inferior  in  numbers.  To  the  forty-six  thousand  tons  of 
armored  ships  and  the  twenty-eight  thousand  tons  of  wooden  ships 
of  the  Italian  squadron,  armed  with  a  total  of  five  hundred  and 
ninety-six  guns,  he  could  only  oppose  twenty-seven  thousand  tons 
of  armored  ships  and  twenty  thousand  tons  of  wooden  ships, 
mounting  altogether  five  hundred  and  thirteen  guns. 

And  yet,  as  much  by  his  boldness  as  by  his  skill  in  profiting  by 
the  faults  of  his  adversary,  he  managed  to  turn  the  scales  in  his 
own  favor  by  obtaining  superiority  of  forces  at  one  point  of  the 
battle  field. 

The  essence  of  the  battle  of  Lissa,  in  my  opinion,  is  contained  in 
these  simple  considerations.  It  has  been  customary,  on  the  con- 
trary, to  indulge  in  endless  dissertations  attributing  all  its  success 
to  the  formation  of  the  Austrian  squadron  in  double  echelon ; 
there  has  even  been  imagined  in  this  double  echelon  a  sort  of 
spur,  ram  or  wedge,  with  which  Admiral  Tegethoff  broke  up  the 
Italian  squadron.  That  is  but  imagery ;  the  reality  was  otherwise. 
Under  any  circumstances  such  a  conception  would  give  to  geom- 
etry, in  matters  of  war,  a  part  which  certainly  does  not  belong  to 
it ;  but  in  the  case  of  Lissa  it  would  have  been  necessary,  to  justify 
its  utility,  for  a  real  engagement  between  two  squadrons  manoeu- 
vering  on  the  field  in  different  formations  to  have  taken  place. 
These  manoeuvers  alone  would  have  permitted  a  judgment  of  the 
respective  values  of  the  different  formations.  But  after  the  first 
encounter,  the  action  degenerated  at  once  into  a  veritable  melee, 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

a  succession  of  partial  combats  wholly  beyond  the  control  of  the 
commander-in-chief. 

It  is  not  to  his  wedge  that  Tegethoff  owed  his  victory ;  but  to 
the  concentration  of  all  his  ships  upon  the  almost  isolated  head  of 
the  Italian  column. 

We  may  believe,  on  the  other  hand,  that  if  opposed,  for  example, 
to  a  compact,  supple,  thoroughly  manageable  column,  under  the 
direction  of  a  resolute  chief,  the  Austrian  squadron  would  per- 
haps have  regretted  having  adopted  a  too  rigid  and  too  little 
manageable  formation.  Like  Nelson  at  Trafalgar,  Tegethoff  at 
Lissa  profited  greatly  by  the  timid  weakness  of  his  adversaries. 

We  must  recognize,  however,  that  his  boldness  was  justified  by 
the  certain  knowledge  which  he  had  of  their  weaknesses. 

This  observation  strengthens  the  impression,  which  we  have 
already  received  from  the  study  of  history,  that  it  would  be  vain 
to  seek  for  the  formula  of  some  one  formation  applicable  to  all 
cases  and  sure  to  give  victory. 

The  best  movements  to  make  on  the  field  of  battle  necessarily 
depend  upon  those  of  the  enemy,  upon  his  activity,  his  initiative, 
his  morale.  Such  a  manoeuver,  dangerous  against  a  resolute  oppo- 
nent, will  be  perfectly  proper  and  will  make  complete  success  easy 
against  another  who  is  demoralized.  In  tactics,  as  in  strategy, 
outside  of  general  principles,  there  are  only  concrete  cases,  and 
since  I  am  recalling  the  great  English  seaman,  it  is  always  useful 
to  remember  that  he  surely  never  thought  of  describing,  on  the 
surface  of  the  sea,  more  or  less  ingenious  geometric  figures,  when 
he  led  his  two  squadrons  in  wedge  formation  against  the  center 
of  Villeneuve's  fleet.  He  merely  applied  the  elementary  principle 
of  the  power  of  mass  upon  a  point  of  feeble  resistance. 

I  have  said  that  the  battle  at  once  took  on  the  character,  of  a 
melee ;  it  is  in  this  series  of  individual  combats  that  the  events 
occurred  the  persistent  repetition  of  which  has  given  to  the  battle 
of  Lissa  a  traditional  aspect,  and  which  have  had  such  great 
influence  on  naval  ideas  up  to  our  own  time.  In  the  eyes  of  too 
many  people  still,  Lissa  represents  only,  in  effect,  battle  by  ram- 
ming and  the  triumph  of  the  spur. 

The  wreck  of  the  Re  d'ltalia,  struck  broadside  on  by  the  Ferdi- 
nand-Max and  sinking  in  two  minutes,  was  the  salient  feature  of 
the  battle,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  we  must  admit  that  this  pic- 
ture is  very  striking  in  order  to  explain  the  considerable  influence 

92 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

of  an  incident  which  has  never  been  repeated  and  the  impression 
of  which  still  lasts  after  forty  years,  despite  altogether  radical 
changes  in  naval  material. 

I  shall  limit  myself  to  the  remark  that  when  Lissa  took  place, 
rifled  artillery  was  still  in  its  infancy,  and  that  on  the  Austrian  as 
well  as  on  the  Italian  ships  smooth  bores  were  in  the  majority. 
The  adversaries,  then,  like  those  of  the  war  of  secession,  had  no 
long  range  weapons  at  their  disposal,  sufficiently  efficient  at 
great  distances  to  prohibit  close  action. 

TegethofFs  merit  was  precisely  that  he  understood  that  the  rela- 
tive impotency  of  the  artillery,  at  that  time,  permitted  taking  all 
the  risks  of  closing.  His  signal  ff  to  rush  upon  the  enemy  and  sink 
him  "  was  then  fully  justified. 

And  he  discounted,  for  the  success  of  his  attack,  not  only  the 
insufficiency  of  the  guns  of  his  time,  but  also  the  incapacity  of  the 
Italian  gunners,  and  their  lack  of  training,  so  true  is  it  that  at 
every  stage  of  history  the  all  powerful  influence  of  preparation  for 
war  makes  itself  felt. 

From  the  insignificant  part  played  by  the  gun  in  the  battle  of 
Lissa,  so  insignificant  that,  aside  from  the  burning  of  the  Palestra, 
caused  by  an  Austrian  shell,  gun  fire  did  only  very  slight  damage 
on  either  side,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  draw  far  too  broad 
conclusions  and  to  assign  to  that  weapon,  in  the  future,  a  secondary 
role.  This  is  to  forget  that  an  exception  only  confirms  the  rule, 
which  from  the  very  beginning  of  disputes  and  battles,  has  been 
characterized  by  a  progressive  evolution  tending  to  the  production 
of  weapons  of  longer  and  longer  range.  Fortunately  we  shall 
find  a  striking  demonstration  of  this  in  the  study  of  the  actual 
events  of  more  recent  wars. 

To  finish  with  this  engagement  of  Lissa  (I  purposely  use  the 
word  of  restricted  meaning  rather  than  the  word  battle,  for  the 
character  of  a  great  battle  is  not  to  be  found  there),  I  have  only  to 
observe  that  if  Tegethoff  revealed  in  his  energetic  attack  the  real 
qualities  of  a  great  chief,  he  was  not  completely  a  great  chief.  His 
victory  was  really  only  a  half  victory;  to  make  it  decisive,  it 
would  have  been  necessary  for  him  to  pursue  the  scattered  units 
of  the  Italian  fleet,  to  track  them  without  truce  or  mercy,  to  take 
advantage  of  their  disorder  and  the  certain  demoralization  of 
their  personnel  to  destroy  them. 

In   leaving   the   field   of   battle   without   following  the   logical 

93 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

sequence  of  his  first  success,  Tegethoff,  whatever  his  worth,  proved 
that  he  was  not  of  the  same  metal  as  Nelson. 

It  is  only  fair  to  state  that,  in  attacking,  Tegethoff  disregarded 
the  formal  directions  of  his  government,  whose  constant  care  was 
to  be  sparing  of  its  forces.  But  since,  to  his  great  honor,  the 
Austrian  admiral  had  had  the  courage  to  assume  that  responsi- 
bility, once  the  victory  was  in  his  grasp  he  should  have  gone  on  to 
the  very  end. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  CHILE  AND  PERU. 

Although  I  have  included  in  my  work  a  study  of  the  war 
between  Chile  and  Peru,  it  is  not  because  of  any  expectation  of 
finding  there  encounters  of  great  naval  forces  such  as  must  be 
expected  in  any  modern  war  between  powerful  maritime  nations. 
But  this  naval  campaign,  although  in  a  restricted  field,  affords  us 
a  chance  of  an  excellent  lesson  in  strategy,  and  also  furnishes  a 
new  contribution  to  the  demonstration  of  the  utility  of  a  navy. 

The  respective  geographic  situations  of  the  two  countries,  sepa- 
rated by  a  zone  almost  uninhabited  and  arid,  and  very  hilly,  insured 
an  important  role  to  their  naval  forces,  because  it  was  necessary 
for  troops  to  avoid  crossing  this  desert  by  taking  the  sea  route 
around  it. 

At  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  naval  forces  of  the  belligerents 
were  very  nearly  equal.  Peru  had  two  armored  ships,  the  Huascar 
and  Independence,  two  monitors  and  two  wooden  ships ;  Chile 
-could  oppose  to  these  two  armored  ships,  the  Blanco-Encalada  and 
Cochrane,  four  wooden  corvettes  and  two  gunboats.  As  may  be 
seen,  the  two  naval  forces  were  quite  comparable,  although  of 
slightly  different  composition. 

With  a  clearness  of  decision  which  does  honor  to  her  judg- 
ment and  was  to  procure  for  her  an  immediate  naval  advantage, 
Chile  without  delay  assumed  the  offensive  by  blockading  the  port 
of  Iquiqui.  But,  in  speaking  of  this  as  advantageous,  I  do  not 
mean  that  I  can  give  unreserved  praise  to  the  manner  of  its  execu- 
tion, for  the  Chilean  navy  could  not  hope  to  maintain  an  effective 
blockade  with  two  small  gunboats  like  the  Esmeralda  and  Cova- 
donga.  But  the  mere  fact  of  vigorously  planning  an  attack 
showed  her  energetic  resolution,  and  by  intimidating  the  adver- 
sary, should  have  taken  from  him  a  portion  of  his  resources. 

The  two  Peruvian  armor-clads,  Huascar  and  Independence, 

94 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

attacking  the  two  gunboats,  to  break  up  the  appearance  of  a 
blockade,  sank  the  first  by  ramming  her ;  but,  pursuing  the  second 
into  shallow  water,  the  Independence  struck  a  rock  and  sank. 

We  may  attribute,  in  a  philosophical  sense,  some  small  part  in 
causing  this  important  event  to  the  offensive  action  of  the  little 
Chilean  gunboats,  taken  to  disconcert  the  Peruvian  sailors  and 
diminish  their  needful  coolness. 

However  that  may  be,  the  loss  of  the  Independencia,  by  destroy- 
ing the  balance  of  naval  force  in  favor  of  Chile,  turned  the  tide  of 
events  and  pointed  to  an  end  of  the  conflict  which  nothing  but  a 
reconstitution  of  the  Peruvian  fleet  could  possibly  prevent. 

And  this  was  indeed  really  the  decisive  act  of  the  war.  Chile 
thenceforth  possesses  superiority  of  forces  on  the  sea,  and  her 
opponent  will  never  take  it  back  from  her.  The  Huascar,  under 
Admiral  Grau's  excellent  direction,  may  multiply  her  movements, 
may  appear  and  disappear  here,  there  and  everywhere,  bombard 
the  shore  batteries,  capture  prizes,  sow  terror  along  the  whole 
coast,  and  display  unexampled  activity  in  interfering  with  and  dis- 
couraging the  military  operations  of  the  Chileans,  who  will  not 
dare  to  embark  their  troops  so  long  as  she  so  resolutely  keeps  the 
sea.  All  that  is  true,  and  without  exception  remarkable,  but  it  is 
all  useless.  The  Huascar  is  marked  by  destiny,  her  days  are 
counted  and  her  end  is  fixed.  Writh  equal  preparation  on  both 
sides,  and  above  all  equal  morale,  she  must  succumb  to  the  superi- 
ority of  material  force,  and  as  battle  cannot  be  indefinitely  escaped 
or  refused,  the  day  will  come  when,  forced  to  fight,  she  will  finally 
perish. 

The  combat  of  Punta-Agamos  remains  justly  famous,  because  a 
drama,  to  satisfy  the  public  mind,  must  have  decorations,  scenery, 
above  all  be  touching ;  the  heroic  resistance  of  the  little  Huascar 
to  the  furious  attacks  of  the  Cochrane  and  Blanc  o-Encalada,  re- 
sponds wonderfully  to  these  aspirations.  But  for  us,  who  have  to 
weigh  matters  with  more  calm  deliberation,  the  essential  fact,  the 
determining  cause,  will  always  be  the  initial  weakening  of  the 
Peruvian  naval  forces. 

The  capture  of  the  Huascar  by  Chile  definitely  ratified  the  con- 
quest, already  virtually  won  by  that  nation,  of  command  of  the 
sea.  Thenceforth  she  could  freely  transport  her  troops  to  the 
Peruvian  coast,  blockade  its  ports,  and  as  a  last  resort  force  upon 
Peru  an  agreement.  The  final  victory  was  truly  the  navy's  doing. 

95 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  war  in  the  Pacific  not  only  gives  a  lesson  in  strategy,  but 
it  also  affords  opportunity  for  valuable  tactical  observations. 

The  battle  of  Punta-Agambs  is  really,  in  the  chronology  of 
naval  battles  of  modern  times,  a  turning  point  of  history ;  it  in- 
augurated the  reappearance,  on  a  brilliant  stage,  of  a  too  long 
neglected  weapon,  and  one  which  will  resume,  after  a  half  cen- 
tury's unjustifiable  obscurity,  a  place  which  will  not  cease  to 
grow  in  importance  till  it  has  become  the  very  first:  I  speak  of 
the  gun.  And  it  is  truly  by  the  gun,  and  by  the  gun  alone,  that 
the  Huascar  was  defeated  and  at  last  compelled  to  lower  her  flag. 

That  is  not  all.  This  fight  marks  yet  another  memorable  date, 
for  it  gave  a  wholly  experimental  proof  of  the  fact  that  an  armored 
ship  had  other  weak  points  than  those  that  were  sheltered  by  an 
armor  thought  invulnerable;  and  that,  through  them,  her  source 
of  life  could  be  reached. 

When  the  Huascar,  unable  to  longer  resist,  surrendered,  the 
command  had  descended  to  the  seventh  officer  in  order  of  rank,  the 
six  seniors  having  been  killed  in  succession ;  a  third  of  her  crew 
were  dead  or  wounded,  and  there  remained  on  her  not  a  single 
gun  capable  of  being  fired.  But  this  ship,  become  an  inert  wreck 
by  reason  of  the  destruction  of  her  personnel,  was  so  little  damaged 
in  her  essential  parts  that,  hardly  a  few  weeks  after  the  battle,  she 
was  cruising  again  under  the  Chilean  flag. 

Already  new  times  could  be  foreseen  in  which,  the  gun  having 
rightly  again  become  the  incontestible  arbiter  of  naval  battles,  it 
would  be  judged  much  more  reasonable  to  seek  to  attack  a  vessel 
at  all  points  than  only  in  a  zone  of  too  limited  extent  not  to  make 
the  chances  of  striking  it  very  uncertain. 

From  all  that  precedes  there  arises,  as  may  be  seen,  the  clear 
impression  that  the  lessons  of  history  are  not  measured  by  the 
stature  of  its  events,  and  that  in  such  a  small  theater  as  that  of  the 
war  between  Chile  and  Peru,  the  harvest  may  be  valuable  and 
abundant. 

ADMIRAL    COURBET'S    CAMPAIGN. 

For  the  reason  just  given  it  will  be  interesting  to  examine  the 
broad  outlines  of  Admiral  Courbet's  Chinese  campaign.  Here 
again  we  shall  find  no  great  military  doings.  China,  properly 
speaking,  had  no  navy,  or  at  least  what  constituted  the  germ  of 
one  could  not  stand  against  the  naval  forces  disposed  of  by  France. 

96 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Therefore  we  are  not  going  to  seek  examples  of  encounters  of 
squadrons  or  large  groups  in  this  campaign ;  but  every  military 
action,  small  or  great,  is  the  enforced  consequence  of  a  controlling 
thought,  of  a  general  plan  aiming  at  a  determined  object;  it  neces- 
sarily derives  from  either  good  strategy  or  bad  strategy ;  and  that 
is  exactly  why  the  analysis  of  every  war  campaign,  no  matter  how 
narrow  its  limits,  contains  a  lesson. 

Moreover  this  affair  is  one  in  which  our  own  country  was  en- 
gaged, and  that  reason  alone  should  suffice  to  attract  our  attention 
to  it.  The  attentive  examination  of  past  errors  should  help  us 
to  avoid  making  errors  in  the  future. 

Nobody  any  longer  seriously  denies  that  a  great  many  errors 
were  committed  in  this  Chinese  campaign ;  and  here  let  me  make 
my  position  clear.  Confining  ourselves  exclusively  to  the  study 
of  war,  for  that  very  reason  we  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  bring  to  that 
study  absolute  sincerity  and  frankness;  the  errors  made  in  the 
conduct  of  the  war  are  all  that  concern  us,  but  we  must  not  conceal 
any  of  them. 

It  suffices  to  run  through  the  official  correspondence  between 
the  government  and  Admiral  Courbet  for  these  errors  to  become 
apparent,  almost  from  the  first  telegram. 

The  most  important  of  all  of  them,  beyond  any  doubt,  is  the 
absence  of  a  supreme  controlling  idea — of  a  coldly  matured  plan  of 
operations- — which  is  revealed  by  the  collection  of  dispatches. 
In  this  respect,  they  evidently  live,  in  governmental  circles,  from 
day  to  day,  under  the  unstable  impressions  of  events,  without  well 
knowing  what  they  wish,  or  whither  they  are  tending.  And,  as  is 
inevitable  in  such  cases,  the  commander-in-chief  is  closely  held  in 
leading  strings,  by  which  the  wonderful  privileges  of  action  are 
paralyzed. 

After  the  ambush  of  Bac-lieu,  Admiral  Courbet  had  received 
orders  to  set  out  for  the  north  of  China  and  to  hold  himself  in 
readiness  to  seize  guarantees,  if  that  power  refused  to  accord  legit- 
imate compensation.  I  have  purposely  used  the  very  word  which 
served  to  make  known  by  telegraph  the  governmental  idea ;  for 
the  insistence  with  which  it  was  repeated,  in  the  subsequent  official 
correspondence,  indicates  that  it  was  the  cherished  hope  of  the 
French  cabinet  to  lead  China  to  an  agreement  by  the  seizure  of 
territory  belonging  to  her. 

I   do  not  condemn  the  principle   itself  of  taking  guarantees. 

97 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  procedure  should  necessarily  be  counted  one  of  the  many 
ways  that  can  be  employed  to  injure  the  forces  of  an  enemy,  and 
doubtless  it  is  an  attack  upon  them,  especially  upon  their  morale, 
to  take  possession  of  one  or  more  portions  of  the  national  domain. 
Yet  it  is  indispensable  to  make  a  good  choice  of  these  guaran- 
tees, and  such  was  not  the  case,  certainly,  when  the  French  govern- 
ment designated  to  Admiral  Courbet  the  island  of  Formosa  as  that 
whose  seizure  would  intimidate  China.  That  was  ill  to  compre- 
hend the  special  characteristics  of  the  vastest  empire  of  the  world, 
so  vast  that  its  nationality  is  a  pure  abstraction  and  that  North 
Chinamen  and  South  Chinamen,  not  speaking  the  same  language, 
have  lived  to  this  day  in  the  most  complete  reciprocal  indifference. 
Formosa  was  already  very  far  removed  from  the  center  of 
Chinese  life  for  it  to  be  hoped  that  its  conquest  would  greatly 
affect  a  public  opinion  which,  moreover,  was  completely  misled 
by  a  controlling  bureaucracy  interested  in  concealing  from  it  the 
truth  by  representing  defeats  to  be  brilliant  victories. 

Moreover,  the  island  had  too  large  a  population  to  think  of 
trying  to  conquer  it  by  the  insufficient  means  of  landing  parties 
from  the  French  squadron.  Finally,  from  the  seaman's  point  of 
view  exclusively,  the  choice  of  Formosa  was  a  detestable  one, 
since  that  island  was  destitute  of  safe  and  sheltered  harbors. 
This  is  plainly  seen  when,  after  having  given  up  the  occupation 
of  Kee-lung  on  account  of  insufficient  troops,  it  was  wished  to 
maintain  a  blockade  of  that  port.  At  the  same  time  with  this 
difficult  and  useless  operation,  the  admiral  was  ordered  to  blockade 
Fu-chow. 

The  second  error ;  scattering  of  efforts,  so  contrary  to  all  the 
principles  of  war,  which  demanded,  on  the  contrary,  their  con- 
centration, with  a  view  of  obtaining  the  superiority  of  forces. 

To  conquer  nations,  as  with  individuals,  the  heart  must  be  struck 
at.  It  was  at  the  very  center  of  the  Chinese  power,  then,  that 
blows  should  have  been  directed.  Admiral  Courbet  would  not 
have  been  the  great  chief  who  has  left  with  us  an  imperishable 
memory,  if  he  had  not  felt  these  essential  truths.  Accordingly  he 
proposed  to  the  government,  only  a  few  days  after  the  opening  of 
his  campaign,  to  take  the.  proposed  guarantees  in  the  Gulf  of 
Petchili,  and  he  indicated  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-Wei  as  the 
two  most  favorable  places.  The  mention  of  these  two  names  is 
peculiarly  suggestive  in  view  of  the  future  events  which  on  two 

98 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

different  occasions  took  place  on  those  shores.  This  common 
sense  strategic  plan  the  French  government  could  not  compre- 
hend ;  it  maintained  its  first  project  of  purposeless  blockade  of  the 
coast  of  Formosa. 

On  August  22,  1884,  China  having  refused  all  satisfaction,  an 
active  move  was  decided  upon,  and  on  the  following  day,  Admiral 
Courbet,  momentarily  free  from  restraint,  accomplished  his  fine 
feat  of  arms  in  the  river  Min  and  destroyed  the  arsenal  of 
Fu-chow. 

But  this  tentative  activity  was  only  to  be  for  the  occasion,  since 
the  government's  instructions,  immediately  afterwards,  turned 
again  and  more  obstinately  than  ever  the  valiant  admiral's  efforts 
towards  the  useless  Formosa  undertaking. 

Acting  under  the  dictation  of  his  honor  and  his  responsibility 
as  military  chief,  the  admiral  could  not  but  reopen  the  subject 
with  his  government,  to  explain  the  weakness  of  the  operations, 
without  any  possible  result,  which  were  forced  upon  him,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  propose  those  which  the  true  theories  of  war 
indicated. 

On  September  4  he  set  forth  in  a  telegram  to  the  Minister  of 
Marine  the  difficulties  of  the  capture  and  retention  of  Kee-lung 
and  Formosa  with  the  resources  at  his  disposal,  and  the  dispropor- 
tion between  the  necessary  effort  and  the  profit  to  be  drawn  from 
a  venture  against  an  island  too  far  away,  as  Fu-chow  was,  from 
Pekin,  to  influence  the  Chinese  government  in  the  desired  manner. 
And  he  added :  "  It  would  be  better  to  begin  operations  at  once 
in  the  north;  we  would  take  Che-foo  as  our  base,  and  establish 
there  the  troops  ivhich  zvould  enable  us  to  occupy  Wei-hai-Wei  and 
Port  Arthur!'  Some  days  later  he  reverted  to  the  subject :  "  My 
plans  are:  to  start  for  Che-foo  with  the  forces  available,  to  take 
the  islands  at  Che-foo  as  a  center  of  operations  and  supplies,  from 
Che-foo  to  fall  upon  the  Chinese  naval  forces,  to  attack  Wei-hai- 
Wei  and  Port  Arthur  by  sea;  to  occupy  them  with  the  available 
troops,  if  possible;  if  hot  possible,  to  establish  ourselves  on  the 
best  points  of  the  Miau-Tau  islands  to  blockade  Port  Arthur  and 
the  Gulf  of  Petchili!' 

To  fall  upon  the  Chinese  naval  forces!  We  find  in  these  words 
from  Admiral  Courbet's  pen  the  application  of  a  doctrine  which 
we  have  already  more  than  once  met  with,  and  which  begins  to 
appear  to  us  as  the  foundation  stone  of  the  theory  of  war.  Its 

99 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

execution  would  have  made  necessary  the  use  of  all  the  disposable 
naval  forces  and  the  sending;  of  a  few  troops ;  but  with  blind 
obstinacy,  the  French  government,  in  all  its  instructions,  went  on, 
in  somewhat  puerile  fashion,  reiterating  its  fixed  idea  of  having  in 
hand  a  guarantee  with  a  zriew  to  reopening  negotiations,  and 
refused  to  furnish  the  -troops.  So,  to  satisfy  this  fixed  idea,  im- 
portant forces,  which  would  have  been  much  better  employed  else- 
where, had  to  be  left  stationed  before  Kee-lung.  The  reverse  of 
Tamsui,  and  the  obligation  closely  to  blockade  Formosa,  were  to 
demonstrate  the  ineffectiveness  of  this  method  to  bring  China  to 
yield  to  the  French  demands.  As  we  know,  it  was  only  by 
stopping  the  exportation  of  rice  that  this  result  could  be  attained 
at  last;  this  can  not  surprise  us,  for  only  in  that  way  were  the 
vital  interests  of  China  touched. 

Even  the  foregoing  very  brief  analysis  of  this  campaign  fur- 
nishes matter  for  important  reflections. 

We  have  there  seen  an  admirable  chief,  full  of  energy  and  of 
wise  resolution,  having  a  very  clear  sense  of  the  fundamental  rules 
of  the  conduct  of  war  and  capable,  surely,  as  he  has  proved  him- 
self, of  accomplishing  great  deeds,  if  the  blundering  control  of  an 
authority  exercised  from  thousands  of  miles  away  had  not  neutral- 
ized these  incomparable  qualities.  Quite  like  Tourville  before  him, 
Courbet  suffered  from  too  heavy  fetters  placed  by  the  government 
on  his  military  actions. 

In  striking  contrast  to  this  is  what  will  happen  ten  years  later 
in  the  same  theater.  We  shall  not  find  then,  at  the  head  of  the 
Japanese  fleets,  admirals  of  such  exceptional  worth  as  to  deserve 
immortality,  but  on  the  other  hand  we  shall  see  a  staff  already 
conscious  of  the  impossibility  of  military  improvisations,  knowing 
what  it  wishes  and  with  a  firm  will  to  attain  to  it,  having  prepared 
a  plan  of  operations  in  conformity  with  sane  principles  and  carry- 
ing it  out  to  the  end  without  weakness.  We  had  "  the  man"  but 
we  neglected  preparations  for  war,  as  well  as  war  itself;  in  the 
contest  between  China  and  Japan,  the  conquerors  did  not  have 
"  the  man"  but  they  knew  how  to  prepare  methodically  for  war 
and  to  carry  on  war.  This  was  an.  experimental  proof  that  the 
system  to  which  von  Moltke  owed  his  successes  in  1870  is  as 
excellent  on  the  sea  as  on  shore. 

One  other  observation  is  necessary ;  there  are  no  profitable 
operations  possible  in  a  war  the  details  of  which  the  political 

100 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

power  pretends  to  direct,  when  the  distance  of  the  field  of  action 
forbids  its  determining  their  relative  importance  and  following 
their  progress. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  exhibit  the  productive  freedom 
of  action  which  Nelson  of  good  rights  enjoyed,  the  elasticity  of 
the  general  orders  given  to  him,  wholly  contained  in  the  brief  and< 
clear  formula :  to  win  command  of  the  Mediterranean,  which 
permitted  him  to  follow  the  enemy's  fleet  even  to  the  Antilles. 

Suffren,  he  also  felt  the  full  value  of  military  independence 
when  he  wrote  the  Minister,  de  Castries :  "  The  king  can  be 
well  served  in  these  far  off  countries  only  when  those  in  command 
have  great  powers  and  the  courage  to  use  them." 

Moreover,  our  illustrious  seaman -had  found  a  man  capable  of 
understanding  him  in  this  Minister  who  wrote  to  him :  "  The  king 
has  announced  to  you  in  your  instructions,  Sir,  that  all  courageous 
acts  which  his  generals  may  do,  even  though  they  fail  of  the 
success  which  their  boldness  deserves,  will  be  none  the  less  honored 
of  him,  and  that  inaction  is  the  only  thing  with  which  he  will  be 
displeased." 

I  have  already  affirmed  under  too  many  circumstances  the 
necessity  of  building  everything  upon  a  system  of  definite  respon- 
sibilities for  anyone  to  suppose  that  I  am  defending  the  delegation 
of  powers.  It  belongs  to  the  national  authorities  alone  to  give  the 
initial  impulse,  to  establish  what  may  be  called  the  program  of 
future  hostilities,  but  if  one  makes  war,  of  his  own  accord  or 
because  he  is  forced  to,  it  matters  not  which,  he  must  know  how 
to  make  it;  once  the  war  has  begun,  its  direction  belongs  to  the 
military  chief.  Every  other  method  leads  straight  to  defeat,  and 
if  all  the  conquests  of  modern  progress  in  the  matter  of  rapidity 
of  communications  are  to  have  for  a  consequence  restraint  of  the 
indispensable  initiative  of  the  supreme  commander  in  the  field,  all 
the  benefits  which  they  confer  will  not  be  sufficient  to  make  up 
for  their  evil  effects. 

That  is  why  I  could  not  let  slip  the  chance  of  expressing  myself 
frankly  on  this  subject.  If  there  be  need  of  supporting  the  exam- 
ples of  Suffren  and  Nelson,  we  have  the  great  authority  of  Napo- 
leon, the  master  of  the  subject.  Treating,  in  his  Memoirs,  of  the 
duties  of  generals,  he  expresses  himself  as  follows : 

"  A  general  in  chief  is  not  relieved  of  responsibility  by  an  order 
from  a  minister  or  a  prince  far  from  the  Held  of  operations  and 

101 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

knowing  badly  or  not  knowing  at  all  the  last  state  of  affairs:  (i) 
Every  general-in-chief  who  undertakes  to  execute  a  plan  which  he 
thinks  bad  or  injurious  is  criminal;  he  ought  to  make  representa- 
tions, to  insist  upon  a  change,  finally  to  resign  rather  than  be  the 
instrument  of  the  ruin  of  his  own  people;  (2)  Every  general-in- 
chief  who,  in  consequence  of  orders  from  a  superior,  delivers  battle 
with  a  certainty  of  losing  it,  is  equally  criminal;  (3)  A  general-in- 
chief  is  the  -first  officer  of  the  military  hierarchy.  The  minister,  the 
prince  give  directions  to  which  he  must  conform  in  his  soul  and 
conscience ;  but  these  directions  are  never  military  orders  and  do 
not  exact  a  blind  obedience ;  (4)  Even  a  military  order  is  to  be 
blindly  obeyed  only  when  it  is  given  by  a  superior  who,  being  on 

the  spot  at  the  moment  of  giving  it,  knows  the  state  of  affairs 
)) 

It  seems  to  me  well  to  give  these  quotations,  not  only  because, 
with  due  regard  for  the  proportions  of  course,  they  apply  to  the 
campaign  we  have  just  been  considering,  but  also  because  they 
condemn  the  unfortunate  natural  tendency  of  the  central  authority, 
in  almost  all  contemporary  wars,  in  all  countries,  to  meddle  with 
the  practical  conduct  of  operations.  I  am  inclined  to  think,  for 
my  part,  that  the  repeated  defeats  of  General  Kuropatkin,  on  the 
plains  of  Manchuria,  had  no  other  original  cause. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN   CHINA  AND  JAPAN. 

The  war  between  China  and  Japan  was  carried  on  by  the  Japan- 
ese government,  as  I  have  already  said,  in  an  infinitely  wiser  way. 
A  savage  attack  at  the  beginning,  before  any  official  rupture,  was 
the  first  manifestation  of  the  manner  in  which  it  intended  to 
operate.  By  sinking,  without  formal  declaration  of  war,  a  trans- 
port laden  with  Chinese  troops,  and  by  attacking  some  Chinese 
cruisers,  the  Japanese  indicated  their  intention  of  not  letting 
things  drag  out  to  great  length.  They,  also,  drew  inspiration 
from  the  formula  "  quickly  and  thoroughly,"  and  if,  from  the  sen- 
timental point  of  view,  which  we  need  not  here  regard,  this  action 
was  of  doubtful  propriety,  it.  offers  in  the  special  order  of  ideas 
of  our  studies  a  valuable  hint. 

And  truly  the  execution  of  their  plan,  from  beginning  to  end, 
was  carried  forward  with  the  same  resolution.  The  Japanese  gov- 
ernment well  understood  the  whole  value  that  can  be  derived  from 
a  seizure  of  guarantees ;  but  it  never  thought  of  chosing  them  in 

102 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

some  useless  island,  almost  unknown  to  the  Chinese  world,  in  any 
case  too  far  from  that  empire's  brain  for  events  taking  place  there 
to  make  an  impression  upon  it.  It  is  in  the  Gulf  of  Petchili,  in 
that  way  of  entry  to  the  capitol,  that  the  Japanese  are  going  to 
strike. 

Their  initiation  into  the  military  doctrines  of  high  war  was  cer- 
tainly of  very  recent  date,  since,  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  century 
before,  their  sole  war  material  was  the  Samurai's  sword,  and  their 
navy  had  no  existence,  and  yet  they  had  been  able  so  completely 
to  assimilate  them  as  to  afford  an  example  to  more  than  one 
nation  rich  in  old  traditions. 

"Aux  nations  bien  nees, 
La  valeur  n'  attend  pas  le  nombre  des  annees." 

I  am  tempted  to  point  out  an  initial  error  which  they  made, 
although  it  had  no  evil  consequences :  their  first  effective  military 
operation  was  the  transportation  of  an  expeditionary  force  to  Che- 
mulpo. Looking  at  it  from  a  purely  traditional  point  of  view,  it 
is  certain  that,  in  the  very  interest  of  the  success  of  this  undertak- 
ing, their  first  care  should  have  been  to  "  fall  upon  the  Chinese 
fleet "  to  destroy  it,  or  in  any  event  to  put  it  out  of  any  condition 
to  do  harm,  by  blockading  it  in  its  port  of  refuge,  and  to  assure 
to  the  Japanese  navy  the  command  of  the  sea. 

Doubtless  the  very  judicious  arrangements  made  by  Admiral 
Ito  for  the  passage  of  the  convoy,  the  protection  of  the  transports 
en  route  by  the  squadron,  the  precautions  taken  to  clear  the  way 
and  to  avoid  any  possible  surprise  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  squad- 
ron, reduced  to  a  minimum  the  hazard  of  this  infraction  of  funda- 
mental principles.  With  different  adversaries  than  the  Chinese, 
it  might  nevertheless  have  cost  dearly,  for  a  sudden  attack,  by  a 
very  small,  manageable  naval  force,  on  a  fleet  embarrassed  by  the 
care  of  a  convoy,  will  always  put  the  latter  in  a  very  disadvan- 
tageous position. 

The  fact  is  that  we  must  suppose  the  Japanese  admiral  to  have 
had  the  conviction,  which  he  certainly  ought  to  have  had,  that  with 
such  adversaries  as  the  Chinese  he  could  permit  anything ;  he  was 
quite  right  in  that.  And  this  observation  has  its  value,  for  as  we 
have  already  many  times  pointed  out,  there  exists  in  every  war  a 
psychological  side  which  must  not  be  neglected. 

The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Japanese  fleet,  moreover,  a  few 
days  after  the  combined  operations  at  Chemulpo,  was  to  return 

103 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

to  basic  principles  by  seeking  the  Chinese  squadron  and  inflicting 
upon  it  a  defeat,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Yalu.  It  is  particularly 
suggestive  to  note  that  Admiral  Ito  benefited,  to  a  very  con- 
siderable extent,  by  a  strategical  error,  due  to  Admiral  Ting,  and 
of  the  same  nature  as  that  which  he  himself  committed  in  the 
operations,  at  Chemulpo. 

The  Chinese  admiral  had  himself  decided,  on  September  16,  to 
proceed  to  land  troops,  without  having  in  the  first  place  sought  to 
destroy  the  adverse  forces.  There,  where  his  rival  had  succeeded 
fully,  he  was  to  meet  with  a  complete  reverse,  so  true  it  is  that 
only  those  conclusions  which  take  account  of  many  contingencies 
can  be  registered  as  truths  in  war. 

Just  as  the  Japanese  navy  was  trained,  disciplined,  homoge- 
neous, conscious  of  its  own  strength,  so,  to  the  same  extent,  the 
personnel  of  the  Chinese  fleet  was  made  up  of  disparate  elements, 
without  either  training  or  military  education,  with  no  binding  ties, 
not  even  that  which  faith  in  a  common  ideal  gives. 

Therefore,  even  with  equal  material  forces,  Ito  had  the  supe- 
riority of  forces. 

The  Chinese  admiral  was  at  anchor  on  September  17,  with  his 
squadron,  at  the.  mouth  of  the  Yalu,  when  the  Japanese  fleet  was 
signaled ;  he  at  once  got  under  way  to  approach  the  latter. 

The  two  squadrons  in  sight  were  quite  comparable,  as  well  in 
number  of  ships  as  in  their  total  tonnage,  and  also  in  their  arma- 
ment. The  superior  protection  of  the  Chinese  ships — even  very 
decidedly  superior,  for  the  two  battleships  Ting-Yuen  and  Chen- 
Yuen  had  belts  of  355  mm.  and  the  two  cruisers  Lai-Yuen  and 
King-Yuen  belts  of  240  mm.,  while  among  the  Japanese  ships  the 
only  battleships,  the  already  old  Fuso  and  Hiyei,  had  a  central 
redoubt — was  compensated  by  a  real  inferiority  in  speed. 

These  two  naval  forces  advance  against  each  other  in  very  dif- 
ferent formations.  The  Chinese  admiral  in  a  very  open  wedge  for- 
mation the  point  of  which  was  occupied  by  his  strongest  ships, 
while  Admiral  Ito  had  arranged  his  ships  in  column.  Moreover 
this  was  not  merely  the  ordinary  long  column  of  ships,  but  com- 
prised in  reality  of  two  independent  homogeneous  divisions,  or  at 
least  as  homogeneous  as  they  could  be  at  that  epoch,  composed  of 
similar  ships  ranged,  in  each  of  those  divisions,  in  column. 

This  arrangement  gave  to  the  Japanese  squadron  all  the  advan- 
tages of  flexibility  of  the  traditional  column  with  an  increase  of 

104 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

mobility ;  this  same  scheme  of  formation  was  to  be  employed  ten 
years  later,  with  equal  success,  by  Admiral  Togo. 

At  this  point  of  our  exposition,  having  explained  the  respective 
positions  of  the  two  forces,  we  are  strongly  reminded  of  some- 
ching.  These  positions  recall  to  us  the  identical  ones  at  the  battle 
of  Lissa,  double  echelon  with  center  leading  on  one  side  and 
column  on  the  other ;  but  here  the  roles  are  reversed.  The  column 
is  in  close  order,  flexible  and  manageable,  as  much  as  that  of  the 
Italians  was  open  and  sluggish ;  the  compact  formation  is  as  little 
rigid  as  that  of  Tegethoff  was  resistant. 

If  ordinary  common  sense  failed  to  do  so,  this  actual  comparison 
would  suffice  to  demonstrate  how  little  geometry  counts  for  in 
the  matter  of  battle  formations. 

The  regular  presentation  of  their  bows  to  the  enemy  put  the 
Chinese  ships  under  extremely  disadvantageous  conditions  for 
battle. 

While  the  Japanese,  presenting  themselves  broadside  on  by  the 
development  of  their  columns,  had  all  their  guns  bearing,  the 
Chinese  could  only  use  their  bow  guns  and  were  thus  condemned 
to  a  notable  inferiority  of  gun  fire.  This  inferiority  was  to  become 
still  greater  after  the  first  phase  of  the  battle  by  reason  of  the  very 
judicious  dispositions  taken  by  Admiral  Ito.  The  latter,  anxious 
to  make  up  for  the  disadvantage  of  the  insufficient  protection  of 
his  ships,  and  at  the  same  time  wishing  to  profit  by  his  undoubted 
superiority  in  speed  and  gunnery,  while  he  kept  his  two  colunms 
at  a  distance  from  the  enemy  always  greater  than  three  thousand 
meters,  followed  a  very  gradually  changing  course,  with  the  first 
division  composed  of  the  fast  protected  cruisers  leading,  so  as 
little  by  little  to  outflank  the  right  of  the  Chinese  squadron.  That 
wing,  which  was  constituted  of  small  cruisers  of  little  military 
value,  was  almost  immediately  crushed,  and  the  main  force  of 
Chinese  battleships,  turning  two  points  to  starboard  to  come  to 
their  assistance,  destroyed  all  regularity  in  their  formation;  the 
fire  of  some  ships  became  masked  by  others,  and  the  battle  was 
lost  to  the  Chinese. 

This  battle  of  the  Yalu,  the  description  of  which  I  shall  pur- 
posely limit  to  this  brief  sketch,  has  given  rise  to  much  writing. 
Analyzed  with  passions  and  preconceived  ideas  inspired  by  reasons 
most  often  foreign  to  the  single  consideration  of  the  technical 
question,  it  has  sustained  the  most  widely  different  opinions. 

105 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Later  on  the  same  thing  will  occur  in  relation  to  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war. 

To  show  how  necessary  it  is  to  be  careful  in  formulating  conclu- 
sions from  the  actual  events  of  war,  I  will  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that,  from  the  mere  consideration  of  this  single  incontestable 
result  of  the  defeat  of  an  armored  squadron  by  another  composed 
of  only  protected  cruisers,  the  conclusion  has  been  drawn  that  the 
day  of  armored  ships  is  over. 

As  for  us,  wholly  absorbed  in  the  professional  problem,  and 
moreover  knowing  the  importance  of  the  associated  facts,  we  shall 
avoid  so  superficial  and  hasty  a  judgment ;  but,  insisting  upon  our 
right  to  free  discussion,  at  least  to  that  which  is  wholly  based  on 
experience,  without  seeking  to  distort  it,  we  shall  draw  from  this 
battle  a  lesson  which,  though  less  definite,  will  not  be  less  useful. 

The  crushing  of  the  two  wings  successively  by  the  turning 
movement  of  the  Japanese  had  resulted  in  reducing  the  resisting 
force  of  the  Chinese  squadron  to  the  battleships  alone.  Over- 
whelmed by  the  fire  of  the  whole  Japanese  squadron  concentrated 
upon  them,  swept  by  an  iron  storm  which  struck  down  their  masts 
and  superstructures,  smashed  their  guns  and  destroyed  all  their 
means  of  internal  communication,  these  unhappy  ships,  after  an 
action  which  had  lasted  four  hours,  were  reduced  to  a  state  of 
impotency.  They  were  ready  to  receive  the  death  stroke,  without 
even  being  able  to  strike  a  last  blow  as  they  plunged  to  destruction, 
when  Admiral  Ito,  out  of  ammunition,  withdrew  from  the  battle 
field ;  lacking  torpedoes,  we  must  add,  which  at  that  moment  with- 
out any  risk  would  have  been  able  to  finish  the  Chinese  battleships. 

Thus,  in  spite  of  its  brilliant  success,  the  victory  of  the  Japanese 
fleet  was  incomplete,  and  furthermore,  though  disabled  to  the 
extent  of  being  military  wrecks,  the  Chinese  battleships  still  kept 
afloat.  They  floated  so  well,  were  so  little  injured  as  regards 
their  buoyancy  and  in  their  essential  parts,  that  a  few  months  later 
they  were  able  to  serve  under  the  flag  of  the  conqueror. 

After  Punta-Agamos,  Yalu  reminds  us  that  to  reduce  a  warship 
we  are  not  necessarily  limited  to  the  single  and  somewhat  chimeri- 
cal design  of  attacking  her  water-line,  and  finally  that  the  limit  of 
the  capacity  to  resist  of  the  personnel  can  be  reached  without 
destroying  the  buoyancy.  Just  like  the  Huascar,  the  Chen-Yuen 
and  Ting-Yuen,  without  guns  and  fighting  against  fires,  yielded  to 
the  effects  of  gunfire  against  their  upper  works. 

106 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Such  in  my  opinion  is  the  great  lesson  of  the  battle  of  the  Yalu. 
This  battle,  which  destroyed  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Gulf  of 
Petchili  to  Japan's  advantage,  gave  the  latter,  from  that  time  on, 
command  of  the  sea.  Thenceforth,  the  capture  of  Port  Arthur 
by  the  Japanese  army  was  merely  a  question  of  time,  and  with 
that  place  there  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Empire  of  the 
Rising  Sun  one  of  the  double  gates  of  entry  into  the  Celestial 
kingdom.  The  other  gate,  Wei-hai-Wei,  remained  to  be  taken  ;  its 
conquest  was  the  object  of  a  combined  operation  of  the  fleet  and 
army. 

From  a  strictly  naval  point  of  view,  the  attack  on  Wei-hai-Wei 
has  no  other  real  interest  for  us  than  through  the  important  co- 
operation of  the  Japanese  torpedo-boats  in  the  military  enterprise. 
To  tell  the  truth,  the  affair  of  Wei-hai-Wei  was  not  the  first  entry 
upon  the  scene  of  these  little  vessels;  already,  in  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war,  they  had  made  their  proofs  and  shown  what  could 
be  expected  from  these  new  instruments  of  battle  when  they  were 
commanded  by  energetic  and  resolute  men. 

The  offensive  use  of  torpedo-boats,  acting  with  the  squadron 
assisting  in  the  attack  on  Wei-hai-Wei,  was  perfectly  logical.  In 
the  impossibility  of  the  large  ships  approaching  closely  to  the  inner 
harbor  without  imprudently  exposing  themselves  to  the  fire  of  the 
powerful  batteries  along  the  sea  front,  a  night  attack  of  the  tor- 
pedo-boats was  the  only  possible  way  to  destroy  what  was  left  of 
the  Chinese  fleet. 

At  all  events,  it  may  be  seen  what  a  variety  of  ways  there  are 
of  using  these  little  vessels,  and  that  it  would  be  a  pity  to  confine 
them  exclusively  to  a  passive  role  by  assigning  them  permanent 
stations  at  the  different  parts  of  a  coast  to  be  defended.  But  it 
would  be  equally  a  mistake  to  assume  that  torpedo-boats  are  not 
weapons  for  coast  defense.  Their  sea-going  qualities,  necessarily 
limited,  require  the  proximity  of  safe  shelters  where  they  can  take 
refuge  in  bad  weather. 

We  shall  see  later  on  that  at  Tsushima  the  state  of  the  sea  did 
not  allow  using  them  during  battle ;  so  that  they  can  not  always  be 
counted  on  as  certain  aids  in  purely  offensive  operations.  They 
really  constitute,  applying  Jomini's  happy  expression  to  the  navy, 
the  "  defensive-offensive,"  and  they  offer  proof  of  the  correctness 
of  the  principle  that  the  surest  way  to  defend  is  to  attack. 

Wei-hai-Wei  taken,  the  way  to  Pekin  was  open,  and  the  Chinese 

107 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

government  had  nothing  else  to  do  but  capitulate.  Thus  were  jus- 
tified the  views  of  Admiral  Courbet,  and  once  more  verified  cer- 
tain general  rules  of  strategy  that  cannot  with  impunity  be  vio- 
lated in  the  conduct  of  war. 

If  now,  taking  a  general  view  of  the  Chinese- Japanese  war,  we 
seek  to  determine  its  character,  it  appears  to  us  that,  like  many 
others,  it  has  consecrated  the  influence  of  preparation  for  war,  and 
proved  its  superiority  over  carelessness  and  indifference  in  mili- 
tary affairs,  it  has  shown  the  importance  of  the  morale  and  train- 
ing of  the  personnel,  and  finally  it  is  a  guarantee  that  success  will 
result  from  having  a  directing  principle,  a  plan  of  operations,  as 
opposed  to  absence  of  initial  conceptions  and  reliance  upon  luck. 

A  firm  will  in  the  pursuit  of  a  well-defined  end  will  always 
triumph  over  indecision  and  lack  of  foresight. 


108 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  WAR  BETWEEN  SPAIN  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

The  Spanish- American  war,  like  the  one  preceding  it,  embraces 
no  great  military  facts  capable  of  throwing  by  their  lessons  a  bril- 
liant light  upon  the  vital  problems  of  the  constitution  of  fleets. 
Although  certain  consequences  of  the  battle  of  Santiago,  which 
really  do  not  exist,  have  been  imagined  by  minds  imbued,  perhaps, 
with  preconceived  ideas,  it  is  realty  on  account  of  its  many  moral 
lessons  that  this  war  is  worthy  of  remembrance. 

In  that  respect,  the  harvest  will  be  rich.  For  no  other  war, 
perhaps,  has  shown  to  an  equal  degree  the  influence  which  neglect 
of  preparation  for  war  exercises  upon  the  results  of  an  armed  con- 
flict. From  this  point  of  view,  we  could  not  devote  too  much  time 
to  studying  all  its  details. 

It  really  seems  as  if  in  unhappy  Spain  the  phenomenal  care- 
lessness concerning  military  organization  is  a  sort  of  endemic  and 
incurable  evil,  for  warnings  have  not  been  wanting  to  her  in  the 
past.  We  have  retained  the  vivid  memory  of  the  lamentable  con- 
dition of  the  Spanish  fleet  at  the  time  of  the  events  of  1805,  the 
incessant  complaints  of  Villeneuve,  as  well  as  the  contemptuous 
sarcasms  of  Nelson  in  regard  to  that  naval  force.  It  would  appear 
incredible,  then,  that  lessons  so  dearly  paid  for  should  not  have 
profited  that  country,  which,  one  hundred  years  later,  was  to  go 
to  battle  under  conditions  quite  the  same  as  before.  This  example 
has  an  immense  philosophical  meaning,  for  us  in  particular;  for, 
companions  of  the  Spaniards  in  misfortune  a  century  ago,  we,  at 
least,  ought  to  draw  moral  profit  from  the  persistent  causes  of 
their  ills. 

THE  STRATEGIC  ERROR  OF  SPAIN. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  this  war,  we  find  a  strategic  error  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  as  we  shall  find  a  similar  one  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan ;  and  it  was  this 
original  error  which,  in  both  cases,  bore  with  its  whole  adverse 
weight  upon  the  conduct  and  the  results  of  the  war. 

The  Spanish  government  could  not  be  unaware  of  the  views  of 

109 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  United  States  regarding  the  Pearl  of  the  Antilles.  The  sym- 
pathies, avowed  under  all  circumstances,  of  the  American  people 
with  the  cause  of  the  insurgents,  the  secret  or  open  aid  which  was 
extended  to  them  upon  the  Union  territory ;  everything,  up  to 
veiled  or  openly  expressed  propositions  to  purchase  Cuba,  made 
several  times  by  the  American  government,  was  of  a  nature  to 
open  the  eyes  of  the  most  incredulous  as  to  the  actual  desires  of 
America  and  the  dangers  to  Spain  which  would  result  from  them. 

And  the  latter  country,  when  war  broke  out  in  1898,  in  complete 
naval  anarchy,  had  not  even  the  excuse  of  having  been  surprised 
by  events,  for  these  manifestations  of  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
Americans  were  not  of  recent  date.  As  long  ago  as  1823,  Adams, 
Secretary  of  State,  wrote :  "  There  are  laws  of  political  as  well 
as  of  physical  gravitation;  and  if  an  apple  detached  by  the  wind 
from  the  tree  which  produced  it  can  only  fall  to  the  earth  in  virtue 
of  the  law  of  gravity,  so  Cuba,  separated  by  force  from  her  own 
connection  with  Spain,  and  incapable  of  standing  alone,  can  only 
gravitate  towards  the  North  American  Union,  which,  following 
the  same  law  of  nature,  cannot  reject  her  from  its  breast." 

As  may  be  seen,  the  desires  were  scarcely  dissimulated ;  hence, 
if  Spanish  pride  could  not  resolve  itself  to  yield  the  island  of  Cuba 
at  a  good  price,  it  was  necessary  to  prepare  a  military  force  capa- 
ble of  defending  it  against  any  attempt  at  aggression  and  of  hold- 
ing on  to  it. 

To  defend  Cuba  there  was  a  choice  between  two  methods ; 
either  to  make  the  coasts  of  that  island  bristle  with  forts  and 
batteries,  to  sow  the  approaches  of  her  bays  and  harbors  thick 
with  torpedoes  and  to  maintain  permanently  a  formidable  army ; 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  remembering  that  another  great  island, 
Great  Britain,  had  been  able  to  preserve  throughout  the  wars  of 
the  past  the  inviolability  of  her  territory  without  forts  or  batteries, 
without  torpedoes  and  without  an  army,  in  fact,  without  any 
passive  defence  whatever,  but  wholly  by  the  invincible  might  of 
a  powerful  fleet,  also  to  prepare  a  navy  strong  enough  to  command 
respect. 

If  we  only  reflect  that  every  aggressive  move  against  Cuba, 
necessarily  having  to  be  by  way  of  the  sea,  required,  prior  to  any 
military  operation,  the  conquest  of  maritime  supremacy,  without 
which  transportation  of  an  expeditionary  force  is  impossible,  we 
will  quickly  agree  that  the  strategic  solution  of  the  retention  of 


no 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Cuba  by  Spain  likewise  depended  upon  that  power's  holding  the 
command  of  the  sea,  and  consequently,  upon  the  building  of  a 
powerful  navy. 

In  thus  setting  forth  the  necessary  principle  of  what  has  been 
named  the  "  command  of  the  sea,"  we  anticipate  the  conclusions 
which  we  shall  draw  from  the  study  of  history ;  but  we  can  never- 
theless, from  now  on,  use  the  example,  conclusive  above  all 
others,  of  Napoleon's  designs  against  England,  the  sole  cause  of 
whose  failure  was  his  inability  to  assure  the  freedom  of  the  sea. 

Certain  facts  of  the  very  war  that  we  are  now  considering  will 
be  used  later  on  to  strengthen  this  argument. 

The  financial  burden  necessary  to  create  a  fleet  was  not  so  ex- 
cessive that  the  Spanish  nation,  weighted  down  with  debts  as  it 
was,  would  have  been  unable  to  support  it.  At  the  moment  of  the 
opening  of  hostilities,  the  American  effective  naval  strength,  in 
ships  having  a  real  military  value,  was  actually  five  battleships  of 
eleven  to  twelve  thousand  tons,  Iowa,  Indiana,  Massachusetts, 
Texas  and  Oregon;  two  armored  cruisers,  New  York  and  Brook- 
lyn, of  eight  thousand  tons ;  and  eleven  protected  cruisers  of  a  dis- 
placement varying  from  three  to  six  thousand  tons,  Cincinnati, 
Philadelphia,  Charleston,  Newark,  Columbia,  Minneapolis,  San 
Francisco,  Olympia,  Baltimore,  Raleigh  and  Boston. 

I  do  not  mention  steamships  requisitioned  by  the  Americans  to 
serve  as  auxiliary  cruisers,  that  reserve  force  of  secondary  im- 
portance being  largely  available  at  all  times  to  both  belligerents, 
and  not  requiring  the  patient  and  methodical  preparation  of  fight- 
ing units  of  the  first  class. 

To  impose  respect  upon  this  surely  modest  fleet,  it  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  oppose  to  it,  concentrated  in  Cuban  waters,  as 
homogeneous  a  squadron  as  practicable  of  twelve  armored  crui- 
sers of  twelve  thousand  tons,  whose  construction  should  have  been 
the  constant  care  of  the  Spanish  government  for  more  than  fifteen 
years  past.  The  cost  of  such  represents  a  sum  of  three  hundred 
million  francs,  to  which  must  be  added  ninety  millions  for  the  pro- 
tected cruisers  necessary  as  its  auxiliaries.  That,  however,  is  not 
all,  for  a  fleet  cannot  shift  for  itself,  especially  in  our  times,  and 
there  are  needful  to  it  one  or  several  bases  of  operations  pro- 
vided with  abundant  stores  and  the  various  requirements  necessi- 
tated by  the  state  of  naval  war.  To  be  efficient,  a  base  should  be 
as  near  as  possible  to  the  theater  of  war ;  in  the  case  we  are  con- 
in 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

sidering  the  best  situation  by  all  means  was  on  the  coast  of  the 
island,  at  the  very  center  of  naval  operations.  Spain  had  only  the 
difficulty  of  a  choice  between  the  numerous  bays  of  the  island.  It 
is  not  exaggerated  to  compute  at  three  hundred  millions  the  ex- 
penditures for  organizing  a  reliable  and  suitably  equipped  base  for 
a  squadron  such  as  we  have  just  described. 

There  would  have  been  required,  then,  a  total  expenditure  of 
six  hundred  and  ninety  million  francs ;  spread  over  the  preceding 
last  fifteen  years  it  represents  an  annual  contribution  of  forty-six 
millions.  Adding  two  millions,  absolutely  necessary  for  the  mili- 
tary training  of  the  personnel,  for  gunnery  and  squadron  exercises, 
we  arrive  at  a  total  of  forty-eight  millions,  or  let  us  say  fifty  mil- 
lions in  round  numbers,  as  the  annual  financial  burden  that  the  cer- 
tainty of  safeguarding  her  colonial  interests  imposed  upon  Spain, 
outside  of  her  normal  budget  of  expenses  for  maintenance. 

Such  a  sacrifice,  relatively  slight,  was  surely  possible ;  it  would 
have  been  a  tremendous  economy,  in  view  of  the  very  great  loss 
sustained  by  Spain  on  account  of  a  war  waged  under  miserable 
conditions  as  well  as  through  the  complete  suppression  of  the 
revenues  which  she  drew  from  her  American  colony  and  which 
very  often  had  served  to  balance  the  budgets  of  the  mother 
country. 

Doubtless  objection  will  be  made,  based  upon  the  tremendous 
additions  made  to  its  navy  by  the  United  States  government,  after 
the  war  of  1898,  that  if  this  contest  could  very  certainly  have  been 
avoided  by  the  means  I  have  just  pointed  out,  the  fatal  moment  of 
conflict  between  the  desires  of  North  America  and  the  resistance 
of  Spain  would  merely  have  been  delayed.  I  willingly  recognize 
it,  and  I  am  willing  to  admit  equally  that  Spain,  poor  and  in  want, 
would  not  have  been  able  long  to  resist  the  all  powerful  influence 
of  the  American  dollar,  sovereign  master  in  the  maintenance  of 
that  costly  luxury,  a  strong  navy. 

But  anything  was  better,  under  any  circumstances,  than  that 
struggle  without  honor  or  dignity  undergone  by  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, and  if  naval  strength  was  really  beyond  its  means,  it  had 
only  to  take  to  itself  the  very  just  remark  of  Napoleon,  apropos 
of  the  cession  of  Louisiana :  "  No  colonies  are  possible  without  a 
navy,"  and  in  its  turn  consent  to  give  up  Cuba. 

It  is  because  these  preliminary  critical  remarks  have  reference 
to  a  situation  not  at  all  peculiar  to  Spain  that  I  have  so  readily 

112 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

yielded  extensive  consideration  to  them.  We  shall  have  occasion 
to  revert  to  it  with  greater  detail  when  we  study  the  contingencies 
of  possible  conflicts,  and  to  show  how  this  example  concerns  to  the 
highest  degree  our  own  country. 

It  is  on  that  account  particularly  that  I  have  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  emphasize  an  initial  political  error- which  hampered  the 
whole  conduct  of  the  war  by  its  evil  influence,  and  by  itself  alone 
brought  about  Spain's  defeat.  And  if  we  were  limited  to  the  mere 
study  of  high  strategy,  we  could  at  this  point  stop  in  our  examina- 
tion of  the  Spanish- American  conflict.  The  causes  of  Spanish  dis- 
asters are  already  sufficiently  indicated,  so  true  it  is  that  the  poli- 
tics of  a  nation  are  the  true  inspiration  of  the  strategy  of  its 
armies,  the  directing  idea  of  its  military  action. 

"  Give  me  good  statesmanship,  and  I  will  give  you  sound 
finance"  said  Baron  Louis.  It  would  be  equally  true  to  say: 
"  Give  me  good  statesmanship,  and  I  will  give  you  adequate  mili- 
tary forces."  The  bond  between  the  one  and  the  other  is  indis- 
soluble ;  the  example  of  Spain  is  the  proof  to  be  pondered  by  many 
other  nations. 

THE  FORCES  OF  SPAIN. 

The  Spanish  navy  entered  upon  the  struggle  in  a  condition  of 
the  most  lamentable  inferiority,  and  not  alone  through  its  insuffi- 
cient material,  but  especially  through  the  lack  of  preparation  of 
its  personnel. 

It  comprised  four  battleships  of  from  seven  to  nine  thousand 
tons,  four  armored  cruisers  of  seven  thousand  tons,  and  four 
protected  cruisers  of  from  two  to  four  thousand  tons.  Of  the 
four  battleships,  two  old  and  obsolete  units,  Numancia  and  Vitto- 
ria}  are  only  named  as  a  matter  of  form.  In  reality,  the  only  real 
strength  of  the  Spanish  fleet  was  in  the  two  battleships  Pelayo 
and  Carlos  V ,  and  especially  in  the  very  homogeneous  division  of 
the  four  armored  cruisers  Infanta,  Maria  Teresa,  Viscaya,  Almi- 
rante  Oquendo  and  Cristobal  Colon;  though  this  last  was  without 
her  two  heavy  turret  guns  of  25  cm. 

Although  this  was  the  case,  the  Spanish  government,  in  one  of 
the  many  manifestations  of  its  stupefying  incompetence  in  the 
affairs  of  war,  heedless  that  the  first  step  towards  success  is  to 
seek  the  superiority  of  forces  which  concentration  at  one  point 
alone  can  give,  did  exactly  the  wrong  thing  by  dividing  its  own. 

113 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Under  the  impulsion  of  an  energetic  and  bold  leader,  much 
might  have  been  hoped  from  the  action  of  a  squadron  formed  of 
these  six  ships;  at  all  events,  it  would  not  have  been  negligible, 
being  concentrated,  and,  lacking  other  advantages,  would  have 
been  able  to  save  by  its  resistance  the  military  honor  of  Spain. 
This  arrangement  was  really  planned  for  a  moment  at  the  beginn- 
ing of  the  war,  but  it  remained  a  project  only. 

This  fundamental  principle  being  violated,  the  two  battleships 
placed  under  Admiral  Camara,  as  we  know,  played  no  useful  part 
in  the  war,  and  even  had  to  suffer  the  ridicule  of  a  futile  sortie 
towards  the  Philippines. 

As  for  the  division  of  armored  cruisers,  the  only  force  to  which 
Spain  was  willing  to  prescribe  a  semblance  of  action,  it  was  far 
from  having  the  ardent  and  warlike  chief,  the  leader  of  men 
whose  appearance  upon  the  scene  we  have  above  evoked. 

Who  is  now  ignorant  of  the  lamentations  of  the  unfortunate 
Cervera?  Complaints,  before  the  war,  during  it  and  after  it,  of 
the  miserable  condition  of  the  material,  the  incapacity  of  the  per- 
sonnel, the  poverty  of  the  most  essential  articles,  etc.,  protests 
against  the  orders  he  receives ;  all  these  weaknesses  have  been 
fully  displayed  and  have  exposed  to  their  smallest  details  the 
faults  which  have  made  Spain  incapable  of  victory. 

That  unhappy  admiral  knew  not  Billow's  fine  saying :  "  One 
is  never  whipped  so  long  as  he  refuses  to  believe  that  he  is." 

Furthermore,  this  condition  of  moral  depression  in  a  leader  in- 
vested with  the  redoubtable  honor  of  a  great  military  responsi- 
bility is  no  novelty  to  us ;  in  Cervera  we  find  the  same  state  of 
mind  which,  in  Villeneuve,  spent  itself  in  endless  lamentations 
over  the  bad  condition  of  his  ships,  the  difficulties  which  inter- 
fered with  the  execution  of  the  orders  given  him,  etc.  And  what 
makes  the  resemblance  still  more  striking  is  that,  a  century  apart, 
the  two  leaders,  alike  brave  individually,  but  equally  incapable  of 
effective  action,  found  their  force  of  protest  in  the  single  thought 
of  a  personal  defence  before  the  perhaps  too  severe  judgment  of 
posterity. 

Upon  reflection,  this  need  not  astonish  us :  Villeneuve  and  Cer- 
vera were  merely  the  natural  products  of  two  equally  feeble  organ- 
izations, the  French  navy  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  centuries  and  the  Spanish  navy  at  the 
end  of  the  latter  century.  Generals-in-chief  are  only  able  to  reflect 

114 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  environments  in  which  they  were  developed.  To  have  men 
equal  to  becoming  great  leaders,  there  must  be  necessarily,  except 
under  extraordinary  circumstances,  schools  of  energy,  and  they 
were  not  to  be  found  in  either  of  the  two  navies  referred  to.  The 
preceding  philosophical  observation  has  a  very  wide  application, 
for  it  is  a  precept  to  be  remembered  always  and  everywhere. 

As  extenuating  circumstances,  we  must  by  no  means  forget  the 
extremely  insufficient  resources  placed  at  the  disposition  of  these 
two  seamen,  and  though  their  poverty  of  action  must  be  charged 
against  them,  the  greatest  part  of  the  responsibility  for  the  disas- 
trous results  rests  beyond  any  doubt  upon  their  respective 
governments. 

At  the  moment  when  Cervera*^  received  orders  to  set  sail,  he 
lacked  the  most  indispensable  appliances :  his  ships  had  been 
unable  to  fill  up  with  coal  at  Carthagena,  his  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion were  incomplete ;  there  was  nothing,  even  to  charts  of  the 
West  Indian  seas,  that  was  not  wanting  on  his  ships. 

The  letters  of  Admiral  Cervera,  from  which  I  shall  frequently 
quote,  are  taken  from  the  interesting  translation  published  in  the 
Revue  Maritime  by  Commander  Mourre. 

Under  date  of  March  3,  1898,  the  admiral  wrote  to  his  Minis- 
ter :  "  My  reflections  which  so  painfully  affect  you  are  doubtless 
very  grievous,  and  yet  perhaps  I  am  short  of  the  whole  truth! 
A  proof  of  this  is  the  lack  of  money  which  makes  the  acquisition  of 
cartridges  for  the  Colon  difficult,  and  this  on  the  eve  of  war  against 
the  richest  nation  in  the  world.  Even  here,  when  it  is  a  question 
of  reloading  the  empty  fourteen-centimeter  cases,  I  have  been  told 
that  it  is  impossible  ....  No  matter  what  the  occasion,  our  lack 
of  resources,  the  absence  of  organisation,  IN  A  WORD  THE  WANT  OF 
PREPARATION,  is  immediately  apparent/' 

Let  us  compare  with  this  the  letter  which  Villeneuve  wrote  to 
the  Minister  Decres  on  January  7,  1805. 

"  My  dear  General,  I  have  ceased  to  write  you  private  letters 
because  I  have  thought  this  method  bothered  you  and  I  fear  noth- 
ing so  much  as  being  a  burden.  I  wrote  thus  to  you  on  my  arrival 
at  Toulon  and  you  did  not  answer  me.  It  is  true  that  I  ask  for 
money  with  good  reasons,  to  which  it  suited  you  not  to  reply/' 

The  likeness,  as  may  be  seen,  is  striking.  To  the  too  well 
founded  remonstrances  of  Admiral  Cervera,  the  Minister  of 
Marine  finds  only  these  words  of  reply :  "..-.-.  Your  calcula- 

115 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tions  do  not  take  account  of  the  difference  which  exists  betiveen 
homogeneous  crews,  trained  and  disciplined,  and  the  mercenaries 
of  the  United  States" 

We  know  this  refrain ;  it  has  served  and  will  again  serve  the 
ministers  of  all  countries  to  make  a  sentimental  and  passionate 
diversion,  instead  of  replying  to  often  embarrassing  questions  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  naval  material. 

To  understand  what  it  was  worth  in  the  case  of  Spain,  it  suffices 
to  know  a  little  anecdote  which  was  related  to  me  by  a  person 
worthy  of  belief,  and  which  goes  back  to  the  acceptance  trials  of 
the  Cristobal  Colon.  The  trials  of  this  cruiser,  built  by  Ansaldo  at 
Genoa,  had  been  conducted  by  the  constructor's  men  and  had 
gone  along  most  satisfactorily  up  to  the  time  established  by  the 
contract  when  the  machinery  was  to  be  put  in  charge  of  the  ship's 
regular  crew.  On  that  day  the  watch  of  Spanish  firemen  had  just 
replaced  the  contractor's  men  in  the  fire  rooms,  when  the  enticing 
sound  of  the  signal  for  the  crew's  dinner  was  heard.  With  a 
touching  unanimity,  the  firemen  immediately  abandoned  their  fur- 
naces, powerless  to  resist  the  call  to  food  and  the  provoking  image 
of  the  cigarette  which  was  to  follow  it.  There  was  a  discipline 
beyond  the  possibility  of  characterization. 

The  analogy  to  wrhich  I  referred  above  is  not  merely  accidental, 
it  is  complete.  Villeneuve  wrote  again,  on  his  return  from  the 
sortie  from  Toulon  on  January  18,  1805,  in  the  letter  from  which 
I  have  already  quoted :  "  Fortune  did  not  fail  me  on  this  occasion 
for  if  I  had  been  sighted  by  the  English  squadron,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  me  to  escape  it,  and  even  with  inferior  forces, 
it  would  have  completely  routed  us." 

And  the  following  day  he  adds :  "  /  beg  you  to  remember  that 
I  did  not  desire  the  command  of  this  squadron  ....  /  very 
earnestly  pray  that  the  Emperor  may  not  commit  any  of  his  squad- 
rons to  the  hazard  of  events m .  .  .  .  /  should  be  greatly  pleased  if 
the  Emperor  would  relieve  me  from  the  command"  Later  he 
was  to  write  from  Cadiz  on  August  22,  1805 :  "  /  have  been 
unable  to  perceive  any  good  whatever  in  the  campaign  I  was  to 
undertake.  I  would  pardon  the  -whole  world  for  casting  stones  at 
me;  but  naval  people  in  Paris  and  in  the  bureaus  who  join  in  doing 
so  will  be  very  blind,  very  contemptible  and  above  all  very  foolish." 

Cervera,  likewise,  despairs  before  he  has  made  any  trial;  he 
makes  numerical  calculations  showing  the  crushing  superiority  of 

116 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  Americans,  he  complains  of  the  poverty  of  .his  ships,  he  pro- 
claims the  certainty  of  his  defeat.  Later,  at  Santiago,  he  will 
express,  just  as  Villeneuve  did,  his  indignation  at  the  views  of  his 
colleagues  in  Madrid,  as  well  as  his  desire  to  be  replaced,  to  see 
"  the  cup  of  responsibility  taken  from  his  lips,"  a  terrible  phrase, 
for  it  is  the  courage  to  take  responsibility  which  makes  great 
leaders ;  in  fact,  imitating  his  precursor,  he  does  all  things  which 
can  stifle  what  little  moral  force  the  Spanish  navy  may  still  have, 
but  none  of  the  things  necessary  to  revive  its  flagging  energies. 

Admiral  Cervera  to  General  Blanco,  Santiago,  June  27 :  "  /  am 
of  opinion  that  there  are  many  seamen  more  skilful  than  myself, 
and  it  is  regrettable  that  one  of  them  cannot  come  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  squadron,  in  which  f  would  remain  as  a  subordinate." 

It  is  not  for  artistic  effect  that  I  have  called  attention  to  this 
curious  parallel  between  two  personalities  of  which  one,  after  the 
lapse  of  a  century,  is  the  image  of  the  other.  What  I  have  really 
aimed  at  is  to  bring  into  comparison  two  systems,  or  more  exactly, 
for  these  two  systems  are  one  and  the  same,  I  have  tried  to  bring 
out  the  fact  that  in  different  surroundings,  times  and  circum- 
stances, and  with  very  different  instruments,  the  same  results 
were  produced  by  the  same  cause,  unpreparedness. 

And  in  the  two  cases,  in  1805  as  well  as  in  1898,  there  exists,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  but  one  single  cause  for  the  final  disaster,  the 
absence  of  preparation  for  war,  which  betrays  itself  in  the  bad 
condition  of  ships,  the  lack  of  resources  of  all  sorts,  the  poverty  of 
the  crews,  their  lack  of  instruction  and  training,  and  what  may  be 
summed  up  as  military  weakness. 

CERVERA'S  SQUADRO^T. 

In  Spain's  case  there  was  one  more  aggravation,  and  a  tremen- 
dous one,  at  that.  Villeneuve  at  least  knew  what  his  Emperor 
desired;  he  knew  it  only  too  well.  We  have  considered  at  its 
proper  place  Napoleon's  strategic  plan,  which  had  at  least  the 
immense  merit  of  existing.  As  for  Cervera,  he,  when  setting  out 
for  the  West  Indies,  is  ignorant  of  the  motives  for  his  departure, 
does  not  know  what  is  expected  of  him  and  of  his  squadron. 
Beyond  doubt  this  is  because  his  government  was  equally  ignorant. 
All  that  part  of  the  official  correspondence  which  refers  to  the 
matter  is  worth  recalling,  to  serve  as  a  real  lesson  in  affairs,  a 
mournful  lesson.  "  Cadiz,  April  4,  Admiral  Cervera  to  the  Min- 

117 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ister :  Having  no  instructions,  it  would  seem  well  that  I  proceed 
to  Madrid  to  obtain  them  and  to  fix  upon  a  plan  of  campaign" 
And  the  Minister  replies :  "  In  the  midst  of  this  international 
crisis,  it  is  impossible  to  formulate  anything  precise/' 

What  the  Minister  neglects  to  say  is  that  it  would  be  impossi- 
ble to  make  a  more  explicit  confession  of  incompetence.  Thus 
in  the  councils  of  the  Spanish  government  nothing  was  foreseen, 
nothing  planned.  The  question  was  not  even  asked  what  should 
be  done  in  case  facts  gave  the  lie  to  their  optimistic  anticipations. 
They  let  themselves  be  surprised  by  the  war  as  by  a  sudden  flash 
of  lightning  out  of  a  clear  sky.  This  is  inexcusable,  for  the  storm 
which  then  rumbled  had  been  gathering  slowly,  beginning  as  a 
cloud  at  the  opening  of  the  century  and  growing  day  by  day.  It 
is  therefore  a  very  true  saying  that  nations  suffer  only  the  mis- 
fortunes they  deserve. 

The  unhappy  admiral  protests  once  more  before  leaving  Cadiz : 
"  Allow  me  to  insist  upon  the  necessity  of  agreeing  upon  a  general 
plan  of  campaign,  in  order  to  avoid  fatal  vacillations.  The  govern- 
ment doubtless  has  its  plan,  and  it  is  indispensable  that  I  should 
be  informed  of  it,  so  as  to  be  able  to  co-operate  with  it  efficiently" 

That  the  government's  plan  had  no  existence  is  beyond  any 
doubt,  and  the  reply  made  to  the  admiral  proves  it :  "  The 
urgency  of  your  departure  prevents  for  the  moment  making 
known  to  you  the  plan  which  you  ask  for.  You  will  have  it  in  all 
its  details  a  few  days  after  your  arrival  at  Cape  V  erd,  by  d 
steamer  loaded  with  coal  which  will  follozv  you." 

What  is  there  then  more  important  than  for  the  executor  of  the 
government's  will  to  know  at  the  crisis  of  the  game  what  is 
expected  of  him  and  where  he  is  to  go?  The  shocking  discrep- 
ancy between  the  great  importance  of  war  orders  and  their  expe- 
dition by  a  collier  shows  well  that  the  minister  sheltered  himself 
behind  the  dilatory  formula  to-morrow,  as  convenient  for  govern- 
ments as  for  individuals  in  an  embarrassing  situation. 

From  the  Cape  Verd  islands,  Cervera  returns  again  to  the 
attack:  "I  request  precise  instructions  for  the  contingency  of 
war  not  having  been  officially  declared  at  my  departure."  And 
this  was  the  incredible  reply:  "I  am  unable  to  give  you  more 
precise  instructions." 

Finally,  before  definitely  starting  for  the  West  Indies,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Spanish  squadron  writes  anew,  after  complaining 

118 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

of  the  poor  condition  of  the  ordnance:  "At  the  end  of  all  there 
is  neither  plan  nor  agreement  such  as  I  have  so  much  unshed  and 
vainly  proposed  ....  and  so  already  disaster  is  upon  us." 

It  might  appear  that  I  am  wasting  time  in  formulating  com- 
ments of  the  nature  of  truisms  concerning  these  official  documents 
of  a  history  written  scarcely  seven  years  ago.  But  when  we  think 
that  less  than  six  years  after  these  events  a  nation,  Russia,  dis- 
posing of  much  more  formidable  resources  than  Spain,  was  to  give 
to  the  astonished  world  the  spectacle  of  the  same  blunders,  of 
identical  errors,  of  similar  weaknesses,  we  must  recognize  that 
certain  truths,  however  evident  they  may  appear,  have  need  to  be 
repeated  over  and  over  again  in  or<Jer  to  be  understood  by  nations 
that  have  not  yet  undergone  the  trial  of  war,  or  have  forgotten 
its  teachings. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  principal  Spanish  force  was  so 
unfortunately  constituted,  it  may  well  be  asked,  what  could  be  the 
object  of  the  government  in  sending  it  to  the  West  Indies? 
Opposed  to  very  much  superior  forces,  this  squadron  evidently 
could  not  have  any  pretention  to  seizing  upon  command  of  the 
sea  by  force.  Was  it  intended,  then,  to  limit  its  role  to  a  con- 
tinuing threat  against  the  American  naval  forces,  and  to  employ 
it  as  a  Heel  in  being,  to  adopt  the  expression  first  used  by  Admiral 
Torrington  after  the  battle  of  Beachy  Head,  and  used  again  with 
great  good  judgment  by  Mahan  in  his  critical  study  of  this  very 
Spanish- American  war?  In  principle,  the  use  in  war  of  the  fleet 
in  being  is  perfectly  defensible  for  the  weaker  nation,  and,  for  the 
matter  of  that,  the  squadron  constituted  as  it  was  would  have 
admirably  played  that  part,  if  the  real  value  of  its  units,  which 
were  all  fast  cruisers,  had  faithfully  represented  its  theoretical 
value. 

Unhappily  this  was  very  far  from  being  the  case ;  the  speed  of 
these  four  ships,  splendid  on  paper,  was  purely  fictitious,  on 
account  of  the  incapacity  of  the  engine  room  and  fireroom  forces, 
a^  well  as  because  the  machinery  had  not  been  kept  in  proper 
:pair.  And  that  is  not  all ;  the  essence  of  a  "  fleet  in  being,"  its 
~ole  raison  d'etre,  is  its  mobility ;  it  is  by  this  precious  quality  of 
being  able  to  appear  now  at  one  point  and  now  at  another  point  of 
<.ne  theater  of  war  that  it  constitutes  a  threat  serious  enough  to 
naralyze  any  operations  of  wide  scope  on  the  part  of  its  adversary. 

The  truth  of  this  was  exemplified  on  June  8,  when  the  Ameri- 

119 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

can  expedition  was  ready  to  set  sail  for  Santiago ;  for  a  telegram, 
bringing  the  information,  quite  untrue  moreover,  that  a  group  of 
suspicious  ships  had  been  seen  off  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  was 
enough  to  cause  the  order  to  sail  to  be  countermanded,  so  that  the 
departure  did  not  take  place  actually  until  six  days  later.  The 
effect  produced  by  this  false  news  was  so  great  that  the  govern- 
ment did  not  hesitate  to  order  Sampson  to  send  two  of  his  battle- 
ships to  Key  West ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  naval  forces  did  not  obey  this  order,  and  he  did 
well  not  to.  But  this  mobility,  this  intensity  of  life  is  only  possible 
nowadays  during  very  short  periods,  at  the  ends  of  which,  under 
penalty  of  breaking  down,  our  modern  ships  are  obliged,  by  the 
inexorable  necessities  of  their  constitutions,  to  return  to  port  for 
supplies,  in  the  shape  of  coal  and  renewals  of  all  sorts.  And  this 
means,  in  the  last  analysis,  that,  for  a  "  fleet  in  being/'  a  base  of 
operations,  abundantly  provided  with  the  varied  stores  without 
which  the  war  ships  of  the  2Oth  century  are  but  inanimate  car- 
cases, is  at  least  as  necessary  as  it  is  for  an  offensive  fleet. 

But  there  was  no  such  base  for  Cervera's  fleet.  The  most  indis- 
pensable supply,  coal,  was  so  stingily  measured  out  to  him,  that 
even  before  he  had  reached  his  destination,  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, through  various  channels,  announced  to  the  admiral  by 
telegrams  the  successive  sending  of  five  thousand  tons  to  Curagao 
and  of  two  English  steamers,  each  carrying  three  thousand  tons, 
to  Martinique.  Cervera  never  received  them,  and  moreover  it 
was  too  late ;  it  is  not  when  operations  have  begun,  and  everything 
is  made  difficult  and  complicated  as  a  result  of  hostilities,  that  it 
becomes  necessary  to  think  of  procuring  necessary  supplies ;  it  is 
during  the  time  of  peace  that  it  is  useful  to  accumulate  them  at 
judiciously  selected  points.  No  one  would  think,  in  private  life, 
of  waiting  till  the  storm  bursts  and  the  tempest  begins  to  rage 
before  building  himself  a  shelter ;  It  is  during  the  prior  period  of 
fine  weather  that  each  one  takes  his  precautions. 

It  does  not  seem  any  more  difficult  to  admit  that  for  this  storm 
of  war,  more  terrible  than  any  other,  it  is  wise  to  proceed  in  the 
same  manner. 

Thenceforth,  what  could  be  hoped  for  from  this  starveling 
squadron,  on  a  fruitless  chase  after  fuel ;  what  reserve  of  energy 
was  to  be  expected  from  the  hunger  stricken?  If  the  choice  of 
Santiago  for  the  squadron's  destination  was  a  strategical  error, 

120 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

that  was  a  fault  of  small  moment  and  a  consequence  of  the  veri- 
table error,  that  irreparable  one  which  entailed  the  defeat  of  Spain 
— lack  of  preparation  for  war. 

Certainly  it  would  have  been  better  had  Cervera  led  his  squad- 
ron to  Havana,  the  attack  upon  which  would  have  demanded  from 
the  American  expeditionary  forces  a  much  greater  effort  than  at 
Santiago,  on  account  of  the  more  important  resources  of  every 
nature  possessed  by  the  former  place,  and  which  it  is  not  excessive 
to  estimate  at  fully  ten  thousand  men ;  or  even  at  Cienfuegos, 
which  is  connected  by  railroad  with  Havana.  But  one  must  not 
lose  sight  of  the  constant  preoccupation  of  the  Spanish  admiral  to 
get  his  forces  into  shape,  and,  in  the  absence  of  precise  orders 
from  his  government,  it  was  the  port  where  he  hoped  to  be  able 
to  do  this  the  soonest  and  the  easiest  that  he  selected. 

He  intended,  moreover,  to  set  forth  again  on  the  very  next  day, 
his  coal  once  aboard ;  but  the  difficulties  of  coaling  prevented. 
There  is  in  this  example  warning  of  the  far  reaching  importance 
of  having  bases  and  coaling  stations  equipped  with  all  necessary 
machinery  and  apparatus. 

To  appreciate  the  result  of  this  unfortunate  choice,  we  need 
only  glance  at  a  few  quotations.  On  May  19,  the  very  day  of  his 
arrival  at  Santiago,  the  admiral  telegraphed  to  his  Minister :  "  / 
shall  have  need  of  more  coal  than  there  is  in  this  port;  "  and  his 
chief  of  staff,  Commander  Concas,  in  the  account  which  he  wrote 
of  the  squadron's  movements,  expresses  himself  thus :  "  We  set 
to  work  taking  in  coal  with  frenzy;  but  everything  is  wanting, 
even  baskets,  and  the  difficulties  are  such  that,  even  with  the  help 
of  working  parties  of  soldiers,  we  do  no  more  than  a  hundred  and 
fifty  tons  a  day,  and  each  ship,  with  fires  out,  burns  from  four  to 
five  tons  in  the  same  time." 

This  truly  is  black  despair,  and  despair  is  a  poor  counsellor. 

On  May  22,  Cervera  again  telegraphed :  "  There  is  not  enough 
coal  here  to  fill  us  up,  but,  if  the  collier  which  left  Curasao 
arrives,  there  zvill  be  some  left  over." 

Nothing  is  lacking  to  this  distress,  not  even  the  hopeless  watch, 
which,  like  Sister  Ann's,  catches  no  glimpse  of  that  coal  ever 
announced  by  the  government  and  which  never  comes.  At  that 
very  moment  there  were  nearly  thirty  thousand  tons  at  Havana, 
and  this  observation  only  makes  the  clearer  Cervera's  error  in 
chosing  Santiago. 

121 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  question  of  the  best  destination  for  the  Spanish  squadron 
has  supplied  material  for  numerous  controversies ;  some  have  pre- 
tended that  Santiago  was  well  chosen  because  it  removed  the 
American  action  the  furthest  possible  from  their  base  of  opera- 
tions, Key  West,  while  Havana  was  much  nearer  to  it.  Knowing 
as  we  do  now  what  a  poor  leader  Cervera  was,  we  may  well  doubt 
the  depth  of  intention  which  is  attributed  to  him.  The  sole  and 
only  cause  of  his  entry  into  Santiago  was  his  anxious  haste  to 
coal,  a  desire  shown  also  by  his  stopping  at  Martinique,  and  then 
at  Curasao,  as  he  had  anticipated  before  leaving  Cape  Verd,  with- 
out allowing  the  state  of  war  to  modify  in  any  way  his  plan.  Hav- 
ing neither  the  means,  nor  the  idea  either,  of  resorting  to  scouting 
to  obtain  information  as  to  the  enemy's  movements,  he  entered 
Santiago  quite  simply  because  that  port  was  the  first  on  his  route. 

It  is  himself  who  tells  us  so,  moreover,  for  he  wrote  on  May 
25,  to  General  Linares :  "  It  is  regrettable  that  my  bad  luck 
brought  me  to  this  port  which  is  so  destitute  of  resources,  and  that 
I  chose  it  thinking,  since  it  had  not  been  blockaded,  that  it  would 
be  well  supplied  with  provisions,  coal  and  various  stores." 

All  the  more  or  less  profound  combinations  which  have  been 
attributed  to  him  are  purely  imaginary.  I  repeat  it — Havana 
would  have  been  much  preferable,  in  spite  of  its  proximity  to  Key 
West,  not  only  because  the  squadron  would  have  found  there  re- 
sources which  did  not  exist  elsewhere,  but  because  by  that  course 
Spain  would  have  brought  about  a  concentration  of  her  forces  of 
all  kinds.  The  governor  of  the  island  had  an  army  at  the  seat  of 
government,  which  his  adversaries  estimated  at  fifty  thousand 
men,  but  which  really  could  have  been  brought  to  twice  that  num- 
ber. In  estimating  at  one  hundred  thousand  men  the  force  which 
the  Americans  would  have  needed  to  reduce  Havana,  I  believe  I 
am  really  below  the  mark.  I  have  the  right  to  think  so,  and  even 
to  express  some  doubts  as  to  their  being  successful  at  all,  when  I 
remember  the  many  disgraceful  events  of  the  so  much  more 
modest  expedition  which  was  made  against  Santiago,  the  scenes 
of  disorder  when  the  expeditionary  force  was  being  assembled, 
and  its  singularly  heterogeneous  composition. 

It  is  certainly  curious  to  note  that,  if  Cervera  had  made  for 
Havana,  or  Cienfuegos,  no  hostile  force  would  have  been  able  to 
oppose  his  entrance,  since  neither  Schley  nor  Sampson  happened 
to  be  there  the  day  when  the  Spanish  division  would  have  arrived. 

122 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

By  shutting  himself  up  in  Santiago,  on  the  contrary,  Cervera, 
completely  destitute,  by  that  very  act  put  an  end  to  his  "  fleet  in 
being,"  and  permitted  the  American  fleet  to  possess  itself  of  com- 
mand of  the  sea  by  strictly  blockading  him  there.  After  that  it 
was  at  least  as  much  the  extreme  distress  which  I  have  above 
explained  as  the  criminal  pressure  from  a  government  under  the 
influence  of  I  know  not  what  political  aim,  ignorant  of  military 
necessities  and  devoid  both  of  sincerity  and  intelligence,  which 
determined  the  Spanish  squadron  to  effect  its  heart-rending 
departure. 

On  May  24,  after  holding  a  council  of  war  of  his  commanders, 
Cervera  telegraphed  to  the  minister :  "  The  squadron  being  ready 
to  leave  port  to  seek  elsewhere  supplies  which  are  lacking  here, 
I  have  consulted  the  commanding  officers."  Their  opinion  being 
adverse  to  going  out,  on  account  of  the  reduced  speed  of  the 
squadron  (fourteen  knots,  due  to  the  foul  condition  of  the  Vis- 
caya's  hull),  they  did  not  start,  and  on  the  next  day  found  them- 
selves blockaded.  And  it  is  necessary  to  state  that,  in  the  delib- 
erations of  the  council  of  war,  the  possibility  of  fighting,  even  a 
partial  engagement,  or  even  of  any  military  operation  whatever, 
was  never  so  much  as  glanced  at.  One  single  objective  exists, 
flight  towards  another  shelter.  A  sad  state  of  mind  which  ex- 
plains the  defeat  to  come. 

This  thought  is  again  found  in  the  same  letter  to  General 
Linares  from  which  I  have  already  quoted  a  passage  :  "  In  think- 
ing of  the  probable  upshot  of  a  blockade,  I  consider  myself  fortu- 
nate to  be  able  thus  to  occupy  the  greatest  part  of  the  enemy's 
fleet,  for  it  is  the  only  service  that  can  be  expected  of  a  squadron 
so  small  and  so  ill  armed.  I  beg  you  to  make  these  explanations 
known  to  the  Captain-General,  in  order  that  he  may  understand 
the  cause  of  my  apparent  inaction." 

What  poverty  of  military  understanding !  And  what  a  strange 
conception  by  which  the  act  of  kindly  offering  to  an  adversary, 
without  a  struggle,  full  liberty  of  movement  and  what  we  already 
understand  as  command  of  the  sea,  is  made  to  appear  as  a  service 
rendered  to  his  own  cause! 

On  May  25,  the  squadron  has  only  provisions  for  one  month, 
and  on  June  20  General  Blanco  telegraphs  to  the  Minister  of  War : 
"  The  entry  of  Cervera 's  squadron  into  Santiago  and  its  stay  there 

123 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

have  completely  changed  both  the  objective  of  the  campaign  and 
its  aspect,  and  thereby  also  the  value  of  the  provisions  and  coal  on 
hand  and  the  supplies  of  certain  places  ....  If  would  be  better 
perhaps  to  go  to  Cienfuegos  or  Havana,  which  is  still  possible,  or 
even  better  to  start  for  Spain;  anything  rather  than  to  remain 
shut  up  in  Santiago,  exposed  to  the  necessity  of  surrendering, 
starved  out." 

So  then  hunger  is  to  chase  the  squadron  from  its  refuge ;  but 
not  hunger  alone.  Interferences  from  without,  ill-omened  as  are 
all  those  which  emanate  from  an  authority  far  removed  from  the 
scene  of  events,  are  to  drive  forth,  against  its  will,  this  unhappy 
squadron  and  to  precipitate  the  inevitable  disaster. 

In  this  same  letter  from  which  I  have  just  borrowed  an  extract 
the  governor  of  Cuba  asks  for  supreme  authority  over  all  the  mili- 
tary forces  of  the  island.  This  demand  is  beyond  any  doubt  legit- 
imate and  conforms  with  the  true  principles  of  war  as  well  as  with 
the  efficient  use  of  forces,  which  requires  an  undivided  authority  to 
command  them,  but  he  only  demands  these  powers  to  misuse  them 
and  from  a  distance  to  weigh  upon  the  admiral. 

"  It  is  unfortunate,"  says  General  Blanco,  "  that  the  independ- 
ence enjoyed  by  Cervera's  squadron  has  prevented  my  interfering 
with  its  movements,  and  I  have  suffered  therefrom  .  ...  /  re- 
spectfully suggest  that  this  is  a  favorable  moment  for  unifying 
military  action  in  the  present  war  by  giving  me  the  authority  of 
commander-in-chief  over  all  the  land  and  sea  forces  on  these 
shores" 

The  ministerial  despatch,  conferring  upon  the  governor  the 
higher  powers  which  he  requested,  is  dated  June  24,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  pressure  begins  by  a  despatch  in  cypher  ad- 
dressed to  General  Linares: 

"I  am  of  the  opinion  that  he  (Cervera)  ought  to  set  out  as 
quickly  as  possible  for  the  destination  ivhich  he  considers  the 
most  suitable,  for  his  stay  in  port  is  the  most  dangerous  of  all 
things  .  ...  To  lose  the  squadron  without  -fighting  would  have  a 
terrible  effect  in  Spain  and  everywhere." 

The  accuracy  of  the  final  reflection  is  incontestable,  but  the  re- 
sponsibility for  this  lamentable  result  must  rest  upon  a  higher 
authority  than  the  unfortunate  admiral ;  more  than  anything  else 
the  improvidence  of  the  Spanish  government  was  responsible,  an 

124 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

improvidence  which  would  be  incredible  were  it  not  proven  by 
official  documents. 

General  Blanco  returns  to  the  charge,  several  times,  on  succeed- 
ing days,  becoming  each  time  more  pressing  and  at  last,  having 
obtained  the  approval  of  the  government  at  Madrid,  giving  the 
order  to  depart  three  times  on  July  I  and  finally  an  imperative 
order  on  July  2. 

To  understand  the  exact  extent  of  the  pressure  put  on  Cervera, 
it  suffices  to  consider  the  words  spoken  at  one  of  the  meetings 
of  the  council  of  war  of  commanders  of  the  Spanish  squadron, 
that  of  May  26,  by  Commanders  Bustamente  and  Concas.  Both 
state  that  they  believe  in  their  soul  and  conscience  that  the  gov- 
ernment at  Madrid  wishes  the  destruction  of  the  squadron,  in 
order  to  have  an  excuse  for  cor  eluding  a  peace. 

ff  It  is  necessary  then,"  says  Commander  Concas,  "  to  go  forth, 
not  because  it  is  reasonable,  but  because  later  on,  under  conditions 
probably  worse,  we  shall  without  doubt  receive  a  formal  order  to 
•  do  so." 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  point  out,  in  occurrences  of 
war,  certainly  less  serious  than  these,  the  pernicious  influence  ex- 
perienced by  the  untimely  interference  of  a  central  authority  in  the 
details  of  the  conduct  of  war.  In  this  tendency  of  governments 
to  wish  to  direct  operations  from  a  great  distance  away,  a  ten- 
dency greatly  accentuated  by  the  facilities  of  all  sorts  which 
modern  -progress  affords  for  the  rapid  transmission  of  orders,  I 
perceive  a  great  danger  for  the  future.  That  is  why  I  thought  it 
right  to  revert  to  the  subject.  The  true  doctrine,  without  any  pos- 
sible doubt,  is  that  formulated  by  Napoleon,  and  every  general-in- 
chief  who  has  proper  understanding  of  his  responsibilities  ought 
to  be  guided  by  it. 

Although  in  the  domain  of  strategy  the  largest  part  of  the 
errors  committed  must  be  blamed  upon  the  Spanish  government, 
the  responsibility  for  the  tactical  errors  of  the  desperate  sortie 
from  Santiago  belongs  wholly  to  Cervera.  The  official  correspon- 
dence, with  which  we  already  are  acquainted,  has  revealed  to  us 
the  remarkable  state  of  mind  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Spanish  squadron,  as  well  as  of  most  of  his  captains,  relative  to 
their  departure ;  there  was  for  them  no  question  of  fighting,  sell- 
ing their  lives  dearly,  and  at  least  offering  to  their  poor  country 
the  alms  of  a  little  glory ;  their  one  thought  was  to  flee. 

125 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  fixed  idea  may  be  discovered  in  a  despatch  from  Cervera 
to  the  Minister,  dated  June  23:  "As  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
for  the  squadron  to  escape  under  these  circumstances,  I  expect  to 
make  as  good  a  resistance  as  possible,  and  then  as  a  final  resort  to 
destroy  my  ships." 

The  question  is  more  and  more,  why  did  the  Spanish  send  war 
ships  to  the  West  Indies  when  their  commander  perceived  no  other 
result  than  either  flight  or  suicide?  What  then  is  a  war  ship,  if 
it  is  not  an  instrument  to  fight  with  ? 

But  in  any  case,  assuming  Cervera's  point  of  view,  that  is  to 
say,  seeking  to  gain  a  better  provisioned  port  than  Santiago  for 
the  purpose  of  refitting,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  why  he  did 
not  make  that  sortie  at  night.  In  the  council  of  war  of  June  8, 
Commanders  Bustamente  and  Concas  had  expressed  the  opinion 
that  they  should  go  out  by  night,  taking  advantage  of  the  period 
of  absence  of  the  moon.  On  June  26,  the  government  itself 
recommended  to  Cervera  this  night  attempt ;  but  such  a  manceuver 
is  too  bold  for  the  poor  weak  soul  of  the  commander-in-chief.  It  • 
is  the  characteristic  of  his  moral  feebleness  to  evoke  phantoms,  to 
see  difficulties  everywhere.  One  night  he  ascends  to  the  high 
battery  of  Socapa,  and  the  sight  of  the  American  ships  on  the 
blockading  line,  with  their  search  lights  turned  on  the  entrance,  is 
sufficient  to  make  him  despair  of  any  possible  success.  Those  lu- 
minous rays,  across  the  darkness,  take  in  his  fevered  eyes  the  fan- 
tastic appearance  of  insurmountable  barriers.  Not  once  does  he 
say  to  himself  that  a  resolute  attack  is  by  itself  a  chance,  that  it 
necessarily  produces  in  a  line  of  blockade  a  disturbance  from 
which  advantage  can  be  drawn,  that  a  blockading  ring  by  night 
is  not  so  unyielding  that  it  cannot  be  broken  at  one  point  and  a 
sufficient  disorder  made  there  to  prevent  its  reforming  before  an 
escape  has  been  effected,  that  in  such  a  disorder  nothing  is  more 
like  a  friendly  ship  than  a  hostile  one,  and  that  this  confusion 
profits  above  all  the  attack ;  finally  that  a  night  battle  is  too  indefi- 
nite not  to  be  advantageous  to  the  weaker. 

For  him  the  chance  of  success  remains  hidden  in  the  dark 
shadows  of  the  night ;  but  in  revenge  he  perceives  the  difficulties, 
all  the  difficulties,  as  through  magnifying  glasses.  The  narrow- 
ness of  the  channel,  which  obliges  the  ships  to  go  out  one  by  one ; 
the  impossibility  of  passing  through  it  under  the  blinding  light  of 

126 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  enemy's  search  lights  without  going  aground ;  the  opinion  of 
the  pilots  that  the  Colon's  draft  makes  his  going  out  more  diffi- 
cult, etc. :  all  the  pretexts  are  put  forward  and  exaggerated  to 
mask  the  sole  true  motive  of  the  choice  of  going  out  by  day. 

And  this  motive  is  given  to  us  by  Cervera  himself  in  his  letter 
of  justification  of  October  7,  1898,  addressed  from  Madrid  to 
General  Blanco :  "  Counting  as  I  did,  on  a  fatal  disaster,  my  task 
was  reduced  to  having  the  smallest  possible  number  killed  and  to 
not  leaving  the  ships  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy'."  This  letter  was 
not  published  till  1900;  but  I  have  kept  an  exact  remembrance  of 
the  quite  accordant  statement  made  early  in  1899  in  my  presence, 
to  the  Minister  of  Marine,  by  a^Spanish  officer :  "  We  went  out 
in  broad  daylight  so  as  to  let  the  greatest  possible  number  of  men 
save  themselves  when  we  ran  aground." 

From  this  sample  it  may  be  seen  that  if  Spain  knew  not  how  to 
prepare  her  material  forces  for  war,  neither  was  she  any  more 
foresighted  as  regards  her  moral  forces.  Let  us  pause  for  a 
moment  over  one  last  quotation,  taken  from  Commander  Concas' 
memoir,  from  the  chapter  devoted  to  the  battle  of  Santiago: 
"  On  the  practical  side  of  gunnery,,  the  enemy,  who  for  two  years 
has  been  preparing  for  war,  has  had  frequent  exercises;  moreover, 
the  bombardments  of  Porto  Rico,  Santiago  and  Daiquiri  have 
enabled  him  to  correct  the  defects  in  his  material. 

"For  our  part,  the  28  c.  m.  guns  have  fired  in  all  two  rounds 
apiece  and  what  is  frightful,  on  account  of  the  little  confidence  we 
have  in  our  cartridges,  the  14  c.  m.  guns  have  never  been  tested 
and  their  first  rounds  are  to  be  fired  at  the  enemy.  Except  that, 
our  ships  are  in  perfect  condition  and  as  regards  training  are 
second  to  none  in  any  navy  in  the  world." 

To  use  one  of  this  officer's  own  expressions,  what  is  above  all 
frightful  is  to  find  in  his  account  this  sort  of  testimonial  given  as 
to  the  material  and  moral  condition  of  the  squadron  after  having 
ascertained  its  destitution  of  all  which  constitutes  preparedness  for 
war.  Except  for  the  guns,  except  for  gunnery  and  target  practice, 
except  for  trained  gunners,  except  that,  all  is  well ;  but  that  is  the 
whole  of  war,  because  war  is  settled  by  battle.  With  officers  in 
such  a  state  of  mind,  which  is  but  the  image  of  the  national  mind, 
a  nation  is  ripe  for  defeat. 


127 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  AMERICANS. 

Hitherto  I  have  entirely  disregarded  the  part  played  by  the 
Americans  in  the  war ;  this  because,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
its  final  result  is  almost  wholly  due  to  Spain's  weakness,  and  be- 
cause, in  my  opinion,  the  complete  lack  of  preparation  of  her  mili- 
tary forces,  using  the  term  in  its  broadest  sense,  is  a  full  explana- 
tion of  the  war.  The  superiority  of  the  Americans,  which  in  the 
main  resulted  from  the  poor  quality  of  their  adversaries,  was  made 
apparent  by  plans,  often  doubtful,  and  sometimes  incorrect,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  theory  of  war,  but  easily  rectified  under 
the  most  favorable  circumstances. 

On  this  account  I  have  been  unable  to  understand  the  great 
admiration  which  Commodore  Dewey's  operations  in  the  Philip- 
pines evoked,  in  his  own  country  particularly,  but  also  in  many 
other  countries. 

The  naval  forces  once  in  sight  of  each  other,  the  disproportion 
was  such  that  their  encounter  could  only  be  butchery,  not  battle. 
Between  the  modern  protected  cruisers  of  the  American  squadron, 
of  high  speed  and  armed  with  powerful  guns  of  8-inch  and  6-inch 
caliber,  and  the  old  fashioned  Spanish  ships,  without  speed  or 
armament  (for  the  Reina  Christina  alone  had  16  cm.  guns,  the 
others  having  nothing  bigger  than  13  cm.  and  12  cm.),  the 
struggle  was  too  unequal  for  the  issue  to  be  doubtful. 

The  battle  of  Cavite,  therefore,  has  very  little  interest  for  us, 
and  I  shall  confine  my  examination  of  it  to  a  single  brief  observa- 
tion. As  though  there  were  not  enough  elements  of  weakness  in 
the  very  constitution  of  his  fleet,  Admiral  M  onto  jo  added  to 
them  another,  worse  than  all  the  rest,  by  awaiting  at  anchor  the 
enemy's  approach.  He  had  forgotten  Aboukir,  or  rather  he 
exhibited,  like  so  many  others  before  him,  the  incurable  physical 
and  moral  inactivity  of  the  weak. 

It  was  simple:  the  Americans,  having  retained  their  ability  to 
manceuver,  passed  back  and  forth  in  column  before  the  anchorage, 
at  the  distance  they  had  chosen  and  which  they  controlled,  with 
their  guns  playing  on  the  Spanish  ships.  It  was  a  target  practice, 
a  gunnery  exercise  with  stationary  target,  and  here  again  the  true 
lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  encounter  concerns  the  inveterate 
weakness  of  the  Spanish  sailors  much  more  than  the  strength  of 
their  opponents. 

128 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

In  the  matter  of  the  armed  intervention  of  the  Americans  in  the 
Philippines,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  much  of  interest  to  be  said, 
for  in  that  a  fundamental  principle  of  strategy  is  concerned. 

The  utility  of  operations  in  the  Far  East  was  more  than  doubt- 
ful. It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of,  in  fact,  that  the  precise  object  of 
the  war  was  the  success  of  the  century-old  politics  of  the  United 
States  in  Cuba;  it  had  no  other  object.  Every  measure  capable  of 
endangering  the  success  of  operations  in  Cuban  waters  was  there- 
fore essentially  bad ;  and  such  was  the  maintenance  in  the  Philip- 
pines of  a  not  inconsiderable  part  of  the  American  naval  forces, 
which,  violating  the  principle  of  concentration  of  forces,  weakened, 
without  any  advantage,  the  military  action  in  the  chief  scene  of  the 
theater  of  war.2 

Doubtless,  against  such  weakness  of  mind  and  body  as  were 
Spain's,  much  could  be  permitted ;  but  organisms  which  are  the 
most  exhausted  by  sickness  sometimes  have  redoubtable  death 
struggles.  If,  instead  of  sending  four  forlorn  unhappy  ships  to 
the  West  Indies,  under  the  orders  of  a  new  Villeneuve,  Spain  had 
placed  all  her  available  forces  in  the  hands  of  an  enterprising  chief, 
to  lead  them  to  the  West  Indies  and  there  to  sell  dearly  the  honor 
of  the  Spanish  arms,  the  United  States  would  have  had  none  too 
great  a  force  to  make  head  against  them  and  finally  conquer. 
Therefore  it  was  in  the  West  Indian  seas  that  Dewey's  squadron 
should  have  been  and  not  anywhere  else. 

To  judge  still  better  the  question,  it  suffices  to  observe  that  all 
the  military  successes  possible  in  the  Philippines  would  have  had 
no  sort  of  effect  upon  the  issue,  if  the  arms  of  the  United  States 
had  been  unable  to  triumph  in  Cuba.  The  operations  at  the  latter 
point  were  the  only  ones  which  answered  to  the  aims  of  the  war, 
and  it  was  their  success,  consummated  by  the  destruction  of  Cer- 
vera's  fleet,  which  brought  about  peace,  on  the  conqueror's  terms ; 

3  The  author's  conclusions  are  based  upon  his  wholly  mistaken  belief 
that  the  United  States  anticipated  war  with  Spain  and  prepared  for  it  in 
advance.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  war  was  precipitated  by  the  destruction  of 
the  Maine  in  Havana  Harbor,  and  its  sudden  outbreak  found  a  considerable 
part  of  the  United  States  naval  forces  carrying  on  the  usual  duties  of 
peace-time  on  the  Asiatic  Station.  Under  the  circumstances  it  was  hardly 
possible  to  do  anything  else  but  attack  the  Spanish  forces  in  the  Philip- 
pines. As  regards  this  performance  it  may,  at  least,  be  said  that  Com- 
modore Dewey  did  what  he  set  out  to  do  and  did  it  as  thoroughly  as 
Nelson,  Sufferen,  or  anybody  else  could  have  done  it. — TRANSLATOR. 

129 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

they  would  have  equally  entailed  the  surrender  of  the  Philippines 
by  Spain  if  not  a  shot  had  been,  fired  there. 

This  does  not  merely  demonstrate  the  strategical  error  of  the 
Americans ;  it  also  lays  bare  the  absurdity  of  the  Camara  under- 
taking, which  never  got  beyond  Suez ;  and,  from  a  quite  general 
point  of  view,  calls  attention  to  the  pressing  need  of  not  having  a 
scattering  of  objectives  but,  on  the  contrary,  knowing  how  to 
choose  from  the  always  complicated  grouping  of  interests  in  the 
vast  field  of  war  the  one  which  is  the  most  important. 

Apropos  of  monitors,  which  he  very  rightly  condemns,  Mahan 
has  very  happily  recalled,  in  his  work,  Lessons  of  the  War  with 
Spain,  a  splendid  maxim  of  Napoleon  which  the  American  author 
considers  to  be  pregnant  of  the  whole  art  and  practice  of  war. 
It  applies  even  better,  in  my  opinion,  to  what  we  have  just  seen 
of  the  strategic  plans  of  the  Spanish-American  war.  It  is  this 
"  E Delusiveness  of  purpose  is  the  secret  of  great  successes  and  of 
great  operations." 

Dewey's  cruisers  would  have  been  so  much  the  more  useful  in 
the  West  Indian  sea  because,  as  Mahan  very  clearly  shows,  the 
lookout  and  scouting  service  of  the  American  squadrons  was  very 
defective.  Thus  it  is  that  Cervera's  squadron  was  able  to  gain 
Curagao  and  Santiago  without  being  sighted  by  the  American 
cruisers,  even  though  notice  of  its  appearance  off  Martinique  had 
been  telegraphed  on  May  12  to  the  United  States  government 
from  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Harvard,  which  was  undergoing  repairs 
at  Fort  de  France.  Even  more,  the  Spanish  squadron  entered 
Santiago  on  the  iQth,  and  it  was  not  until  the  26th  that  Com- 
modore Schley  established  the  blockade  of  that  port ;  nor  did  he 
obtain  from  spies  exact  information  of  the  actual  presence  of 
Spanish  ships  in  the  harbor  till  some  days  later. 

Yet  it  would  have  been  very  advantageous  to  the  American 
naval  forces  to  have  come  into  contact  with  the  Spanish  squadron 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  The  battleship  Oregon,  having 
started  from  San  Francisco  before  the  declaration  of  war,  arrived 
in  the  Atlantic  in  the  midst  of  the  hostilities.  As  she  had  left 
Bahia  on  May  9,  while  the  Spanish  squadron  was  to  the  south- 
ward of  Martinique  on  the  loth,  an  attack  upon  this  single  vessel 
by  the  very  superior  forces  of  the  enemy  was  possible  and  to  be 
feared.  Her  destruction  or  capture  would  have  been  a  very  appre- 
ciable loss  to  the  American  navy,  not  only  ar>  being  a  notable  weak- 

130 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ening  of  military  strength,  the  battleship  in  question  constituting 
a  very  powerful  righting  unit,  but  still  more  on  account  of  the 
moral  effect  upon  the  whole  nation. 

I  have  just  said  that  this  attempt  on  the  part  of  Cervera  was  to 
be  feared ;  such  was  the  very  firm  opinion  of  Mahan  himself. 
Hence  re-enforcements  should  have  been  sent  to  meet  the  Ameri- 
can battleship,  keeping  a  close  watch  upon  the  movements  of  the 
Spanish  squadron;  or  more  exactly,  for  this  would  have  been 
much  the  most  decisive  aid  to  bring  to  the  Oregon,  it  was  needful 
to  get  in  touch  with  the  hostile  naval  force,  to  fight  and  destroy  it, 
in  a  word  to  cling  to  what  the  learned  American  writer  himself 
calls  "  the  great  objective  which  dominates  all  others  and  replaces 
them,  the  hostile  naval  force,  when  a  reasonable  chance  offers  of 
destroying  it  or  one  of  its  pozverful  parts." 

The  same  author  explains  the  abstention  of  the  government 
at  Washington  from  initiating  a  strategical  operation  logically 
called  for,  as  due  to  fear  of  newspaper  indiscretions.  This  very 
weak  explanation  would  be  surprising  from  the  pen  of  so  wise  a 
writer,  if  the  perception  of  his  natural  indulgence  regarding  the 
errors  of  his  own  country  did  not  explain  why  he  believed  it 
proper  to  throw  a  veil  over  the  real  motives.  And  these  motives 
arose  almost  wholly  from  a  scarcity  of  cruisers,  which  once  again 
rendered  the  organization  of  search  and  scouting  very  difficult. 

The  timidity  of  their  adversaries,  whose  plans  never  for  an  in- 
stant were  directed  towards  offensive  action,  even  when  they  had 
a  great  superiority  of  force,  as  in  the  exceptional  case  of  the 
Oregon,  nullified  the  possible  consequences  of  this  error;  never- 
theless it  was  an  error. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  American  navy  during  this  critical 
period  could  only  appropriate  to  the  scouting  service  four  auxiliary 
cruisers,  the  St.  Louis,  St.  Paul,  Harvard  and  Yale,  and  two  regu- 
lar cruisers,  the  Minneapolis  and  Columbia.  It  was  a  small  force 
with  which  to  cover  the  approaches  to  the  West  Indies,  and  all 
the  places  where  Cervera  might  appear.  Thus  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment was  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  torpedo  boats  for  picket 
service,  and  this,  according  to  Mahan  himself,  "  to  the  great  hurt 
of  their  engines,  not  intended  for  long-continued  high  exertion, 
and  to  their  own  consequent  injury  for  their  particular  duties." 

I  have  underlined  purposely  part  of  the  preceding  paragraph, 
for  it  is  not  the  American  navy  alone  that  deserves  to  be  re- 

131 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

preached  with  giving  employment  for  which  they  are  not  at  all 
suitable  to  vessels  of  small  tonnage  "  liable  to  serious  retardation 
in  a  seaway,"  and  with  thus  forgetting  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  specialization  in  warfare. 

THE  BLOCKADE  OF  SANTIAGO. 

That  simulacrum  of  naval  force,  Cervera's  squadron,  having 
taken  refuge  in  Santiago,  the  problem  became  a  very  simple  one. 

Taking  inspiration,  according  to  Mahan,  "  from  the  true  general 
principle  that  the  enemy's  fleet,  if  there  is  any  probable  way  of 
getting  at  it,  is  the  objective  which  takes  precedence  of  all  others, 
because  control  of  the  sea  by  the  overthrow  of  the  hostile  navy  is 
the  determining  factor  in  naval  warfare,"  there  was  nothing  left 
to  do  but  institute  a  close  blockade. 

The  beginning  of  this  blockade  is  also  the  beginning  of  really 
correct  operations  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  naval  forces. 
It  is  interesting  to  reproduce  seme  of  Admiral  Sampson's  orders, 
which  will  be  read  with  profit  provided  the  particular  and  excep- 
tional circumstances  under  which  they  were  written,  as  well  as  the 
far  too  unaggressive  character  of  the  defence,  be  not  for  a  moment 
lost  sight  of. 

The  admiral  had  divided  his  forces  into  two  squadrons,  keep- 
ing command  of  the  first  and  giving  the  second  to  Commodore 
Schley. 

June  2,  1898:  "  The  vessels  will  blockade  Santiago  de  Cuba 
closely,  keeping  about  six  miles  from  the  Morro  in  the  daytime, 
and  closing  in  at  night,  the  lighter  vessels  well  in  shore.  The 
first  squadron  will  blockade  on  the  east  side  of  the  port,  and  the 
second  squadron  on  the  west  side.  If  the  enemy  tries  to  escape, 
the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon  as  possible,  and  endeavor 
to  sink  his  vessels  or  force  them  to  run  ashore  in  the  channel.  It 
is  not  considered  that  the  shore  batteries  are  of  sufficient  power  to 
do  any  material  injury  to  battleships. 

"  In  smooth  weather  the  vessels  will  coal  on  station.  If  with- 
drawn to  coal  elsewhere  or  for  other  duty,  the  blockading  vessels 
on  either  side  will  cover  the  angle  thus  left  vacant" 

The  characteristic  of  this  order  is  the  feeling  which  it  reflects 
of  absolute  security  from  any  demonstration  whatever  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy;  it  is  much  more  like  an  order  concerning  an 
exercise  of  times  of  peace  than  a  war-time  order.  The  admiral 

132 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

who  signed  it  could  certainly  afford  to  do  so,  for  so  far  as  the 
batteries  in  particular  are  concerned,  we  find  justification  in  the 
letter  already  referred  to  from  Cervera  to  General  Blanco  written 
from  Madrid:  "Santiago  was  without  artillery,  in  the  modern 
sense  of  the  word.  Except  for  the  guns  of  the  Mercedes,  mounted 
in  the  S  oca  pa  and  Punta-Gorda  batteries,  there  ^vere  only  two  9 
c.  m.  Krupp  guns;  useless  against  ships,  and  some  howitzers  and 
obsolete  guns;  so  the  enemy  approached  without  fear,  coming 
very  close  at  night  and  taking  stations  around  the  entrance." 
Does  not  the  mere  fact  of  coaling  on  station  indicate  the  full  mea- 
sure of  a  quite  justifiable  confidence. 

"  Order  No.  13,  June  7,  i#p#.  After  careful  consideration  of 
the  various  schemes  of  maintaining  an  effective  blockade  of  San- 
tiago de  Cuba  at  night  which  have  been  advanced,  I  have  decided 
upon  the  following,  which  will  be  maintained  until  further  orders: 

"  The  weather  permitting,  three  (3)  picket  launches  detailed 
from  the  ships  of  the  squadron  each  evening,  will  occupy  positions 
i  mile  from  the  Morro — one  to  the  eastward,  one  to  the  westward, 
and  one  to  the  southward  of  the  harbor  entrance.  On  a  circle 
drawn  with  a  radius  of  two  miles  from  the  Morro  will  be  stationed 
three  vessels,  the  Vixen  to  the  westward,  from  one-half  mile  to  I 
mile  from  the  shore,  the  Suwanee  south  of  the  Morro,  and  the 
Dolphin  to  the  eastward,  between  one-half  mile  and  i  mile  from 
the  shore.  The  remaining  vessels  will  retain  the  positions  already 
occupied,  but  they  will  take  especial  care  to  keep  within  a  4-mile 
circle. 

"  All  vessels  may  turn  their  engines  whenever  desirable  to  keep 
them  in  readiness  for  immediate  use,  and  while  so  doing  may  turn 
in  a  small  circle,  but  without  losing  proper  bearing  or  distance. 

"  The  signal  for  an  enemy  will  be  tivo  red  Very  signals  burned 
in  rapid  succession.  If  the  enemy  is  a  torpedo-boat  these  two  red 
lights  will  be  followed  by  a  green  one. 

"  I  again  call  attention  to  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  close  block- 
ade of  this  port,  especially  at  night  and  in  bad  weather.  In  the 
daytime,  if  clear,  the  distance  shall  not  be  greater  than  6  miles; 
at  night  or  in  thick  weather,  not  more  than  4  miles.  The  end  to  be 
attained  justifies  the  risk  of  torpedo  attacks  and  that  risk  must  be 
taken.  The  escape  of  the  Spanish  vessels  at  this  juncture  would 
be  a  serious  blow  to  our  prestige  and  to  a  speedy  end  of  the  war." 

In  carefully  reading  this  order,  one  would  think  himself  in  a 

i33 


WAR  ON 'THE  SEA. 

dream,  and  the  mind  inevitably  reverts  to  those  squadron  exercises 
in  which  certain  accepted  hypotheses  are  unreal  because  the  condi- 
tions of  war  are  only  feigned.  But  this  concerns  reality.  In  what 
peace-time  exercises  would  one  dare  to  allow  as  practicable  such 
a  stationing  of  three  small  boats,  and  the  placing  of  ships  on  a 
line  of  blockade  at  so  short  a  distance  from  the  shore  ?  Yet  these 
were  operations  against  an  enemy.  But  what  an  enemy !  It 
would  seem  impossible  to  imagine  that  one  so  easy  to  deal  with 
could  ever  be  found,  if  an  actual  example  had  not  just  shown  us 
that  passive  fatalism  can  be  found  among  all  races.  Lacking 
cannon,  are  there  not  then  torpedos  or  torpedo-boats  at  Santiago, 
to  forbid  to  the  blockaders  so  reckless  an  attitude?  No,  there  is 
nothing,  and  Cervera  himself  tells  us  so  under  date  of  June  20 : 8 
"Six  sevenths  of  the  14  c.  m.  ammunition  is  unserviceable;  the 
primers  are  unreliable  and  there  are  no  torpedoes.  These  are  the 
principal  needs" 

This  official  Spanish  correspondence  truly  contains  terrible 
ironies:  These  are  the  principal  needs.  But,  if  those  needs  are 
not  supplied,  it  is  life  which  departs,  for  they  are  the  very  soul  of 
the  struggle!  If  there  are  neither  cannon  nor  torpedoes,  at  least 
Santiago  still  holds  men,  rifles  and  boats ;  they  might  attempt  to 
take  by  assault  those  three  American  boats,  were  it  only  to  take  up 
the  constant  gage  of  which  they  are  the  symbol.  But  for  this  it 
is  necessary  to  act,  and  the  Spaniards  dread  action.  It  is  there- 
fore very  true  that  Sampson  has  nothing  more  to  worry  about ;  for 
him  have  been  fashioned  adversaries  who,  as  I  have  already  ob- 
served, constitute  by  their  own  weakness  nine-tenths  of  his 
strength  and  with  their  own  hands  prepare  for  him  victory. 

As  it  is  absolutely  inadmissible  to.  count  upon  similar  chances  in 
the  future,  I  should  not  have  dwelt  upon  the  dispositions  taken  in 
the  blockade  of  Santiago,  if  I  had  not  thought  it  useful  to  show 
once  more  to  what  a  lamentable  degree  of  feebleness  a  country 
may  attain  when  it  has  not  long  and  painstakingly  prepared  for 
war. 

Others  of  Sampson's  orders  prescribe  the  use  of  search  lights  to 
illuminate  the  entrance  of  the  channel,  and  regulate  their  employ- 
ment as  well  as  the  method  of  keeping  watch  of  the  ships ;  finally 
they  reduce  to  four  miles  the  station  distance. 

3  The  correct  date  is  June  22.— -  TRANSLATOR. 

134 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  period  of  blockade,  a  true  blockade  of  "  petty  warfare," 
furnishes  matter  for  but  two  useful  observations.  The  American 
squadron  conducted  numerous  bombardments,  expending  ammu- 
nition to  no  account;  just  as  in  an  operation  of  the  same  kind,  and 
a  perfectly  useless  one,  previously  carried  on  at  San  Juan,  they 
obtained  no  results  of  value.  And  yet  there  was  no  energetic  re- 
sponse to  interfere  with  the  bombarding  gunfire.  The  Spanish 
forts,  so  ill  equipped,  replied  little  or  not  at  all.  What  should  be 
remembered  is  the  waste  of  ammunition,  out  of  all  proportion  with 
die  result  to  be  expected,  which  an  attack  by  ships  upon  coast 
batteries  entails,  when  the  latter  are  sufficiently  elevated,  as  at 
Santiago. 

The  second  fact  relates  to  the"  Merrimac's  attempt  to  "  bottle 
up  "  the  Spanish  squadron.  It  is  interesting  because  it  was  the 
first  of  the  kind,  those  more  numerous  attempts  which  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  note  in  studying  the  blockade  of  Port  Arthur 
having  been  modeled  upon  it.  Though  it  failed,  for  the  sunken 
wreck  on  one  side  of  the  channel  has  never  prevented  the  navi- 
gation of  the  passage,  the  principle  itself  of  the  attempt  is  a  serious 
argument  against  naval  ports  with  a  single  entrance  or  too  narrow 
a  one,  and  a  warning  in  any  event  to  provide  for  them  an  outer 
watch  and  defence  service  rendering  any  sort  of  surprise  impossi- 
ble. Without  any  doubt,  such  an  operation  is  extremely  delicate, 
and  this  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  gallant  Lieutenant  Hobson, 
despite  exceptional  circumstances,  never  likely  to  arise  again, 
which  allowed  him  to  reach  the  narrowest  part  of  the  passage 
without  be'ing  seriously  interfered  with,  was  unable  to  succeed. 
But  the  luck  may  be  better  another  time,  and  the  accident  of 
success  is  so  much  to  be  dreaded  that  too  many  precautions  can- 
not be  taken  to  prevent  it. 

Of  the  military  expedition  from  Tampa  to  Santiago,  I  shall  say 
nothing  here.  Of  a  truth  it  would  not  be  well  to  seek  there  any- 
thing to  imitate,  but  much  rather  examples  to  avoid.  In  this  con- 
nection a  new  proof  may  be  found  of  the  wholly  relative  value  of 
superiority  of  forces.  Against  a  nation  less  inactive  than  Spain, 
less  flabby,  according  to  President  Roosevelt's  strong  expression, 
there  would  have  been  great  probabilities  of  a  radical  change  of 
fortune  in  this  war  to  the  prejudice  of  the  Americans. 

I  have  gathered  from  the  lips  of  a  Frenchman  present  in  San- 
tiago during  the  whole  siege  some  striking  facts  regarding  the 

i3S 


.    WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

respective  situations  of  the  two  armies.  At  the  moment  of  San- 
tiago's capitulation,  the  Spanish  troops  still  had  ammunition  and 
rations  for  six  months ;  on  the  American  side  yellow  fever  had  al- 
ready produced  such  ravages  that  the  volunteers  of  the  expe- 
ditionary force  were  arrogantly  demanding  to  be  sent  home.  To 
explain  und.er  these  conditions  the  unexpected  denouement,  now 
a  matter  of  history,  it  is  necessary  to  refrain  from  attributing  it  to 
the  military  forces,  and  to  recollect  that  effective  strength  in  war 
is  not  composed  of  material  forces  alone ;  it  also  comprises  finan- 
cial forces,  visible  or  concealed. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  THE  SPANISH  SQUADRON. 

I  come  to  the  decisive  moment ;  the  attempt  of  Cervera's  squad- 
ron to  escape  from  Santiago.  It  would  be  superfluous  to  enum- 
erate all  the  details  of  this  sortie,  or  more  exactly  this  flight. 

Where  there  is  no  intention  of  fighting,  at  least  on  one  side, 
there  cannot  be  matter  for  a  tactical  discussion ;  what  the  manceu- 
ver  was  is  well  known,  the  passing  out  of  the  Spanish  cruisers  in 
column;  the  despairing  flight  to  the  westward,  at  much  reduced 
speed  (less  than  fourteen  knots)  for  theoretically  fast  ships,  since 
battleships  like  the  Oregon  gained  on  them ;  finally  the  voluntary 
running  ashore. 

The  action  was  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  target  practice  car- 
ried on  by  the  American  ships  against  a  moving  target,  with 
scarcely  more  risks  than  those  of  a  gunnery  drill;  this  needs  no 
further  proof  than  the  very  statements  of  Sampson's  official  re- 
port, which  establish  the  fact  that  less  than  a  quarter  of  an  hour 
after  their  exit  from  the  passage,  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  and 
the  Oquendo  had  already  ceased  firing  on  account  of  being  on 
fire;  that  the  total  losses  in  the  United  States  fleet  in  this  affair 
were  one  killed  and  two  wounded,  all  on  board  the  Brooklyn;  and 
finally  that  the  Spanish  gunners  were  as  bad  as  possible. 

The  American  gunners,  on  the  contrary,  were  very  well  trained. 
It  is  all  the  more  useful  to  examine  what  the  practical  results  of 
firing  under  such  eminently  favorable  conditions  were ;  it  is  not 
often  that  gun  captains  are  so  lucky  as  to  have  real  ships  for  their 
target,  and  the  lesson  will  be  a  profitable  one. 

The  range  varied  between  two  thousand  and  four  thousand 
meters.  The  number  of  projectiles  of  all  calibers  fired  by  the 
Americans  can  be  estimated  at  six  thousand ;  out  of  that  immense 

136 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

number  there  were  only  one  hundred  and  thirty  hits,  which  gives 
the  very  small  percentage  of  2.2.  There  is  nothing  in  this  which 
ought  to  surprise  us,  and  I  am  not  making  these  statements  merely 
to  recall  figures  which  complete  and  verify  the  theoretical  proba- 
bilities. But  among  the  very  various  calibers  used,  eight  1 3-inch 
guns  gave  not  a  single  hit,  six  12-inch  gave  but  two  hits,  and  eight 
8-inch  only  ten  hits ;  all  the  rest  of  the  hits  came  from  the  fire  of 
the  medium  and  light  guns. 

Upon  this  point,  there  is  a  very  important  remark  to  be  made ; 
when  the  comparative  ballistic  value  of  different  guns  is  discussed, 
a  relation  is  established  between  the  effects  of  their  projectiles, 
supposing  them  to  have  struck  the  target.  Thus  proposed,  the 
problem  is  vitiated  from  the  start,  because  it  does  not  take  account 
of  the  chances  of  hitting,  which  are  strictly  proportional  to  the 
number  of  shots  fired  and  consequently  to  the  number  of  rounds 
carried.  But  this  number  of  rounds  carried,  and  the  resultant 
ability  to  fire  a  considerable  number  of  shots,  as  well  as  the 
chances  of  hitting  the  target,  are  generally  and  in  all  navies,  from 
considerations  of  weight  and  space  which  it  is  useless  to  inquire 
into,  so  much  the  smaller  as  caliber  is  greater.  Such  is  the  sole 
and  correct  explanation  of  the  results  given  above.  At  the  same 
time  it  is  a  complete  demonstration  of  the  error  committed  in 
adopting  a  diversity  of  calibers  and  giving  fighting  ships  a  very 
small  number  of  big  guns,  theoretically  of  great  power,  but  too  ill 
supplied  with  ammunition  to  be  reasonably  sure  of  making  a  hit. 

This  is  not  all :  of  the  one  hundred  and  thirty  hits  counted  upon 
the  hulls  of  the  Spanish  ships,  not  one  affected  their  buoyancy, 
not  one  reached  their  underwater  parts,  not  to  mention  their  essen- 
tial organs ;  their  machinery  remained  intact.  And  yet  these  in- 
struments of  battle  had  exceeded,  long  before  the  firing  ceased, 
the  limit  of  their  resistance.  Devoured  by  fire,  having  all  their 
upper  works  torn  to  pieces,  their  guns  destroyed,  the  ammunition 
hoists  broken  down,  the  means  of  communication  cut,  the  fire 
mains  riddled,  they  were  no  more  than  defenceless  wrecks  when 
they  ran  ashore. 

Thus,  without  going  back  to  the  naval  battles  of  sailing  ships, 
following  Punta-Agamos  and  Yalu,  Santiago  showed  once  again 
to  the  naval  world  what  the  battle  of  August  10  and  especially  that 
of  Tsushima  later  on  confirmed,  that  it  is  not  at  all  necessary  to 
sink  and  completely  destroy  a  fighting  ship  to  force  its  surrender, 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

but  that  this  result  is  much  more  surely  obtained  by  riddling  that 
part  of  the  target  which  almost  all  the  successful  shots  hit,  thus 
reaching  the  field  of  action  of  the  personnel  and  so  destroying  the 
force  of  resistance  of  that  personnel.  It  proves  furthermore  that 
it  would  be  foolish  in  any  case  to  base  offensive  action  upon  the 
hope  of  striking  a  single  limited  part  of  the  target  which  by  its 
very  narrowness  escapes  being  hit. 

I  will  add  in  conclusion  that  the  demonstration  of  Santiago  is 
still  more  convincing  than  all  the  others,  because  the  enemy  did 
not  defend  himself,  and  the  American  gunners,  in  full  possession 
of  their  faculties,  found  themselves  placed  in  extraordinarily  fav- 
orable conditions. 

Next  in  importance  to  the  disastrous  consequences  which  ab- 
sence of  preparation  for  war  entails,  this  is  the  most  important 
lesson  to  be  learned  from  the  Spanish-American  war.  By  itself 
alone  it  would  justify  the  study  of  that  war. 

THE  POPULAR  OPINION  OF  THE  FUNCTION  OF  FLEETS. 

There  only  remains,  in  conclusion,  to  give  due  consideration  to 
an  absolutely  erroneous  popular  conception  which  manifested  it- 
self with  singular  persistency  in  both  of  the  belligerent  nations 
during  this  war,  and  which  it  is  the  more  necessary  to  combat 
because  of  its  dangerous  consequences  and  particularly  because  it 
is  far  from  being  peculiar  to  those  two  countries.  To  some  extent 
everywhere  in  the  world,  except  in  England,  public  opinion  sees 
in  squadrons  a  system  of  defence  for  the  coasts  and  the  national 
domain.  It  is  in  an  endeavor  to  destroy  this  false  idea  of  the 
proper  use  of  naval  forces  that  I  think  it  needful  to  elucidate  this 
question. 

On  the  Spanish  side  documents  are  not  wanting  to  make  clear 
the  existence  of  this  particular  state  of  mind ;  we  find  it  first  in  a 
despatch  from  the  governor  of  Cuba  under  date  of  April  7,  1898 : 
"  Public  opinion  is  disquieted  by  the  absence  of  any  naval  force. 
You  will  appreciate  the  favorable  effect  which  would  be  produced 
by  sending  some  war  ships  here." 

The  vague  instructions  which  Cervera  received  at  St.  Vincent 
contained  also  the  following  phrase :  "  If  war  is  declared,  your 
objective  will  be  the  defence  of  Porto  Rico."  General  Blanco  re- 
peated his  request  on  April  22 :  "  The  enthusiasm  here  is  great, 
but  I  fear  a  painful  reaction  if  it  is  learned  that  the  squadron  is 

138 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

not  to  come.  May  1  hope  to  see  it  arrive  within  a  reasonable 
time? }>  The  governor  of  Porto  Rico  had  himself  also  telegraphed 
to  the  government  two  days  earlier:  "I  am  ignorant  of  the 
whereabouts  of  the  squadron.  You  know  how  scanty  my  resources 
are,  and  it  would  be  well  that  we  should  be  informed  as  to  what 
our  naval  forces  are  doing/' 

Finally,  on  May  17  and  18,  having  learned  of  an  order  sent  to 
Cervera  on  the  I2th,  to  turn  back  to  Spain  with  his  squadron,  an 
order  which  the  latter  only  knew  of  when  he  returned  to  Spain 
after  the  war,  the  governors  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  made  a  fur- 
ther vehement  protest  against  this  decision. 

On  the  side  of  the  American  people,  the  error  is  the  same.  It  is 
Mahan  himself,  and  his  testimony  cannot  be  doubted  by  anyone, 
who  is  to  inform  us  upon  this  point.  "  Our  sea-coast  was  in  a 
condition  of  unreasoning  panic,  and  fought  to  have  little  squadrons 
scattered  along  it  everywhere,  according  to  the  theory  of  defence 
always  favored  by  stupid  terror" 

Speaking  of  the  effect  produced  in  America  by  the  announce- 
ment of  the  departure  from  Spain  of  Cervera's  squadron,  he  says 
further,  and  I  ask  all  to  ponder  his  serious  words : 

"By  some  of  the  latter  (the  inhabitants),  indeed,  were  dis- 
played evidences  of  panic  unworthy  of  men,  unmeasured,  irre- 
flective,  and  therefore  irrational;  due  largely,  it  is  to  be  feared,  to 
that  false  gospel  of  peace  which  preaches  it  for  the  physical  com- 
fort and  ease  of  mind  attendant;  and  in  its  argument  against 
war  strives  to  smother  righteous  indignation  or  noble  ideals  by 
appealing  to  the  fear  of  loss — casting  the  pearls  of  peace  before 
the  swine  of  self  interest." 

The  blind  belief  of  public  opinion,  in  America  as  well  as  in 
Spain,  in  the  purely  defensive  role  of  fighting  fleets  appears  with 
perfect  clearness  from  the  documents  just  exhibited.  In  that  ex- 
pression :  little  squadrons  scattered  everywhere  along  the  coast, 
may  be  found  condensed  an  idea  so  general,  and  still  so  wide 
spread,  that  it  can  be  considered  the  expression  of  a  universal  pub- 
lic sentiment. 

It  is  in  obedience  to  this  influence  that  the. "  flying  squadron  " 
of  Commodore  Schley  was  kept  on  the  United  States  coast,  con- 
trary to  the  fundamental  principle  of  concentration  of  forces,  until 
the  "  fleet  in  being "  of  Cervera  committed  suicide  by  shutting 
itself  up  in  Santiago. 

139 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

It  is  because  this  feeling  is  so  strongly  rooted  in  the  mind  of 
the  great  masses  of  the  people  ihat  it  is  necessary  to  strive  to  com- 
bat it  by  every  means.  That  the  task  is  a  difficult  one  cannot  be 
denied,  because  there  exist  in  the  body  of  the  people  very  few  of 
a  character  capable  of  elevating  themselves  to  a  point  of  general 
view,  and  of  turning  their  regards  from  isolated  facts  so  as  to  per- 
ceive only  the  general  trend  of  events. 

The  enemy  appears  at  some  point  on  the  coast,  fires  a  few  shots 
at  the  shore;  demolishes  some  villages,  even  burns  a  commercial 
port.  The  instinctive,  irresistible  action  of  the  people  under  the 
pressure  of  private  interests  which  are  menaced,  is  to  demand  aid 
and  protection  from  the  central  authority;  and  the  most  efficient 
mode  of  protection  unconsciously  takes  the  form  in  their  minds  of 
that  sort  of  floating  and  moveable  fort  which  a  fighting  ship  is. 

Throughout  the  ages,  the  same  story  is  told  over  and  over 
again.  To-day,  the  same  as  at  the  battle  of  Arbela,  the  question 
being  between  the  immediate  and  accessory  defence  of  some  bag- 
gage and  the  quest  of  victory,  we  must  decide  whether  we  ought 
to  take  as  objective  the  impossible  task  of  succoring  all  the  secon- 
dary ports  threatened  with  some  partial  depredation,  or  whether 
we  ought  to  pursue,  as  a  unique  and  exclusive  end,  the  destruction 
of  the  active  forces  of  the  enemy. 

Our  choice  is  already  made,  for  we  cannot  forget  that,  among 
many  other  examples  which  we  might  have  selected,  England  was 
saved  from  invasion  at  Trafalgar.  That  cape  is  not  situated,  to 
my  knowledge,  on  the  British  shores. 

A  fleet  is  an  offensive  weapon,  and  the  best  method  of  defending 
oneself  that  has  ever  yet  been  found  is  by  attacking. 


140 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  RUSSIA  AND  JAPAN. 

In  devoting  a  whole  chapter,  and  an  important  one,  to  the  study 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  I  have  not  merely  yielded  to  a  very 
natural  desire  to  examine  events  "which  are  so  much  the  more 
interesting  on  account  of  their  recent  occurrence.  I  have  been 
particularly  led  to  do  so  by  the  firm  belief  that  this  war  abounds 
in  experimental  lessons  in  strategy  and  tactics,  that  it  is  also 
valuable  for  its  numerous  teachings  regarding  errors  to  be 
avoided,  and  that  for  divers  reasons  it  demanded  an  examination 
in  detail. 

So  far  as  the  errors  are  concerned,  we  can  say  at  once,  even 
before  an  actual  'examination,  that  the  number  committed  by 
Russia  was  beyond  measure. 

In  the  night  of  February  8-9,  1904,  Japanese  torpedo-boats 
attacked  the  Russian  squadron  anchored  in  the  outer  harbor  of 
Port  Arthur.  This  beginning  of  the  campaign,  as  savage  as  it 
was  deceitful,  without  preliminary  declaration  of  war,  might  well 
surprise  and  afflict  sensitive  souls ;  yet,  in  the  logic  of  events,  it 
was  the  natural  consequence  of  the  Japanese  temperament  and  the 
English  education  of  their  navy. 

This  carelessness  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  sailors,  their  abso- 
lute neglect  of  the  most  elementary  precautions  in  the  matter  of 
watchfulness,  in  the  midst  of  a  time  of  political  tension,  despite 
the  suggestive  warnings  of  English  naval  wars,  have  everywhere 
been  charged  against  them  as  a  grave  fault  which  weighed  heavily 
upon  all  their  succeeding  operations. 

Their  lack  of  care,  undoubtedly  blameworthy,  dear  as  its  cost  to 
Russia  was  (for  by  the  putting  out  of  action  of  two  battleships, 
the  Cesarevitch  and  Retvisan,  and  the  protected  cruiser  Pallada, 
she  found  herself  from  the  start  in  a  condition  of  undoubted  in- 
feriority), is  nevertheless  only  a  fault  of  detail,  only  a  single  term, 
among  many  others,  in  a  long  series  of  errors  of  the  Russian 

141 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

policy,  which  can  all  be  classed  as  the  result  of  an  absolute  lack  of 
understanding  of  the  preponderant  importance  of  naval  prepara- 
tion for  war  with  Japan. 

THE  POLITICAL  STRATEGY  OF  RUSSIA. 

The  first  of  the  series  of  errors  occurred  ten  years  before,  when 
by  her  lease  of  Port  Arthur,  followed  by  the  invasion  of  Man- 
churia, Russia  inaugurated  an  active  policy  of  expansion  in  the 
Far  East. 

From  that  moment,  for  two  chief  reasons,  a  war  was  inevitable, 
sooner  or  later,  between  Japan  and  Russia. 

The  self-esteem  of  Japan,  a  new  recruit  to  Western  civiliza- 
tion, and  so  much  the  more  sensitive  that  her  initiation  had  been 
rapid  and  was  of  very  recent  date,  could  not  pardon  her  dis- 
possession by  the  allied  forces  of  Europe  of  a  naval  base  which  she 
believed  to  be  her  own  by  right  of  conquest.  The  time  was  to 
come  when  the  beneficiary  would  have  to  bear  the  consequences  of 
this  resentment.  When  there  is  added  the  uneasiness  which  the 
encroachments  of  the  great  Russian  Empire  upon  Chinese  soil 
could  not  fail  to  provoke,  and  that  Empire's  constant  approach  to 
Korea,  for  centuries  the  object  of  the  desires  of  the  Empire  of 
the  Rising  Sun,  the  probabilities  of  this  war  must  appear  numer- 
'ous  in  the  eyes  of  the  most  sceptical. 

In  stating  this,  I  am  taking  into  account  the  aspirations  of  her 
people.  I  know  very  well  that,  even  at  the  beginning  of  the  year 
1904,  no  one  thought  there  would  be  war,  any  more  in  Japanese 
governmental  circles  than  in  Russia.  By  a  very  curious  coinci- 
dence, two  days  after  the  night  attack  at  Port  Arthur  there  was 
given  to  me  to  read  a  letter  just  come  from  the  Far  East,  written 
consequently  a  month  before  the  opening  of  hostilities,  by  a  person 
well  situated  to  know  the  sentiments  of  the  Japanese  authorities, 
and  in  which  the  opinion  was  clearly  expressed  that  only  in  Eu- 
rope could  anyone  believe  that  a  conflict  was  possible.  The  prox- 
imity of  date  of  the  reception  of  this  letter  and  an  event  so  decisive 
as  the  torpedo-boat  attack  is  suggestive  of  consummate  irony. 

They  had  forgotten,  in  the  Far  East,  that  there  are  many  in- 
stances in  history  where  the  current  of  a  superexcited  public  opin- 
ion, stronger  than  all  the  combinations  of  diplomats,  recognizes  no 
obstacles,  hurries  on  governments  impotent  to  resist  and  bears 
nations  irresistibly  towards  inevitable  encounters. 

142 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  policy  of  expansion,  then,  it 
was  necessary  to  prepare  for  war  carefully  and  decisively.  And 
this  was  so  much  the  more  needful  because,  though  the  repeated 
military  successes  of  the  yellow  race  are  to-day  a  revelation  for 
the  immense  majority  of  Europeans,  accustomed  to  regard  all  the 
nations  of  Asia  with  the  same  contemptuous  disdain,  they  should 
have  been  no  surprise  to  all  those  who,  scarcely  twenty  years  ago, 
had  opportunity  to  compare  the  warlike  ardor  of  the  Japanese 
with  the  submissive  inertness  of  the  Chinese,  even  in  the  most 
trivial  affairs. 

Russia  to-day  is  paying  the  penalty  of  this  capital  fault  of  not 
understanding  the  pressing  necessities  to  which  her  policy  of  ex- 
pansion condemned  her,  a  fault  before  the  act  as  it  were,  and  one 
compared  with  which  all  the  others  committed  after  the  opening 
of  hostilities,  although  they  derive  from  the  same  false  principle, 
are  yet  but  of  secondary  importance.  To  make  clearer  my  idea, 
I  will  say  that  Russia  is  now  bearing  the  consequences  of  a  funda- 
mental error  of  strategy  which  from  the  beginning  involved  the 
fate  of  her  arms  and  in  advance  marked  her  for  defeat. 

The  question  is  worth  pausing  to  consider,  for  unhappily  Russia 
is  by  no  means  the  only  power  in  the  world  which  has  neglected 
this  great  duty  of  preparing  for  war  which  every  far-sighted  and 
strong  nation  fulfils  along  with  a  policy  of  expansion. 

To  found  colonies,  and  to  sow  in  them  with  liberal  hand  the 
riches  which  enhance  their  value,  without  developing  at  the  same 
time  the  means  of  protecting  them  from  the  covetous,  is.  to  play 
the  part  of  dupe  and  to  work  for  others. 

From  the  moment  that  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  was  signed  it 
was  therefore  urgently  necessary  to  prepare  for  war  with  Japan, 
and  the  period  of  nearly  ten  years  which  followed  would  certainly 
have  sufficed  to  secure  Russia  such  a  preponderance  that  the 
classic  proverb  would  have  once  more  proved  true  and  peace  been 
assured. 

This  being  granted,  how  ought  this  war  to  have  been  prepared 
for?  Here  the  problem  becomes  definite.  For  those  who  firmly 
believe  that  in  the  teachings  of  the  military  history  of  the  past 
there  are  to  be  found  laws  and  lessons  from  which  modern  wars 
can  profit,  this  preparation  must  be  above  all  and  almost  exclu- 
sively naval.  . 

The  future  adversary  was,  in  fact,  an  insular  nation,  and  al- 

143 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

i 

though  undoubtedly  possessed  of  a  strong  army,  this  could  only 
act  by  the  efficient  help  of  a  powerful  fleet,  and  one  so  much  the 
more  powerful  as,  its  base  of  operations  being  beyond  the  seas, 
the  condition  necessary  to  its  success  rested  on  the  retention  of 
command  of  the  sea. 

Therefore  it  was  necessary  to  be  prepared  to  strike  decisively  at 
this  navy.  And  such  was  in  very  truth  the  set  problem.  Let  us 
suppose  it  for  the  moment  solved,  that  is  to  say  let  us  imagine  that 
Russia  had,  at  the  beginning  of  1904,  in  the  seas  of  the  Far  East, 
a  superiority  of  naval  force,  incontestable  and  admitted,  over  Japan. 
The  disembarkation  of  the  Japanese  armies  upon  the  Korean  and 
Manchurian  shores  would  have  been  perfectly  impossible ;  and,  if 
reason  is  insufficient  to  compel  conviction  upon  this  point,  the 
teachings  of  the  past  furnish  arguments  beyond  dispute.  The 
study  of  our  centuries-long  struggles  with  England  is  particularly 
profitable  in  this  regard. 

While  invasion  of  England  by  French  forces  has  been  an  ex- 
ceptional event  in  the  course  of  naval  history,  the  descents  of  the 
English  upon  the  soil  of  France  have  been  extremely  numerous. 
In  the  one  case,  as  in  the  other,  these  operations  of  invasion  have 
always  been  carried  on  by  that  one  of  the  two  nations  whose  fleets 
were  in  command  of  the  sea. 

For  if,  from  1377  to  1385,  with  Admiral  Jean  de  Vienne,  several 
descents  upon  the  British  Isles  could  be  successfully  executed,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  was  owing  to  the  genius  of  that 
great  seaman,  who  first  in  France  was  able  to  understand  the  ex- 
ceptional value  of  dominion  over  the  sea  and  to  conquer  it  by 
profiting  by  the  momentary  eclipse  of  the  English  naval  power. 

It  is  thus,  thanks  to  their  uncontested  superiority  upon  the  sea, 
that  the  English  were  frequently  able  to  make  landings  upon  our 
coasts,  and  even  to  retain  guarantees  there  for  so  long  a  time — 
Calais,  Dunkirk,  etc. — which  it  would  have  been  impossible  for 
them  to  hold  without  the  support  of  a  fleet  which  was  sovereign 
mistress  of  the  maritime  avenues  of  revictualment  and  re-enforce- 
ment. 

It  was  from  the  absence  of  this  indispensable  condition  that  all 
the  projects  of  invasion  of  England,  conceived  in  the  reigns  of 
Louis  XIV  and  particularly  of  Napoleon,  could  have  no  chance  of 
success. 

Egypt  was  virtually  lost  to  France  after  Aboukir. 

144 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

In  our  own  days,  if  Great  Britain  can  continue  to  regard  as  a 
useless  luxury  the  organization  of  an  army  whose  function  it 
would  be  to  safeguard  her  territory,  it  is  because  she  has  full  con- 
sciousness that  hef  formidable  fleet  constitutes  for  her  the  most 
invulnerable  of  protections.  Quite  recently  indeed,  the  Prime 
Minister,  replying  to  a  question  in  the  House  of  Commons,  re- 
jected as  a  quite  impossible  hypothesis  the  invasion  of  England, 
so  long  as  the  English  naval  forces  dominated  the  sea. 

It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  a  military  expedition  beyond  seas 
cannot  be  successfully  carried  out  except  with  the  previous  con- 
dition of  freedom  of  the  sea. 

Thus  that  which  contributes  to  the  strength  of  England  and  of 
Japan,  their  insular  situation,  is  also  their  weakness  in  the  case  of 
a  war  of  conquest.  And  so  it  was  the  Japanese  navy,  above  all, 
that  the  Russians  should  have  thought  of  holding  in  check. 

But  from  1894  to  1904,  that  is  in  ten  years,  the  Russian  navy 
gained  twenty-one  units,  namely :  eighteen  battleships  of  a  total 
displacement  of  199,800  tons  and  three  armored  cruisers  altogether 
of  33,000  tons.  And  as  a  matter  of  form  I  mention  58,500  tons 
of  so-called  protected  cruisers,  which  are  not  counted  as  fighting 
ships. 

If  a  mere  comparison  of  figures  were  to  be  made,  perhaps  the 
Russian  effort  could  be  thought  acceptable,  since  in  the  same 
period  the  Japanese  fleet  only  gained  fourteen  fighting  ships,  of  a 
total  displacement  of  160,000  tons.  But  so  superficial  a  method  of 
valuation  can  lead  only  to  gross  errors,  since  it  takes  account 
neither  of  the  quality  of  the  fighting  units  nor  of  their  personnel. 

While  the  Japanese  built  the  four  fifteen  thousand-ton  battle- 
ships of  Shikishima  type,  which  by  themselves  alone  represented  a 
considerable  power,  and  the  seven  armored  cruisers  of  Asama  type, 
to  which  were  added,  before  the  war  was  declared,  the  Nisshin  and 
Kasuga,  bought  from  Ansaldo  of  Genoa,  all  similar  modern  units, 
constituting  a  formidable  homogeneous  force,  the  Russian  Naval 
General  Staff  laid  down  successively  a  number  of  far  too  unlike 
types,  from  the  Admiral  Oushakoff  to  the  Cesarevitch,  no  one  of 
which  came  near  to  equaling  in  value  the  powerful  Japanese  units, 
and  finally  three  armored  cruisers  having  very  few  points  in  com- 
mon, the  Rossia,  the  Gromoboi  and  the  Bay  an. 

In  this  absence  of  continuity  of  ideas,  of  any  fixed  principle  in 
the  matter  of  new  constructions,  in  these  too  numerous  trials  of 

i45 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

different  models,  a  new  proof  must  be  seen  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment's lack  of  understanding  of  the  greatness  of  the  part  which  its 
navy  could  and  ought  to  play  in  case  of  war  with  Japan. 

On  the  sea,  even  more  than  on  land,  combinations  of  hetero- 
geneous forces  are  not  conducive  to  victory,  and  command  of  the 
sea  cannot  be  maintained  with  a  naval  museum  of  samples. 

The  Russian  effort  during  the  period  of  incubation  of  the  in- 
evitable hostilities  will  appear  still  more  insufficient  when  it  is 
remembered  that,  besides  the  new  requirements  of  their  Asiatic 
expansion,  the  Muscovite  diplomacy  had  to  take  account  of  their 
ancient  interests  in  Europe,  of  their  preponderating  role  in  the 
Balkan  peninsular,  of  the  jealousies  of  Germany  as  well  as  of  Eng- 
land, all  causes  which  imposed  upon  them  a  strict  obligation  to 
maintain  a  powerful  navy  in  home  waters.  The  Japanese  policy, 
for  its  part,  on  the  contrary,  had  as  sole  field  of  operations  the  seas 
of  the  Far  East. 

If  to  govern  is  to  foresee,  it  is  therefore  quite  exact  to  say  that 
the  Empire  of  the  Tsars  was  badly  governed,  since  it  did  not  com- 
prehend that  the  constitution  of  a  powerful  fleet,  which,  in  the  ten 
years'  respite  at  its  disposal,  it  could  easily  have  formed  of  eighteen 
fighting  units  of  the  first  class,  would  have  been  a  great  economy. 
This  imposing  and  homogeneous  force  would  have  sufficed  to  calm 
all  the  belligerent  ardor  of  Japan,  and  would  thus  have  prevented 
the  mad  squandering  of  money  and  of  human  lives  which  the  war 
entailed. 

The  needful  effort  would  have  required  an  addition  to  the  spe- 
cial budget  of  expansion  in  Manchuria  of  an  annual  supplementary 
credit  of  from  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  twenty  millions 
(francs)  ;  that  would  not  have  been  beyond  Russia's  means.  It 
represented  the  premium  on  insurance  that  progress  towards  the 
East  should  continue  and  that  an  ice-free  sea  should  not  be  put  out 
of  reach.  The  parsimony  with  which  the  Russian  General  Staff 
treated  its  naval  force,  in  its  ignorance  of  the  preponderating  ser- 
vices which  common  sense  strategy  assigned  to  the  navy,  can  be 
recognized  by  another  sign. 

If,  at  every  period  of  naval  history,  fleets  have  had  pressing 
need  to  secure  "  advanced  bases,"  centers  for  laying  up,  revictual- 
ing,  etc.,  where  the  ships  can  go  to  be  repaired,  to  get  new  sup- 
plies, or  even  merely  to  rest,  above  all  during  the  winter,  from  the 

146 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fatigues  of  long  cruising,  never  have  these  "  bases  of  operations  " 
been  more  indispensable  than  nowadays. 

When  the  wind  was  the  only  moving  force,  a  fleet  well  provided 
with  food  and  ammunition  could,  if  need  there  were,  keep  the  sea 
for  long  months,  at  a  pinch  even  put  in  to  port  on  a  foreign  coast. 
It  is  thus  that  our  great  Suffren,  in  his  immortal  campaign  of  the 
Indies,  remained  away  from  Reunion,  his  only  friendly  port,  dur- 
ing twenty-two  consecutive  months.  I  hasten  to  recall,  further- 
more, that  he  would  have  had  no  rest  if  he  had  not  conquered  the 
advanced  base  which  he  lacked,  which  he  accomplished  by  captur- 
ing Trincomalee. 

In  our  time,  needs  of  this  kind  are  infinitely  more  pressing. 
Though  modern  ships  of  war  carry  enough  food  to  suffice  for  the 
nourishment  of  their  crews  for  several  months,  on  the  other  hand 
they  only  hold  the  coal  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  propulsive 
power  for  a  few  weeks,  one  may  even  say  a  few  days.  The  obliga- 
tion to  return  frequently  to  port  for  fuel  is  therefore  imperious. 
Moreover  steel  hulls  in  sea  water  become  covered  with  grass  and 
barnacles ;  under  penalty  of  seeing  the  high  speeds  which  are  a 
strategic  factor  of  the  first  importance  greatly  reduced,  periodic 
visits  to  a  dock  are  necessary. 

Thus  far  I  have  considered  only  the  exigencies  of  the  daily  life 
of  fleets.  What  must  there  not  be  added,  when  one  thinks  of  the 
needs  entailed  by  bad  weather,  of  the  repairs  of  all  sorts  necessary 
to  restore  to  fighting  trim  the  ships  composing  a  naval  force  which 
has  been  in  battle,  even  if  victorious. 

Modern  bases  of  operations,  therefore,  require  considerable  sup- 
plies of  provisions,  ammunition,  coal,  lubricants,  spare  articles, 
raw  materials,  etc.,  dry  docks,  repair  shops  well  equipped  with 
tools,  etc.,  all  under  the  safeguard  of  defences  which  cannot  be 
too  strong,  since  the  question  is  to  guarantee  the  security  of  the 
preparations  of  naval  operations. 

Remember  that  it  was  much  more  from  the  almost  complete  lack 
of  means  of  action  of  this  sort  than  from  the  individual  weakness 
of  his  ships,  that  Admiral  Cervera's  unfortunate  squadron  perished 
at  Santiago  de  Cuba ;  for  his  four  cruisers  would  still  have  been 
able  to  play  a  good  part  if  they  had  been  active,  if  they  had  been 
provided  with  the  things  most  essential  to  their  very  life. 

What  we  know  to-day  of  the  events  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
permits  us  to  believe  that,  at  Port  Arthur  as  well  as  at  Vladivostok, 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

none  of  those  judicious  arrangements  which  indicate  a  wise  and 
farsighted  preparation  for  war  had  been  planned  and  executed. 

The  damages  of  the  Cesarevitch,  of  the  Retvizan  and  of  the 
Pallada,  in  the  unexpected  Japanese  attack  which  gave  the  signal 
for  war,  could  only  be  repaired  by  improvised  means.  This  was  a 
demonstration  of  the  poverty  of  naval  resources  at  Port  Arthur. 
The  subsequent  events  of  the  war  furnished  a  later  occasion  to  see 
that  Vladivostok  was  not  much  better  provided. 

The  characteristic  of  this  war,  so  far  as  the  Russian  side  is  con- 
cerned, is  truly  then  the  lack  of  prevision  of  the  primary  part 
which  was  to  fall  to  the  navy  to  play.  Nothing  can  be  improvised 
in  war,  to-day  less  than  ever,  and  proper  preparation  for  it  takes 
a  long  time. 

It  is  because  of  having  ignored  these  essential  truths  that  Russia 
pays  penalty  to-day;  that  great  and  unfortunate  nation  had  no 
faith  in  her  navy,  she  did  not  understand  that  by  itself  it  would  be 
the  best  guarantee  of  her  policy ;  she  pays  dearly  for  that  initial 
error. 

"  No  colonies  without  a  navy,"  said  Napoleon  on  the  occasion 
of  the  cession  of  Louisiana.  A  striking  truth,  to  be  constantly 
borne  in  mind,  and  particularly  applicable  to  the  case  of  Man- 
churia. And  this  error  on  Russia's  part  was  so  enduring  that  even 
after  the  war  had  begun  she  had  no  perception  that  from  the 
navy  alone  could  her  salvation  come. 

To  the  strategical  errors  of  the  government  are  to  be  added 
those  of  the  chief  command.  How  really  can  the  strange  careless- 
ness which  exposed  the  Russian  fleet  to  the  night  attack  of  Feb- 
ruary 8  be  less  severely  spoken  of  ?  It  was  already  too  much  when, 
in  the  full  period  of  political  tension,  war  ships  rested  each  night 
in  careless  and  complete  quietude  in  the  outer  harbor  of  Port 
Arthur ;  the  continuation,  after  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  re- 
lations, of  such  dangerous  misconduct,  which  exposed  valuable 
righting  units  to  the  chance  of  a  possibly  total  destruction,  is 
inexcusable. 

A  striking  comparison  enables  us  to  foresee  what  henceforth  are 
to  be  the  very  different  methods  adopted  by  the  adversaries  for  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  On  the  side  of  the  Japanese,  whose  sailors  are 
brought  up  on  English  naval  doctrines,  there  will  be  the  bold  and 
energetic  offensive,  the  sudden  attack  which  disconcerts  and  de- 
moralizes the  enemy,  in  a  word  the  method  of  which  the  applica- 

148 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tion  has  given  victory  to  the  great  captains  of  all  ages,  Alexander, 
Caesar,  Hannibal,  Napoleon,  Suffren,  Nelson. 

In  the  Russian  camp,  on  the  contrary,  there  will  be  adopted  a 
timorous  defensive,  a  passive  attitude  of  waiting,  a  depressing 
inactivity,  and,  to  say  all,  the  system  which  has  brought  upon  us 
Frenchmen  our  most  grievous  naval  defeats  from  the  battle  of 
Sluys  to  Aboukir  and  Trafalgar. 

Moreover  the  choice  of  Port  Arthur  as  the  point  of  concentra- 
tion of  the  Russian  naval  forces  was  not  a  happy  one.  The  hydro- 
graphic  conditions  of  that  port  were  hardly  suited  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  principal  advanced  base  or  base  of  strategic  opera- 
tions ;  the  inner  harbor  too  small  to  shelter  a  fleet ;  no  safe  outer 
harbor  insuring  to  a  squadron  at  anchor  perfect  and  absolute  se- 
curity ;  absence  of  any  outer  roadstead  in  which  a  fleet  could  form 
in  order  of  battle  under  the  protection  of  defensive  works  ;  difficul- 
ties of  organizing  the  naval  defence ;  possibility  of  closing  the 
entrance ;  finally  a  situation  at  the  end  of  a  long  and  narrow  penin- 
sular, exposing  it  to  attacks  from  the  rear ;  all  these  unfavorable 
conditions  were  more  numerous  than  should  have  been  necessary 
logically  to  compel  the  commander-in-chief  to  chose  Vladivostok 
instead  of  Port  Arthur  as  a  base  of  operations. 

Another  still  more  important  disadvantage  to  be  mentioned  is 
the  eccentric  position  of  the  second  of  these  two  ports  relative  to 
the  Sea  of  Japan,  the  probable  theater  of  war. 

Beyond  doubt  the  ice  blockade  of  the  great  Siberian  port,  during 
the  severest  months  of  the  winter,  made  it  apparently  the  inferior, 
I  say  apparently,  for  this  fault  was  attenuated  hy  the  presence  of 
the  ice  breaker  Ermak;  but,  on  the  one  hand,  this  relative  immo- 
bility would  only  occur  during  a  short  period  when  the  excessive 
rigor  of  the  climate  of  necessity  interferes  with  all  operations  of 
much  scope,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  blockade  by  the  elements 
was,  during  this  period,  the  most  efficacious  of  safeguards  against 
a  blockade  of  a  different  nature. 

Vladivostok  moreover  offered  many  advantages  which  Port 
Arthur  was  without :  a  large  fine  harbor,  numerous  exits,  facilities 
for  .defence,  many  means  of  replenishment  by  railroad,  highways, 
etc.,  difficulty  of  investment  by  land,  and  finally  a  position  at  the 
very  center  of  the  theater  of  war. 

It  is  not  alone  in  the  objectionable  choice  of  the  point  of  con- 
centration of  the  naval  forces  that  a  strategical  error  on  the  part  of 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  Russian  commander-in-chief  appears  ;  another  is  to  be  found  in 
the  very  incompleteness  of  this  concentration.  The  strict  obliga- 
tion to  secure  the  assemblage  at  a  given  point  of  superior  forces, 
should  have  forced  upon  the  admiral  the  resolution  to  gather  under 
his  flag  all  the  ships  present  in  the  Far  East.  The  isolation  of  the 
Varyag  at  Chemulpo,  there  to  succumb  with  glory  but  to  no  pur- 
pose;  and  that  of  the  Rossia,  the  Gromoboi,  the  Rurik  and  the 
Bogatyr  at  Vladivostok,  are  not  in  accord  with  any  military  idea. 
Did  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  fleet  have  even  one 
single  military  idea  ?  We  may  well  doubt  it. 

I  have  thought  it  useful,  before  any  analysis  of  the  actual  events 
of  this  war,  to  set  forth  the  initial  errors  which  from  the  very  be- 
ginning inclined  the  balance  of  fortune,  for,  in  my  opinion,  no 
other  method  would  have  so  clearly  revealed  the  lessons  which  per- 
tain to  our  special  line  of  investigation. 

Although  we  have  not  yet  summed  up  the  philosophy  of  the 
general  doctrines  of  military  history,  the  preceding  chapters  have 
sufficiently  familiarized  us  with  certain  fundamental  ideas  to  make 
me  think  myself  authorized  to  preface  the  narrative  of  events  by  a 
critical  review  of  initial  conceptions. 

The  great  moral  bearing  of  the  facts  will  be  only  the  better  un- 
derstood. 

Nor  must  we  expect  to  find  on  the  Japanese  side,  during  the 
whole  course  of  this  campaign,  the  evidence  of  a  profound  master- 
ship in  naval  affairs ;  there  was  far  from  being  any  revelation  of  a 
man  of  genius,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  striking  successes  of  the 
Japanese  sailors  were  much  more  the  results  of  the  incapacity  of 
their  adversaries  than  of  the  special  excellence  of  their  own 
admirals. 

But  in  all  justice  we  must  recognize  the  latters'  merit  of  having 
always  known  what  they  wanted  and  having  pursued  it  with 
energy  and  determination.  Thanks  to  these  qualities  of  the  first 
rank,  powerfully  aided  by  a  preparation  for  war  which,  contrary  to 
that  of  their  enemies,  was  marvelous  in  its  method  and  logic,  they 
won  the  victory. 

The  example  is  all  the  more  striking  for  us,  because  it  affords  a 
new  proof  of  the  preponderant  influence  upon  success  exercised 
in  our  days  by  patient  and  methodical  preparations  in  time  of 
peace,  as  well  as  of  the  possibility  of  winning  success  without  of 
necessity  possessing  any  great  man. 

ISO 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

THE  JAPANESE  OFFENSIVE. 

The  surprise  of  the  night  of  February  8  finds  its  justification  on 
the  side  of  the  Japanese  in  their  anxiety  to  destroy,  to  their  own 
profit,  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  balance  of  naval  forces  in  the 
Far  East.  This  result,  by  assuring  to  them  control  of  the  sea, 
alone  could  permit  them  to  disembark  troops  in  Korea  with  all  the 
conditions  of  safety  which  comport  with  such  an  operation.  Free- 
dom of  the  sea  was  therefore,  for  the  Japanese  navy,  the  principal 
objective. 

They  secured  it,  in  fact,  from  the  first  day  of  hostilities,  thanks 
to  their  vigorous  attack,  and  this  in  spite  of  the  relative  non-success 
of  that  attack,  for  the  Russian  .fleet  was  from  that  moment  re- 
duced to  five  battleships,  Petropavlovsk,  Sevastopol,  Peresviet, 
Pobieda,  Poltava,  and  five  cruisers,  Bay  an,  Ask  old,  Diana,  Boyarin 
and  Novik,  of  which  the  first  alone  was  armored ;  a  condition  of 
undoubted  inferiority  with  regard  to  the  principal  Japanese  forces, 
which  constituted  two  squadrons,  the  first  of  six  battleships  and  the 
second  of  an  equal  number  of  armored  cruisers. 

I  have  said  relative  non-success.  It  is  in  fact  difficult  to  explain, 
otherwise  than  by  the  inexperience  of  the  personnel  of  the  Japan- 
ese destroyers,  how  a  surprise  attack,  made  at  night  and  with  a 
smooth  sea,  upon  a  squadron  at  anchor  in  an  open  roadstead, 
without  lookouts,  and  to  such  an  extent  undefended  that  watch  is 
being  kept  as  in  times  of  peace  and  the  assailants  are  taken  for 
Russian  torpedo-boats,  did  not  give  results  more  decisive  and 
more  complete. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  were  not  the  destroyers  of  a  type  too  big 
for  the  mission  confided  to  them,  which  required  a  handiness  and 
manoeuvering  qualities  that  are  combined  to  a  much  higher  degree 
in  torpedo-boats  ?  It  would  be  extremely  valuable  to  be  informed 
upon  this  important  point,  but  exact  knowledge  of  the  facts  is 
wanting.  All  we  know  is  that  the  ten  destroyers  which  took  part 
in  the  attack  fired  twenty  torpedoes,  only  three  of  which  made  hits. 
Taking  into  account  the  exceptionally  favorable  circumstances  of 
the  attack,  such  as  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  occur  again, 
this  result  is  poor. 

Putting  aside  the  Cesarevitch,  on  account  of  her  special  con- 
struction and  her  particular  system  of  protection  against  torpedoes, 
the  performance  of  which  appears  at  first  sight  to  be  promising, 
the  injuries  of  the  Retvizan  and  especially  of  the  Pallada,  merely 

151 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

a  protected  cruiser,  are  out  of  proportion  to  the  explosive  charges 
of  the  torpedoes  which  struck  them.  Judging  from  the  experi- 
ments made  in  France  and  England,  upon  caissons  representing 
sections  of  the  hull  of  modern  ships,'  these  two  vessels  should  have 
sunk. 

Precise  information  is  lacking  to  explain  this  anomaly.  Must  it 
be  attributed  to  the  nature  of  the  charge,  very  probably  of  melinite, 
as  the  beginning  of  asphyxiation  felt  by  several  men  on  the  Pallada 
after  the  explosion  seems  to  show  ? 

The  one  certain  lesson,  incomplete  though  it  be,  that  we  ought  to 
derive  from  this  attack  is  the  very  grave  influence  of  the  practical 
experience  of  the  personnel  upon  the  success  of  such  enterprises. 
They  require  infinitely  more  of  it,  in  fact,  than  any  other  under- 
taking whatever  that  occurs  in  naval  wars. 

There  appears  to  have  been  altogether  too  little  practice  with 
torpedo-boats  in  most  countries ;  and  I  do  not  hesitate  to  find  in 
this  circumstance  the  explanation  of  the  quite  insignificant  part 
played  by  them,  on  both  sides,  in  the  course  of  this  Russo-Japanese 
war. 

I  dwell  upon  this  point;  because  only  a  few  years  ago,  at  our 
school  for  torpedo-boat  officers,  night  firings  were  very  consid- 
erably reduced  in  number,  for  the  single  purpose  of  avoiding  losses 
of  torpedoes.  This  strange  conception  of  preparation  for  war 
needs  no  comment,  for  such  an  economy  of  old  exercise-torpedoes 
may,  some  day,  cost  very  dear. 

On  the  next  day,  February  9,  the  Japanese  fleet  made  its  appear- 
ance before  Port  Arthur ;  it  was  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
attack  of  the  preceding  night  and  the  first  effective  manifestation 
of  the  command  of  the  sea  by  the  Japanese. 

Before  anything  else  the  latter  endeavored  to  attain  this  princi- 
pal objective,  and  they  attained  it  by  coming,  on  the  opening  of 
hostilities,  to  blockade  in  their  place  of  refuge  the  forces  of  their 
adversaries.  Thus  they  showed  their  understanding  of  the  true 
principles  of  war,  and  they  gave  a  second  proof  of  it  by  the  rational 
composition  of  their  fleet. 

That  which  presented  itself  before  Port  Arthur  was  divided  into 
three  main  groups,  the  first  composed  of  six  battleships  com- 
manded by  Admiral  Togo,  the  second  of  six  armored  cruisers 
under  the  orders  of  Admiral  Kamimura,  and  the  third  of  five  pro- 
tected cruisers  under  the  flag  of  Admiral  Dewa.  It  is  impossible 

152 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

not  to  see  in  this  arrangement  a  faithful  application  of  the  princi- 
ple of  homogeneous  forces.  We  shall  see  in  the  course  of  events 
that  the  Japanese  respected  that  principle  knowingly,  and  as  rigor- 
ously as  possible. 

THE  EVENTS  AT  CHEMULPO. 

The  events  of  February  8  and  9  before  Port  Arthur  were  inti- 
mately connected  with  other  operations  of  which  Chemulpo  was 
the  scene  at  the  same  moment.  The  severe  cold,  by  limiting  the 
number  of  landing  points  not  blocked  by  ice,  and  moreover  the 
need  of  securing  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  submissive  sup- 
port of  Korea  and  of  the  Korean  government,  indicated  this  port 
as  the  initial  place  of  invasion  of  the  first  Japanese  troops. 

On  the  evening  of  February  8,  the  Russian  gunboat  Korieits 
sailed  from  Chemulpo  to  join  the  fleet  at  Port  Arthur.  Just  out- 
side she  conies  upon  a  flotilla  of  four  Japanese  torpedo-boats,  the 
advance  guard  of  a  division  of  cruisers  commanded  by  Admiral 
Uriu,  which,  without  any  provocation,  fire  their  torpedoes  at  her. 
One  of  these  torpedoes  sinks  in  its  course ;  the  other  two  miss. 
This  very  bad  shooting  at  short  range,  a  real  firing  exercise  against 
a  harmless  target,  for  the  Korieits  had  her  guns  secured  for  sea, 
does  not  give  a  high  idea  of  the  training  of  the  Japanese  torpedo- 
boats  ;  it  gives  still  more  weight  to  the  importance  already  pointed 
out  of  having  as  much  actual  firing  as  possible  in  peace  time. 

I  shall  not  dwell  upon  the  attack  of  the  Varyag  by  the  Japanese 
division  in  the  Chemulpo  passage ;  that  attack  is  but  a  secondary 
incident  of  the  first  and  really  important  act  of  the  great  military, 
drama  of  the  conquest  of  command  of  the  sea,  of  which  the  two 
capital  scenes  are  the  night  and  day  attack  at  Port  Arthur  and  the 
simultaneous  disembarkation  of  the  first  Japanese  troops  at  Che- 
mulpo under  the  protection  of  Admiral  Uriu's  naval  forces.  Fur- 
thermore, this  fight,  or  more  exactly  this  massacre  without  glory 
for  the  Japanese  sailors,  is  as  little  instructive  as  possible  for  us, 
since  so  unequal  a  struggle  as  five  ships  against  one  caught  in  a 
trap,  and  necessarily  overcome  under  the  inexorable  law  of  num- 
bers, could  not  to  any  extent  furnish  matter  for  profound  dis- 
cussions. 

The  sole  detail  of  this  incident  of  a  nature  to  call  for  some  con- 
sideration would  have  to  do  with  the  regrettable  hesitation  of  the 
commanders  of  the  foreign  war  ships  in  the  harbor  to  remonstrate 

153 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

against  so  flagrant  a  violation  of  the  neutral  waters  of  Korea,  a 
violation  which  constitutes  on  the -part  of  the  Japanese  a  real  act  of 
brigandage ;  but  its  examination  belongs  to  international  law. 

There  is  one  fact  of  primary  importance  to  note ;  from  the  very 
origin  of  this  war  the  Japanese  fleet  had  taken  upon  the  coast  of 
Korea  a  base  of  naval  operations.  The  real  position  of  this  base 
is  not  yet  very  exactly  determined ;  whether  it  was  at  first  at  a 
point  situated  near  Chemulpo,  and  then,  after  the  melting  of  the 
ice,  at  Hai-ju  bay,  is  of  little  consequence  to  us.  It  is  the  princi- 
ple that  we  have  especially  to  bear  in  mind,  and  it  is  of  interest  to 
emphasize  the  fact  that,  despite  their  proximity  to  the  Japanese 
shores,  despite  the  exceptional  facilities  for  obtaining  supplies  and 
resources  of  all  sorts  that  this  proximity  assured  to  them,  the 
Japanese  squadrons  adopted  an  advanced  base,  at  the  very  center 
of  naval  operations,  the  nearest  possible  to  their  point  of  attack, 
and  suitable  for  covering  the  landing  operations  of  the  Japanese 
armies  on  the  Korean  coast: 

The  chosen  position  would,  under  all  circumstances,  afford  an 
excellent  anchorage,  defended  against  the  possible  attacks  of  tor- 
pedo-boats by  natural  obstacles,  reefs,  shallows,  narrow  passages, 
etc. 

It  is  to  this  base  that  the  Japanese  fleet  always  went  to  anchor 
in  the  intervals  of  its  operations  against  Port  Arthur. 

The  first  very  distinct  period  of  these  operations  extends  from 
February  9  to  May  15 ;  it  is  characterized  by  an  effective  and  un- 
disputed control  of  the  sea  by  the  Japanese  navy.  They  go  freely 
to  and  fro,  and  their  transports,  without  the  least  anxiety  in  the 
world,  land  the  Japanese  armies  upon  the  Korean  and  Manchurian 
shores. 

Repeated  appearances  before  closely  watched  Port  Arthur  and 
artillery  duels  with  the  sea  front  batteries  of  that  port  have  for 
their  object  the  maintenance  of  the  blockade  of  the  Russian  naval 
forces,  and  the  keeping  busy  of  the  defence  of  the  place,  much 
more  than  attempting  to  reduce  it.  These  successive  attacks  coin- 
cide, indeed,  with  the  disembarkations  of  the  armies  of  occupation 
at  Chemulpo  and  at  other  points  of  the  coast,  and  they  are  intended 
to  protect  these  disembarkations  against  any  possible  offensive 
action  of  the  forces  of  Port  Arthur.  In  this  respect,  their  success 
is  complete. 

i54 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

i 

SUBMARINE  MINES. 

The  study  of  this  period  is  interesting  not  alone  from  the  fore- 
going points  of  view ;  an  event  occurs,  notable  from  its  fre- 
quently repeated  consequences  even  in  this  relatively  short  space  of 
time,  and  forces  attention  to  the  important  part  played  by  the  auto- 
matic torpedo,  or  submarine  mine,  as  a  powerful  means  of  de- 
struction, in  modern  wars. 

Employed  on  both  sides,  its  brutal  and  blind  force  strikes  blows, 
so  much  the  more  terrible  that  it  is  still  under  little  control,  against 
both. 

First  it  is  the  Yenisei,  a  mine-planting  ship,  which,  after  having 
placed  nearly  four  hundred  machines  of  the  sort,  explodes  one  and 
sinks  on  February  1 1  ;  it  is  a  serious  matter,  for  this  accident  de- 
prives the  Russian  defence  of  valuable  information  as  to  their 
exact  situations.  Moreover,  on  the  next  day  a  violent  storm  dis- 
places these  torpedoes,  of  which  several  come  to  the  surface  and 
drift  away.  Three  days  later,  on  February  14,  the  cruiser  Boyarin 
runs  upon  one  of  these  mines  and,  receiving  a  mortal  blow,  sinks. 

In  the  night  of  April  12,  the  Japanese,  favored  by  darkness  and 
steady  rain,  succeed  in  their  turn  in  mooring  submarine  mines  on 
the  line  of  the  entrance  to  Port  Arthur,  without  their  action  being 
discovered  by  the  Russians. 

On  the  1 3th,  the  Russian  squadron,  composed  of  five  battleships 
and  three  cruisers,  gets  under  way  in  the  morning;  but,  finding 
itself  in  presence  of  forces  too  greatly  superior,  takes  a  course  to 
return  to  its  anchorage.  It  is  in  this  manceuver  of  retreat  that  the 
Petropavlovsk  encounters  one  of  the  Japanese  mines,  and,  after  a 
tremendous  explosion,  undoubtedly  due  to  the  ship's  magazines, 
following  that  of  the  mine,  sinks  in  two  minutes,  carrying  down  in 
a  glorious  death  the  valliant  Admiral  Makaroff,  a  moral  loss  for 
the  Russian  sailors  more  harmful  even  than  the  material  losses. 

The  battleship  Pobieda  also  is  reached  by  the  explosion  by  shock 
of  another  Japanese  mine,  which  opens  in  her  side  a  rent  ten 
meters  long,  extending  over  four  compartments.  Till  then  only 
the  Russians  had  been  tried  by  mines ;  the  turn  of  the  Japanese  was 
to  come. 

On  May  12  and  the  following  days  Admiral  Kataoka,  with  three 
cruisers  and  four  flotillas  of  torpedo-boats  was  supporting  off 
Kerr  bay  the  operations  of  the  army,  holding  the  Russian  troops  in 
check  by  his  fire.  His  torpedo-boats  were  engaged  in  clearing  the 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

bay  of  mines  planted  by  the  Russians  when,  on  the  I3th,  one  of 
these  mines  exploded  and  cut  in  two  torpedo-boat  No.  48,  which 
immediately  sank.  On  May  14,  the  cruiser  Miyako  in  her  turn 
runs  upon  another  mine  and  in  less  than  half  an  hour  disappears 
in  the  abyss. 

Finally  on  May  15,  a  grievous  day  for  the  Japanese,  while 
cruising  off  Port  Arthur,  the  battleships  Yashima  and  Hatsuse 
strike  successively,  the  first  a  mine  and  the  second  two  connected 
mines.  The  Yashima  escapes,  very  seriously  damaged  but  still 
able  to  keep  afloat,  but  the  Hatsuse  goes  down  in  a  few  minutes. 

It  is  impossible  not  to  be  struck  by  the  importance  of  the  part 
which  circumstances  gave  to  engines  of  this  character  to  play  in  a 
period  of  time  of  quite  brief  duration.  And  the  use  which  may  be 
made  of  them,  in  future  wars,  in  closely  blockading  a  naval  force 
in  port,  in  barring  a  passage,  etc.,  is  at  once  apparent.  For  this 
reason  it  was  essential  to  point  out  the  services  rendered  by  them 
to  one  side  and  the  other  during  the  war  in  the  Far  East.  And  it 
is  not  without  interest  to  note  the  frequent  and  systematic  use  of 
the  torpedo-boats  by  the  Japanese  to  clear  bays  or  neighborhoods 
obstructed  by  mines.  Finally,  the  laying  out  of  these  engines  was 
done,  on  both  sides,  by  special  vessels :  the  Yenisei  and  the  Amur 
for  the  Russians,  the  Koryo  Maru  for  the  Japanese.  In  all  of 
which  there  are  valuable  hints  for  the  future. 

THE  ATTEMPTS  TO  BLOCK  THE  ENTRANCE 
TO  PORT  ARTHUR. 

During  this  same  period  the  Japanese  made  three  attempts  to 
bottle  up  the  Russian  squadron  in  Port  Arthur.  These  operations 
were  always  carried  out  in  the  same  way;  transports  laden  with 
hydraulic  cement,  and  with  just  enough  men  to  handle  them, 
approached  the  passage  at  night,  supported  by  flotillas  of  torpedo- 
boats  whose  function  it  was  to  make  a  diversion ;  they  endeavored 
to  sink  themselves  in  the  middle  of  the  channel  so  as  to  obstruct  it. 
Either  on  account  of  wrong  movements,  due  to  the  difficulty  of 
exactly  marking  the  position,  or  because  they  were  distracted  by 
the  efforts  of  the  defence — the  gun  fire,  torpedoes,  etc. — none  of 
these  attempts  was  crowned  with  complete  and  decisive  success. 
Up  to  May  2  the  Japanese  had  sacrificed  in  these  enterprises  not 
less  than  seventeen  steamships,  of  displacement  ranging  from  one 
to  three  thousand  tons,  without  having  succeeded  in  preventing 
the  Russian  squadron  from  going  out. 

156 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

We  may  draw  various  lessons  from  this  practical  example;  in 
the  first  place,  the  advantage  of  establishing  principal  or  secondary 
bases  of  operations  as  far  as  practicable  in  ports  having  more  than 
one  entrance ;  then  the  urgent  need  of  as  complete  as  possible  an 
outer  defence,  assuring  the  discovery  and  destruction,  at  points  far 
removed  from  the  entrances,  of  structures  sent  to  close  them  with 
their  wrecks.  Whatever  may  be  the  difficulties  of  such  an  under- 
taking to  the  assailants,  this  vigilance  and  these  ways  of  acting  are 
indispensable  to  exclude  any  possibility  of  a  success  of  which  the 
consequences  would  be  irreparable. 

THE  VLADIVOSTOK  CRUISERS. 

I  have  taken  the  date  of  May  I5*as  ending  one  period  of  the  war, 
because  it  corresponds  to  an  apparent  cessation,  or  I  may  better  say 
a  momentary  hesitation,  in  the  offensive  ardor  of  the  Japanese. 
Thus  they  give  up  a  fully  prepared  combined  operation  against 
Nieu-Chwang,  from  which  they  withdraw  their  forces ;  and 
thenceforth  they  adopt  Taku-Shan  as  their  point  of  disembarka- 
tion. This  modification  of  the  original  plan  is  solely  due  to  the 
very  appreciable  naval  loss  which  the  Japanese  have  just  expe- 
rienced, and  which,  by  notably  diminishing  their  strength  upon  the 
sea,  makes  them  fear  that  their  superiority  thenceforth  will  be  too 
slight  to  justify  the  risk  of  operations  of  very  great  boldness. 

This  loss  of  strength  has  another  after  effect  upon  the  general 
plan  of  naval  operations.  Till  then  Admiral  Kamimura  had  had 
more  particularly  as  mission  the  establishment,  in  the  Sea  of  Japan, 
of  a  guard  intended  to  keep  watch  upon  and  hold  in  check  the 
Russian  division  of  three  armored  cruisers. 

After  May  15,  Togo,  considering  that  his  superiority  upon  the 
principal  scene  of  action  is  not  sufficient,  retains  part  of  Kami- 
mura's  ships.  The  repair  by  the  Russians  of  the  battleships  Retvi- 
zan,  Pobieda  and  Cesarevitch  made  this  a  measure  of  imperious 
necessity  to  him.  It  is  true  that  he  weakened  a  secondary  strategic 
point,  but  it  was  to  maintain  an  effective  force  at  the  principal 
point.  This  incident  emphasizes  once  again  the  very  great  im- 
portance of  the  navy's  work. 

It  is  this  relaxation  of  the  guard  which  permits  Admiral  Bezo- 
brazoff  to  go  out  from  Vladivostok  and  to  execute  a  raid  which 
takes  him  to  the  neighborhood  of  Yokohama. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  role  of  this  Russian  division 
had  been  a  very  insignificant  one.  After  a  first  sortie,  effected  two 

157 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

days  after  the  opening  of  hostilities,  in  very  bad  weather,  and  in 
the  course  of  which  its  action  was  limited  to  the  capture  of  a  Jap- 
anese steamer,  it  had  returned  to  port. 

Closely  watched  by  Kamimura's  squadron,  which  appeared  sev- 
eral times. before  the  Siberian  port,  and  the  numbers  and  compo- 
sition of  which,  five  armored  cruisers  and  two  protected  cruisers 
at  least,  established  too  great  a  disproportion  of  forces  to  permit 
fighting  successfully,  the  Russian  division  only  risked  itself  at 
sea  once,  on  April  25,  when  it  went  as  far  as  Gensan.  During  this 
cruise  of  forty-eight  hours  in  the  Sea  of  Japan,  they  stopped  a  fine 
Japanese  transport  of  six  thousand  tons,  the  Kinshu-Maru,  loaded 
with  troops,  and  sunk  her  by  means  of  a  torpedo. 

Favored  by  a  thick  fog,  they  passed  undetected  within  a  few 
miles  of  Kamimura  both  going  out  and  returning.  This  momen- 
tary good  fortune  was  but  the  passing  luck  of  the  gambler,  which 
lures  him  on  to  the  final  and  irremediable  fall. 

The  relaxation  in  the  Japanese  guard  about  Vladivostok,  after 
their  losses  before  Port  Arthur  in  the  month  of  May,  though  it 
gave  the  Russian  naval  division  relative  freedom  of  movement,  did 
not  give  to  it  what  it  really  needed,  that  is  to  say  a  force  sufficient 
to  change  the  course  of  events. 

It  is  very  true  that  the  Russian  cruisers  profited  by  this  liberty 
to  explore  the  Korean  strait,  as  well  as  that  of  Tsugaru,  during  the 
month  of  June ;  that  they  repeated  this  expedition  at  the  beginning 
and  at  the  end  of  the  following  month,  this  time  giving  it  a  wider 
range,  since  they  went  within  sight  of  Tokio.  It  is  equally  true 
that  in  the  course  of  this  cruise  they  seized  a  number  of  merchant 
steamships  of  various  displacements,  some  with  and  some  without 
troops  and  war  material.  I  hasten  to  acknowledge  also  that  the 
moral  effect  of  this  raid  upon  the  Japanese  sea  coast  population 
was  considerable;  that  the  Japanese  commerce  was  for  that  very 
reason  interfered  with  to  an  appreciable  extent;  that  the  cost  of 
maritime  insurance  was  raised  sensibly ;  and  finally  that  the  money 
losses  which  were  the  natural  consequence  of  these  various  dis- 
turbances were  far  from  being  negligible,  since  they  were  esti- 
mated at  fifteen  million  yen  for  a  period  of  a  few  days. 

I  am  the  more  ready  to  establish  these  facts  because  they  give 
greater  force  to  the  conclusion  which  we  are  bound  to  come  to 
that  all  these  captures  of  ships,  non-belligerents  or  carriers  of  con- 
traband of  war,  all  these  raids  seemingly  so  bold  but  really  in- 

158 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

offensive,  had,  in  the  final  analysis,  absolutely  no  influence  upon 
the  course  of  events  and  the  military  solution  of  the  problem.  It  is 
the  more  interesting  to  note  this  because  as  a  matter  of  fact  the 
Russians  did  nothing  else  than  apply  the  method  of  war  known  by 
the  entirely  inappropriate  term  guerre  de  course,  and  which  in  our 
days  is  merely  the  use  of  war  ships  in  the  pursuit  and  capture  of 
merchant  ships. 

Upon  this  point  it  is  needful  to  be  precise ;  I  do  not  pretend,  in 
my  previous  remark,  to  condemn  a  system  of  action,  but  rather  the 
exclusive  use  of  that  system.  The  total  strength  of  a  country  is 
made  up  of  the  aggregate  of  all  the  forces  which  that  country  dis- 
poses of ;  military  forces  first  in  importance,  then  industrial,  com- 
mercial, financial  forces,  etc.  If  then,  as  it  is  reasonable  to  believe, 
the  objective  of  war,  its  very  raison  d'etre,  must  be  to  paralyze  the 
adverse  forces,  it  is  logical  and  legitimate  to  attack  all  those  forces, 
without  neglecting  a  single  one  of  them,  but  only  on  the  express 
condition  of  understanding  that  their  totality  is  the  only  real  power 
to  be  destroyed. 

Because  they  were  without  effect  upon  the  Japanese  military 
forces,  the  division  of  Bezobrazoff  could  have  multiplied  its  raids 
and  have  captured  still  more  merchant  ships  without  thereby  ad- 
vancing by  a  single  day  the  end  of  the  war,  without  even  changing 
to  the  very  smallest  degree  its  conclusion.  Much  more,  for  the 
same  reason,  was  it  marked  for  certain  destruction,  after  long  or 
short  delay,  on  account  of  its  lack  of  strength  and  the  obligation 
which  was  imposed  thereby  to  shun  combat,  instead  of  seeking  it  as 
the  sole  efficient  means  of  destroying  the  balance  to  its  own 
advantage. 

Although  the  Russian  division  on  July  I,  suddenly  finding  itself 
in  sight  of  Kamimura's  squadron,  in  the  Korean  strait,  at  nightfall, 
was  able  to  escape  from  that  superior  force  by  extinguishing  its 
lights  and  using  full  speed,  the  evil  day  was,  could  only  be,  post- 
poned. To  retreat,  always  to  retreat,  has  never  been  considered  an 
advisable  procedure  in  a  duel,  for  it  sooner  or  later  happens  that  a 
material  obstacle,  or  some  other  unforeseen  incident,  puts  the  one 
who  retreats  at  the  mercy  of  the  attacking  sword  of  his  adversary. 

Success  in  war  cannot  be,  never  in  any  period  can  have  been, 
obtained  by  evading  battle.  History  teaches  us,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  destiny  of  fleeing  squadrons  has  always  been  the  same — to 
be  destroyed. 

159 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

And  I  do  not  fear  being  taxed  with  tiresome  repetition  when  I 
recall  once  again  this  expression  of  Tourville :  "  From  the  moment 
that  the  two  fleets  are  in  sight,  so  as  to  be  able  to  make  each  other 
out,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  a  fight."  Certain  principles,  after  the 
lapse  of  two  centuries,  have  lost  nothing  of  their  truth.  And  so, 
on  August  14,  at  daylight,  the  three  Russian  cruisers,  Rossia, 
Gromoboi  and  Rurik,  finding  themselves  thirty  miles  to  the  north 
of  the  strait  of  Korea,  perceived  all  at  once,  about  eight  miles  to 
the  north-northwest,  Kamimura's  division  of  four  armored  cruis- 
ers. Without  further  delay,  the  Russian  ships  stood  away  to  the 
northeast,  making  every  effort  to  attain  their  highest  speed. 

For  us,  who  ought  to  seek  to  see  beyond  mere  facts,  trying  to 
extract  from  them  their  philosophy,  it  is  worth  observing,  as  a  new 
proof  of  the  moral  weakness  of  the  Russians,  this  instinctive  feel- 
ing which  dictates  to  them  flight  as  the  sole  means  of  safety. 
Doubtless  they  were  under  the  disadvantage  of  inferiority  of  num- 
bers, three  ships  against  four,  but  a  military  force  is  not  measured 
solely  by  the  absolute  number  of  its  units ;  it  is  further  necessary 
that  the  unities  be  of  the  same  kind  in  order  that  such  a  measure 
may  be  exact. 

And  in  this  case  each  of  the  Russian  units  taken  separately  was 
sensibly  superior  to  those  of  Kamimura.  It  is  true  that  a  little 
later  the  protected  cruiser  Naniwa  came  to  reinforce  the  Japanese ; 
but  in  spite  of  everything,  under  the  control  of  an  energetic  and 
resolute  chief,  the  Russian  division  commanded  by  Admiral  Yessen 
could  have  accepted  the  gage  of  battle  without  too  great  a  disad- 
vantage. But  it  was  necessary  to  fight,  and  it  is  truly  extraordi- 
nary to  observe,  in  the  course  of  history,  the  surprising  number  of 
men,  individually  brave  beyond  dispute,  who  in  the  practice  of  the 
military  art  have  a  profound  and  instinctive  dread  of  battle. 

Rossia.  Gromoboi.  Rurik. 

Displacement     13,675  tons  13,220  tons  10,933  tons 

Maximum  speed    21  knots  20  knots  18.8  knots * 

Anything  was  better,  in  any  case,  than  flight,  in  which  the  lack 
of  homogeneousness  of  the  Russian  division  must  have  evil  con- 
sequences. By  a  comparison  of  the  characteristics  above  set  forth 
of  the  three  cruisers,  it  is  very  quickly  seen  that  the  actual  speed 
of  the  Rurik,  a  relatively  old  ship,  being  sensibly  less  than  that  of 

1  The  Rurik' s  trials  going  back  to  1892,  we  may  be  sure  that  her  actual 
maximum  speed  was  much  lower  than  that  given. 

160 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  other  two,  became  of  necessity  the  real  speed  of  the  division 
if  the  latter  remained  intact,  in  which  case  it  could  not  escape  the 
pursuit  and  was  forced  to  the  necessity  of  engaging  in  battle  under 
conditions  more  disadvantageous,  consequently,  than  if  battle  had 
been  energetically  sought  for. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  excitement  of  their  flight,  the  elemen- 
tary principle  that  in  union  alone  is  strength  was  forgotten,  each 
cruiser  would  attain  her  highest  speed  and  the  fatal  result  would 
be  the  isolation  of  the  slowest  ship. 

That  is  what  happened  to  the  Rurik,  which  had  to  support  al1 
most  the  whole  fire  of  the  Japanese  concentrated  upon  her,  and 
this  so  much  the  more  because  ^an  injury  to  the  steering  gear, 
caused  by  a  shell  almost  at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement,  pre- 
vented her  maneuvering.  At  that  very  moment,  the  Rossia  and 
Gromoboi  afforded  the  best  of  all  proofs  of  what  they  could  have 
accomplished  if  their  commanders  had  been  imbued  with  the  true 
conceptions  of  war.  In  order  to  disengage  the  unfortunate  ship, 
they  went  to  her  assistance  to  enable  her  to  make  repairs,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  holding  the  Japanese  cruisers  in  check  by  a  steady  fire 
which  did  serious  damage  to  the  Idzumo,  the  flagship.  But,  as  if 
this  fortuitous  effort  had  used  up  their  reserve  strength,  blind 
instinct  urged  the  Russians  to  retake  their  mad  course  towards 
Vladivostok  the  instant  that  the  Rurik  signalled  that  her  damage 
was  repaired. 

This  time,  nothing  could  stop  the  Rossia  and  Gromoboi  in  their 
flight,  and  to  use  a  familiar  but  imaginative  naval  expression,  the 
Rurik  was  soon  "  left." 

While  the  two  leaders  supported  the  fire  of  the  four  Japanese 
armored  cruisers,  the  Rurik,  several  miles  astern,  had  to  oppose 
the  Naniwa  and  two  other  protected  cruisers  which  had  joined  her. 
The  unhappy  ship,  left  to  her  own  resources,  much  weakened  by 
the  fire  of  her  opponents,  soon  had  her  guns  put  out  of  action  one 
after  another  and  her  commander  killed,  and  finally  she  is  sunk  by 
opening  the  sea  valves. 

And  yet  there  was  a  good  chance  still  for  the  Russian  division, 
since  Kamimura,  after  five  hours'  fighting  at  six  thousand  meters 
range,  abandoning  the  pursuit  of  the  Rossia  and  Gromoboi,  sud- 
denly stood  away  for  the  Korean  coast,  doubtless  because  his  ar- 
mored cruisers  were  themselves  too  much  distressed  and  especially 
because  they  were 'out  of  ammunition.  By  turning  back  again  to 

161 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA, 

the  aid  of  the  Rurik,  these  two  ships  would  very  probably  have 
delivered  her  from  her  relatively  feeble  adversaries  and  saved  her 
from  the  final  catastrophe. 

They  limited  themselves  to  stopping  to  repair  their  greater 
damages  and  then,  without  disturbing  themselves,  steered  for 
Vladivostok.  The  results  given  by  their  weak  and  indifferent 
behavior  justify  counting  upon  the  very  different  one  which  an 
energetic  and  vigorous  offensive  would  have  given.  So,  in  analyz- 
ing this  incident  of  the  war,  I  do  not  think  that  I  am  deceived  in 
believing  that  on  this  occasion  the  Russians  had  success  within 
their  grasp.  A  man  was  wanting  to  them,  and  the  confidence  of 
success  that  comes  from  the  perception  of  a  wise  preparation  for 
war. 

This  sortie  of  the  Vladivostok  division,  effected  on  August  12 
and  terminated  so  tragically  on  the  I4th,  had  had  for  its  special 
object  to  facilitate  the  escape  to  that  Siberian  port  of  the  naval 
forces  still  stationed  at  Port  Arthur. 

THE  SORTIE  OF  AUGUST  10. 

The  period  from  May  15  to  August  10  is  characterized  by  the 
slow  but  continuous  investment  of  the  stronghold  of  Port  Arthur 
by  the  Japanese  armies,  the  progressive  shortening  of  the  iron 
circle  which  closes  in  upon  it  until  the  Russian  war  ships,  hidden 
in  the  harbor,  have  left  only  a  choice  of  two  alternatives,  either 
passively  to  let  themselves  be  destroyed  at  anchor  by  the  fire  of  the 
siege  artillery,  or  to  seek  to  break  the  blockade  and  gain  Vladi- 
vostok. 

During  these  three  months  what  was  left  of  the  Russian  fleet 
remained  completely  inactive  or  very  nearly  so.  The  Japanese  fleet 
could  appear  frequently  on  the  coast,  engage  in  artillery  passages 
with  the  batteries  of  the  defence,  support  from  the  rear  the  offen- 
sive operations  of  the  troops  all  along  the  shore ;  nothing  could 
succeed  in  arousing  this  do-nothing  fleet  from  its  torpor.  It  is 
almost  certain,  and  this  would  explain  such  incredible  inactivity, 
that  several  improvised  batteries  on  the  sea  front  were  armed  with 
guns  taken  from  the  ships.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  one  of  many  proofs 
of  the  persistence  of  the  strategical  error  committed  by  the  Rus- 
sians ;  if  anything  had  to  be  sacrificed,  it  surely  was  not  the  naval 
force,  the  most  valuable  of  all,  but  much  rather  the  purely  nominal 
base  which  had  no  raison  d'etre  except  for  the  existence  of  the 
fleet. 

162 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Once  only,  on  June  23,  this  squadron  gives  a  sign  of  life :  it  gets 
under  way  with  Admiral  Vithoft  in  command ;  it  is  made  up  of  six 
battleships,  Cesarevitch,  Peresviet,  Pobieda,  Poltava,  Retvizan,  Se- 
vastopol, of  the  armored  cruiser  Bayan,  of  the  protected  cruisers 
Askold,  Diana,  Pallada,  Novik,  and  of  ten  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 
At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  it  stands  out  to  seaward ;  towards 
five  o'clock  the  Japanese  squadron  is  in  sight,  formed  of  four 
battleships,  seven  armored  cruisers,  ten  protected  cruisers  and 
thirty  torpedo-boats.  The  Russian  admiral  changes  course,  then 
turns  completely  round  and  heads  for  Port  Arthur,  pursued  by 
Admiral  Togo's  forces,  which,  however,  do  not  get  near  enough 
to  open  fire ;  towards  nine  o'clock-in  the  evening  he  anchors  in  the 
outer  roadstead  and  on  the  following  morning  takes  his  ships  back 
into  the  harbor.  All  the  narratives,  in  relating  this  incident,  agree 
in  making  clear  the  disastrous  effect  of  this  futile  sortie  upon  the 
morale  of  the  Russians. 

We  may  well  ask  what  Vithoft  could  really  have  hoped  to  gain 
by  this  sortie.  He  evidently  had  no  intention  of  fighting,  since  the 
mere  sight  of  the  Japanese  fleet  dictated  to  him  the  fatal  resolution 
to  return  to  anchor;  neither  is  it  any  more  credible  that  he  in- 
tended to  try  to  reach  Vladivostok,  for  the  hour  of  the  departure 
would  have  been,  in  that  case,  very  badly  chosen.  The  first  prin- 
ciples of  the  profession  of  seaman  and  of  blockade  runner  show 
that  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  success  in  that  sort  of  enter- 
prise are  to  be  found  all  together  at  night.  It  was  only  by  taking 
advantage  of  the  night,  directing  the  bulk  of  his  forces,  which  were 
very  far  from  being  negligible,  against  one  wing  of  the  blockading 
line,  while  the  torpedo  boats  made  a  diversion  at  another  point, 
that  he  could  have  any  chance  of  getting  through. 

It  is  quite  likely  that  the  Russian  admiral  really  did  not  have  any 
very  clear  objective.  Of  all  the  conditions  of  war  this  is  surely 
the  most  fatal,  for  better  even  a  poor  plan  than  no  plan  at  all. 
Another  bad  feature,  and  not  a  small  one,  of  this  unfortunate  sortie 
was  that  it  convinced  the  Japanese  sailors  that,  with  adversaries  as 
timid  as  the  Russian  sailors,  anything  could  be  dared. 

This  conviction  was  already  half  of  success,  as  it  had  been  for 
Nelson  before  Villeneuve's  sortie  from  Cadiz. 

On  August  10,  the  Russian  squadron  was  finally  obliged  to  leave 
its  resting  place,  under  penalty  of  being  destroyed  by  the  Japanese 

163 


9A.M.    R.USSIA.M   SHiPS  ASSEMBLED 
IN     R.O/VDSTEAO 


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WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fire  opened  from  Wolf  hill,  to  which  they  could  not  effectively 
reply. 

The  six  battleships  got  under  way  at  eight  in  the  morning,  fol- 
lowed by  the  three  cruisers  Askold,  Pallada  and  Diana,  preceded 
by  the  Novik  convoying  seven  *  destroyers.  At  nine  o'clock  they 


JAPAMESEL 


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POSITION  AT  11.30  A.    M. 


headed  for  Shantung  Promontory  at  a  speed  of  thirteen  knots 
(Plate  I).  Almost  immediately  the  first  Japanese  squadron  is 
made  out  to  port;  it  consists  of  the  Mikasa,  Shikishima,  Asahi 
and  Fuji,  battleships,  and  the  Kasuga  and  Nisshin,  armored  cruis- 


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165 


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168 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ers,  together  with  a  considerable  number  of  destroyers  or  torpedo- 
boats,  about  forty  altogether ;  then  a  little  later  the  second  squad- 
ron is  seen  on  the  starboard  quarter.  These  forces  are  very  far 
apart;  the  first,  composed  of  four  battleships  and  two  armored 
cruisers,  to  the  east ;  the  second,  composed  of  the  Yakunio  and 
three  protected  cruisers  to  the  west-southwest. 

The  Japanese  fleet  steers  on  a  slightly  converging  course  and 
gains  in  the  chase.  The  Russian  squadron  continues  in  the  same 
direction,  which  is  that  leading  to  Vladivostok,  until  noon ;  then  it 
turns  to  the  northeast,  very  probably  intimidated  by  the  thick 
screen  of  hostile  torpedo-boats  which  have  placed  themselves 
across  its  path.  These  torpedo-boats,  it  is  said,  visibly  scattered 
over  the  surface  of  the  sea  buoys,  kegs  and  other  things  which 
could  from  a  distance  be  taken  for  mines.  The  morale  of  the 
Russians  evidently  could  not  stand  against  this  terrifying  appear- 
ance (Plate  II,  Fig.  i). 

At  one  o'clock  an  artillery  contest,  at  extreme  range,  is  begun 
with  Togo's  squadron  on  the  starboard  hand,  but  there  is  no  great 
damage  done.  At  five  in  the  evening,  the  two  lines  were  still 
seventy-five  hundred  meters  apart,  and  were  exchanging  shots ;  at 
half  past  six  a  shell  struck  the  Cesareintch  and  killed  Admiral  Vit- 
hoft,  while  at  the  same  instant  control  of  the  ship  was  lost  through 
an  injury  done  to  her  helm  (Plate  III). 

This  serious  damage,  attributed  somewhat  too  hastily  in  the  first 
advices  to  a  projectile  having  struck  the  rudder  below  the  water 
line,  was  the  result  of  a  1 2-inch  shell  exploding  in  the  sighting 
holes  of  the  conning  tower  and  destroying  the  steering  apparatus 
as  well  as  all  the  means  of  communicating  orders  (Plate  IV, 
Fig.  i). 

A  first  version  attributed  to  the  other  battleships  a  vigorous 
attack  upon  the  enemy  with  a  view  to  getting  about  the  Cesar evitch 
and  protecting  her  while  she  repaired  her  damages ;  but  the  night 
was  coming  on,  and  Admiral  Ukhtomsky,  who  had  assumed  com- 
mand, judging  his  ships  too  weakened  to  be  able  to  hope  to  force 
their  way  through  and  reach  Vladivostok,  resolved  to  return  to 
Port  Arthur  and  made  signal  to  follow  his  movements.  He  thus 
rallied  five  battleships  that  he  was  able  to  lead  back  and,  on  the 
following  morning,  take  into  the  port  which  he  had  just  left ;  but 
he  did  not  take  back  there  his  honor  as  a  leader ;  that  was  lost 
forever  in  this  affair  (Plate  IV,  Fig.  2). 

170 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  analysis  of  this  sortie  of  August  10  is  suggestive  in  more 
than  one  respect.  In  the  first  place  it  illustrates  that  instinctive 
repugnance  to  fighting  which  throughout  the  past  has  always 
characterized  timid  nations  and  which  is  to-day  the  undeniable 
trait  of  the  Russian  navy.  That  Russian  squadron  of  six  battle- 
ships was  a  force  of  considerable  strength,  sufficiently  homo- 
geneous and  powerful  to  compensate  by  these  qualities  for  its 
numerical  inferiority  relative  to  a  fleet  which,  excepting  the 
Mikasa,  Shikishima,  Asahi  and  Fuji,  comprised  only  ships  of  in- 
comparably less  military  value.  This  composition,  for  the  first 
time  very  much  mixed,  of  the  Japanese  fleet,  can  only  be  explained 
by  their  considerable  losses  in  the  operations  off  the  Liau-Tung 
peninsular. 

Yet  not  for  a  single  instant  in  the  course  of  that  interminable 
artillery  duel  in  cruising  order,  which  lasted  hardly  less  than  eight 
hours,  did  the  Russian  commander-in-chief  have  the  appreciation 
of  his  real  strength.  It  never  even  occurred  to  him  that  perhaps 
there  was  something  better  to  do  than  run  away,  that  by  falling 
resolutely  with  his  main  body  upon  one  of  the  Japanese  squadrons, 
he  would  have  a  chance  of  annihilating  it  and  of  opening  for  him- 
self a  passage. 

When  they  went  out  from  Port  Arthur,  the  Russian  naval  forces 
had  the  rare  good  luck  to  find  the  two  Japanese  squadrons  sepa- 
rated by  a  distance  great  enough  to  offer  a  fine  opportunity.  If, 
instead  of  changing  course  to  the  northeast  at  noon,  the  Russian 
commander-in-chief  had  boldly  assumed  the  offensive  by  bearing 
down  upon  Togo's  squadron  to  the  eastward,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
he  could  have  offered  fight  under  conditions  of  equality  of  forces 
sufficiently  satisfactory  to  give  him  hopes  of  success.  If  the  Jap- 
anese admiral  had  accepted  the  challenge,  and  everything  indicates 
that  on  that  day  he  would  have  submitted  to  rather  than  sought 
close  action,  the  losses  experienced  by  his  ships  would  have  had  a 
decisive  influence  upon  the  remainder  of  the  campaign.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  the  Japanese  admiral  had  refused  the  fight  by  standing 
away,  this  manceuver  would  have  favored  the  Russians'  object. 

Therefore  such  an  energetic  attitude  could  not  have  failed  to  be 
of  profit  to  them  in  all  ways.  But  it  would  have  required  the  will 
to  fight  and  take  risks,  and  they  never  even  suspected  that  that 
could  be  of  any  use ;  even  more,  far  from  seizing  the  opportunity 
offered  by  the  separation  of  the  Japanese  forces,  they  did  every- 

171 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

thing  to  facilitate  the  latter's  concentration  and  thus  to  give  to 
them  the  superiority  of  forces  which  they  lacked. 

How  many  truly  disconcerting  events  in  war  prove  the  im- 
perious necessity  of  a  doctrine ! 

In  speaking  of  the  commander-in-chief,  I  refer  to  Vithoft  in  par- 
ticular no  more  than  to  Ukhtomsky ;  the  personality  is  of  no  im- 
portance, it  is  the  system  which  it  represents  and  which  is  named 
indecision  or  want  of  will. 

And  this  time  again  it  may  be  asked :  Why,  if  the  Russian  squad- 
ron wished  to  evade  battle  and  merely  to  break  through  the  block- 
ade, why,  in  that  case,,  did  it  go  out  in  the  daytime? 

From  the  result  obtained  while  the  Cesarevitch,  stopped,  re- 
paired her  damages,  wre  can  judge  what  an  energetic  and  bold 
chief  with  his  five  other  battleships  would  have  secured.  This  is 
not  an  unwarranted  hypothesis,  for  it  is  impossible  not  to  charac- 
terize Togo's  action  as  also  very  weak.  Numerous  incidents  of  the 
affair  prove  it.  Not  only  did  he  fail,  during  an  entire  day,  to  se- 
cure a  decisive  result  against  a  manifestly  demoralized  enemy,  but 
when  the  latter  was  beaten  and  his  forces  dispersed,  he  did  not 
succeed  in  barring  a  passage  to  them. 

While  the  five  battleships  are  going  to  Port  Arthur,  the  Cesare- 
vitch, almost  wrecked  and  only  able  to  make  four  knots  speed,  pro- 
ceeds at  that  tortoise  gait  to  Kiao-Tcheou,  and  arrives  there  on  the 
following  evening  without  having  been  troubled  otherwise  than  by 
a  torpedo-boat  attack  just  as  she  left  the  field  of  battle. 

According  to  a  more  recent  version,  the  Russian  battleships  did 
not  turn  back  at  all  to  help  the  Cesarevitch,  but  the  latter,  taking  a 
great  sheer  on  account  of  her  helm  damage,  ran  into  the  midst  of 
the  enemy's  line,  throwing  them  into  disorder.  This  account, 
much  more  in  accord  with  the  Russian  demoralization,  and  which  I 
regard  as  probable  until  time  permits  the  truth  to  be  known,  does 
not  invalidate  the  preceding  argument ;  far  otherwise,  indeed. 

The  light  division,  commanded  by  Admiral  Reitzenstein,  had 
energetically  forced  a  passage  through  the  Japanese  squadron,  and 
that,  characteristically,  not  in  an  endeavor  to  preserve  its  forces 
for  their  country  but  to  flee,  always  to  flee.  The  Askold  succeeded 
in  reaching  Wusung,  the  Diana  got  as  far  as  Saigon,  and  finally 
the  Novik,  excepting  the  Retvisan  the  only  example  of  valor  in 
the  whole  affair,  after  having  stopped  less  than  twenty-four  hours 

172 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

at  Kiao-Tcheou,  proceeded  to  Saghalien  where,  after  a  combat 
with  a  Japanese  cruiser,  her  commander  sunk  her. 

More  proof  than  is  necessary  may  be  found  there  to  show  how 
indecisive  and  vacillating  the  Japanese  pursuit  itself  was.  With  a 
Suffren  at  its  head  the  Russian  squadron  might  have  hoped  every- 
thing, and  I  make  this  remark  to  note  in  passing  how  great  the  im- 
portance of  moral  worth  is  among  all  the  various  forces  whose 
close  union  constitutes  the  military  strength  of  a  nation. 

It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  feebleness  of  Togo's  pursuit  was 
an  error  of  doctrine.  It  has  been  claimed  as  his  excuse  that  the 
Japanese  admiral,  on  his  own  initiative  or  under  orders  from  his 
government,  wished  to  be  sparing"  of  his  ships  in  prevision  of  the 
arrival  of  the  Second  Pacific  Squadron.  The  error  would  be  a 
great  one,  for  the  opportunity  of  destroying  the  forces,  even  par- 
tial, of  the  enemy,  is  always  too  valuable  to  be  allowed  to  escape. 
He  would  much  more  surely  have  secured  the  final  preponderance 
of  force  by  the  destruction  of  the  Port  Arthur  squadron,  even  at 
the  cost  of  damages  to  his  own  ships,  than  by  letting  it  escape  al- 
most intact. 

Though  this  error  of  principle  did  not  have  great  consequences, 
not  the  less  it  was  committed;  none  can  foresee  the  future,  and 
Togo  forgot,  on  August  10,  that  Suffren  and  Nelson  never  post- 
poned to  a  later  day  what  they  could  do  then  and  there. 

Just  as  in  the  case  of  June  23,  the  causes  of  this  inconceivable 
cowardice  on  the  part  of  the  Russians  must  be  sought  in  a  foolish, 
unreflecting  fear  of  the  attacks  of  torpedo-boats  which,  as  night 
came  on,  spread  through  all  their  ships  illusion  and  fright,  hypno- 
tizing all  their  faculties  upon  a  single  object,  flight.  That  alone 
can  explain  why  both  the  attempts  to  break  through  the  blockade 
were  made  in  full  day. 

And  yet  there  was  no  occasion  to  dread  so  much  the  attacks  of 
those  little  vessels.  I  do  not  say  this,  you  may  be  sure,  on  the  mere 
ground  of  personal  opinion.  I  should  have  no  right  to  do  so 
here,  where  I  am  under  strict  obligation  not  to  advance  any  propo- 
sition which  is  not  supported  by  practical  examples  readily  to  be 
found. 

At  the  moment  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  Russian  squadron  the 
light  division  had  been  attacked  by  the  Japanese  torpedo-boats ; 
four  of  them  fired,  each  a  single  torpedo,  at  the  Askold  unsuccess- 

i73 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fully,  and  one  of  the  four  was  sunk  by  the  Askold's  gunfire.  This 
attack  was  not  renewed,  and  the  torpedo-boats  disappeared. 

The  greater  part  of  the  flotilla  had  joined  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
five  Russian  battleships  fleeing  to  Port  Arthur.  During  the  night 
these  ships  were  the  object  of  repeated  attacks  in  which  the  Jap- 
anese torpedo-boats  fired  not  less  than  sixty  torpedoes  without  any 
result. 

Finally,  in  spite  of  the  reduced  speed  which  made  her  a  very 
easy  prey  for  her  adversaries,  the  Ccsarevitch,  in  leaving  the  field 
of  battle,  withdrew  unharmed  from  an  attack  by  another  group  of 
torpedo-boats  which  fired  ineffectively  a  dozen  torpedoes. 

These  far  from  brilliant  results  justify,  I  believe,  what  I  have 
already  said  in  regard  to  the  insignificant  part  played  by  torpedo- 
boats  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  If  it  were  not  for  certain  more 
encouraging  facts  of  previous  wars,  and  particularly  if  one  did  not 
know  to  what  a  degree,  in  this  special  branch  of  the  naval  per- 
sonnel even  more  than  any  other,  patient  preparation  and  training 
in  time  of  peace  influence  results  in  time  of  war,  it  would  be  legit- 
imate to  doubt  the  value  of  the  instrument.  Here  again  the  con- 
ditions were  such  that  none  better  could  be  desired. 

In  regard  to  the  principle  itself  of  the  sortie  of  August  10,  it 
can  be  said  that  it  was  perfectly  legitimate,  on  condition  that  its 
object  was  battle  and  not  flight.  By  so  acting,  and  we  have  seen 
that  the  conditions  were  favorable,  the  Russian  squadron  of  Port 
Arthur  would  have  prepared  the  way  for  the  Second  Pacific 
Squadron  much  better  than  by  gaining  Vladivostok  without  fight- 
ing. The  ends  of  war  are  met  by  seeking  the  enemy  and  not  by 
running  away  from  him.  The  formal  orders  of  the  Emperor,  if 
it  be  true  that  such  had  been  given,  would  not  have  sufficed  to 
fetter  the  initiative  of  a  true  military  leader  conscious  of  his 
responsibilities. 

However  that  may  be,  the  return  of  the  Russian  battle  fleet  to 
Port  Arthur  consummated  definitely  .the  ruin  of  the  last  hope  of 
saving  that  fleet ;  it  buried  itself  living  in  its  tomb,  for  some  months 
later  the  voluntary  destruction  of  its  units,  before  the  surrender  of 
the  place,  was  but  a  mere  formality.  It  really  died,  as  a  moral 
force  even  more  than  as  a  material  force,  the  day  of  its  return  to 
port.  We  shall  speak  of  it  no  more. 

i74 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

THE  SECOND  PACIFIC  SQUADRON. 

While  these  events  were  happening  in  the  Far  East,  Russia  was 
preparing  in  her  European  arsenals  a  new  naval  effort  to  regain 
naval  supremacy.  A  naval  force,  which  later  was  called  the  Sec- 
ond Pacific  Squadron,  armed  in  the  Baltic  ports  with  the  Far  East 
as  its  destination. 

Further  on  we  shall  have  to  study  in  detail  the  operations  of  this 
fleet,  but  it  seems  to  me  useful,  in  conformity  with  the  method  of 
analysis  thus  far  employed,  to  make  a  preliminary  examination  of 
the  motives  which  dictated  sending  it  and  above  all  the  directing 
ideas  and  intentions. 

To  tell  the  truth,  I  am  very  sure  that  these  motives  were  purely 
sentimental,  and  that  at  the  origin  of  this  measure,  so  important  in 
its  consequences,  there  was  not  any  seriously  developed  strategic 
plan.  The  long  delays  in  the  preparation  of  this  naval  force,  the 
indolence  in  the  labors  of  arming  its  ships,  the  indecision  betrayed 
by  the  announcements,  as  numerous  as  false,  of  its 'constantly  post- 
poned departure,  all,  even  to  accidents  caused  by  ignorance  or  by 
malice,  denotes  a  situation  from  which  every  military  conception 
is  absent. 

These  half-hearted  preparations  give  the  impression  of  a  deci- 
sion taken  much  rather  to  afford  a  sham  moral  satisfaction  to  the 
national  self-esteem  than  to  carry  out  a  logical  and  deliberate  plan 
of  war. 

And  surely  there  was  opportunity,  even  at  that  moment,  for  a 
strategic  combination  of  large  scope,  capable  of  restoring  victory 
to  the  Russian  banners.  But  for  that  it  would  have  been  necessary 
to  renounce  the  delusion  of  that  long  ribbon  of  steel,  the  Manchu- 
rian  railroad,  and  to  shake  off  the  dream  of  a  constant  communica- 
tion, more  theoretical  than  practical,  afforded  by  that  iron  way 
with  the  immense,  inexhaustible  resources  of  the  Empire. 

By  the  middle  of  May,  this  railroad  could  still  only  carry  eight 
hundred  men  a  day.  This  figure  reached  about  fifteen  hundred  at 
the  beginning  of  June  and  two  thousand  at  the  end  of  that  month, 
but  it  fell  back  to  eighteen  hundred  at  the  beginning  of  November. 

At  the  end  of  January,  1905,  the  Russian  army  still  comprised 
only  three  hundred  thousand  men  at  the  most.  The  battle  of 
Mukden  was  fought  with  this  force,  about  two-thirds  that  of  the 
Japanese. 

Above  all  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  understand  how  much 

i75 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  celebrated  expression  of  the  "  Kaiser,"  "  The  future  is  upon  the 
sea"  was  applicable  to  the  situation. 

Let  a  Russian  fleet,  even  after  the  unfortunate  sortie  of  August 
10,  make  its  appearance  in  the  Far  Eastern  waters,  in  sufficient 
force  to  take  away  naval  supremacy  from  the  Japanese,  and  the 
whole  course  of  events  would  be  reversed.  The  mere  evocation  of 
this  possibility  immediately  makes  all  its  consequences  appear. 
They  were  first  the  immediate  rupture  of  the  communications  of 
the  Japanese  forces  of  invasion  with  their  home  base,  the  impossi- 
bility of  their  receiving  new  re-enforcements  or  fresh  troops,  the 
suppression  of  regular  arrivals  of  supplies,  food  as  well  as  muni- 
tions. To  sum  it  all  up,  loss  of  command  of  the  sea  must  be,  for 
the  Japanese,  the  sudden  shutting  off  of  the  reservoir  which  gen- 
erously fed  the  Japanese  military  effort  by  supplying  it  with  life 
and  energy. 

The  certain  result  would  have  been  to  force  the  Japanese  armies 
of  occupation  to  a  precipitate  retreat,  a  worse  one  than  that  of 
1812,  for  Napoleon  and  the  Grand  Army  at  least  were  not  cut  off 
from  their  base  of  operations. 

The  prospect  was  good  enough  to  justify  the  necessary  effort  on 
Russia's  part ;  there  only  was  safety  for  her.  This  effort  was  quite 
possible,  moreover,  at  least  so  far  as  material  was  concerned,  for 
by  calling  upon  all  the  naval  resources  still  available  in  her  home 
ports  there  were  enough  elements  to  make  up  a  very  strong  fleet, 
notably  superior,  at  any  rate,  to  that  which  the  Japanese  could  still 
put  in  line. 

It  would  be  easy  to  draw  up  a  comparative  table  in  which  the 
units,  distributed  in  as  homogeneous  squadrons  as  possible,  would 
give  an  idea  of  the  greatness  of  the  effort  permitted  by  Russia's 
still  remaining  resources,  and  of  the  probable  power  of  resistance 
of  their  adversaries.  But  this  is  not  necessary ;  a  glance  over  the 
lists  of  the  two  fleets  is  enough.  Under  the  leadership  of  a  great 
chief  the  game  would  still  have  been  a  good  one ;  and  here  I  am 
almost  compelled  to  stop  short ;  in  my  desire  to  present,  in  the  very 
spirit  of  the  principles  of  naval  strategy,  an  example  which  was  a 
true  practical  lesson,  I  was  about  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  all 
this  available  material  was  good  for  nothing  without  a  personnel 
capable  of  bringing  out  its  value,  that  these  ships  represented  only 
a  virtual  energy,  if  they  lacked  men  able  to  put  life  into  them,  that 
finally,  had  they  been  ten  times  as  numerous,  the  Russians  would 

176 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

still  have  been  beaten  because  they  did  not  have  to  any  extent  the 
most  essential  of  all  the  elements  that  make  up  military  strength — 
moral  force. 

These  just  reflections  nevertheless  take  nothing  away  from  the 
preceding  argument.  It  is  not  permitted  to  make  war  lightly,  and 
in  the  case  which  we  are  considering  either  it  was  necessary  to 
send  to  the  Far  East  a  naval  force  capable  beyond  any  doubt  of 
gaining  command  of  the  sea,  or  not  to  do  anything  at  all.  All  war 
plans  can  be  defended  excepting  half  measures.  The  Rozhest- 
vensky  expedition  was  only  a  half  measure ;  it  was  for  that  very 
reason  impotent  even  before  it  set  out. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  the  preceding  reference  to  the  available 
Russian  forces  I  have  taken  account  of  the  ships  stationed  in  the 
Black  Sea,  while  the  Second  Pacific  Squadron  did  not  include  any 
of  them.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  at  first  sight  that  my  argument, 
resting  upon  a  feeble  support,  since  the  Russian  Government  did 
not  believe  it  possible  to  utilize  these  resources,  would  have  at 
most  the  value  of  a  theoretical  criticism.  Such  is  not  the  case,  and 
although  the  subject  is  apparently  one  outside  our  field  of  inves- 
tigation, I  shall  discuss  this  objection  because  it  raises  an  inter- 
esting question  of  political  strategy. 

Forgetting  this  maxim  of  Napoleon  :  "  When  you  wish  to  fight  a 
battle,  assemble  ALL  YOUR  FORCES,  do  not  neglect  any,  one  battalion 
sometime*  decides  the  fate  of  a  day,"  a  doctrine  wonderfully  appli- 
cable to  naval  war,  the  government  of  the  Russian  Empire  did  not 
dare  to  utilize  its  important  forces  of  the  Black  Sea,  and,  acting 
thus,  it  allowed  itself  to  be  intimidated  by  a  simple  written  docu- 
ment, thus  giving  to  the  world  another  example  of  its  hopeless 
feebleness. 

My  reference  is  to  the  treaty  of  Paris,  and  at  once  there  is  felt 
such  a  disproportion  of  cause  and  effect,  between  the  restrictions 
put  down  on  a  piece  of  paper  by  diplomats  assembled  about  a  green 
table  and  the  forced  inactivity  of  an  important  military  force  neces- 
sary to  the  safety  of  a  great  nation — that  simple  common  sense  re- 
fuses to  accept  it. 

It  would  have  been  difficult,  moreover,  to  make  common  opinion 
understand  that  the  clauses  agreed  to  in  1856,  at  the  end  of  a 
general  European  war,  could  be  applicable  to  war  between  two 
belligerent  nations  one  of  which  had  no  recognized  existence  when 
the  treaty  was  signed. 

177 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Furthermore,  the  preamble  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  reads  thus : 
"  Their  Majesties  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  the  Queen  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  the,  Emperor  of  all 
the  Russiasythe  King  of  Sardinia  and  the  Emperor  of  the  Turks, 
animated  by  the  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  calamities  of  the  war, 
and  wishing  to  provide  against  the  return  of  the,  complications 
which  have  given  rise  to  it,  have  resolved  to  agree  with  his  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Austria,  upon  conditions  for  the  re-establishment 
and  maintenance  of  the  peace  by  assuring,  through  efficacious  and 
reciprocal  guarantees,  THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TURKISH 
EMPIRE/' 

The  object  of  .the  treaty  is  wholly  contained  in  the  last  under- 
lined words,  and  there  was  no  other. 

It  would  be  necessary  to  possess  great  mental  obliquity,  or  the 
inexhaustible  faculty  of  discussion  of  a  shrewd  diplomat,  to  see  in 
this  agreement  anything  but  the  single  care  to  safeguard  the  integ- 
rity of  Turkey  and  thereby  to  maintain  the  European  balance  of 
power.  How  then  could  it  have  been  held  that  the  bonds  placed 
upon  Russia  by  the  contracting  powers  to  assure  this  single  object 
could  not  be  cut  in  case  of  conflict  with  Japan,  nonexistent  in  1856 
and  in  any  case  not  having,  far  or  near,  any  interest  in  the  Oriental 
question ! 

Article  7  of  the  treaty  further  states:  "Their  Majesties  (the 
contracting  powers)  agree,  each  on  his  own  part,  to  respect  the 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  guar- 
anteeing in  common  the  strict  observance  of  this  agreement,  and 
they  will  regard,  in  consequence,  any  act  of  a  nature  to  violate  it 
as  a  question  of  general  interest." 

Any  other  intention  than  respect  for  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  being  evidently  omitted  from  these  written  instruments, 
it  would  have  been  necessary  to  demonstrate  that  the  departure  of 
the  Russian  naval  forces  from  the  Black  Sea  threatened  the  secur- 
ity of  the  Sultan  in  order  to  make  them  applicable  to  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  the  mere  supposition  of  which  would  have  seemed 
to  the  plenipotentiaries  of  1856  the  wildest  of  dreams. 

Such  a  demonstration  would  have  been  the  more  difficult,  be- 
cause the  notable  weakening  of  the  Russian  navy  in  the  waters  of 
the  Black  Sea  would,  on  the  contrary,  admirably  satisfy  the  spirit 
of  the  treaty. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  the  treaty  failing,  an  argument 

178 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

has  frequently  been  based  upon  its  article  n,  relative  to  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Black  Sea.  "'  The  Black  Sea  is  made  neutral:  open  to 
the  merchant  marine  of  all  nations,  its  waters  and  its  ports  are, 
formally  and  forever,  interdicted  to  war  ships  either  of  the  adjoin- 
ing powers  or  of  any  other  power." 

But  the  stipulations  of  this  part  of  the  protocol  of  1856  remain 
inoperative  to-day  from  the  single  fact  that  there  is  a  Russian 
squadron  of  the  Black  Sea. 

There  is  the  less  room  for  doubt  in  regard  to  this  particular 
question  because,  by  a  special  agreement  signed  after  the  treaty, 
Russia  and  Turkey  made  a  mutual  solemn  engagement  to  each 
maintain  in  the  Black  Sea  only  (>*six  steam  vessels  of  fifty  meters 
waterline  length,  of  a  displacement  of  eight  hundred  tons  at  the 
most,  and  four  light  vessels,  steam  or  sail,  of  a  displacement  not 
to  exceed  two  hundred  tons  each." 

It  is  quite  curious  to  note  that  these  little  vessels  would  be  rep- 
resented to-day  by  torpedo-boat  destroyers ;  this  remark  empha- 
sizes the  strained  construction  of  the  treaty,  and  the  bitter  irony  of 
the  eternal  (  ! !)  engagements  entered  into  by  diplomats. 

A  last  argument  remained  to  those  who,  under  an  affirmation  of 
respect  for  treaties,  really  mask  their  incurable  fear  of  action ;  it 
relates  to  the  act  annexed  to  the  treaty  of  Paris,  by  which  the  sig- 
natory powers  of  the  London  Convention  of  1841  reciprocally 
agreed  to  respect  the  ancient  rule  of  the  closure  of  straits  to  foreign 
warships. 

But  the  text  of  this  act  contains  only  a  single  declaration  of  prin- 
ciple on  the  Sultan's  part,  which  the  other  powers  agree  to  respect, 
but  the  observance  of  which  belongs  to  him  alone  to  enforce.  We 
may  well  believe  in  this  matter  that  the  Porte  would  have  viewed 
with  pleasure  a  squadron's  definite  departure  which  would  have 
freed  it  from  a  permanent  threat  in  its  immediate  neighborhood 
and  would  have  put  everything  in  conformity  with  the  spirit  as 
well  as  the  letter  of  the  treaty  of  Paris. 

All  the  reasons  called  upon  to  justify  the  inaction  of  the  Black 
Sea  Squadron  are  therefore  bad.  There  is  much  more  to  be  said 
on  this  subject,  but  it  would  exceed  the  limit  I  have  set  for  myself. 
It  is  sufficient  to  have  made  it  clear  that  once  more  the  new  plan, 
upon  which  depended  the  whole  effort  to  win  the  victory,  was  not 
inspired  by  any  strategic  idea.  To  conclude,  there  is  one  single 
and  only  cause  why  unhappy  Russia  must  inevitably  have  been 

179 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

beaten ;  neither  before  nor  during  this  disastrous  war  has  she  ever 
known  what  it  was  to  prepare  her  operations.  Finally  and  above 
all,  neither  her  diplomacy,  nor  her  strategy,  governmental,  military 
and  naval,  nor  her  tactics  in  the  theater  of  war,  have  known  how, 
or  wished,  to  dare. 

This  long  digression  will  not  seem  useless,  for  it  will  tend  to  a 
better  understanding  of  the  reason  for  the  complete  failure  of  the 
Second  Pacific  Squadron. 

The  study  of  this  squadron's  operations  comprises  two  abso- 
lutely distinct  phases :  a  purely  maritime  expedition  and  an  act  of 
war.  The  first,  certainly  interesting,  gave  better  promise  for  the 
second  than  was  borne  out. 

The  task  imposed  upon  Admiral  Rozhestvensky  was  really  a 
hard  one.  To  lead  an  imposing  fleet  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the 
Far  East,  without  other  resources  than  those  obtained  wholly  by 
way  of  the  sea,  in  the  absence  of  advanced  bases,  of  well  pro- 
visioned stopping  places  on  the  route,  appeared  to  the  sailors  of 
all  countries  a  more  than  difficult,  almost  impossible,  enterprise, 
and  many  were  convinced  that  he  would  fail  completely. 

The  success  is  entirely  due  to  the  indomitable  energy  of  the 
leader  of  the  Russian  fleet,  for  all  the  information  gathered  relat- 
ing to  this  voyage  agrees  in  attributing  the  fortunate  completion 
of  so  long  a  cruise,  with  completely  demoralized  crews,  solely  to 
his  tenacity  of  purpose  and  iron  will.  It  is  regrettable  that  this 
man  did  not  have  the  military  sense  as  well  developed  as  the  sea- 
man's sense. 

The  study  of  the  arrangements  to  be  made,  with  a  view  to  over- 
coming the  considerable  difficulties  of  all  sorts  to  be  met  with  in 
the  course  of  so  extraordinary  a  journey  as  this  one,  is  too  far  re- 
moved from  my  chosen  subject.  I  shall  be  satisfied  here,  after  the 
foregoing  statement  of  the  results  obtained  by  a  leader's  moral 
force,  even  under  quite  unfavorable  circumstances,  with  formulat- 
ing some  reflections  on  the  subject  of  the  Hull  incident. 

All  of  its  details  are  known,  and,  to  perceive  the  exceptional 
qualities  of  coolness  and  judgment  necessary  to  the  making  of  a 
great  naval  chief,  the  entire  report  of  the  international  commission 
must  be  read. 

For  ourselves,  who  are  not  bound  to  the  same  reservations  of  in- 
dulgence and  of  diplomacy  as  the  members  of  that  commission,  we 
can  very  well  say  that  the  presence  of  Japanese  vessels  on  the 

180 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Dogger  Bank,  during  the  night  of  the  Russian  squadron's  passage, 
was  more  than  doubtful.  The  single  cause  which  provoked  the 
Russians'  fire  against  the  inoffensive  and  peaceable  trawlers  is  the 
same  as  that  which  made  the  sortie  of  August  10  abortive ;  it  is  a 
measureless  fear,  akin  to  madness,  of  the  torpedo-boat,  of  the 
phantom  torpedo-boat,  which  assumes,  to  the  anxious  eyes  of  the 
Russian  sailors,  the  most  extraordinary  .shapes.  The  special  de- 
tails in  the  case  of  the  Kamtchatka,  which  exhibit  this  vessel  de- 
layed in  rear  of  the  squadron,  seeing  torpedo-boats  everywhere, 
to  the  extent  of  opening  fire  upon  every  vessel  she  met,  are  a  par- 
ticularly good  proof. 

Thus,  as  soon  as  this  affair,  tfnique  of  its  kind,  became  known, 
the  value  of  the  military  force  of  a  squadron  in  which  indications 
of  such  a  moral  depression  were  shown  could  already  be  doubted. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  TSUSHIMA. 

On  May  27,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  Second  Pacific 
Squadron  was  sighted  by  the  Japanese  scouts  off  the  Eastern 
passage  of  the  Korean  Strait,  towards  which  it  was  directing  its 
course. 

Admiral  Togo,  informed  by  wireless,  immediately  got  under 
way  from  his  base  and  steered  for  the  same  point  with  all  his 
forces.  Thenceforth  the  encounter  was  inevitable. 

But  the  inclinations  were  far  from  the  same  on  both  sides.  In 
the  Japanese  fleet  they  went  eagerly  to  the  battle,  on  the  Russian 
side  they  submitted  to  it.  Rozhestvensky's  objective  was  so  evi- 
dently and  so  exclusively  to  get  to  Vladivostok  at  any  cost,  that  he 
had  not  arranged  for  any  battle  formation  even  then  when  contact 
with  the  Japanese  scouts  should  have  convinced  him  of  the  cer- 
tainty of  an  approaching  attack.  He  advanced  towards  the  enemy 
in  the  same  order,  in  columns,  which  he  had  prescribed  for  cruis- 
ing, the  right  column  made  up  of  the  Rozhestvensky  and  Folker- 
sham  divisions,  the  left  column  of  NebogatofFs  coast  defence  ships 
and  Enquist's  cruisers,  and  the  convoy  protected  by  these  cruisers 
following  behind  the  squadron  (Fig.  i). 

Before  entering  the  strait,  the  commander-in-chief  seemed  to 
have  become  aware  of  the  disadvantage  of  his  formation  in  the 
event  of  an  attack,  for  he  formed  single  column  by  placing  his  own 
ahead  of  the  left  column  (Fig.  2).  But  almost  immediately  after- 
wards he  displayed  to  all  an  irresolution  which  augured  ill  by 

181 


CRUISING  FOK^AT'ON  OFTHC  RUSSIAN  FLEET 
UP  TO  NOON.  MAY  27. 


JEMTCHUG 


0 


,-r 


MlCOLASl     II 

0 

Yi 

D 


O 


[]     OREU 


K-^MTC  H  ATK  A 

Q  f  0    OSL\A 

15  2S  5 

O 

f)     O  ^ArtADlR.  (1 

W  ^  U   S»SSO« 

IG  O  22  e 


\A 


D 


MON!OMACH[] 


25 


0    MAVAR\M 


KOR.EA 


MAKHIMOFF 


10 

J^OUSS 


SV1E1R 


0 
V» 

Q 
20 


Q   OURAL. 
2.) 


27 


SHIPS        I       I 
^^ 

S  ^fr 

O 


BE-TV/EEN  THCTWO  COUJMFvJ^..QS 
«      SMlPSOF-AOWISlONl—-  0.-Z 


FlG.    I. 
182 


THC  FICMTINJQ   SH»PS  FOR.M    SINCL.E.  COl-UMH 
12.?>o  R.  M.  ^> 

[jj 

fl 


OR.CU. 


. 

'»        Z/ 


6  »' 


- 

L/16 


o 

O 


MOMOMACH  /7 
U« 


23  ,RTYCH 


SVICR. 


28 


ARMOR.EO   SHIPS          CZZI 


AUXIL.IARJE.S  *S> 

O 


FIG.  2. 


183 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

again  displacing  the  first  division  of  his  column  to  the  right,  so 
that  the  double  column  formation  was  reconstituted. 

No  formation  could  be  more  unfortunate ;  for  when  the  Jap- 
anese naval  forces,  debouching  by  the  north  of  Tsushima,  came 
into  contact  with  the  Russian  fleet,  it  was  the  left  column,  much  the 


THE,  RWS51ANJ  FI-CE1T  AT2  RM. 

u? 


07 


06 

0\\ 


0 

21 


19 


ARMOF^CD  &MIPS 
CRUISEK6 


AUXII.IA.R.I&S 


0> 

o 


FIG.  3. 

weaker  of  the  two,  that  they  could  first  attack,  without  the  more 
powerful  battleships  of  the  right  column,  whose  fire  was  interfered 
with  by  the  interposition  of  the  other,  being  able  to  reply  energet- 
ically to  the  fire  of  the  Japanese  guns.  And  moreover,  the  battle 
once  engaged,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  change  so  unmanageable 
a  formation. 


184 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Quite  otherwise  was  the  Japanese  order.  Their  fleet,  divided 
into  three  homogeneous  groups,  of  battleships,  armored  cruisers 
and  protected  cruisers,  following-  the  movements  of  the  comman- 
der-in-chief,  but  each  of  them  under  the  effective  direction  of  its 
squadron  commander,  exhibited  as  much  flexibility,  by  the  devel- 
opment of  three  independent  columns,  as  the  Russians  showed 
want  of  it  in  the  manceuvers  of  their  compact  formation.  Finally, 
to  complete  the  wholly  unfavorable  dispositions  of  the  Russians, 
the  sun's  position,  in  the  direction  of  the  Japanese  fleet,  prevented 
their  making  out  accurately  its  movements,  formation,  and  dis- 
tance. 

At  the  moment  when  the  battle  is  about  to  open,  the  situation  of 
the  two  squadrons  is  as  follows  : 

The  Russians  in  two  columns ;  to  the  right,  the  Sonvaroff,  Alex- 
ander III,  Borodino  and  Orel;  to  left,  the  Osliabia,  Sissoi-Veliki, 
Navarin,  Nakhimoff,  Nicolas  I,  Admiral  Apraxin,  Admiral  Senia- 
vin  and  Admiral  Oushakoff;  the  cruisers  Jemtchug  and  I  sum- 
rud  to  the  right  of  the  two  columns ;  astern,  quite  far  off,  the 
Oleg,  Dmitri-Donskoi  and  Vladimir-Monomach,  protecting  the 
transports.  The  speed  is  from  eleven  to  twelve  knots  (Fig.  3). 

On  the  side  of  the  Japanese  fleet,  the  first  and  second  squadrons 
in  a  single  column,  at  first  standing  to  the  southwest  as  if  to  pass 
on  a  parallel  course  to  the  port  of  the  Russian  squadron,  suddenly 
at  2.05  p.  m.  turn  by  head  of  column  to  the  east,  at  a  speed  of  15 
knots.  The  third  squadron  steers  to  attack  the  convoy  from  the 
rear. 

At  2.15  the  Japanese  fired  their  first  shots,  though  the  Rus- 
sians, on  account  of  their  excessive  nervousness,  had  then  been  fir- 
ing at  them  for  some  minutes  at  extreme  range.  At  2.45,  that  is  at 
the  end  of  a  half  hour,  the  fate  of  the  battle  could  be  considered  to 
be  definitely  determined.  In  the  artillery  duel  which  took  place 
between  the  two  squadrons,  at  a  distance  always  between  fifty-five 
hundred  and  twenty-five  hundred  meters,  the  Osliabia,  at  the  head 
of  the  left  column,  had  suffered  greatly  from  the  intensity  of  the 
fire  concentrated  upon  her ;  completely  disabled,  and  having  lost 
her  commander,  on  account  of  her  position  as  leader  she  threw 
into  disorder  the  ships  which  were  following  her. 

The  relative  positions  of  the  two  naval  forces  at  2.30  p.  m.  (Fig. 
4)  clearly  shows  the  critical  situation  of  the  Russians. 

185 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  Souvaroff  and  Alexander  III  are  on  fire,  the  coast  defence 
armorclads  have  scattered  ;  there  is  no  longer  any  order  in  the  Rus- 
sian fleet,  which  no  effort  thenceforth  can  save. 

From  this  moment  till  the  end  of  the  day  the  battle  will  continue 
with  alternating  periods  of  relaxation  and  of  renewed  attacks,  but 


THE.  TWO  ri-ElETS   AT     2..  BO  Rl 


FIG.  4. 

the  mortal  wound  has  been  given.  The  Japanese  keep  up  a  speed 
of  14  to  15  knots,  that  of  the  Russians  being  n  to  12 ;  they  follow 
a  gradually  changing  course,  seeking  to  get  ahead  of  the  Russian 
squadron.  The  latter  follows  this  movement  in  a  sort  of  passive 
resignation,  changing  its  course  correspondingly  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. It  irresistibly  makes  one  think  of  the  frightened  gesture  of 

186 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

a  child  who  tries  to  ward  off,  with  arm  bent  above  his  head,  his 
mother's  punishment.  The  evocation  of  this  tragic  scene  is  fright- 
fully sad.  The  Russians'  torpor  is  such  that  the  protected  cruisers 
as  well  as  the  convoy,  sticking  obstinately  to  the  tail  of  the  column, 
follow  all  its  movements  with  disconcerting  tenacity,  even  under- 
going the  attack  of  the  Japanese  protected  cruiser  squadron 
through  holding  their  position  with  a  precision  worthy  of  praise 
anywhere  else  than  in  battle. 

At  three  o'clock  the  movement  to  get  across  its  head  of  column 
has  proceeded  so  far  that  the  Russian  squadron  fears  being  caught 


ATTEMPT  OF  THE  RUS&1AMS  To  ESCAPE!  TO  THET 


K 


\ 
\ 


A    s- 
V'"vA 


\  VII  -V  1  A     I  *T 

\  \'A         '\ 

\  vj%-x      '-V 

\  vV-/7 

/  \  1^ 


FIG.  5. 

between  two  fires ;  it  turns  sharply  to  the  north,  in  order  to  endea- 
vor to  escape  by  passing  around  the  rear  of  the  Japanese  column. 
The  latter  performs  a  right  about  movement,  in  a  particularly  in- 
teresting way  from  the  point  of  view  of  battle  tactics,  and  finds 
itself  again  parallel  with  the  Russian  forces,  upon  which  it  once 
more  gains,  endeavoring  to  get  in  front  and  bar  the  way  (Fig.  5). 

The  Russian's  repeat  their  manoeuver,  this  time  turning  to  the 
east,  at  3.45,  and  the  Japanese  immediately  make  a  right  about 
movement  in  the  same  manner  as  before  (Fig.  6). 

At  7.30  in  the  evening,  after  a  momentary  disappearance  of  the 
Russians  in  the  fog  and  a  renewal  of  the  engagement,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Second  Pacific  Squadron  is  almost  consummated ;  Ad- 

187 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

miral  Togo  orders  the  firing  to  cease.  The  Osliabia  has  sunk  ;  the 
Souvaroff,  a  complete  wreck,  has  met  the  same  fate,  having  been 
finished  by  a  torpedo  from  a  destroyer ;  the  Borodino  has  blown 
up;  finally  the  Alexander  III  has  capsized,  as  have  also  several 
other  less  important  armored  ships.  (The  sketch  gives  an  exact 
representation  of  the  battle.) 


ATTELMTT  OF  RUSSIAN! S  TO  ESCAPE  TO  THE  EASTWARD 


^ 


V 


CD  CD  CD  CD 

D 


FIG.  6. 

In  putting  an  end  to  the  action,  Admiral  Togo  orders  the 
flotillas  to  attack  during  the  night.  During  the  whole  day,  in  fact, 
the  torpedo-boats  have  played  no  part  on  account  of  the  weather 
conditions,  a  strong  breeze  from  the  west  and  a  heavy  sea,  which 
prevented  their  leaving  the  shelter  of  the  coast.  At  night,  the 
wind  having  fallen,  they  were  able  to  put  to  sea  in  spite  of  a  quite 
heavy  swell.  Their  attacks  lasted  all  night,  but  a  study  of  them 
would  have  no  great  interest  for  us,  since  they  were  directed 

188 


SKETCH  PLAN  OFTHE1  BATTUE!  OF  TSUSHIMA 

N 

X 


'        '        '       Jl      '        '        '        '       V^o     '       '        '        '      ty 


TRACK  or  JAPANESE:  AHMOR.ED  SHIPS 

i.          *      RUSSIAN) 

.     ^»APAMCSE   CRUISERS 

RUSSIAN  »  AND 


189 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

against  fighting  units  already  mortally  wounded  and  which  they 
merely  finished. 

The  following  day,  in  the  morning,  the  Japanese  cruisers  re- 
gained touch  with  the  coast  defence  ships  of  NebogatofFs  division, 
which  surrended  at  the  first  shot. 

Thus  was  completed  the  destruction  of  the  Second  Pacific 
Squadron,  and  this  time  there  was  a  final  end  to  the  Russian  naval 
power  in  the  Far  East. 

I  have  described  only  in  broad  outlines  this  battle  of  Tsushima, 
which  has  already  made  floods  of  ink  to  flow  and  will  continue  to 
do  so  for  a  long  time  yet :  this  has  seemed  to  me  to  be  sufficient.  I 
do  not  believe,  in  fact,  that  all  the  wonderful  things  are  to  be  found 
in  this  battle  that  people  have  wished,  with  a  little  too  much  imagi- 
nation, to  see  in  it.  Some,  with  the  enthusiasm  of  poets,  have 
wished  to  establish  a  likeness  between  Trafalgar  and  Tsushima,  to 
compare  Togo  with  Nelson  ;  that,  in  my  opinion,  is  doing  too  much 
honor  to  the  Japanese  admiral. 

A  very  lively  imagination  would  be  needed  to  compare  the  en- 
veloping manceuver  of  the  two  Japanese  armored  squadrons,  using 
their  superior  speed,  to  the  wedge  formed  by  Nelson's  and  Colling- 
wood's  squadrons  at  Trafalgar  and  intended  to  break  through  the 
center  of  the  French-Spanish  fleet.  The  reality  is  more  simple. 
The  Japanese  commander-in-chief,  discarding  his  timidity  of 
August  10,  this  time  advanced  boldly  to  battle,  and  profited 
greatly  by  his  boldness.  He  did  it,  moreover,  without  complicated 
manceuvers,  without  learned  evolutions,  in  simple  column. 

One  important  fact  dominates  throughout  this  battle  of  Tsu- 
shima, and  that  is  the  artillery  combat  at  long  range.  Better  still 
than  Punta-Agamos  or  the  Yalu,  it  afforded  proof  that  henceforth 
the  gun  is  to  be  the  sovereign  arbiter  of  the  fate  of  naval  battles. 

Furthermore,  on  this  memorable  day,  May  27,  1905,  which  will 
be  a  notable  date  in  naval  history,  the  advantage  derived  from  the 
development  of  modern  rapid  fire  guns  and  smokeless  powder  was 
to  bring  about  a  result  in  accord  with  the  immemorial  and  natural 
tendency  of  men  to  increase  their  fighting  distances.  I  say  that 
this  tendency  is  natural ;  an  artillery  duel  is,  in  fact,  an  eminently 
unstable  state  of  equilibrium.  Just  as  soon  as  the  balance  begins 
to  turn  in  favor  of  one  side,  and  a  single  lucky  shot  may  some- 
times be  enough  for  that,  this  advantage  rapidly  increases  at  least 
as  much  by  reason  of  the  continuous  weakening  of  the  moral 

190 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

forces  of  the  adversary  as  by  the  material  work  of  destruction 
which  influences  them. 

It  is  important  then,  in  the  highest  degree,  to  acquire  as  soon 
as  possible  that  superiority  of  fire  which  demoralizes  the  hostile 
personnel  by  striking  down  everything  round  about  it,  and  takes 
from  it  all  strength  to  resist. 

This  conclusion  is  so  unquestionable  that  since  the  battle  of 
Tsushima  an  irresistible  development,  previously  advocated  in 
France,  forces  all  navies  towards  the  adoption  of  calibers  of  more 
and  more  power  and  of  firing  exercises  at  great  range. 

If  a  comparison  must  be  made,  it  would  be  quite  exact  to  affirm 
that,  after  the  lapse  of  a  century,  the  same  errors  have  brought 
about  the  same  disasters ;  that  there  is  a  striking  analogy  between 
the  strategical  or  tactical  ideas  of  Villeneuve  and  those  of 
Rozhestvensky. 

The  two  beaten  leaders  had,  to  the  same  degree,  that  incon- 
ceivable blindness  which  made  them  see  their  principal  objective 
in  the  mission  they  had  to  accomplish ;  in  the  case  of  the  Russian 
admiral,  this  preoccupation  betrayed  itself  by  an  immense  error 
whose  consequences  had  a  large  part  in  the  disaster  of  Tsushima. 
Fearing  to  lack  coal  with  which  to  reach  Vladivostok,  he  had  so 
encumbered  his  ships  with  fuel  that  they  were  overloaded  to  the 
amount  of  fifteen  hundred  tons.  Their  narrow  armor  belts  were 
therefore  partially  submerged,  and  this  explains  the  capsizing  as 
soon  as  breaches  were  made  in  the  side  above  the  armored  deck. 
Finally,  the  presence  of  this  fuel  favored  the  development  of  the 
many  fires  which  occurred  on  the  Russian  ships.  Is  it  to  be  be- 
lieved that  if  Rozhestvensky's  mind  had  been  fixed  for  a  single 
instant  upon  the  possibility  of  a  battle,  he  would  have  put  his 
ships  in  such  a  condition  ? 

There  is  another  resemblance  between  the  unfortunate  beaten 
one  of  1805  and  the  one  of  1905 ;  both  commanded  hastily  organ- 
ized crews,  without  cohesion  and  without  moral  force,  having  re- 
ceived no  preliminary  instruction  nor  military  training,  and  which 
had  to  fight  against  disciplined  adversaries,  accustomed  to  all 
exercises,  above  all  excellent  gunners. 

And  when  we  make  a  general  survey  of  this  war,  perhaps  too 
hastily  analyzed,  it  is  by  that  very  thing  that  we  can  explain  the 
causes  of  the  Russian  defeat.  Surprised  by  a  war  unexpected  only 
by  itself,  the  government  of  that  country  carried  it  on,  without 

191 


I 


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A  MAY  27-28,  19O5. 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

having  prepared  for  it,  in  a  state  of  constant  and  disordered  im- 
provisation. That  is  why  their  ships  in  the  Far  East  burned  the 
detestable  Japanese  coal,  while  the  Japanese  burned  Cardiff.  This 
example  by  itself  is  as  good  as  long  arguments. 

The  Russian  ships,  before  the  war,  never  had  any  gunnery  prac- 
tice, never  any  concerted  exercises  or  manceuvers ;  the  Cesare- 
vitctis  heavy  guns  were  fired  for  the  first  time  in  the  battle  of 
August  10. 

Never  at  any  moment  of  the  war  did  the  Russian  sailors  reflect 
that  instruments  of  war  like  their  ships  are  made  to  fight  with  and 
have  no  other  raison  d'etre.  On  August  10,  just  as  at  Tsushima, 
they  had  so  little  wish  to  fight  that  they  maintained  there  also  a 
formation  in  three  columns,  the  cruisers  to  the  left  of  the  battle- 
ships, a  formation  bad  from  every  point  of  view,  since  the  cruisers 
received  the  projectiles  which  missed  the  battleships.  Finally 
they  returned  to  port  with  a  large  reserve  of  projectiles;  more 
than  three-fourths  of  their  regular  supply. 

If  these  proofs  seem  insufficient,  I  will  add  that,  in  his  instruc- 
tions before  the  sortie  of  August  10,  Admiral  Vithoft  declared  his 
intention  to  return  to  Port  Arthur,  if  he  could  not  reach  Vladivos- 
tok without  fighting. 

Such  blindness,  so  persisting  from  beginning  to  end  of  the  war, 
must  bear  fruit,  and  the  best  conclusion  that  I  can  reach  in  closing 
is  that  the  study  of  this  war,  like  that  of  many  others  which  pre- 
ceded it,  will  be  above  all  useful  to  us  by  teaching  us  to  profit  by 
errors  which  we  must  not  imitate. 

The  victorious  force  of  Admiral  Togo  was  made  of  the  ineradi- 
cable weakness  of  the  Russian  sailors  infinitely  more  than  of  its 
own  worth. 

Never  be  weak ! 


194 


CHAPTER  VI. 

RESUME  OF  THE  LESSONS  OF  HISTORY;  THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  WAR; 

THE  ROLE  OF  FLEETS  ;  THE  VALUE  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  ; 

BLOCKADE  ;  COMMAND  OF  THE  SEA. 

We  have  passed  in  review,  in  the  preceding  chapters,  important 
historical  facts  to  derive  from  them  a  philosophic  lesson,  from  the 
special  point  of  view  of  naval  warfare.  I  should  have  liked  to  be 
able  to  give  a  great  deal  more  time  to  these  studies,  for  there  is  no 
more  fruitful  method  of  apprehending,  and  above  all  under- 
standing, the  military  art.  I  will  even  say  that  there  is  no  other 
method. 

Only  those  who  have  never  examined  military  questions  can  re- 
gard it  as  superfluous  to  connect  existing  problems  with  the  expe- 
rience of  the  past.  Under  the  pretext  that  "  means  "  have  been 
radically  transformed,  they  deny  to  ancient  wars  the  very  great 
influence  which  they  really  exercise  upon  those  of  to-day. 

But  as  soon  as  the  attempt  is  made,  as  we  are  bound  to  make  it 
here,  to  throw  a  little  light  upon  the  numerous  and  complex  sub- 
jects involved  in  preparation  for  war,  it  is  quickly  perceived  that, 
under  penalty  of  enunciating  sentimental  propositions  which  other 
exactly  opposite  sentimental  propositions  of  equal  validity  can 
destroy,  it  is  necessary  to  build  upon  a  solid  foundation,  and  this 
foundation  experience  alone  can  supply. 

And  it  is  for  this  reason  also  that,  although  I  have  been  obliged 
to  cut  short  the  space  given  to  the  general  teachings  of  history  in 
order  to  follow  my  program,  I  do  not  thereby  renounce  the  benefit 
which  its  lessons  confer,  and  we  shall  take  no  step  in  advance,  so 
to  speak,  without  asking  from  them  the  support  of  their  experi- 
mental confirmation. 

The  time  has  come  to  conclude,  or  rather  to  sum  up,  and  in  this 
connection  it  seems  opportune  to  declare  that  I  have  no  pretention 
whatever  to  innovate  in  these  matters.  I  do  not  think  I  am  wrong 
in  expressing  my  conviction  that  no  one  of  the  distinguished 
officers  who  have  before  me  discussed  military  questions  has  been 
able  to  differ  in  opinion  from  me  on  this  subject.  Our  role,  much 
more  modest,  is  limited  to  seeking  and  recapitulating  truths  old 

195 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

as  the  world,  which  all  the  great  captains  have  made  their  own, 
which  all  the  military  writers  of  note  have  developed,  perhaps 
under  different  forms,  but  identical  in  essential  ideas.  And  it  is 
precisely  for  that  reason  that  it  has  appeared  to  me  as  impossible 
to  take  up  the  very  subject  of  this  work  without  a  preliminary  ex- 
amination of  military  history  as  it  would  be  to  understand  the 
actual  state  of  contemporary  Europe,  for  example,  without  know- 
ing the  acts  by  which  it  was  constituted. 

And,  finally,  till  now  my  task  has  been  a  simple  and  easy  one :  to 
bring  together  the  military  teachings  of  the  most  famous  special- 
ists in  the  art  of  war,  to  set  forth  their  methods,  above  all  to  let 
them  speak,  as  it  were,  so  that,  though  with  my  pen,  it  is  really 
these  practitioners  themselves,  of  greater  authority,  who  lay  down 
the  general  principles  of  the  art  of  war  and  make  a  vision  of  the 
future  emerge  from  the  past. 

The  exact  end  which  I  have  proposed  to  myself  is  to  diffuse  in 
the  body  of  naval  officers  those  eternal  principles  the  forgetfulness 
of  which,  too  frequent  by  the  French  navy  in  the  course  of  its  long 
history,  has  always  coincided  with  the  worst  disasters  that  have 
overwhelmed  it.  So  limited,  this  task  is  already  quite  fine  and 
useful,  if  it  allows  me  to  contribute  even  slightly  towards  making 
it  understood  that  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  such  errors  forever  and 
always. 

If  the  work  thus  far  done  has  been  well  assimilated,  many 
memories  throng  upon  us  when  we  think  of  it ;  certain  terms,  cer- 
tain ideas  above  all  present  themselves  to  our  minds  with  a  special 
persistence :  the  principal  objective,  battle,  destruction  of  the  hos- 
tile naval  force,  etc.,  all  these  expressions,  become  familiar  by  dint 
of  repetition,  sound  in  our  ears  like  the  leitmotif,  as  it  were,  of  this 
study  of  the  wars  of  the  past. 

It  certainly  cannot  be  a  mere  coincidence  that  we  always  find 
identical  principles  underlying  the  ways  of  acting  of  all  the  great 
captains ;  for  that  reason  alone  we  already  have  the  right  to  be- 
lieve that  their  successes  have  been  due  precisely  to  their  agree- 
ment in  the  application  of  these  principles. 

Perhaps  it  might  be  objected  that,  having  chosen  only  a  limited 
number  of  historical  facts,  the  choice  may  have  unconsciously 
been  made  of  those  which  correspond  with  a  preconceived  opinion 
and  satisfy  a  personal  theory.  If  the  necessary  and  very  useful 
study  of  history  has  been  cut  short,  it  is,  I  repeat,  because  the 

196 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

necessarily  small  compass  of  the  book  imposed  that  obligation, 
however  powerful  the  interest  of  the  subject  would  have  been; 
but  it  is  the  duty  of  all  who  may  read  my  work  to  fill  out  its  defi- 
ciencies by  a  personal  study  which  I  cannot  too  earnestly  recom- 
mend. They  will  derive  from  it  a  very  great  benefit,  and  will  find 
new  reasons,  I  am  entirely  certain,  to  strengthen  their  judgment 
regarding  the  general  principles  which,  from  Alexander,  Caesar 
and  Hannibal  to  the  Japanese  generals,  not  omitting  Frederick  the 
Great  and  Napoleon,  have  always  led  to  victory.  I  scarcely  need 
to  state,  moreover,  that  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  took  up  the 
study  of  the  military  questions  which  at  this  moment  absorb  our 
attention  with  the  most  complete  sincerity  and  an  entire  inde- 
pendence of  thought. 

And,  moreover,  we  feel  that  chance  alone  cannot  be  the  expla- 
nation of  the  great  warriors,  of  such  various  times,  countries  and 
temperaments,  having  obeyed  like  rules.  When  we  add,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  forgetfulness  or  neglect  of  those  same  rules 
always  coincides,  in  the  course  of  our  naval  history,  with  our  most 
painful  trials,  it  seems  difficult  not  to  be  convinced  that  there  must 
really  exist  a  general  method  of  war,  which  all  the  great  captains 
have  used,  whether  in  conscious  imitation  of  their  predecessors 
in  the  career  or  at  the  simple  suggestion  of  their  own  genius. 

When  we  observe,  on  the  other  hand,  the  persistence  with  which 
certain  nations  in  the  course  of  history  have  accumulated  reverses 
by  the  use  of  the  same  confusing  methods,  we  can  but  think,  with 
Commander  Daveluy,  that  "  though  many  people  have  made  war, 
very  few  have  understood  it,"  and  since  the  occasion  offers  to 
speak  of  our  comrade,  I  cannot  too  strongly  advise  the  interesting 
and  beneficial  reading  of  his  fine  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  WARS. 

We  have  seen,  in  the  course  of  the  preceding  chapters,  what  idea 
Duquesne,  Tourville,  Suffren  and  Nelson,  to  speak  only  of  the 
most  famous,  had  of  war.  Their  conceptions  in  this  regard  can  be 
condensed  in  the  classic  formula,  "  To  seek  the  enemy,  to  come  up 
ivith  him  and  to  beat  him  with  superior  forces,"  and  this  sums  up 
very  well,  in  fact,  the  true  conception  of  war. 

Two  nations  go  to  war  as  a  general  rule  about  questions  of  self 
interest,  disputed  territory,  rivalries  of  political  influence  or  of 
economic  supremacy.  In  the  most  frequent  case,  the  belligerents 

197 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

quarrel  over  a  new  possession  which  serves  as  a  pretext  for  the 
armed  strife;  or  still  again,  in  the  course  of  the  events  of  war, 
they  seek  mutually  to  secure  territorial  advantages  in  order  to 
bring  the  adversary  to  an  agreement.  Note  well  that  this  is  only 
a  means  and  not  at  all  the  object  of  the  war.  The  latter  is  essen- 
tially limited  to  the  intention,  or  the  hope,  of  obtaining  on  one  side 
or  the  other,  by  force,  the  result  which  persuasion  or  diplomatic 
negotiations  have  been  unable  to  bring  about. 

To  sustain  their  claims,  nations  have  at  their  disposal  various 
forces,  military,  financial,  economic,  moral,  etc.,  which  they  oppose 
one  to  another,  and  it  is  thus  that  the  idea  of  force  arises  as  soon 
as  the  study  of  war  is  taken  up ;  we  shall  concern  ourselves  only 
with  military  forces  in  this  chapter.  To  be  strong,  still  stronger, 
above  all  much  stronger  than  the  adversary,  such  briefly  is  the 
most  efficacious  means  of  conducting  war  to  one's  own  best  ad- 
vantage. 

And  here  it  is  important  to  have  a  clear  understanding ;  the 
question  cannot  be  one  of  force  in  absolute  value.  To  lay  down  the 
principle  that  there  is  no  possible  success  unless  the  totality  of  the 
military  power  of  a  country  is  superior  to  the  totality  of  the  mili- 
tary power  of  the  enemy,  would  be  to  ascribe  to  war  a  much  too 
simple  character  and  to  advance  a  proposition  the  falsity  of  which 
numerous  historical  facts  have  in  advance  demonstrated.  It  would 
also  be  to  proclaim  the  deceptive  axiom  of  the  constant  and  sure 
triumph  of  brute  force,  as  well  as  the  immoral  renunciation  by 
weak  nations  of  all  hope  of  respect  or  even  of  independence. 

When  we  speak  of  force,  we  mean  relative  force,  that  is  to  say 
the  superiority  of  military  power  at  a  fixed  point  or  under  certain 
favorable  conditions.  The  example  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
furnishes  means  of  giving  this  thought  the  maximum  of  precision. 
If,  in  comparing  at  the  beginning  of  this  conflict  and  in  their 
totality  the  war  forces  of  all  sorts  possessed  respectively  by  Russia 
and  Japan,  only  their  absolute  values  had  been  taken  account  of, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  prognostications  would  have  been  unani- 
mously in  favor  of  Russia,  whose  resources  were  incomparably 
the  greater  from  every  point  of  view.  Thus  the  Japanese  had  in 
all  and  for  all  only  the  effective  forces  which  they  were  able  to 
bring  to  the  front  almost  to  a  man  during  the  war,  about  six 
hundred  thousand  men,  while  a  general  Russian  mobilization, 
according  to  the  most  probable  estimates,  would  have  called  to 

198 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

arms  an  eight  times  greater  number.  And  yet  it  is  the  Muscovite 
colossus,  to  use  the  well  worn  expression,  who  was  vanquished  in 
every  encounter  by  his  enemy,  skilful  in  maintaining  his  relative 
military  superiority  at  a  point  too  far  removed  from  the  center  of 
the  Russian  power  for  the  latter  to  be  able  efficiently  to  bring  into 
play  the  weight  of  his  immense  armament.  It  did  not  suffice  that 
the  theater  of  operations  was  connected  by  a  way  of  communica- 
tion to  the  reservoir  of  the  total  energy  of  the  nation,  if  that  way 
was  too  narrow.  This  is  a  too  superficial  view  of  that  steel  con- 
ductor, the  Manchurian  railroad,  which  exercised  upon  minds,  in 
Russia  and  also  in  France,  a  dominating  control,  and  imposed  for 
so  long  a  time,  against  all  reason,  the  belief  in  final  success.  I 
would  not  for  anything  wish  a  straining  after  a  scientific  analogy 
to  be  seen  in  the  comparison  I  am  about  to  make ;  it  must  be  taken 
simply  as  an  image  to  help  out  language. 

For  a  source  of  energy  to  be  utilized  at  a  certain  distance,  it  is 
not  enough  that  it  have  a  high  potential,  it  is  further  necessary 
that  it  be  connected  with  the  center  of  use  by  a  conductor  of 
sufficient  section  to  give  the  required  flow.  The  military  energy 
of  Russia  had  a  very  high  potential ;  the  conductor  which  was  to 
transmit  this  energy  to  Manchuria  had  an  insufficient  section. 
The  power  delivered  was  always  below  the  needs. 

Thus  then,  in  the  case  we  are  considering,  it  is  the  weaker  peo- 
ple in  absolute  value  which  has  seen  victory  crown  its  arms ;  but  it 
obtained  this  result  because  it  knew  how  to  be  the  stronger  in 
relative  value,  that  is  to  say  the  stronger  in  every  combat. 

And  such  is  truly,  in  effect,  the  objective  of  war ;  it  can  only  be 
with  a  view  to  securing  this  advantage  that  war  demands  special 
combinations,  a  preliminary  preparation,  all  things  which  would 
become  superfluous  if  the  numerical  superiority  of  armies  sufficed 
to  give  it. 

It  is  with  this  order  of  ideas  that  the  study  of  strategy  and  tac- 
tics, or  better  the  study  of  the  ensemble  of  procedures  suitable  to 
bring  about  this  result,  deals.  The  aim  of  strategy  is  to  obtain  this 
superiority  at  a  point  of  the  theater  of  war,  that  of  tactics  to  have 
it  at  a  point  of  the  field  of  battle. 

And  why  is  this  superiority  of  forces  so  much  sought  after? 
Solely  because  at  all  epochs  it  has  furnished  the  most  certain,  as 
well  as  the  most  rapid,  solution  of  all  wars  by  the  destruction  of 
the  weaker  military  power. 

199 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

So  long  as  the  forces  of  the  belligerents  are  intact,  they  repre- 
sent antagonistic  efforts  which  are  in  equilibrium ;  a  single  cause 
can  produce  the  dissolution  of  this  balance,  that  is  to  say  the  end 
of  the  war,  namely,  the  destruction  of  one  of  those  actions,  the 
opposing  one  thereby  becoming  preponderant. 

It  goes  without  saying,  in  fact,  that  a  nation  which  has  no 
armed  force  left  at  its  disposal  is  a  nation  at  the  mercy  of  the  con- 
queror, since  it  no  longer  has  any  means  of  holding  him  in  check. 

And  thus  clearly  appear  the  high  value  and  the  philosophy  of 
the  principles  which,  to  speak  only  of  naval  matters,  always 
guided  Suffren  and  Nelson.  These  considerations  explain  their 
obstinacy  in  the  pursuit  of  the  hostile  fleets,  which  they  rightly 
regarded  as  the  principal  force  to  destroy.  And  this  appears  so 
reasonable,  so  evidently  correct,  that  we  may  well  ask  how,  in  the 
course  of  our  long  naval  -history,  those  who  directed  naval  opera- 
tions have  been  able  so  frequently  and  so  obstinately  to  remain 
blind  to  this  truth. 

Examples  abound.  There  is  Pontchartrain  who  directs  Tour- 
ville  to  avoid  the  enemy's  squadron  in  order  to  capture  a  rich  con- 
voy ;  there  is  d'Estaing  who  tries  to  take  Saint  Lucia  instead  of  to 
destroy  Barrington's  squadron ;  there  is  also  de  Grasse  committing 
the  same  error  at  Saint  Christopher,  finally  there  is  the  French 
government  prescribing  to  Admiral  Courbet  the  useless  and  diffi- 
cult blockade  of  Formosa  instead  of  consenting  to  that  of  Petchili, 
in  the  very  heart  of  the  Chinese  power. 

In  all  these  cases,  the  same  error  is  manifest ;  the  secondary  and 
material  objective  conceals  from  the  eyes  of  those  who  know  not 
how  to  make  war  the  principal  objective  which  must  be  followed 
in  order  to  be  successful. 

Yet  a  very  little  reflection  will  make  it  clear  that  no  territorial 
conquest  is  durable,  that  no  result  can  be  considered  definitely 
achieved,  so  long  as  the  forces  of  the  adversary  are  intact,  or  even 
still  active.  The  collision  of  the  antagonistic  forces  is  therefore 
fated  to  occur  at  one  period  or  another  of  the  war,  and  it  alone, 
under  almost  all  possible  circumstances,  permits  the  conflict  to  be 
ended.  Logic  itself  indicates,  consequently,  that  every  effort 
should  be  made  to  bring  it  on  as  soon  as  possible,  under  chosen 
conditions,  because  it  is  the  surest  means  of  fulfilling  the  objects 
of  the  war.  Whatever  may  be  the  motives  of  this  war,  political 
supremacy,  extension  of  the  zone  of  influence,  territorial  or  eco- 

200 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

nomic  conquest,  etc.,  is  it  not  fully  proved  that  those  motives  will 
be  so  much  the  better  and  quicker  satisfied  as  the  adversary  shall 
dispose  of  no  further  reserve  strength  to  oppose  them? 

All  this  seems  the  truth  itself,  and  yet  ignorance  of  it  seems  so 
deep  rooted  in  France  that  in  our  time,  and  almost  every  day, 
there  may  be  read  in  the  newspapers,  there  may  be  heard  echoed  in 
Parliament,  the  affirmation,  wholly  based  on  sentiment,  that  squad- 
ron warfare  would  be  for  France  a  foolish  thing,  and  that  at  any 
cost  it  must  be  renounced.  It  certainly  might  be  renounced  if, 
after  we  had  really  tried  it,  it  had  given  us  only  mortifications. 
But  it  is  sufficient  to  read  history  to  remain  unalterably  convinced 
that  we  have  experienced  disaster^because  of  having  almost  always 
avoided  it,  and  that  by  means  of  it,  on  the  contrary,  Suffren  shed 
the  brightest  lustre  on  our  naval  arms. 

Admiral  Rozhestvensky's  magnificent  naval  foray  has  given  rise 
to  many  controversies ;  though  there  has  been  a  unanimous  ad- 
miration of  the  remarkable  seamanlike  qualities  of  this  flag  officer, 
which  enabled  him  to  lead  his  fleet  from  Russia  to  the  Far  Eastern 
seas,  under  exceptional  difficulties  of  all  sorts,  on  the  other  hand 
there  was  much  discussion,  prior  to  Tsushima,  as  to  his  military 
objective.  Should  the  Russian  admiral  have  sought  battle  with 
the  Japanese  squadron,  or  should  he  rather  have  attempted  to 
avoid  it  in  order  to  reach  Vladivostok? 

In  a  published  article,  a  French  general  officer  of  high  authority 
has  maintained  the  thesis  that  Rozhestvensky's  objective  ought  to 
have  been  Vladivostok.  This  same  opinion  is  clearly  expressed 
in  a  document  emanating  from  the  General  Staff,  having  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  for  its  subject. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  chief  of  the  Russian  squadron 
thought  the  same ;  the  cruising  formation  of  his  fleet  when  it 
entered  the  Korean  Strait  proves  this  superabundantly.  The  recol- 
lection of  Nelson's  memorandum  then  comes  forcibly  to  mind, 
and  a  comparison  is  forced  upon  us.  In  the  case  of  the  illustrious 
English  admiral,  the  formation  adopted  for  cruising  was  the  order 
of  battle ;  the  Russian  admiral  kept  in  cruising  order,  as  he  would 
have  done  in  time  of  peace,  in  closely  grouped  columns,  with  his 
impedimenta  of  transports  and  colliers.  The  reason  is  that  the 
latter  did  not  seek  to  fight.  If  he  had  even  had  an  idea  of  doing 
so,  he  would  have  sent  away  his  convoy,  which  could  not  be  of  any 
use  and  which  on  the  contrary  was  a  danger. 

201 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Of  these  two  plans,  which  is  the  good  one?  To  judge  only  by 
results,  one  would  already  be  able  to  conclude  that  the  one  from 
which  came  the  triumph  of  Trafalgar  is  infinitely  superior  to  the 
other  which  brought  forth  the  disaster  of  Tsushima. 

As  far  as  I.  am  concerned,  I  pronounce  energetically  for  the 
first.  And  since  we  are  discussing  an  example  essentially  of  the 
present,  I  will  say:  The  principal  objective  of  Admiral  Rozhest- 
vensky  ought  to  be  battle ;  in  the  first  place  as  a  matter  of  prin- 
ciple, the  destruction,  even  partial,  of  the  Japanese  naval  forces 
being  the  most  profitable  result  to  attain  and  the  most  influential 
upon  the  destinies  of  the  war ;  then  as  a  necessity,  the  chances  of 
escaping  it  being  as  small  as  possible,  on  account  of  the  proximity 
of  the  Japanese  naval  bases  and  the  narrowness  of  the  passages 
leading  to  the  only  Russian  base ;  finally  as  reasonable,  this  battle 
being  the  justification  and  the  logical  consummation  of  the 
immense  effort  undertaken  by  the  Russian  Empire  to  regain 
supremacy  in  the  China  seas. 

D'Estaing,  de  Grasse,  Brueys,  and  Villeneuve  were  beaten  be- 
cause they  fought  only  when  forced  to;  Rozhestvensky  tasted 
defeat  because  he  had  to  be  dragged  to  battle.  The  sortie  of 
August  10  from  Port  Arthur  was  a  pitiable  failure  likewise  be- 
cause, even  before  they  set  out,  the  staff  officers  of  the  Russian 
ships  were  resolved  not  to  fight.  Suffren,  Nelson  and  Togo  were 
victorious  because,  on  the  contrary,  they  wished,  sought  for  and 
prepared  for  battle.  The  same  causes  have  produced  the  same 
effects. 

And  how  can  it  be,  after  this,  that  in  France  certain  cultivated 
minds  still  maintain  the  same  error? 

I  shall  not  weary  of  repeating  that  it  is  the  duty  of  all  naval 
officers  sustained  by  the  study  of  war  to  uproot  these  ideas  which 
periodically  spring  up  in  France  with  the  vigor  of  vegetable  para- 
sites, and  positively  to  implant  the  true  doctrine  of  war  by  edu- 
cating public  opinion ;  such  a  result  would  by  itself  alone  justify 
the  foundation  of  the  War  College  and  make  plain  the  immense 
service  rendered  to  the  country  by  the  Minister  of  1895-96. 

In  this  connection,  I  must  confess  that  in  beginning  this  chapter 
I  had  some  doubts  as  to  its  utility.  For  a  moment  I  asked  myself 
if  I  should  not  be  accused  of  breaking  through  doors  already  open 
or  of  speaking  platitudes,  so  evident  do  the  propositions  here  set 
forth  appear  and  so  much  the  mere  expressions  of  common  sense. 

202 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

I  was  reassured  by 'the  recollection  of  the  persistence  of  certain 
errors  and  by  the  perception  of  the  necessity  of  extirpating  them. 
So  then,  for  us,  the  principal  objective  remains  always  the  pur- 
suit and  destruction  of  the  enemy  afloat.  This  will  be  the  solid 
and  enduring  foundation  of  our  military  edifice. 

THE  OFFENSIVE. 

In  writing  the  word  pursuit,  I  thereby  indicate  the  choice  be- 
tween two  opposing  methods  of  war,  the  comparison  between 
which  has  given  rise  to  long  and  warm  discussions.  I  refer  to  the 
offensive  and  the  defensive.  With  very  few  exceptions,  which 
serve  but  to  confirm  the  rule,  the"  former  is  infinitely  superior  to 
the  latter. 

In  his  Esprit  des  Lois,  Montesquieu  says :  "  The  nature  of  de- 
fensive warfare  is  discouraging,  it  gives  to  the  enemy  the  advan- 
tage of  the\  courage  and  energy  of  the  attack;  it  would  be  better  to 
risk  something  by  an  offensive  war  than  to  depress  minds  by  keep- 
ing them  in  suspense." 

"Fortunate  the  soldier,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  "to  whom  des- 
tiny assigns  the  fole  of  assailant."  And  he  adds :  "  To  make  war 
is  to  attack." 

And  it  is  truly  a  fact  that  all  the  great  warriors  have  adopted 
the  offensive  and  by  it  secured  their  most  brilliant  victories ;  this 
may  be  understood,  for  the  offensive  gives  to  the  leader  who  em- 
ploys it,  even  before  any  action,  precious  advantages.  Such  a 
one  knows  what  he  intends  to  attempt,  while  his  adversary  is  igno- 
rant of  it.  He  is  master  of  his  movements,  of  the  time  and  of  the 
place  where  he  will  carry  on  the  action,  and  the  action  takes  from 
these  eminently  favorable  conditions  a  character  of  precision  from 
which  the  adversary  is  unable  to  derive  any  benefit.  To  the  latter 
everything  is  unknown ;  among  all  the  plans  that  he  can  ascribe  to 
his  enemy,  among  all  allowable  hypotheses,  which  must  he  select? 
Taking  into  account  the  nervousness  of  public  opinion,  quick  to  be 
alarmed  and  to  magnify  beyond  measure  the  dangers  to  which  the 
country  is  exposed,  it  may  be  imagined  how  disagreeable  must  be 
the  role  of  the  military  chief  upon  whom  the  defensive  is  imposed. 
One  need  not  be  much  of  a  prophet  to  predict  that  at  least  in 
France,  of  all  countries  perhaps  the  most  impressionable,  this 
opinion,  to-day  a  sovereign  and  exacting  mistress,  would  not  long 
endure  the  anxiety,  the  anguish  even,  of  the  prolonged  waiting 

203 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

which  is  the  consequence  of  the  defensive  method.  To  understand 
why  I  am  firmly  convinced  that  at  the  end  of  scarcely  a  few  days 
of  enervating  inaction  the  fleet  would  be  driven  out  of  harbor 
under  the  most  unfavorable  conditions,  it  is  enough  to  recall  the 
emotion  roused  in  the  United  States,  by  the  departure  of  Admiral 
Cervera's  squadron  for  the  West  Indies,  in  the  course  of  the 
Spanish-American  war. 

The  fright  of  all  the  people  of  the  American  sea  coast  towns, 
who  each  day.  and  in  each  group  of  inoffensive  steamships,  saw 
the  phantom  squadron,  throughout  the  period  of  its  passage, 
proves  to  us  that  they  thoroughly  misunderstand  our  country  who 
advocate,  as  is  done  daily,  the  policy,  as  fruitless  as  passive,  of 
squadrons  shutting  themselves  up  in  port. 

Without  giving  an  exaggerated  importance  to  examples  taken 
from  the  annual  grand  manceuvers,  it  is  nevertheless  allowable  to 
observe  that  most  frequently,  I  might  say  always,  it  is  upon  the 
side  charged  with  attacking  that  the  most  brilliant  role  has  de- 
volved, as  well  as  the  easiest  task. 

And  the  superiority  of  the  offensive  is  worth  insisting  upon,  be- 
cause it  is  particularly  suited  to  the  French  character,  to  the  tem- 
perament of  this  ardent  and  combative  people  ;  it  is  for  that  reason 
that  we  will  agree  with  Admiral  Bouet-Villaumez :  "  The  role  of 
assailant,  more  suited  to  the  nature  of  the  French  sailor  as  well  as 
soldier,  is  then  the  one  which  an  admiral  ought  to  seek,  and  much 
more  ought  he  seize  upon  it,  if  chance  places  him  in  the  attacking 
position" 

Observe,  in  this  connection,  that  the  word  offensive  is  here  taken 
in  its  broadest  sense ;  it  applies  equally  to  tactics  and  to  strategy, 
to  the  attack  of  a  fleet  on  the  field  of  battle  and  to  its  pursuit  from 
the  opening  of  the  war,  or  to  any  other  similar  military  action 
against  the  hostile  forces. 

The  offensive  method  demands  before  all  else  one  primary 
quality — activity ;  that  which  Alexander,  Caesar,  Hannibal,  Napo- 
leon, Suffren  and  Nelson  possessed  to  the  highest  degree.  It  de- 
mands great  force  of  character  on  the  part  of  the  chief,  with  a 
tenacious  will  controlled  by  a  great  intelligence. 

But  that  is  not  enough,  this  chief  must  have,  to-day  as  of  old, 
the  instrument  suited  to  this  offensive  war  made  up  of  energy  and 
resolution.  The  idea  of  activity  translates  itself  for  us  seamen  by 
the  expression  speed. 

204 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Whether  the  matter  at  issue  be  to  pursue  the  enemy,  or  to  pre- 
vent, by  a  sudden  attack  which  disconcerts  him  and  defeats  his 
plans,  his  own  assumption  of  the  offensive,  it  may  be  conceived 
what  must  be  the  primary  importance  of  time. 

The  more  rapidly  the  execution  of  the  offensive  is  carried  out, 
and  the  less  the  loss  of  time,  so  much  the  greater  the  chance  of  its 
being  crowned  with  success.  In  war,  to  strike  quickly  is  the  first 
step  towards  striking  hard. 

In  the  field  of  naval  strategy  this  signifies,  once  again,  that 
naval  forces  ought  above  all  to  possess  speed.  When  Nelson  was 
pursuing  with  his  well  known  vehemence,  first  Bruey's  squadron 
bearing  Bonaparte  and  his  fortunes,  then  later  on  that  of  Ville- 
neuve  across  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic,  one  single 
anxiety  absorbed  him  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  him  sometimes 
doubtful  of  his  star:  the  delays  which  persistent  contrary  winds 
imposed  upon  him  and  the  loss  of  time  which  resulted  from  them. 

Is  it  not  absolutely  sure  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  great  seaman,  in 
those  moments,  all  which  was  not  related  to  the  factor  speed  must 
have  seemed  of  quite  secondary  importance?  On  the  other  hand, 
is  it  not  to  the  lack  of  speed  of  his  fleet,  due  to  the  presence  of 
several  slow-sailing  ships,  that  Villeneuve  attributed  the  length  of 
his  passage  from  France  to  the  West  Indies,  and  the  delays  in  the 
execution  of  the  Emperor's  strategic  plan  ? 

From  whatever  side  the  question  is  looked  at,  therefore,  the 
idea  of  the  strategic  value  of  speed  is  forcibly  impressed  upon  us. 
And,  in  fact,  speed  is  above  all  a  strategic  quality.  This  state- 
ment is  the  more  necessary  to  make  because  the  initial  preponder- 
ance of  its  role  has  been  denied  by  some  of  our  most  eminent  engi- 
neers, the  authority  of  whose  opinions  does  not  permit  leaving 
them  unanswered.  All  taking  the  rather  too  narrow  point  of  view 
of  the  constructor,  they  have  brought  forward  the  great  cost  of 
speed  in  the  equation  of  the  fighting  ship. 

The  thorough  discussion  of  this  very  important  question  cannot 
be  introduced  here.  I  will  only  observe  that  with  a  view  to  sim- 
plify it,  to  dispel  certain  of  its  difficulties  and  reduce  their  com- 
plexity, the  learned  naval  architects  lay  down  a  principle  to  which 
they  seem  to  wish  to  give  the  force  of  an  axiom,  namely,  that  from 
the  moment  that  two  nations  go  to  war,  one  ought  to  conclude 
that  they  wish  to  fight,  and  that  there  is  therefore  no  need  of  hav- 

205 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ing  speed  greater  than  that  of  one's  adversary  since,  the  latter 
equally  desiring  to  fight,  the  encounter  will  necessarily  take  place. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  look  very  far  in  history  to  find  facts  which 
give  the  lie  to  this  principle.  Without  going  back  to  Villeneuve's 
campaign  in  the  West  Indies,  and  to  so  many  others  of  the  same 
kind,  which  prove  how  often  an  adversary  can  slip  away  and  avoid 
fighting,  the  very  recent  example  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  is 
relevant  to  show  us  that  a  nation  can  very  well  submit  to  a  war 
without  any  preparation  and  never  seek  combat. 

The  axiom  crumbles  away  before  the  facts,  and  there  is  no 
occasion  to  be  surprised  at  it.  The  question  is  not,  in  fact,  to 
know  if  speed  is  costly  and  if,  for  the  constructor,  it  would  be 
worth  while  to  reduce  it.  The  problem  is  too  restricted  when  so 
put ;  speed,  strategically  speaking,  is  indispensable,  that  is  the  only 
exact  principle  in  the  matter. 

And  outside  of  arguments  based  upon  historical  facts,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  how,  in  the  absence  of  the  precious  advantage  of  speed, 
an  admiral  could  attain  his  principal  objective,  which  ought  to  be 
to  paralyze  the  hostile  naval  forces ;  in  a  word,  to  suppress  the 
enemy  afloat. 

Two  cases  can  present  themselves  in  practice.  First,  the  fleet 
whose  destruction  above  all  is  sought  may  accept  battle  or  be 
forced  to  submit  to  it,  which  comes  to  the  same  thing.  This  re- 
sult is  implicitly  contained  in  the  previous  discussion  of  principle ; 
it  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  bring  about  the  battle  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  not  only  because  it  is  desirable  to  secure  as 
soon  as  possible  the  benefits  of  victory,  or  on  the  other  hand  to 
reduce  to  a  minimum  the  evils  of  war,  but  also  because  such  condi- 
tions of  operating  necessitate  prompt  conclusions.  A  single  ex- 
ample will  suffice;  if  interior  lines  are  occupied,  speed  alone  can 
give  the  ability  to  overwhelm  one  of  the  enemy's  forces  before  he 
has  brought  about  their  complete  concentration.  Such  would 
have  been  the  case  for  the  Russian  fleet  on  August  10,  if  it  had 
taken  advantage  of  the  division  of  the  Japanese  forces. 

Second,  the  adversary  may  conceal  himself  and  refuse  battle ; 
in  this  case,  it  is  not  clear  how,  if  he  has  the  greater  speed,  he  can 
be  forced,  immediately,  to  submit  to  the  encounter  which  he  per- 
sists in  fleeing  from.  Doubtless  the  hazards  of  fortune,  especially 
on  the  sea,  are  very  great,  and  can  spoil  the  best  prepared  plans 

206 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

by  forcing  to  battle  a  chief  who  would  have  none  of  it,  but 
chance  ought  not  to  be  counted  upon. 

I  do  not  at  all  forget  that  I  have  already  many  times  shown, 
by  historic  examples,  the  impossibility  of  always  refusing  to  fight. 
There  always  comes  a  time  when  the  fleeing  forces  will  be  forced 
to  battle  (Huascar,  Vladivostok  cruisers,  etc.)  ;  but  this  term, 
if  other  things  are  equal,  will  be  so  much  the  further  removed  as 
the  assailant's  speed  is  less.  This  condition,  then,  is  not  in  accord 
with  the  exigencies  of  war,  which  demands,  for  many  reasons  of 
all  kinds,  as  prompt  solutions  as  possible. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  one  possesses  superiority  of  speed,  the 
adversary  finds  himself  placed  between  the  two  alternatives  only 
of  accepting  battle  or  of  shutting  himself  up  in  port. 

This  is  the  proper  time  to  define  this  question  of  speed,  in  order 
to  leave  no  room  for  misunderstanding.  We  have  taken  pains  to 
dwell  upon  the  reasons  which  made  us  regard  this  strategical 
feature  as  an  essential  one.  Those  reasons  are  wholly  derived 
from  the  necessity  of  seeking  battle,  and  we  cannot  agree  with 
those  who  on  the  contrary  advocate  speed  for  the  purpose  of 
flight.  I  read  recently  in  a  publication  of  no  particular  standing 
an  article  maintaining  this  strange  principle,  to  which  I  would  not 
refer  had  it  not  quoted,  as  a  favorable  argument,  a  speech  made  in 
Parliament  by  an  important  personage. 

In  a  fine  flight  of  eloquence  in  advocacy  of  speed,  this  orator 
reminded  his  hearers  very  justly  that  the  French  nation  owed  its 
most  beautiful  memories  of  military  glory  to  speed ;  but  he  forgot 
to  limit  his  argument  to  the  fact  that  when,  in  the  immortal  cam- 
paign of  Italy  for  example,  Napoleon  made  such  a  wonderful  use 
of  it,  it  was  to  surprise  the  enemy  and  attack  him,  and  that  wher- 
ever speed  has  assured  success  it  is  only  by  conducting  to  battle. 

Personally  I  value  the  teachings  of  history  too  highly  to  take 
exception  to  them,  but  it  is  necessary  not  to  interpret  them 
wrongly.  And  the  quotation  which  follows  is  in  exact  contradic- 
tion to  all  the  experimental  facts  of  war :  "  Suppose  that  instead 
of  our  clumsy  squadrons  imprisoned  in  their  heavy  Harveyed 
armor  as  were  in  their  iron  shells,  during  the  decadence  of  the 
middle  ages,  those  knights  upon  whom  the  leather  clothed  foot 
soldiers,  the  ancestors  of  our  modern  infantry,  inflicted  the  disas- 
ters that  we  knozv  of;  suppose  that  instead  of  these  clumsy  squad- 
rons we  had  fast  ships,  capable  of  avoiding  their  attacks,  what 

207 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

would  become  of  that  empire  of  the  seas  so  much  talked  about  for 
these  battleships? 

"  What  is  so  pompously  called  the  empire  of  the  seas  will  be 
reduced  to  the  narrow  circle  which  that  assemblage  of  fortresses 
called  battleships  traces  on  the  immense  surface  of  the  seas  with 
the  range  of  its  guns. 

"And  this  assemblage  may  carry  to  and  fro  over  the>  waters  the 
mighty  shadow  of  its  armored  walls  and  giant  guns;  but  to  what 
purpose,  if  the  fast  ships  of  the  enemy,  always  capable  of  escap- 
ing from  it,  can  carry  everywhere  where  it  is  not,  perhaps  even 
within  a  few  kilometers  of  it,  menace  and  destruction." 

I  have  given  this  extract,  so  foreign  to  the  doctrines  of  war,  to 
demonstrate  once  more  how  important  it  is  to  destroy,  at  least  in 
the  minds  of  officers,  the  ideas  which  are  there  expressed,  and 
which  are  by  no  means  new. 

They  are,  moreover,  it  will  be  noticed,  the  exact  opposite  of 
those  which  are  defended  by  the  engineers  of  whom  I  have  here- 
tofore spoken. 

Let  us  at  once  note  that  the  second  solution,  which  consists  in 
staying  in  port,  indicated  by  so  many  well  intentioned  advisers 
as  the  only  possible  course  for  the  French  fleet  to  follow,  practi- 
cally settles  at  one  blow  the  principal  problem  of  the  war  in  favor 
of  the  assailant,  and  with  the  maximum  benefit  to  him,  since  he 
obtains  the  desired  result,  which  is  putting  the  adverse  forces  out 
of  condition  to  do  harm,  without  any  loss  of  material  or  personnel 
on  his  own  side. 

COMMAND  OF  THE  SEA. 

These  considerations  awaken  in  us  the  idea  of  the  blockade  and 
of  command  of  the  sea,  two  conceptions  of  exceptional  value. 

To  have  command  of  the  sea,  such  is  the  expression  familiar 
to  all  seamen  which,  in  a  concise  formula,  contains  a  world  of 
ideas  and  thoughts,  and  epitomizes  as  it  were  the  whole  of  naval 
strategy. 

It  does  not  signify  only,  for  the  victorious  side,  the  definite  con- 
quest of  the  field  of  operations  of  war ;  it  comprises  also  freedom 
of  navigation,  security  of  commercial  transactions,  circulation  of 
the  flag,  all  that  represents  the  active  life  of  a  great  nation,  and 
which  constitutes  very  often  the  object  itself  of  the  conflict.  It  is 
precisely  so  that  it  fully  satisfies  the  necessities  of  war. 

208 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

In  the  celebrated  struggle  between  Rome  and  Carthage,  have 
we  not  seen  fortune  waver  from  one  to  the  other,  following  the 
fluctuations  of  their  naval  strength,  to  settle  definitely  upon  the 
one  which  finally  succeeded  in  conquering  command  of  the  sea  ? 

This  conflict  originated  in  a  rivalry  for  economic  supremacy 
upon  the  sea;  such  supremacy  was  assured  to  the  victor  by  the 
conquest  of  the  supremacy  of  war  fleets. 

When  we  see  around  us  all  nations  preparing  formidable  fleets, 
we  cannot  help  establishing  a  relationship  with  the  occurrences 
of  the  Punic  Wars. 

After  centuries,  this  time  again,  the  same  causes  produce  the 
same  effects.  When  the  German-Emperor  pronounced  that  cele- 
brated phrase :  "  The  future  is  upon  the  sea,"  he  showed  that  he 
had  a  clear  conception  of  the  principles  of  war,  and  that  a  nation 
could  not  pretend  to  secure  a  world  wide  economic  empire  if  it 
was  not  prepared,  with  the  industrial  and  peaceful  mastery  of  com- 
mercial fleets,  to  impose  by  force  the  mastery  of  military  fleets. 

There  is  the  secret  of  the  great  effort  made  by  Germany  during 
recent  years,  to  increase  her  naval  forces. 

It  is  also  well  to  recall  that,  in  the  course  of  the  unfortunate 
war  of  1870,  if  the  sea  was  always  free  for  us,  and  by  permitting 
us  to  prolong  our  resistance  through  the  resources  of  all  sorts 
which  came  by  that  way,  helped  to  save  the  honor  of  France,  it 
was  to  the  uncontested  superiority  of  our  navy  that  the  result  was 
due. 

The  moment  is  favorable  to  decide  a  prejudicial  question  which 
has  inflamed  naval  debaters  for  twenty  years  past.  Although  the 
discussion  seems  to  have  now  lost  much  of  its  asperity,  it  is  indis- 
pensable to  settle  it,  because  in  spite  of  the  luminous  demonstra- 
tions of  experience  it  still  continues.  For  us,  who  have  sought  at 
their  very  sources  the  reasons  for  our  convictions,  the  expression 
"  command  of  the  sea "  immediately  awakens  in  the  mind  the 
very  clear  perception  that  to  exist  this  command  must  be  absolute, 
that  is  to  say  be  exercised  through  material  forces,  real  and 
capable  of  triumphing  over  all  obstacles,  and  among  the  latter 
must  be  counted  those  which  sea-going  opposes  to  the  free  use  of 
fleets.  The  condition  necessary  for  the  conquest  and  conservation 
of  a  free  maritime  highway  is  therefore  to  possess  seaworthy 
ships,  fit  to  keep  the  sea  in  any  weather.  This  requirement  spells 
the  incapacity  of  flotillas  to  fill  this  capital  role. 

209 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

For  us  seamen,  who  know  how  great  the  influence  of  the  mass 
of  a  ship  is  in  the  constant  struggle  with  the  elements,  who  have 
learned  by  personal  experience  that  the  bigger  a  ship  the  longer 
she  can  stand  up  against  heavy  weather,  this  affirmation  is  an 
article  of  faith. 

That  it  has,  nevertheless,  constantly  been  contested  by  those 
who  had  neither  the  competence  nor  the  right  to  discuss  it,  is  be- 
cause the  controversy  has  always  been  limited  to  the  question  of 
weapons.  But  the  question  is  not  to  oppose  torpedo  against  gun, 
as  was  attempted  at  each  phase  of  the  recent  war;  that  is  not  it. 
Putting  aside  the  question  of  weapons,  what  we  must  know  is 
whether  command  of  the  sea  can  be  won  by  flotillas. 

And  to  this  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  besides  so  many  others  of 
the  last  and  previous  centuries,  has  replied  with  a  precision  which 
leaves  no  room  for  any  possible  controversy :  the  discussion  is 
closed. 

If  at  Tsushima  the  Japanese  had  had  only  torpedo-boats,  noth- 
ing could  have  stopped  the  Second  Pacific  Squadron  in  the  Korean 
Strait  and  in  its  passage  to  Vladivostok.  And  it  is  not  because 
the  Japanese  naval  forces  would  have  been  able  to  oppose  only 
torpedoes  to  the  Russian  guns  that  this  defeat  would  have  been 
inflicted  upon  the  Japanese,  but  because  their  torpedo  boats  could 
not  face  a  sea  which  Rozhestvensky's  ships  easily  confronted. 
This  is  what  the  disputants  of  eighteen  or  twenty  years  ago,  and 
among  them  the  most  eloquent,  Gabriel  Charmes,  did  not  com- 
prehend when  they  dreamed  of  chasing  great  squadrons  from  the 
seas  with  mosquito  fleets. 

These  theories  are  already  very  far  removed  from  us,  and  I 
have  only  thought  that  they  should  be  recalled  because  they  seem 
to  have  taken  on  new  life  with  the  appearance  of  a  more  modern 
instrument  of  warfare,  the  sub-marine. 

At  each  stage  of  the  war  in  the  Far  East,  a  whole  school,  taking 
its  wishes  for  realities,  has  proclaimed  the  superiority  of  sub- 
marines over  squadrons.  Unhappily  for  it,  they  were  never  at  any 
time  used.  But  certain  illusions  are  so  tenacious  that,  contrary  to 
every  experience  of  war  and  of  sea-going,  people  have  assumed 
to  compel  the  French  navy  to  have  only  sub-marines. 

If  such  a  decision  could  some  day  be  taken,  and  upon  this  point 
I  do  not  think  that  my  personal  opinion  can  be  at  all  doubtful,  on 
that  same  day  our  definite  downfall  would  be  consummated. 

210 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  sea  can  no  better  be  kept  with  sub-marines  than  with  tor- 
pedo-boats, no  more  than  it  was  formerly  kept  with  fire  ships ; 
they  are  all  flotillas. 

To  command  the  sea,  fleets  are  necessary. 

In  a  more  restricted  portion  of  the  sphere  of  operations  of  war, 
this  command  is  no  less  indispensable. 

If  the  principal,  or  even  secondary,  object  of  the  war  is  conquest 
of  territory,  this  carries  with  it  an  armed  expedition,  and  conse- 
quently the  transportation  by  sea  of  military  forces  to  form  the 
army  of  occupation  of  the  coveted  land. 

This  is  what  is  commonly  called,  in  military  language,  a  com- 
bined operation.  In  an  operation"  of  this  sort,  the  navy  has  the 
disagreeable  part  to  play.  Upon  it  devolves  the  protection  of  the 
convoy  of  troops  during  the  entire  passage ;  and  that  is  a  small 
thing  in  comparison  with  the  protection  of  their  disembarkation. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  subject  to  make  all  the  diffi- 
culties of  such  an  undertaking  apparent  to  seamen  by  profession. 
To  prearrange  the  anchorage  in  a  roadstead,  most  often  an  open 
one,  of  a  fleet  of  transports,  and  to  assure  the  absolute  safety  of 
the  operations  of  disembarking  numerous  troops  with  all  their 
campaign  material,  is  an  extremely  arduous  task.  I  mention  only 
its  main  features,  but  they  are  enough  to  make  evident  the  abso- 
lute impossibility  of  success  without  the  no  less  absolute  certainty 
of  not  being  exposed  to  any  danger  of  attack  by  the  enemy. 

The  wide  spread  disorder  and  panic  which  the  appearance  of  a 
hostile  fleet  in  the  midst  of  such  an  enterprise  would  produce  may 
be  imagined.  The  security  which  is  indispensable  is  only  assured 
by  complete  command  of  the  sea. 

And  I  have  made  no  mention  of  the  rigid  obligation  of  assur- 
ing the  communications  of  the  expeditionary  corps  with  their 
base  of  operations,  a  condition  only  attainable  with  the  sea  free. 

As  long  as  Admiral  Cervera's  squadron,  keeping  the  sea,  was  a 
possible  menace,  the  United  States  fleet  attempted  no  decisive 
operation ;  as  soon  as  the  Spanish  squadron  was  on  the  contrary 
shut  up  in  Santiago,  the  expedition  was  decided  upon  and  could 
set  out  from  Key  West. 

If  the  Japanese  had  not  won,  from  the  beginning  of  the  last  war, 
entire  liberty  of  movement,  never  would  they  have  been  able  to 
carry  out  successfully  the  disembarkation  in  Korea  of  armies  so 
numerous,  amounting  to  six  hundred  thousand  men. 

211 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  only  serious  cessation  observed 
in  this  delicate  operation,  which  scarcely  ceased  during  the  whole 
time  of  the  war,  coincided  exactly  with  the  awakening  of  activity 
which  the  unfortunate  Admiral  Makaroff  was  able  to  inspire  in 
the  Russian  fleet  of  Port  Arthur. 

Finally,  is  it  not  because  Napoleon  was  at  no  instant  able  to 
secure  a  free  path,  in  spite  of  the  wisest  combinations  of  his 
genius,  that  he  had  to  give  up  his  project  of  invading  England, 
and  to  confess  himself  later  on  vanquished  by  her  ? 

The  notion  of  "  command  of  the  sea  "  ought  to  be  very  definite  ; 
by  this  term  supremacy  over  all  oceans  is  not  to  be  understood. 
England  alone  was  able,  strictly  speaking,  to  cherish  that  megalo- 
maniac dream  some  years  ago ;  she  herself  is  no  longer  able  to 
pretend  to  it  to-day.  The  expression  applies  solely  to  the  mari- 
time theater  of  possible  operations. 

This  command  of  the  sea,  which  plays  thus  in  the  development 
of  every  naval  war  so  preponderant  a  part,  can  only  be  secured,  I 
remind  you,  by  two  means :  the  blockade  of  the  adverse  forces  in 
their  ports,  or  the  destruction  of  those  forces  in  battle. 

BLOCKADES. 

-The  former  of  these  means  has  been  often  used  in  the  past;  the 
history  of  our  struggles  with  England  furnishes  many  examples 
of  it. 

Among  those  best  known,  the  blockade  of  Brest  by  the  fleets  of 
Cornwallis  and  those  of  Toulon  by  Nelson  are  justly  famous.  In 
our  times,  that  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  by  Admiral  Sampson's  squad- 
ron, and  that  of  Port  Arthur  by  Admiral  Togo,  give  proof  that 
the  method  is  not  obsolete. 

And  it  never  can  become  so,  for  if  what  we  have  said  of  the  im- 
portance of  a  free  sea  is  true,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  to 
invest  the  place  in  which  a  hostile  fleet  has  taken  refuge,  not  only 
thereby  to  deprive  it  of  the  power  to  act,  but  also  to  keep  a  close 
watch  upon  it  and  to  be  upon  its  track  in  case  it  should  attempt  a 
sortie. 

Thus  the  plan  of  blockading  serves  two  purposes  ;  it  enables  one 
to  realize  the  benefit  of  command  of  the  sea  without  fighting  and 
so  without  loss,  and  also,  above  all,  to  establish  as  close  as  pos- 
sible a  contact  with  the  fleet  which  it  is  necessary  to  endeavor  to 
destroy.  The  principal  objective  is  therefore  satisfied. 

212 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  case  of  Nelson,  blockading  Villeneuve's  fleet,  is  remem- 
bered by  all,  and  on  this  subject  it  is  well  to  define  with  some  pre- 
cision the  expression  blockade.  We  do  not  mean  by  it  only  the 
operation  which  consists  in  surrounding  the  entrances  of  a  port  or 
roadstead  with  a  cordon  of  ships  so  close  together  that  no  block- 
aded vessel  can  pass  without  being  seen  and  fired  upon.  Such  a 
conception  would  truly  be  too  narrow  and  furthermore  ineffica- 
cious, even  if  not  too  dangerous,  nowadays. 

By  a  blockade  must  be  understood  any  stationing  of  a  naval 
force  at  a  distance  near  enough  to  the  refuge  of  the  hostile  squad- 
ron to  permit  watching  all  its  movements  and  to  prevent  its  escap- 
ing from  this  watch  by  flight. 

There  is  therefore  a  blockade  whenever  the  circle  of  surveillance 
about  the  blockaded  point  is  restricted  enough  to  make  the  meeting 
of  the  two  fleets,  and  consequently  their  engagement,  certain. 
Such  was  the  case  formerly,  in  the  days  of  sailing  ships,  as  when 
Nelson,  from  his  famous  Agincourt  bay,  blockaded  Toulon  and 
the  French  squadrons  as  rigorously  as  if  he  had  been  on  the  coast 
of  Provence.  How  much  more  so  is  it  now,  when  improvements 
of  every  kind,  the  result  of  steam  navigation,  permit  the  removal 
of  the  base  of  operations  of  a  blockade  to  a  considerable  distance ! 
The  introduction  of  wireless  telegraphy  on  warships  has  over- 
turned the  practical  conditions  in  this  respect;  thanks  to  this 
system  of  rapid  communications  over  great  distances,  a  blockade 
will  be  as  effective  to-day  at  a  hundred  miles  distance  as  it  could 
formerly  have  been  at  a  very  few  miles  from  the  blockaded  coast. 

We  find  the  proof  of  this  in  the  preliminaries  of  the  naval  battle 
of  Tsushima,  where  it  was  a  wireless  message  that  warned  the 
Japanese  fleet  of  the  approach  of  the  Russian  squadron  and  put  it 
in  motion  at  the  right  time  to  enable  it  to  find  the  latter  at  the 
desired  point. 

This  step  in  naval  progress  is  so  much  the  more  important  be- 
cause the  profund  modifications  in  material  and  modern  armament 
have  made  it  absolutely  necessary  to  increase  blockading  dis- 
tance. The  appearance  of  the  torpedo-boat,  followed  by  that  of 
the  sub-marine,  have  made  it  much  too  dangerous,  in  fact,  to  re- 
main day  and  night  in  close  proximity  to  a  coast. 

It  may  be  said,  in  this  connection,  that  the  blockade  of  Santiago 
is  not  a  representative  case  and  ought  never  to  have  taken  place  as 
it  did.  The  complete  disorganization  of  the  defence,  the  complete 

213 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

-military  and  naval  anarchy  of  unhappy  Spain,  and  the  absence  of 
torpedo-boats,  or,  more  exactly,  of  such  boats  having  good  torpe- 
does, straight  shooting  and  properly  exploding,  were  necessary  to 
afford  the  spectacle  of  an  American  admiral  daring  to  station  each 
night  one  of  his  battleships  before  the  harbor  mouth,  and  to  do  so 
with  impunity. 

The  withdrawing  of  the  enveloping  line  to  a  great  distance, 
then,  offers  only  advantages,  since  the  means  of  surveillance  and 
of  communication  are  correspondingly  modified. 

It  must  also  be  said  that  it  would  be  vain  to  seek  to  blockade  so 
closely  as  to  indulge  the  hope  of  preventing  any  escape  of  single 
vessels.  At  no  period  in  history  has  there  been  a  guard  strict 
enough  to  stop  a  fast  ship,  commanded  by  an  energetic  and  reso- 
lute seaman,  knowing  how  to  take  advantage  of  all  circumstances 
favorable  to  passing  between  the  links  of  the  blockading  chain. 

The  "  blockade  runners  "  of  the  Southern  fleet,  during  the  war 
of  the  American  secession,  have  left  imperishable  memories  on  this 
subject. 

The  blockade  of  Port  Arthur  was  never  strict  enough  to  prevent 
some  steamers  or  junks  from  taking  supplies  into  that  place. 

There  are  still,  in  our  time,  fine  chances  for  bold  and  brilliant 
maneuvering  on  the  part  of  the  commanders  of  modern  high- 
speed cruisers,  and  there  are  enough  moonless  nights  to  permit 
discounting  opportunities  equally  numerous. 

Moreover  the  importance  of  the  escape  of  a  single  ship  must  not 
be  exaggerated  ;  command  of  the  sea  will  not  thus  be  compromised 
for  the  blockading  force.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  totality  of  the  hostile 
fleet  which,  by  the  assemblage  of  its  units,  constitutes  the  only  real 
force  which  it  is  important  to  watch  and  to  blockade,  always  with 
a  view  to  attain  the  principal  objective,  which  is  to  force  it  to  fight. 

Thus  is  the  question  plainly  set  forth :  immediate  battle  and 
blockade,  in  the  broad  sense  in  which  it  has  just  been  defined,  but 
unchangeable  in  its  principles,  are  the  two  efficient  means  which 
assure  command  of  the  sea. 

THE  PRINCIPAL  OBJECTIVE. 

On  examining  the  question,  it  is  at  once  seen  that  in  reality 
only  the  first  of  these  two  means  is  definite  and  decisive ;  the  sec- 
ond can  furnish  but  a  provisional  solution.  And  it  is  so  true  that 
battle  is  the  real  end  and  objective  of  every  war  that  even  those 

214 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

who  advocate  for  the  French  navy  a  passive  waiting  in  port  con- 
sider this  inactivity  a  measure  wholly  for  the  moment  and  occa- 
sion ;  they  point  it  out  as  the  means  of  awaiting  a  "  favorable 
opportunity."  They  usually  neglect  to  define  what  constitutes 
such  a  favorable  opportunity. 

The  neglect  is  not  accidental,  for  these  exceptional  circum- 
stances, by  the  firm  but  delusive  hope  of  which  they  are  deceived, 
are  not  easily  imagined. 

I  understand  very  well  that,  in  this  solution,  there  is  seen  the 
tempting  image  of  a  relaxation  in  the  watch  of  the  blockading 
forces,  of  a  conjunction  of  weather  and  the  elements  accidentally 
scattering  those  forces,  in  a  manner  to  reverse  the  roles  and  give 
to  the  besieged  superiority  of  numbers. 

It  is  very  necessary,  in  reasoning  thus,  to  count  upon  the  favora- 
ble chances,  for  the  very  definition  of  the  blockade  leaves  no  room 
to  doubt  that  the  fleet  employing  it  is  composed  of  very  superior 
forces.  To  judge  of  the  practical  value  of  such  hopes,  the  history, 
so  constantly  fruitful  in  teachings,  of  the  naval  war  of  1805,  and 
particularly  the  correspondences  of  Nelson  and  Villeneuve,  must 
be  attentively  read. 

They  also,  in  the  French  fleet,  counted  upon  the  benefit  of  bad 
weather  breaking  the  rigid  circle  with  which  the  English  fleet 
hemmed  them  in ;  it  is  well  known  what  the  result  was  of  that  first 
sortie  of  January  18,  from  which  the  French  ships  had  to  return 
to  port  half  wrecked  by  a  violent  storm  from  the  southwest,  so 
much  the  worse  for  them  because  the  long-continued  idleness  in 
which  they  had  lived  for  months  in  the  Toulon  roadstead  had  un- 
fitted them  to  encounter  it. 

The  English  fleet,  for  their  part,  wonderfully  trained  by  endur- 
ing the  trials  of  a  long  blockade,  went  through  this  tempest  with- 
out damage  or  injury.  "Instead  of  putting  to  sea  in  spite  of  the 
English  squadrons,  forcing  a  way  if  necessary,"  wrote  Admiral 
Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  "  they  preferred  to  wait  until  a  gale  of  wind 
compelled  the  latter  to  raise  the  blockade.  They  went  out  then 
favored  by  a  storm,  and  more  than  once  that  storm  gave  them  no 
opportunity  of  doing  anything  against  the  enemy" 

This  method  has  verily  been  too  unsuccessful  for  us  in  the  past 
not  to  be  given  up  in  future. 

Villeneuve  certainly  succeeded,  in  his  second  attempt  on  March 
29,  in  escaping  Nelson's  watchfulness  and  breaking  the  blockade. 

215 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

But  this  was  only  an  absolutely  secondary  episode  of  the  great 
military  drama  whose  conclusion,  logical  and  unimpeachable  as  far 
as  the  principles  of  war  are  concerned,  was  to  be  Trafalgar,  that 
is  to  say  battle. 

At  Santiago  de  Cuba,  the  sortie  of  unfortunate  Cervera's  squad- 
ron, had  it  been  successfully  accomplished,  would  only  have  de- 
layed by  a  few  days  the  final  result.  So  too  the  naval  battle  of 
August  10,  which  marked  the  first  Russian  naval  disaster  of  im- 
portance, was  but  the  material  and  logical  consecration  of  a  defeat 
virtually  accomplished  from  the  day  that  the  superior  naval  forces 
of  the  Japanese  blockaded  the  Russian  squadron  in  Port  Arthur. 

In  a  document  on  the  subject  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  drawn 
up  by  the  General  Staff,  I  find  this  expression :  "  If  Rozhestvensky 
had  been  able  to  reach  Vladivostok  with  his  fleet  intact,  this  accom- 
plishment could  have,  been  regarded  as  equivalent  to  a  victory. 
In  the  shelter  of  a  safe  harbor,  having  at  his  disposal  docks  and 
coal,  he  forced  the  Japanese  to  wear  themselves  out  by  hard  cruis- 
ing, and  kept  himself,  as  a  perpetual  threat  to  their  communica- 
tions by  sea,  master  of  the  choice  of  the  hour  when  it  would  suit 
him  to  engage  in  battle." 

Is  it  not  curious  to  again  find,  after  the  lapse  of  a  century,  the 
same  proposition  which  attributed  to  the  French  fleets  snug  in 
harbor  better  preparation  than  that  of  the  enemy's  forces  at  strife 
with  the  sea.  We  know  only  too  well  what  to  think  of  it. 

Villeneuve  said  to  his  sailors :  "  Nothing  ought  to  astonish  us  in 
the  sight  of  an  English  squadron,  their  ships  are  worn  by  a  two- 
years'  cruise."  That  which  he  also  believed  to  be  a  "  hard  cruise  " 
was  in  reality  the  wonderful  school  of  experience,  where  by  en- 
during the  bitter  trials  of  sea  life,  characters  were  formed  and 
with  them  the  incomparable  instrument  which  Nelson  was  to  use 
so  well. 

If  Rozhestvensky  had  been  able  to  reach  Vladivostok,  he  would 
have  been  immediately  and  closely  blockaded  by  the  Japanese 
naval  forces,  and  the  final  result  would  merely  have  been  post- 
poned. 

Command  of  the  sea  was  assured  just  the  same  to  the  Japanese 
by  this  blockade,  and  on  the  fatal  day  when,  under  the  impulsion 
of  events  or  of  public  opinion,  the  Russian  naval  forces,  depressed 
by  their  long  enforced  inaction,  resigned  themselves  to  going  out, 
they  would  have  found  opposed  to  them  warlike  fleets,  inured  to 

216 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

all  the  hardships  of  cruising,  impregnated  with  that  profound  sea- 
man's sense  which  constant  sea  experience  alone  can  give.  They 
would  have  been  beaten  in  the  same  manner  as  they  were  at  Tsu- 
shima and  for  the  same  reasons. 

It  is  thus  that  indispensable  history,  ancient  or  contemporary, 
teaches  us,  with  unescapable  logic,  that  war  can  have  no  other 
effective  sanction  than  battle. 

Whether  it  be  a  little  sooner  or  a  little  later,  at  the  beginning  or 
at  the  end  of  the  war,  battle  is  unescapable  and  the  moment  will 
inevitably  come  when  the  two  antagonistic  forces  find  themselves 
face  to  face. 

To  speak  truly,  from  the  moment  that  these  forces  are  in  sight 
of  one  another  the  role  of  initial  preparation  for  war  effaces  itself 
before  that  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

The  hour  is  about  to  sound  when  the  heaviest  responsibilities 
accumulate  upon  the  head  of  a  single  man,  and  when  the  wisest 
plans,  the  most  minute  precautions,  the  most  legitimate  hopes, 
since  they  are  based  upon  foresight,  may  be  annihilated,  if  that 
man  does  not  measure  up  to  the  occasion.  Strategical  conceptions 
give  way  to  those  of  tactics. 

At  the  point  which  we  have  reached,  must  we  then  be  forced  to 
this  somewhat  discouraging  conclusion  that  at  the  instant  of  en- 
gaging the  presence  of  the  man  of  genius  is  indispensable,  and 
that  in  his  absence  all  hope  must  be  abandoned  ? 

Whatever  may  be  the  help  that  the  presence  of  such  a  chief 
could  bring  to  his  fleet,  it  is  wiser  to  count  without  him.  The 
attentive  study  of  the  way  of  great  seamen  in  the  past  is  particu- 
larly reassuring  in  this  respect,  for  it  enables  us  to  perceive  that 
there  exist  a  certain  number  of  principles,  if  not  a  method,  insep- 
arable from  success. 

In  carefully  examining  them,  we  shall  not  be  long  in  recogniz- 
ing them,  for  they  are  identical  upon  all  points  with  those  which 
the  necessities  of  a  strategical  order  have  lead  us  to  lay  down. 

Here  in  fact  are  represented  the  first  two  terms  of  the  classic 
formula  laid  down  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter. 

"  To  seek  the  enemy,  to  come  up  ^vith  him  .  .  .  ."  There  re- 
mains "  to  beat  him  with  superior  forces." 

Must  we  understand  this  to  be  a  mere  numerical  statement, 
signifying  that  to  a  fixed  number  of  hostile  ships  it  is  needful 
always  to  oppose  a  greater  number  of  ships  of  the  same  kind  ? 

217 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

If  an  affair  so  complicated  and  so  difficult  as  battle  -is  could  be 
reduced  to  a  simple  question  of  arithmetic,  the  most  magnificent 
feats  of  arms  which  have  illustrated  history  would  have  to  be 
stricken  from  its  records. 

Disregarding  the  many  examples  in  military  wars  where  Alex- 
ander, Hannibal  and  Napoleon  beat  hostile  armies  most  frequently 
more  numerous  than  their  own  troops,  it  is  particularly  inter- 
esting to  observe  that  at  Trafalgar,  as  well  as  at  Aboukir,  Nelson 
was  inferior  in  numbers  and  yet  carried  off  the  victory  each  time 
— and  what  victories  ! 

Just  as,  when  we  examined  the  general  principles  of  war,  we 
were  led  to  conclude  that  the  important  thing  is  to  be  stronger 
than  the  adversary  at  one  definite  point  of  the  strategic  game 
board,  we  will  now  say  that  the  superiority  of  forces  which  it  is 
essential  to  seek  and  to  obtain,  on  the  field  of  battle,  should  be  at 
one  definite  point  of  that  field,  over  a  fraction  of  the  adverse 
forces ;  once  more  we  come  upon  the  notion  of  relative  superiority. 

But  before  going  more  deeply  into  this  subject,  there  is  another 
principle  which  more  pressingly  invites  our  attention.  The  ques- 
tion is  once  more  of  the  choice  to  make  between  two  methods  of 
fighting;  the  offensive  and  the  defensive,  and  the  question  is 
hardly  proposed  before  our  choice  is  easily  devined.  It  is  useless 
to  renew  all  the  arguments  that  I  have  already  developed  in  sup- 
port of  the  first  method  when  the  question  was  of  seeking  the 
enemy  and  forcing  him  to  battle ;  the  whole  weight  of  those  argu- 
ments can  but  be  increased  when  the  question  becomes  that  of 
fighting  him.  The  role  of  assailant  possesses  inherently  too  many 
moral  advantages  of  all  sorts  for  its  renouncement  to  be  thought 
of.  Yet,  whatever  the  strength  of  the  argument,  it  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  enforce  conviction,  if  the  relentless  teachings  of  the 
past  did  not  remind  us  that  our  most  grievous  reverses  upon  the 
sea  have  been  the  fruit  of  our  passive  method  of  making  war. 
Far  from  seeking  combat,  we  have  most  frequently  only  yielded 
to  it. 

In  this  connection,  the  words  of  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere 
cannot  be  too  much  pondered :  "  If  the  names  of  some  of  our  ad- 
mirals are  to-day  so  sadly  associated  with  the/  memory  of  our  dis- 
asters, the  fault,  let  us  be  sure,  is  not  at  all  wholly  theirs.  Rather 
must  the  character  of  the  operations  in  which  they  were  engaged 
be  accused,  and  that  system  of  DEFENSIVE  warfare  which  Pitt  de- 

218 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

dared,  in  Parliament,  to  be  the  precursor  of  inevitable  ruin.  This 
system,  when  we  wished  to  renounce  it,  had  already  become  habit- 
ual to  us;  it  had  weakened  our  arms  and  paralysed  our  confidence. 
Too  often  our  squadrons  left  our  ports  with  a  special  mission  to 
fulfil  and  the  intention  of  avoiding  the  enemy;  to  meet  him  was 
already  an  adverse  stroke.  It  was  thus  that  our  ships  presented 
themselves  to  battle;  they  underwent  it  instead  of  imposing  it" 

" .  .  .  .  For  a  long  time  this  restricted  and  timid  warfare,  THIS 
DEFENSIVE  WARFARE,  could  be  kept  up,  thanks  to  the  circumspec- 
tion of  the  English  admirals  and  the  traditions  of  the  old  tactics. 
It  was  with  these  traditions  that  Aboukir  broke;  the  time  of  de- 
cisive battles  had  come" 

Among  all  the  examples  that  could  be  selected,  that  of  Aboukir 
certainly  affords  the  most  striking  contrast  between  the  two 
methods  of  fighting.  On  the  French  side,  there  is  the  defensive  in 
its  most  indolent  and  depressing  inactivity;  the  squadron  is  at 
anchor,  already  by  that  single  fact  in  a  notable  state  of  inferiority 
since  it  is  unable  to  manoeuver.  Moreover,  it  is  without  proper 
lookout  service,  so  that  the  news  of  the  approach  of  the  English 
fleet  surprises  it  in  full  disorder;  and  virile  resolution  is  to  such 
an  extent  wanting  to  its  leaders  that  but  a  single  voice,  that  of 
Blanquet  du  Chayla,  is  raised,  without  success,  to  demand  that 
they  fight  under  way. 

This  picture  of  a  fleet  at  anchor,  letting  another  fleet  full  of  life 
and  ardor  come  upon  it,  does  it  not  appear  as  the  very  symbol  of 
passive  resignation,  of  the  defensive  method  in  fine? 

If  this  were  an  isolated  example,  perhaps  the  value  of  the  argu- 
ment based  upon  it  could  be  contested ;  but  did  not  the  naval  battle 
of  Sluys,  several  centuries  before  Aboukir,  itself  also  have  as  a 
characteristic  the  complete  defeat  of  the  fleet  which  accepted  battle 
at  anchor? 

This  result  cannot  be  surprising,  for  the  idea  we  form  of  fight- 
ing is  inseparable  from  that  of  action ;  and,  to  repeat  it  once  more, 
a  naval  force  which  is  incapable  of  maneuvering,  and  which 
awaits,  moored  to  its  anchors,  the  adversary's  attack,  is  not  an 
acting  force. 

Quite  otherwise  is  the  appearance  on  the  side  of  the  English 
squadron ;  here  everywhere  is  combative  ardor,  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  to  the  last  sailor.  Each  one  knows  where  he  is 
going  and  what  he  has  to  do,  so  that  all  efforts  tend  to  a  single 

219 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

object  and  work  with  an  irresistible  force.  This  is  the  offensive 
spirit  in  the  full  acceptation  of  the  term  and  of  the  idea. 

Signals  are  useless,  and  only  the  strictly  indispensable  minimum 
of  these  are  made,  for  Nelson's  captains  have  long  known  his 
plan;  they  know  that  he  will  seek  to  crush  one  wing  of  the 
French  squadron  "  with  superior  forces."  It  will  be,  in  the  case 
of  the  battle  of  Aboukir,  the  head  of  the  French  squadron  which 
will  thus  be  .crushed  by  superior  effort,  the  turn  of  the  rear  of  the 
line  being  to  follow. 

Furthermore,  if  Nelson  knew  how  to  apply  this  principle  with 
incomparable  mastery,  it  is  not  his  invention.  Ever  since  the 
legendary  tactics  of  the  Horatii,  to  repeat,  a  great  number  of  their 
imitators,  at  all  stages  in  the  world's  history,  have  striven,  by  skill 
or  cunning,  to  beat  in  detail  adversaries  whom  they  could  not 
overcome  all  together. 

Without  going  outside  of  purely  naval  actions,  we  have  seen 
Suffren  adopt  this  same  tactics,  seek  to  attack  a  fraction  of  the 
opposing  fleet  with  the  whole  of  his  own  forces,  and  endeavor  to 
obtain  thus,  at  one  point  of  the  battle  field,  numerical  superiority. 
In  the  English  navy  likewise,  Rodney,  at  the  battle  of  Dominica, 
had  already  cut  the  enemy's  line  in  such  a  manner  as  to  throw  it 
into  disorder,  dislocating  it  as  it  were,  and  to  bring  between  two 
fires  a  portion  of  that  line. 

An  English  writer,  Clerk,  a  great  admirer  of  Suffren,  has  laid 
down,  in  an  epoch-making  work,  a  whole  body  of  doctrines  based 
on  these  tactics  which  Nelson  was  later  himself  to  adopt.  Re- 
cently, Admiral  Togo,  at  the  battle  of  Tsushima,  attacked  the 
Russian  squadron  in  a  manner  which  strikingly  resembles  that 
of  the  English  fleet  at  Trafalgar.  The  two  Japanese  squadrons, 
or  more  exactly  their  fleet  divided  into  two  squadrons,  crushed 
one  part  of  the  Russian  line,  as  the  two  squadrons  of  Nelson  and 
Collingwood  did  in  the  case  of  the  allied  fleet,  not  choosing 
the  same  part,  nor  attacking  in  the  same  way,  but  under  the  inspi- 
ration of  the  same  principles,  which  alone  are  important. 

In  truth,  this  method  does  not  belong  exclusively  to  any  great 
chief ;  it  is  as  old  as  the  world,  and  I  am  tempted  to  say  that  it  de- 
rives solely  from  good  sense.  If  it  was  lost  sight  of,  at  least  in  the 
naval  wars  which  immediately  preceded  the  campaigns  of  Suffren 
and  Nelson,  if,  for  a  very  long  time,  a  naval  battle  was  looked 
upon  only  as  an  engagement,  in  a  way  academic,  between  two 

220 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

columns  correctly  opposed  one  symetrically  to  the  other,  this 
momentary  neglect  of  the  true  principles  of  war  takes  away  noth- 
ing from  their  force. 

In  the  work  of  which  mention  has  already  been  made,  Clerk 
points  out  the  special  importance  of  bringing  a  squadron  into 
action  in  such  formation  that  the  units  can  mutually  support  each 
other.  This  point  of  view  is  certainly  correct;  it  is  wholly  con- 
tained, moreover,  in  the  offensive  program  which  exacts,  for  suc- 
cess, a  perfect  union  of  efforts,  directed  towards  a  single  object. 

It  is»  this  program  that  the  French  navy  has  so  rarely  made  its 
own ;  for  proof  of  it  I  would  wish  nothing  but  that  interesting  re- 
mark made  by  Mahan  that  the  French  fleets  have  almost  always 
engaged  from  to  leeward;  it  is  this  same  program  which  it  is  indis- 
pensable for  us  to  adopt  definitely  in  order  to  break  away  from  the 
old  ways  which  have  led  us  only  to  mortifications. 

Though  tactics  changes  as  to  its  procedures,  it  does  not  follow 
that  its  principles  change.  Doubtless  in  the  time  of  sailing  ships 
the  weather  gauge  had  an  inestimable  value  which  no  longer 
exists  ;  but  that  is  only  one  detail  which  another  detail  will  replace. 

In  our  time,  for  example,  it  is  the  sun  gauge  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  struggle  to  obtain.  If  the  sun  is  reflected  back  from  the 
adversary,  all  the  details  of  the  targets  are  brought  out  clearly, 
and  the  aim  has  a  precision  which  becomes,  on  the  other  hand, 
impossible  when  it  is  directly  in  the  eyes  of  the  gun  pointers.  It 
is  thus  that  at  Tsushima  Admiral  Togo  secured  for  himself  this 
one  advantage  more  over  his  enemy. 

It  is  not  enough,  finally,  to  have  overcome  the  adversary,  to  have 
compelled  him  to  cease  fighting  and  to  retreat,  it  is  necessary  to 
annihilate  him,  to  destroy  completely  the  power  that  he  repre- 
sents, and  there  is  but  one  method  of  doing  this;  pursuit,  a 
furious,  implacable  pursuit,  giving  neither  respite  nor  repose  to 
the  remnants  of  the  beaten  fleet.  To  a  fleet  thus  harassed,  no  hope 
of  renewing  its  strength  is  any  longer  left,  and  that  alone  responds 
to  the  aim  of  the  war. 

Any  other  method  leads  but  to  half  victories,  which  are  not 
rigorous  solutions  and  remain  too  often  sterile. 

I  would  not  wish  any  possible  misunderstanding  as  to  the  scope 
of  the  chapter  I  have  just  written ;  and,  in  this  respect,  it  is  not 
superfluous  to  return  to  a  certain  statement  made  in  the  intro- 
duction itself  of  the  present  work. 


221 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

There  must  not  be  seen,  in  the  exposition  which  has  just  been 
made,  the  least  pretention  to  a  doctrinal  teaching  of  victory ;  that, 
I  repeat,  cannot  be  taught.  The  sole  legitimate  ambition  in  this 
matter  ought  to  be  and  is,  in  reality,  to  co-ordinate,  as  we  have, 
the  lessons  of  history ;  to  make  a  classification  of  the  methods  of 
war  used  in  the  past  and  to  show  which  of  them  have  been 
crowned  with  success. 

Such  a  work  is  legitimate,  for  it  permits  of  bringing  out  clearly 
a  quite  small  number  of  fundamental  laws  of  which  it  is  exact  to 
say  that  their  neglect  means  certain  failure. 

Doubtless,  once  more,  nothing  can  take  the  place  of  a  good 
general ;  but,  other  things  being  equal,  the  latter  will  be  so  much 
the  more  certain  of  victory  as  he  follows,  in  a  general  way,  the 
method  of  the  most  illustrious  warriors  among  his  predecessors. 

Upon  the  field  of  action,  the  more  convinced  he  is  of  the  neces- 
sity of  striking  at  his  enemy's  weak  point,  the  more  easily  will  he 
discover  that  point. 

But  let  us  not  be  deceived  here ;  this  method,  which  we  have 
broadly  outlined,  exacts  a  long  and  methodical  preparation,  leav- 
ing to  chance  and  circumstances  only  the  minimum  part. 

To  maintain  formidable  forces,  to  discern  the  vulnerable  point 
of  the  adversary,  to  carry  there  rapidly  the  maximum  possible 
effort  to  obtain  at  that  point  superiority,  such  is  the  role  of  strategy 
and,  consequently,  of  the  General  Staff. 

To  watch  closely  the  opposing  forces  of  the  adversary,  to  com- 
pel him  to  battle,  to  discover  the  weak  point  in  his  formation,  and 
to  bring  the  whole  of  one's  own  forces  to  bear  upon  that  point, 
that  is  the  role  of  the  tactician,  that  is  to  say  of  the  commander- 
in-chief. 

Both  are  grandiose  in  their  conception ;  the  first,  the  more  ab- 
stract, admits,  as  we  shall  see  later  on,  of  as  many  different 
methods  of  execution  as  there  may  be  nations  at  war ;  the  second 
is  of  more  general  application.  But  the  second  exacts  also  a  per- 
fect understanding  between  the  commander-in-chief  and  his  subor- 
dinates. There  ought  to  be  no  secrets  between  them,  and  the 
thought  of  the  general  ought  to  become  that  of  all  his  captains. 

A  single  object  ought  to  guide  them — battle;  and  it  is  for  that 
reason  also  that  during  the  period  of  search  for  the  enemy  every- 
thing ought  to  be  planned  as  if  that  battle  might  take  place  at  any 

222 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

instant.  This  implies  that  "  the  order  of  cruising  is  to  be  the 
order  of  battle." 

Finally,  as  a  consequence  of  the  requirements  above  set  forth, 
once  battle  is  engaged,  signals  become  useless :  "  honor  to  whom- 
soever does  the  best/' 

"  The  admiral-in-chicf  ought  as  much  as  possible/'  says  Admiral 
Bouet-Villaumez,  "  foresee  before  the  battle  the  maneuvers  to  be 
made;  and  once  fire  is  opened,  the  captains  ought  to  be  so  much 
under  the  influence  of  their  admiral's  methods  of  attack  and  his 
intentions  that  signals  cease  then  to  be  necessary  for  their  guid- 
ance." 

I  have  only,  in  finishing,  to  emphasize  how  chimerical  it  would 
be  to  wish  to  make  war  without  taking  risks.  War  is  a  game 
in  which  there  is  no  more  certainty  of  winning  than  there  is  in 
any  other  less  serious.  "  Who  risks  not,  gains  not,"  says  an  old 
proverb. 

If  one  does  not  wish  to  take  the  chance  of  losing,  there  is  but 
one  way,  and  that  is  not  to  play ;  yet  when  the  question  is  war  one 
often  is  obliged  to  play  despite  himself. 

Therefore  is  it  not  infinitely  more  reasonable  and  more  wise  to 
learn  to  play  well  that  game?  Thus  will  the  chances  of  loss  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum. 

On  September  14,  1804,  Napoleon  wrote:  "All  the  over  sea  ex- 
peditions which  have  been  undertaken  since  I  am  at  the  head  of  the 
government  have  failed,  because  the  admirals  saw  double  and 
found,  I  know  not  where,  that  war  can  be  made  without  running 
any  risks." 

Suffren  and  Nelson,  in  their  correspondence,  have  also  made 
known  to  us  their  ideas  on  this  subject ;  they  are  worth  meditating 
upon.  That  is  why  I  do  not  think  I  can  better  conclude  all  that 
precedes  than  by  recalling  one  of  Nelson's  professions  of  faith 
which  I  have  already  quoted :  "  /  should  very  soon  either  do  much, 
or  be  ruined.  My  disposition  cannot  bear  tame  and  slow  meas- 
ures," wrote  the  most  illustrious  of  English  admirals,  after  the 
battle  of  March  14,  1795,  against  Admiral  Martin's  fleet.  These 
words  contain  a  whole  program. 


223 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PROOF  OF  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  A  BODY  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  DOC- 
TRINES; OPINIONS  OF  MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  WRITERS. 

The  conclusions  of  the  preceding  chapter,  wholly  drawn  from 
the  impartial  study  of  military  history,  derive  their  value  from  the 
experimental  method  which  furnished  them;  they  are  therefore 
self-sufficient.  But  the  question  is  too  important  and  far-reaching 
for  me  to  hesitate  to  increase  their  persuasive  force  by  arguments 
borrowed  from  the  most  clearly  competent  military  writers.  In 
thus  depending  upon  authors  to  justify  my  own  opinions  as  to  the 
general  teachings  of  great  wars,  I  anticipate  the  objection  which 
could  be  made  to  me  of  having  chosen  among  the  facts  and  of 
having  examined  them  from  a  somewhat  too  personal  point  of 
view. 

And  just  as  it  seemed  to  me  beneficial  to  study  some  great  ex- 
amples of  land  wars  before  taking  up  naval  wars,  so  I  shall  first 
pass  in  review  the  ideas  formulated  by  some  military  specialists 
and  then  finish  with  naval  authors. 

This  general  method  is  once  again  legitimate,  for  there  is  really 
but  a  single  and  unique  doctrine  of  war.  If  we  will  only  reflect 
upon  the  subject  of  war,  we  will  recognize,  in  fact,  with  Clause- 
witz,  that  it  is  nothing  but  the  violent  procedure  by  which  one 
seeks  to  compel  the  adversary  to  yield  to  one's  wishes.  To  obtain 
this  result,  it  is  necessary  to  call  upon  all  the  forces  at  one's  dis- 
posal in  order  to  make  the  greatest  possible  effort.  Thenceforth, 
those  various  forces,  military,  naval,  moral,  etc.,  appear  but  as 
different  means  of  attaining  a  single  object;  there  can  therefore  be 
but  one  single  strategy,  and  every  conception  which  tends  to  es- 
tablish a  distinction  between  the  utilization  of  military  forces  and 
that  of  naval  forces,  in  a  word  to  differentiate  naval  strategy  from 
military  strategy,  is  purely  arbitrary.  This  principle  of  unity  ex- 
tends from  strategy  even  to  tactics ;  infinitely  more  varied  in  de- 
tails (for  it  necessarily  feels  the  effects  of  the  incessant  develop- 
ments in  weapons,  as  we  have  had  to  state  on  many  occasions), 
nevertheless  tactics  also  obeys  unchangeable  laws. 

224 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

JOMINI. 

In  Jomini's  eyes,  the  art  of  war  is  wholly  contained  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  quest  of  superiority  of  forces  at  a  decisive  point.  The 
objective  of  strategy  is  the  concentration  of  the  bulk  of  one's 
forces  upon  a  point  of  the  theater  of  the  war,  just  as  in  the  theater 
of  active  operations  tactics  endeavors  to  bring  the  bulk  of  one's 
troops  to  bear  upon  a  weak  point  of  the  field  of  battle. 

For  him  likewise,  the  offensive  is  in  its  general  principle  advan- 
tageous. It  exercises  a  preponderant  influence  on  the  morale  of 
armies ;  it  is  beneficial  furthermore  from  the  advantage  which  the 
pursuit  of  a  well  determined  object  gives.  If  this  writer,  never- 
theless, seems  to  attribute  to  the  defensive  method  a  partial  supe- 
riority because  it  gives  the  choice  of  the  place  of  operations,  it  is 
on  the  express  condition  that  it  be  active,  for  he  explicitly  con- 
demns every  passive  form  of  the  defensive.  But  what  then  is  the 
active  defensive ;  that  is  to  say  the  defensive  which  contemplates 
attacking  at  a  favorable  moment,  if  not  a  particular  form  of  the 
offensive  ? 

"A  state  attacked  by  its  neighbor,"  says  he,  "which  claims 
ancient  rights  over  a  province,  rarely  decides  to  cede  the  latter 
without  fighting;  and  from  pure  conviction  of  the  reality  of  its 
rights  it  prefers  to  defend  the  territory  that  is  demanded  of  it, 
which  is  always  more  honorable  and  more  natural.  But  instead  of 
remaining  passively  on  the  frontier  awaiting  its  aggressor,  it  may 
suit  it  to  take  the  initiative  or  offensive" 

He  says  likewise:  "Let  us  recognize  that  a  State  does  better 
to  invade  its  neighbors  than  to  let  itself  be  attacked." 

And  in  this  connection,  it  may  not  be  useless  to  explain  that  in 
forcibly  advocating  the  principle  of  the  offensive,  I  have  never 
meant  to  advise  blind  attack,  head  down,  under  all  circumstances 
and  in  all  places,  but  rather  the  aggregate  of  well-planned  active 
operations,  directed  against  the  enemy's  weak  point;  and  this  re- 
quires of  necessity  preliminary  profound  study  of  the  latter's 
military  constitution.  Finally  I  have  wished  above  all  to  contrast 
the  fruitful  method  of  action  with  that  of  resigned  waiting,  which 
leads  surely  to  defeat.  This  is  Jomini's  idea,  which  he  expresses 
in  the  following  manner  in  the  chapter  on  tactics  entitled  "  Of  the 
defensive  offensive  " :  C(  We  have  already  pointed  out,  in  speaking 
of  strategic  operations,  all  the  advantages  which  the  initiative 
gives;  but  we  have  recognized  at  the  same  time  that  in  tactics  the 

225 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

one  who  waited  could  turn  all  these  advantages  to  his  own 
account,  by  a  timely  change  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive. 
A  general  who  awaits  the  enemy  like  an  automaton,  without  any 
other  plan  than  to  fight  bravely,  will  always  succumb  when 
properly  attacked.  It  is  not  so  with  a  general  who  waits  with  the 
firm  resolution  at  the  proper  moment  to  fall  upon  his  adversary 
in  order  to  regain  the  moral  advantage  which  comes  from 'an 
offensive  movement  and  from  the  certainty  of  putting  one's  forces 
in  action  at  the  most  important  point,  which  is  impossible  when 
keeping  strictly  on  the  defensive." 

He  equally  proclaims  the  necessity  of  an  army's  possessing  a 
base  of  operations,  from  which  will  come  to  it  the  re-enforcements 
and  supplies  of  every  nature  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of 
its  vigor,  and  which  is  the  support  of  its  offensive  action.  This 
base  is  not  always  single ;  it  can  and  ought  to  be  completed  by  the 
organization  of  secondary  bases,  in  proportion  as  the  offensive 
operations  of  the  army  separate  it  from  its  principal  base. 

We  have  already  seen,  in  studying  the  events  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  the  application  which  the  Japanese  fleet  made  of 
this  excellent  principle  laid  down  by  Jomini.  Certainly  the  arse- 
nals of  Japan  might  have  been  thought  near  enough  to  the  center 
of  naval  operations,  and  yet  Togo  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  on  the 
Korean  coast  a  base  in  more  immediate  contact  with  what  was 
going  on.  And  since  we  are  alluding  to  a  naval  example,  it  is  of 
interest  to  note  the  formal  condition  put  by  the  general  whose 
military  ideas  we  are  now  discussing  upon  the  adoption  of  the  sea 
as  an  army's  base  of  operations.  He  states,  in  effect,  that  the  con- 
comitant necessity  of  command  of  the  sea  is  a  somewhat  disad- 
vantageous condition. 

It  seems  difficult  to  reproach  this  doctrine,  from  the  pen  of 
such  a  man,  with  having  been  inspired  by  the  necessities  of  a 
cause  or  a  theory ;  it  adds  remarkable  force  to  all  that  I  have  al- 
ready insisted  upon  in  the  exposition  of  the  situation  of  the  oppos- 
ing sides  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  which  has  just  taken  place  in 
the  Far  East.  It  also  puts  in  relief  how  much  the  Japanese,  in 
contradistinction  to  their  adversaries,  were  permeated  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  military  art. 

General  Jomini,  moreover,  did  not  pretend  to  compress  the 
theory  of  war  into  a  sort  of  abstract  formula  applicable  to  all 
cases ;  very  much  to  the  contrary  he  regarded  war  not  at  all  as  a 

226 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

science  based  upon  more  or  less  ingenious  mathematical  specula- 
tions but  as  a  drama  with  all  the  passions,  all  the  sublimities  and 
all  the  weaknesses  which  attend  that  crisis  of  humanity.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  indicate  more  clearly  the  considerable  part  played 
by  moral  forces,  interpreted  broadly,  in  the  progress  of  the  des- 
tinies of  a  war.  At  each  stage  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  we 
could  in  fact  see  the  scenes  and  acts  of  this  poignant  drama  in  the 
course  of  which  the  moral  weakness  of  the  Russians  furnished  us 
with  living  examples  much  more  convincing  than  those  taken 
from  fiction. 

This  moral  conception  of  war  is  worth  remembering,  for  it 
implies  the  indispensable  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  state  of  mind, 
of  his  degree  of  preparation  for  the  struggle,  and  thus  shows  the 
close  bond  which,  at  the  outset  of  any  strategy,  ought  to  exist  be- 
tween the  general  policy  of  a  country  and  its  purely  material 
preparation  for  war. 

Analyzing  Napoleon's  system  of  war,  the  definition  of  which 
can  be  summed  up  in  three  words — speed,  battle,  rest — Jomini 
thinks  that  this  system  will  never  be  abandoned.  I  may  add,  for 
my  part,  that  it  owes  its  wonderful  vitality  to  the  excellence  of  the 
principles  upon  which  it  is  based ;  though  Napoleon  knew  how  to 
make  a  marvelous  use  of  them,  they  really  were  not  exclusively 
his  own.  We  have  seen,  although  a  little  too  briefly,  that  all  the 
great  captains  have  conformed  to  them  while  adapting  them  to  the 
resources  at  their  disposal.  The  practical  means  of  action  have 
undergone  radical  changes,  as  a  result  of  incessant  progress  in 
all  branches  of  human  activity,  but  the  same  essential  laws  belong 
to  all  ages. 

In  his  fine  book  " Precis  sur  I' art  de  la  guerre"  Jomini  estab- 
lishes minutely  all  the  divisions  of  the  arduous  task  which  falls 
upon  the  General  Staff;  preparation  of  material,  orders  of  con- 
centration and  of  route,  elaboration  of  the  plan  of  campaign,  de- 
termination of  the  enemy's  position,  drawing  up  instructions  for 
the  march  and  rendezvous,  direction  of  reconnaissances,  centraliza- 
tion of  information  of  all  sorts  relative  to  the  enemy's  movements, 
etc.,  all  this  together  is  one  of  the  most  overwhelming  duties 
which  men  can  be  called  upon  to  do. 

And  who  then,  in  presence  of  this  program,  still  so  vaguely 
sketched,  could  still  maintain  that  its  consideration  can  be  post- 
poned till  the  moment  of  execution?  The  part  played  by  chance 

227 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

is,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  already  too  great  in  the  course  of 
war  for  the  attempt  to  restrict  it  not  to  be  made.  And  they  would 
truly  be  criminal  in  their  blind  ignorance  who  would  persist  in 
seeing  the  only  remedy  for  all  these  difficulties  in  the  convenient 
formula,  "trust  to  luck." 

It  was  quite  thus  that  Jomini  thought  when  he  wrote,  as  the 
conclusion  of  his  book,  the  following  lines :  "  If  some  prejudiced 
military  men,  after  having  read  this  book  and  studied  attentively 
the  detailed  recital  of  some  of  the  campaigns  of  great  masters,  still 
persist  in  maintaining  that  there  exists  no  principle,  no  practical 
rule  of  war,  we  must  be  satisfied  to  pity  them  and  to  reply  with 
Frederick  the  Great's  well  known  saying,  '  A  MULE  WHICH  HAD 

MADE  TWENTY    CAMPAIGNS   UNDER   PRINCE   EUGENE   WOULD  BE    NO 

BETTER  TACTICIAN  FOR  THAT/  Correct  theories,  founded  upon 
true  principles  and  justified  by  facts,  are,  in  our  opinion,  when 
taken  in  conjunction  with  the  lessons  of  history,  the  veritable 
school  of  generals.  If  these  means  do  not  make  a  great  man, 
since  great  men  are  always  self-made  ivhen  circumstances  favor 
them,  they  will  at  least  form  generals  skilful  enough  to  be  per- 
fectly fitted  for  the  second  rank  under  the  orders  of  great 
generals" 

CLAUSEWITZ. 

General  Clausewitz  in  his  turn  shows  us  the  immense  part 
played  in  war  by  moral  forces  under  all  their  aspects,  passions, 
hates,  fear.  The  most  recent  war  has  already  given  us  most  con- 
vincing proofs  of  the  legitimacy  of  this  conception. 

For  him,  the  immediate  object  of  war  is  to  strike  down  the 
adversary,  and  this  object  exacts  the  use  of  the  maximum  forces 
with  a  view  to  the  greatest  effort.  The  sole  efficient  means  of  war 
is  battle;  that  is  the  essential  thing,  what  I  have  already  several 
times  called  the  principal  objective.  "  Battle,"  says  he,  "  consti- 
tutes the  whole  action  of  war.  In  battle  the  destruction  of  the 
opposing  forces  is  the  means  of  attaining  the  object,  even  though 
the  battle  does  not  actually  take  place  and  the  threat  of  it  suffices 
to  bring  about  a  settlement;  for  in  that  case  the  enemy  manifestly 
retires  only  on  the  supposition  that,  if  he  accepted  the  struggle,  he 
would  inevitably  be  destroyed.  In  war,  then,  the  destruction  of 
the  armed  force  of  the  adversary  is  the  corner  stone  of  all  combi- 
nations ....  In  speaking  of  the  armed  force  of  the  adversary, 

228 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

life  ought  expressly  to  observe  that  nothing  obliges  us  to  limit  this 
idea  to  physical  force;  but  rather  that  everything  makes  it  obliga- 
tory upon  us  to  include  moral  force  also,  for  the  reason  that  these 
two  forces  are  constantly  mingled  even  in  the  smallest  details  of 
the  act  of  war,  and  consequently  are  inseparable." 

To  form  a  fair  judgment  of  Clausewitz's  work,  it  should  be 
read  through,  and  it  would  certainly  be  a  profitable  task,  but  such 
a  complete  study  would  greatly  exceed  our  limits ;  yet  it  alone 
enables  his  true  military  thought  to  be  extracted  from  the  mass 
of  his  literary  labors.  It  is  thus  that,  to  every  superficial  reader, 
he  seems  to  accord  all  his  preferences  to  the  defensive,  which  he 
regards  as  a  superior  method  in  so  far  as  it  is  applied  to  the  con- 
servation of  one's  possessions,  territories,  forces,  etc.  A  more 
complete  understanding  of  his  ideas  leaves  no  room  for  doubt, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  to  the  exceptional  value  that  he  accords  to 
the  offensive.  Let  this  be  judged  from  the  following  extracts : 

"  Outside  of  the  destruction  itself  of  the  armed  forces  of  the 
adversary,  the  different  objects  that  it  can  be  proposed  to  attain 
in  war  are  positive  objects,  and,  consequently,  the  offensive  alone 
is  capable  of  pursuing  them."  It  is  not  less  necessary  to  under- 
stand what  Clausewitz  means  by  the  defensive.  "  Passivity  being 
absolutely  contrary  to  the  nature  of  war,  this  definition  (resist- 
ance) can  only  be  applied  to  the  defence  when  the  latter  is  re- 
garded from  a  quite  general  point  of  view  ....  Resistance 
then  can  only  be  relative,  and  the  defence,  frequently  changing  its 
general  form,  ought  to  pass,  in  the  course  of  the  action,  first  from 
parry  to  parry  and  thrust,  and  then,  as  the  latter  gives  opportu- 
nity, to  ATTACK.  One  is  on  the  defensive  in  a  fight  when  one 
awaits  firmly  planted  the  shock  of  the  enemy  upon  the  point  where 
one  has  taken  his  stand;  in  a  battle,  when  one  waits  for  the  hostile 
army  to  come  to  face  the  positions  that  one  occupies  and  the  fire 
of  the  troops  that  one  commands;  finally,  in  a  campaign,  when  one 
awaits  the  invasion  of  the  theater  of  war  of  which  one  has  made 
choice.  Thus  far  the  defence  is  in  nowise  in  contradiction  with 
the  nature  of  war,  for  one  can  find  his  advantage  in  awaiting  the 
enemy  on  a  field,  in  positions  or  in  a  theater  of  operations  the  re- 
sources of  which  one  knows  and  which  one  has  studied  and  pre- 
pared in  advance.  But  when  resistance  properly  so-called  has 
done  its  work,  and  because,  to  retain  his  part  in  directing  the  con- 
duct of  the  war,  the  defender  must  necessarily  return  to  the 

229 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

attacker  the  blows  received  from  him,  there  immediately  results 
an  offensive  action  on  the  part  of  the  defence  itself." 

"  The  defensive  action  therefore  comports  with  offensive  acts 
in  each  of  its  degrees,  whether  it  is  a  question  of  fights,  of  battles 
or  of  campaigns.  In  a  defensive  battle,  for  example,  one's  isolated 
divisions  can  be  employed  offensively.  This  form  of  warfare, 
therefore,  need  not  be  looked  upon  as  a  shield,  but  rather  as  a 
weapon  suitable  for  thrust  as  well'  as  for  parry/' 

And  to  still  better  define  the  expressions,  already  so  clear,  which 
precede,  I  will  add  this  further  quotation :  "  A  war  in  which  one 
would  be  satisfied  to  use  victory  to  repel  the  enemy,  without  ever 
attacking  him  in  turn,  would  be  as  foolish  as  a  battle  the  arrange- 
ments of  which  were  made  with  the  sole  idea  of  an  absolutely 
passive  defence." 

Thus  we  find  in  these  lines,  on  the  one  hand,  the  formal  con- 
demnation of  that  form  of  resigned  waiting  in  which  the  defen- 
sive is  most  frequently  conceived  and  which,  in  the  history  of  all 
epochs,  has  never  brought  forth  anything  but  defeats ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  clear  meaning,  without  any  possible  equivocation, 
which  must  be  given  to  the  expression  defensive  from  the  pen  of 
this  learned  military  writer.  Thus  understood,  there  is  no  contra- 
diction with  the  conclusions  which  I  have  already  myself  de- 
veloped ;  for  the  defensive,  defined  in  this  manner,  is  only  a 
variety  of  the  well  conceived  offensive.  Better  still,  we  can  make 
an  immediate  application  of  it  to  the  example  of  Tsushima.  The 
"  offensive,"  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  permitted  to  the 
Japanese,  under  the  threat  of  the  speedy  arrival  of  the  Second 
Pacific  Squadron,  a  great  variety  of  solutions ;  it  is  this  which 
explains  why,  from  the  day  that  fleet  set  out,  the  most  fantastic 
projects  were  attributed  to  the  Japanese  Admiralty.  The  squad- 
rons of  Togo  and  Kamimura  were  made  out  by  the  imagination 
of  news  writers,  on  several  occasions,  within  sight  of  Madagas- 
car, then  successively  in  the  Strait  of  Malacca  and  that  of  For- 
mosa ;  I  omit  the  incident  which  happened  in  the  Channel  on  the 
Dogger  Bank.  All  these  fleeting  visions  came  from  the  very  clear 
perception,  forced  upon  the  world  by  their  previous  operations, 
that  the  Japanese  sailors  had  adopted  the  offensive  as  their  line  of 
conduct.  To  attack  Rozhestvensky's  battleships  on  the  shoals  of 
Hull  during  the  night,  with  torpedo-boats,  in  another  fashion  than 
in  the  hallucinations  of  the  Russian  sailors ;  to  surprise  them  off 

230 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Nossi-be,  at  the  entrance  to  the  China  Seas,  or  in  the  bay  of  Cam- 
raigne,  or  finally  in  the  Formosan  Straits,  would  have  been  just  so 
many  offensive  acts.  But  to  wait  for  them  at  the  passage  of  the 
Korean  Strait,  in  proximity  to  the  Japanese  bases  of  operations,  in 
that  very  way  having  available  the  maximum  of  means  of  action, 
fighting  ships,  torpedo-boats,  rapid  communications,  etc.,  was  also 
the  offensive  in  the  sense  given  to  it  by  Clausewitz,  and  the  latter 
course,  in  the  case  considered,  was  incontestably  superior  to  all 
the  others.  By  going  to  meet  his  adversary,  whether  at  Singa- 
pore or  even  only  on  the  coasts  of  Annam,  Togo  would  only  have 
weakened  himself. 

This  example,  corresponding  to  the  definition  contained  in  the 
preceding  quotations,  throws  a  special  light  upon  the  value  which 
should  be  exactly  assigned  to  the  idea  of  the  offensive.  Clause- 
witz adds  further :  "  The  essential  characteristics  of  offensive  war- 
fare are.  rapidity,  decision  and  continuity  of  action,"  and  also  "  The 
greatest  promptitude  should  be  used  in  operations.  Every  loss  of 
time,  every  useless  detour  brings  about  a  waste  of  forces  and  is 
consequently  a  strategic  error." 

Thus  once  more  is  the  high  strategic  value  of  speed  proclaimed. 

'*'  In  tactics  as  in  strategy,  superiority  of  numbers  is,  of  all  prin- 
ciples, the  one  which  most  generally  gives  victory"  Thus  does 
the  Prussian  general  express  himself  upon  an  important  point  in 
the  study  of  war,  and  he  adds :  "  The  greatest  possible  number  of 
troops  should  be  brought  into  action  at  the  decisive  point.  Such 
is  the  first  principle  in  strategy" 

And  such  is  really  the  first  act  of  war;  but  here  it  is  indis- 
pensable to  bring  to  notice  that  the  greatness  of  this  first  effort 
depends  entirely  upon  governmental  action.  This  emphasizes 
the  close  tie  which  binds  the  initial  strategy  to  politics.  If, 
through  the  errors  or  the  weakness  of  the  latter,  this  so  important 
opening  effort  is  insufficient,  if,  in  a  word,  absolute  superiority  of 
forces  cannot  be  realized,  it  becomes  necessary  to  endeavor  to  ob- 
tain, by  surprise  or  by  skill,  relative  superiority  at  the  decisive 
point. 

We  have  already  seen  the  prime  importance  which  Clausewitz 
attributed  to  battle ;  he  defined  it :  "  Strategy's  instrument  for  at- 
taining the  object  of  the  war"  An  opinion  as  weighty  as  his  adds 
new  force  to  the  conclusions  I  have  already  drawn  from  the  sum- 
mary study  of  the  great  wars  of  the  past. 

231 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

We  borrow  from  him  one  last  extract,  which  equally  confirms 
what  we  already  know :  "  The  battle  at  last  gained  and  the  victory 
won,  it  is  necessary  at  once,  without  halt,  without  change,  without 
reflection,  without  even  taking  breath,  to  hurl  oneself  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy,  to  attack  him  wherever  he  resists,  to  seise  upon  his 
capital,  to  destroy  his  armies  of  relief  and  to  overturn  all  the  sup- 
ports of  his  power." 

Here  we  find  again  the  idea  that  victory  cannot  be  complete  if 
it  is  not  followed  by  the  irremediable  destruction  of  the  enemy; 
without  which  it  is  but  a  half  measure  and  does  not  satisfy  the 
ends  of  the  war. 

It  is  not  without  a  lively  regret  that  I  find  myself  compelled  to 
leave  the  very  captivating  study  of  Clausewitz's  works ;  but  our 
space  and  time  are  so  short  that  it  is  indispensable  to  limit  myself. 
Yet  I  am  unwilling  to  finish  without  making  a  brief  allusion  to 
the  interesting  chapter  which  treats  of  the  theory  of  war,  and 
more  particularly  of  the  knowledge  demanded  of  the  commander- 
in-chief :  "  The  general-in-chief ,"  says  he,  "  does  not  acquire  this 
varied  knowledge  from,  formula  and  from  scientific  processes;  it 
requires  on  his  part  special  aptitude,  supported  by  the  judicious 
observation  of  things  and  a  judgment  trained  by  the  events  of 
life"  He  says  again:  "Study  and  meditation  can  produce  an 
Euler  and  a  Newton,  but  experience  of  life  and  its  great  teachings 
are  necessary  to  form  calculators  such  as  Conde  and  Frederick." 

These  words,  struck  with  the  die  of  good  judgment,  are  wholly 
worth  remembering,  above  all  in  our  times  when  there  are  re- 
vealed sad  tendencies  to  misconceive  the  simplicity  of  the  object 
and  means  of  war,  as  well  as  its  purely  artistic  and  personal 
quality;  to  see  in  it  I  know  not  what  false  science  of  a  dry  and 
arbitrary  character.  For  my  part,  I  chose,  without  the  shadow  of 
a  hesitation,  Clausewitz's  concept. 

RUSTOW. 

Another  and  more  modern  foreign  military  writer,  Rustow,  is 
not  less  affirmative. 

•Under  the  title  "  Fundamental  Laws  of  Strategy,"  he  has  col- 
lected a  certain  number  of  maxims  which  it  is  well  to  ponder. 

"  The  fundamental  laws  of  the  art  of  commanding  armies  stand 
clearly  forth  from  all  the  historical  facts  of  war,  and  it  will  always 
be  so  as  long  as  the  nature  of  our  means  of  war  has  not  wholly 

232 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

changed/'  After  this  statement  of  a  principle  already  too  well 
known  to  us  not  to  be  accepted  without  reserve,  he  expresses  his 
maxims  as  follows : 

In  the  first  place,  "  armies  are  the  principal  instrument  and  the 
principal  objective  of  strategy,  the  true  representatives  of  force  in 
war.  To  develop  as  much  as  possible  the  activity  of  his  own 
army  and  to  restrain  the  activity  of  that  of  the  enemy,  to  maintain 
his  army  and  to  destroy  the  enemy's,  such  are  the  dominating 
ideas  that  should  direct  the  general-in-chief.  Battle  is  the  culmi- 
nating act  of  war.  It  commands  and  determines  all  other  opera~ 
tions  of  war." 

Thus  there  is  set  forth  anew,  with  perfect  clearness,  the  idea  of 
forces  and  the  principal  function  devolved  upon  opposition  to 
those  forces,  that  is  to  say  upon  battle.  Here  now  is  how  the 
elements  of  equilibrium  of  this  antagonism  of  forces  are  to  be 
established. 

"  Victory  is  assured  by  superior  forces;  by  the  choice  of  the 
favorable  moment,  that  is  to  say  of  the  moment  when  one  is 
strongest  and  the  enemy  weakest;  by  the  choice  of  the  suitable 
place,  that  is  to  say  of  the  place  where  one  is  strongest  and  the 
enemy  weakest.  Success  is  further  assured  by  a  clear  and  precise 
conception  of  the  result  to  be  attained;  by  the  intelligence  which 
directs  towards  a  single  object  all  one's  material  forces  and 
which  advances  straight  towards  it  without  deviating;  finally  by 
an  energetic  will  which  never  loses  sight  of  this  object  and  never 
abandons  it  zvithout  necessity." 

The  very  recent  examples  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  demon- 
strate the  excellence  of  these  last  principles ;  they  are  in  some 
sort  the  illustration  of  them.  Superiority  of  forces  at  the  point 
where  the  Russians  were  weaker,  choice  of  the  most  convenient 
place,  clear  and  simple  conception  of  the  result  to  be  attained, 
tenacity  in  the  execution  of  the  plan  of  action,  all  these  conditions 
united  assured  success  to  the  Japanese  without  requiring  the 
presence  of  a  man  of  genius. 

This  would  suffice  to  prove,  lacking  other  proofs,  that  there 
truly  are,  as  Rustow,  as  well  as  Clausewitz,  Jomini  and  so  many 
others,  has  declared,  a  certain  number  of  fundamental  laws  which 
cannot  with  impunity  be  ignored. 

Superiority  of  force  must  first  be  sought  in  superiority  of  num- 
bers. If  the  enemy  is  not  outnumbered  absolutely,  nevertheless 

233 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

he  may  be  relatively,  and  it  is  necessary  to  seek  to  outnumber  him 
at  the  point  where  the  campaign  is  to  be  decided,  that  is  in  the 
theater  of  war,  in  the  battle  and  on  the  field  of  battle,  at  the  point 
where  success  is  most  easily  or  most  certainly  to  be  won.  The 
possibility  of  securing  a  relative  superiority  results  from  the  con- 
centration of  our  own  army  and  the  division  of  that  of  the  enemy. 
The  union  of  our  army  is  therefore:  the  first  rule  of  war;  it  may 
undergo  modifications,  but  it  never  ceases  to  exist.  If  great 
armies  cannot  be  kept  united  on  a  point  or  on  a  line,  it  is  never- 
theless desirable:  that  the  bulk  of  the  army  or  the  greatest  possible 
part  of  it  be  united  on  the  decisive  point  at  the  decisive  moment." 

These  ideas  confirm  those  which  we  have  already  derived  from 
historical  examples ;  they  give  special  value  to  some  of  them  as 
well  as  to  the  deductions  which  can  properly  be  made  from  them. 

Among  these  there  is  one  of  which  the  recollection  is  particu- 
larly vivid,  and  I  recall  it  the  more  willingly  because  it  is  of 
such  recent  date.  I  allude  to  the  fundamental  error  committed 
by  the  Russian  government  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  war,  and 
which  I  have  already  had  occasion  to  explain. 

It  now  appears  to  us  as  in  direct  opposition  to  the  principle  laid 
down  by  Rustow.  The  theater  of  this  war  was  certainly  a  vast 
one,  one  of  the  vastest  in  military  history,  for  it  embraced  at  the 
same  time  the  seas  of  China  and  Japan,  Korea  and  wide  spreading 
Manchuria,  without  counting  the  Siberian  steppes,  Russia  and 
Japan.  But  the  theoretical  numerical  superiority  of  the  Russians 
could  have  no  value  unless  it  was  realized  at  the  point  of  the  im- 
mense theater  where  battle  was  to  be  delivered.  As  we  know, 
neither  on  land  nor  at  sea,  could  this  result  ever  be  achieved  by 
the  Russian  General  Staff,  and  that  beyond  anything  else  ex- 
plains the  persistent  defeat  of  the  Russian  armies. 

On  the  sea  the  lesson  is  the  same.  To  satisfy  the  principle  laid 
down  by  Rustow  and  his  predecessors,  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  concentrate  in  Far  Eastern  waters  and  at  Vladivostok,  that 
is  to  say  on  the  probable  battle  ground,  naval  forces  superior  to 
those  of  the  Japanese,  and  it  was  useless  and  could  only  be  useless 
to  send  there  successively  fleets  which,  by  their  union,  would  have 
been  of  sufficient  numbers  to  assure  this  superiority.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  junction  before  the  war  of  the  Port  Arthur,  Vladi- 
vostok and  Rozhestvensky  squadrons,  in  Japanese  waters,  would 
have  given  an  incontestable  superiority  to  the  Russian  naval 

234 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

forces.  Their  separation,  on  the  contrary,  was  to  bring  about 
their  defeat  in  detail.  This  practical  lesson  throws  a  vivid  light 
upon  the  strategical  principle  enunciated  by  Rustow,  a  principle 
already  set  forth  in  our  previous  conclusions,  and  which  the  Jap- 
anese navy  applied  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  late  war 
with  a  remarkable  understanding  of  its  requirements. 

Bearing  on  the  second  proposition,  which  relates  to  tactics,  and 
which  prescribes  seeking  superiority  at  the  decisive  point  in  battle, 
there  are  many  experimental  facts.  Nelson  satisfied  this  principle 
when  at  Trafalgar  he  smashed  the  center  of  the  French-Spanish 
fleet  by  throwing  upon  it  the  whole  weight  of  his  own  and  Col- 
lingwood's  squadrons.  Tegethoff  also  was  inspired  by  it  at  Lissa 
when  he  threw  the  mass  of  his  forces  upon  the  leading  division  of 
the  Italian  squadron.  We  have  seen  Ito  also,  in  the  battle  of  the 
Yalu,  make  the  weaker  right  wing  of  the  Chinese  give  way ;  and 
finally  Togo,  at  Tsushima,  turn  the  head  of  the  Russian  squadron. 

In  each  of  these  cases,  the  victorious  chief  knew  how  to  find 
the  weak  point,  the  Haw,  in  the  hostile  forces,  and  by  concen- 
trating the  whole  effort  of  his  own  forces  on  that  decisive  point 
to  assure  victory. 

"  With  equal  forces,  an  army  will  be,  so  much  the  more  formida- 
ble as  there  is  harmony  between  unity  of  command  and  independ- 
ence of  parts,  in  such  a  way  that  these  fractions  have  as  much  in- 
dependent life  as  is  possible  without  weakening  the  power  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  The  best  method  of  arriving  at  this  result 
is  a  proper  subdivision  of  the  army  so  that  these  fractions  are 
neither  too  numerous,  nor  too  strong,  nor  too  weak  .  .  .  ." 

Here  again  we  have  only  the  embarrassment  of  choice  in  find- 
ing famous  applications  of  this  maxim.  Nelson,  dividing  his 
squadron  and  entrusting  half  of  it  to  Collingwood,  certainly  had 
in  view  giving  to  the  constituent  elements  of  his  fleet  the  greatest 
possible  life.  The  example  of  Tsushima  is  still  more  striking,  for 
on  the  one  hand  freed  from  the  absorbing  influence  of  a  great 
genius  like  Nelson,  who  forcibly  seizes  upon  and  monopolizes  our 
attention,  on  the  other  hand  it  applies  to  occurrences  contem- 
porary with  ourselves,  and  employs  instruments  such  as  we  use 
ourselves.  The  fighting  force  of  the  Japanese  was  composed,  I 
remind  you,  of  four  battleships  and  eight  armored  cruisers,  in 
reality  twelve  units  which  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 
battle  played  identically  the  same  role  and  which,  consequently, 

235 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

we  have  every  right  to  comprise  in  the  general  category  of  fight- 
ing ships. 

But  it  is  easy  to  imagine  the  great  variety  of  combinations  by 
which  this  line  of  battle  of  twelve  ships  could  be  grouped  in  dif- 
ferent ways.  Between  the  two  extremes,  that  is  the  long  column 
of  twelve  ships  and  a  series  of  independent  divisions  each  of  one 
or  two  units,  there  was  evidently  room  for  others  giving  to  the 
totality  more  flexibility,  activity  and  life  than  the  former  and  less 
scattering  of  command  than  the  latter.  And  finally,  among  them, 
one  could  be  found  uniting  the  two  requirements  with  the  maxi- 
mum harmony.  This  was  the  one  adopted  by  Togo,  who,  in  divid- 
ing his  fleet  into  two  squadrons  of  six  ships,  each  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  chief,  obtained  under  his  sole  direction  all  the  advan- 
tages of  a  well  manceuvering  single  column  with  more  precision 
and  vigor  in  the  execution  of  the  movements.  He  realized  "  har- 
mony between  unity  of  command  and  independence  of  parts." 

Rozhestvensky,  on  the  contrary,  with  his  crowding  and  unman- 
ageable squadron,  did  not  possess  this  harmony.  And  this  con-, 
trast  very  well  brings  to  view  the  interest  which  the  idea  of  a 
"  naval  army  "  offers. 

Thus  we  come  anew  upon  the  intimate  bond  which,  in  the  field 
of  principles,  closely  connects  all  the  manifestations  of  the  mili- 
tary art ;  there  is  really  only  one  military  art,  since  we  have  been 
able  to  make  such  a  direct  application  to  naval  questions  of 
maxims  suggested  to  an  author  by  matters  exclusively  concerning 
armies. 

"  He  who  has  a  positive  object  in  view  can  with  the  greater 
facility  bring  superior  forces  to  bear  upon  the  decisive  point.  He 
zvho  waits,  on  the  contrary,  for  the  enemy  to  take  the  initiative, 
makes  this  problem  the  more  difficult  for  himself.  In  fact,  beside 
the  principal  and  positive  object  that  we  chose,  all  others  are 
secondary,  and  the  forces  which  are  devoted  to  them  will  be  in  the 
same  proportion.  But  if  we  allow  the  adversary  to  chose,  then 
several  contingencies  will  seem  to  us  to  have  the  same  value,  and 
we  will  divide  our  forces  equally  to  oppose  these  equally  important 
contingencies.  This  it  is  which  above  all  makes  the  offensive 
superior  to  the  defensive." 

These  lines  apply  perfectly,  although  they  were  not  so  intended, 
to  the  case  of  Cornwallis,  who,  distracted  between  the  necessity 
of  blockading  Ganteaume  in  Brest  and  the  desire  to  re-enforce 

236 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Calder  to  allow  him  to  paralyze  Villeneuve  in  Ferrol,  committed 
the  grave  fault,  the  noteworthy  folly  as  Napoleon  called  it,  of 
dividing  his  squadron.  This  fault  might  have  cost  him  dear,  with 
more  resolute  adversaries  than  the  French  admirals  of  that  period 
were.  The  English  admiral  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  by  pur- 
suing several  objects  at  the  same  time  he  weakened  himself  every- 
where ;  and  that  the  primary  object  ought  to  be  to  prevent  the  es- 
cape of  Ganteaume,  the  only  contingency  which  would  give  to 
the  French  fleet  superiority,  even  momentarily.  Again,  and  per- 
haps with  greater  amplitude,  we  can  make  clear  the  application 
of  this  principle  to  the  carrying  on  of  the  late  war  by  the  Russians. 
As  a  whole,  as  well  as  in  detail,  the  Russian  government  made  a 
passionate  effort  to  accomplish  the  impossible  task  of  repulsing 
all  attacks  at  once ;  in  the  initial  conception,  not  understanding  the 
preponderant  importance  of  naval  operations,  it  wished  to  repel 
on  the  one  hand  the  Japanese  attack  on  land  and  to  resist  on  the 
other  hand  their  attack  on  the  sea.  Reason  itself,  on  the  con- 
trary, as  I  have  explained  at  length,  would  have  imposed  the  exer- 
tion of  the  greatest  effort  on  the  sea.  In  details,  the  scattering  of 
the  naval  forces  at  Port  Arthur  and  at  Vladivostok,  and  the  iso- 
lated action  of  Rozhestvensky's  squadron,  all  at  the  choice  of  the 
adversary,  could  only  produce  deplorable  results. 

As  far  as  the  principle  of  the  superiority  of  the  offensive  is  con- 
cerned, wre  see  that  this  is  affirmed  no  less  clearly  by  Rustow  than 
by  the  preceding  writers ;  and  he  still  better  expresses  his  idea 
when  he  says :  "  For  the  defensive  to  be  as  strong  as  possible,  all 
the  preparations  must  be  directed  by  an  offensive  idea."  Is  not 
this  the  very  thought  already  expressed  by  Clausewitz;  and  in 
view  of  the  remarkable  agreement  between  the  propositions  ad- 
vanced by  the  most  noted  military  writers,  is  it  possible  to  believe 
this  accord  to  be  the  result  of  chance?  For  my  part  I  do  not 
believe  it,  and  I  gain  here  a  new  conviction  of  the  sure  existence 
of  certain  fundamental  laws  of  war,  which  we  have  already  de- 
rived from  the  facts  of  experience,  and  to  which  the  concordant 
testimony  of  authors  adds  a  great  value. 

ff  Victory  is  completed  by  pursuit.  After  his  defeat  the  enemy 
needs  rest  to  reassemble  and  repair  his  forces.  This  rest  is  for- 
bidden him  if  he  is  forced  to  fight  or  to  march  rapidly  in  order  to 
avoid  fighting,  perhaps  under  the  most  disadvantageous  condi- 
tions. Thence  follows  the  rule  that  the  conqueror  should  pursue 

2.37 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  conquered  without  delay,  with  the  greatest^  possible  speed  and 
energy." 

The  naval  battle  of  August  10  will  not  be  noteworthy  in  history, 
because  the  Japanese  did  not  amplify  their  success  by  an  impla- 
cable pursuit  of  the  retreating  Russian  ships  ;  that  of  Tsushima  will 
be  remembered  as  one  of  the  greatest  disasters,  if  not  the  very 
greatest,  which  has  ever  occurred  on  the  sea,  because  pursuit,  this 
time  persevering,  finished  what  the  battle  strictly  so-called  began 
so  well  on  the  field  of  action. 

"  In  any  operation  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that  the  shortest 
road  to  reach  the  enemy  has  a  marked  advantage  over  the  long- 
est" This  is  the  affirmation  of  the  value  of  speed. 

"  The  plan  and  preparation  of  an  enterprise,  whatever  it  may  be, 
are  never  the  act  itself;  and  it  is  to  the  act  alone  that  are  due  suc- 
cess and  the  diminution  of  the  enemy's  success.  The  plan  of  every 
enterprise  ought  to  be  made  in  advance.  This  is  an  indispensable 
condition  of  arriving  at  a  predetermined  end;  but,  beyond  this  end 
to  be  attained,  a  plan  ought  to  take  account  of  the  nature  of  the 
means  and  of  the  existing  circumstances.  The  first  requisite  of  a 
plan  of  war  is  the  greatest  simplicity;  for  a  simple  plan  is  easier  to 
conceive  and  to  execute  than  a  complicated  plan.  The  second 
requisite  of  a  good  plan  of  operations  is  to  limit  the  number  and 
scope  of  those  operations,  to  lay  them  down  according  to  the 
known  data,  with  room  for  the  action  of  unknown  quantities,  and 
allowing  sufficient  freedom  to  the  direction  of  the  operations  to 
enable  the  plan  to  be  modified  in  the  course  of  its  execution,  if 
circumstances  require  it." 

In  spite  of  their  great  interest,  I  must  here  cease  to  quote,  since 
I  am  bound  to  limit  myself.  It  would,  however,  be  difficult  to 
assemble,  in  a  style  more  simple  and  at  the  same  time  more  precise, 
as  great  a  number  of  essential  truths  as  are  contained  in  the  pre- 
ceding lines.  Formal  condemnation  of  the  method  of  chance  and 
improvidence ;  affirmation  of  the  necessity  of  knowing  in  advance 
what  it  is  desired  to  do,  by  having  a  fixed  plan  of  action  limited 
by  the  means  at  one's  disposal ;  the  elasticity  indispensable  for  tak- 
ing account  of  fortuitous  occurrences ;  prohibition  of  paralyzing 
the  initiative  of  the  commander-in-chief ,  etc. ;  all  is  to  be  found 
there.  And  what  above  all  else  ought  to  be  remembered  is  the 
very  formal  declaration  of  the  simplicity  which  should  govern  in 

238 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  preparation  of  operations.  Everything  is  simple  in  war — plan, 
conduct  and  means. 

This  merit  of  simplicity  appears  to  Rustow  to  be  of  the  first 
order,  for  he  says  further  : 

"Simplicity  and  independence  of  plan  (independence  relative 
to  the  plans  attributed  to  the  enemy)  are  principles  of  the  military 
art." 

And  it  is  always  in  this  same  order  of  ideas  that,  speaking  in  a 
general  way  of  the  qualities  of  generals,  and  in  particular  of 
Mack,  the  Austrian  general,  "  well  informed,  but  who  only  knew 
how  to  draw  clear  and  neat  figures  upon  which  he  spent  much 
labor,  and  who  made  of  the  general  a  draftsman"  he  concludes : 
"  This  love  of  geometric  figures  is  the  surest  sign  of  lack  of 
aptitude  for  chief  command.  The  general  ought  to  reckon  with 
forces;  the  forces  are  represented  by  lines  and  directions,  but  they 
are  not  those  lines  themselves." 

I  shall  refrain  from  weakening  by  any  comment  the  scope  of 
this  very  sane  comprehension  of  the  affairs  of  war.  I  limit  my- 
self to  expressing  the  wish :  May  we  make  this  doctrine  our  own! 

VON  DER  GOLTZ. 

Another  contemporary  expert,  Von  der  Goltz,  justly  esteemed, 
estimates  in  these  terms  Napoleon's  role :  "  Our  actual  point  of 
view  depends  in  great  part  upon  his  principles.  He  recalled  to 
military  men  a  thing  which  Frederick  had  already  taught  them, 
but  which  they  had  forgotten,  namely  that  it  is  above  all  important 
to  destroy  the  hostile  forces;  that  battle  is  what  decides  war." 

In  a  remarkable  chapter  on  "  Conditions  of  success  in  war," 
this  same  writer  states  a  certain  number  of  principles,  among  the 
most  important,  which  it  is  well  to  pause  to  consider. 

"  The  first  of  the  conditions  of  success  in  war  is  POLICY."  This 
proposition  is  certainly  not  one  unknown  to  us.  We  have  so  many 
times  repeated,  under  the  most  various  forms,  that  military  action 
is  inseparable  from  politics,  that  it  is  almost  speaking  a  truism  to 
say  it  again,  so,  in  place  of  a  formal  argument,  I  prefer  to  call 
attention  to  some  striking  and  quite  recent  examples  of  this  close 
dependency. 

Spain  lost  Cuba  through  the  blindest  and  most  improvident  of 

policies ;  blind,  because,  beneath  the  rebellious  outburst  of  the 

islanders,  the  Spanish  government  failed  to  devine  the  hidden 

239 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

action  of  the  United  States ;  improvident,  because,  disdainful  of 
the  storm  which  each  day  grew  blacker,  Spain  was  unwilling  to 
make  any  effort  to  prepare  for  war  and  to  sell  dearly  to  that  nation 
the  most  beautiful  pearl  of  her  colonial  crown. 

How  much  more  foolish  still  perhaps  was  the  Russian  policy  in 
the  Far  East.  To  undertake  economic  expansion,  to  stretch  like  a 
long  arm  an  iron  way  towards  countries  already  coveted  by  neigh- 
bors as  powerful  as  ambitious,  to  begin  as  at  Dalny  a  great  com- 
mercial enterprise  without  developing  along  with  it  the  organism 
of  forces  alone  capable  of  imposing  respect  and  guaranteeing  the 
free  flowering  of  that  work,  was  to  labor  for  the  foreigner  and  to 
follow  a  detestable  policy.  Clausewitz  had  already  very  well  ex- 
plained, moreover,  the  intimate  relationship  between  war  and 
politics. 

This  latter  alone  designates  the  end  which  is  to  be  sought  and 
the  general  means  of  attaining  it,  and  presides,  especially  in  time 
of  peace,  at  their  preparation.  This  justifies  Von  der  Goltz's 
phrase :  "  Without  a  good  policy,  it  is  not  probable  that  a  war  will 
turn  out  fortunate." 

Moral  force  has  no  less  importance  in  his  eyes,  and  he  even 
accentuates  the  opinions  of  his  predecessors  in  this  excellent 
maxim  which  I  have  already  mentioned :  "  It  is  essential  that  the 
commander-in-chief,  as  well  as  th&  troops,  have  the  FIRM  WILL  TO 
CONQUER."  The  memories  of  recent  wars  are  too  present  to  our 
minds  for  us  not  to  understand  the  deep  truth  expressed  by  the 
preceding  lines.  The  lamentations  of  unhappy  Cervera,  an  echo 
of  those  further  off  ones  of  unfortunate  Villeneuve,  the  cowardice 
of  Ouktomsky,  the  moral  weaknesses  of  Enquist  and  Nebogatoff, 
without  mentioning  the  deplorable  state  of  mind  of  their  men, 
point  out  all  these  leaders  for  defeat.  How  could  they  hope  for 
victory  when  in  advance  they  despaired  of  it. 

We  are  now  going  to  find,  from  the  pen  of  the  German  author, 
the  affirmation  of  certain  fundamental  principles  already  known : 
"  The  first  object,  and  the  principal  one,  towards  which  the  move- 
ments of  armies  are\  directed  is  the  hostile  army."  He  thus  assigns 
the  great  first  role  to  battle,  of  all  the  operations  of  war.  "  He 
who  has  on  his  side  superiority  of  numbers  has  a  great  chance  to 
triumph  over  the  adversary."  But  after  formulating  this  maxim, 
he  is  careful,  being  a  man  who  has  cultivated  his  knowledge  by  the 

240 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA: 

constant  study  of  great  wars,  not  to  forget  to  specify  what  is  to  be 
understood  by  the  expression  "  superiority  of  numbers." 

He  explains  first  that  it  cannot  be  a  question  of  comparing  a 
numerous  but  poor  army  with  a  small  but  good  one ;  numerical 
superiority  as  between  two  armies  of  equal  quality  is  what  is 
meant.  This  moreover  is  in  accord  with  common  sense,  and  with 
arithmetical  reasoning,  which  only  admits  into  its  calculations 
units  of  the  same  kind ;  and  it  would  even  seem  idle  to  repeat 
these  commonplace  truths  if  in  our  time  still  they  were  not  con- 
tested a  propos  of  naval  problems. 

The  time  has  but  lately  gone  by  when  a  Minister  of  Marine,  to 
justify  the  construction  of  armorefl  cruisers  of  reduced  size,  relied 
upon  this  more  than  doubtful  aphorism,  that  two  weak  men  are 
worth  as  much  as  one  strong  man.  Beyond  its  lack  of  precision, 
for  wanting  a  measure  it  is  difficult  to  understand  what  is  exactly 
meant  by  weakness  or  by  strength,  both  essentially  relative,  this 
statement  contains  another  capital  error ;  it  is  wholly  sentimental, 
and  we  ought  to  reject  everything  which  is  not  based  upon  the 
experience  of  war.  It  is  to  this  aphorism,  moreover,  that  we  owe 
a  type  of  ship  very  happily  limited  to  three  examples,  and  against 
which  there  was  very  properly  an  almost  unanimous  opinion.  So 
true  is  it  still  that  the  principles  of  the  military  art  apply  admirably 
to  our  apparently  more  special  field.  We  are  therefore  in  agree- 
ment with  Von  der  Goltz  when  he  limits  the  application  of  the  idea 
of  superiority  of  forces  to  forces  of  equal  unit  value. 

After  having  conveyed  this  needful  precision  in  the  definition, 
the  German  military  writer  adds :  "  The  first  and  main  principle 
of  modern  tactics  is  THE  GREATEST  POSSIBLE  NUMBER  OF  MEN 

MUST  BE  BROUGHT  TO  THE  PLACE  WHERE  THE  DECISIVE  BLOW  IS  TO 

BE  STRUCK/'  And  we  find  once  again  as  always  the  true  meaning 
of  superiority  of  forces  in  war. 

We  are  going  to  see  again  likewise,  from  Von  der  Goltz's  pen, 
many  other  ideas  which  are  familiar  to  us ;  those  which  follow  are 
specially  interesting  for  us. 

"  To  make  the  fullest  use  of  all  the  means  at  one's  disposal  is 
the  principle  of  war  at  the  present  time."  These  words  bring  out 
clearly  the  plurality  of  means  of  action  in  war  which  we  have  al- 
ready had  many  occasions  to  remark.  Accordingly  the  same 
author  lays  stress  upon  the  importance  of  wealth  and  of  the  factor 
money  among  the  conditions  of  success,  and  he  adds :  "  Whoever 

241 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

can  sustain  a  war  for  a  long  time  possesses  an  important  guarantee 
of  final  success.''  The  undoubted  value  of  this  principle  can  be 
brought  out  by  historical  examples.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be 
recalled  that  though  England,  in  her  implacable  struggle  against 
Napoleon,  finally  succeeded  in  conquering  him,  the  colossal  mili- 
tary forces  of  the  Emperor,  directed  by  the  greatest  genius  in  war 
that  humanity  has  known,  were  definitely  broken  in  1815  at  least 
as  much  by  the  financial  power  as  by  the  material  forces  of  Great 
Britain. 

Again,  in  the  late  war,  at  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
of  Portsmouth,  a  cloud  was  beginning  to  be  seen  forming  on  the 
political  horizon,  disquieting  to  the  Japanese,  whose  financial  em- 
barrassments, known  to  every  one,  threatened  to  compromise  their 
magnificent  military  exploits.  Nothing  could  show  better  than 
this  very  recent  example  the  power  of  money.  "  The  possession 
of  money,  it  is  true,  is  not  alone  to  be  taken  into  account,  but  also 
the  greater  or  less  facility  for  making  use  of  it.  States  which,  in 
case  of  war,  keep  open  their  sea  communications  have  ways  of 
using  their  credit  quite  other  than  have  those  whose  ports  will  be 
immediately  blockaded.  The  former  will  moreover  be  able  to  have 
recourse  to  foreign  industries  for  the  armament  and  equipment  of 
new  armies.  Without  this  last  resource,  the  government  of  the 
National  Defence  would  never  have  been  able,  in  the  late  war,  to 
constitute  the  formidable  armies  which  astonished  the  whole 
world.  If,  in  1814,  Napoleon  had  had  this  resource,  affairs  would 
have  turned  out  differently.  The  Southerners,  in  the  American 
War  of  Secession,  succumbed  in  spite  of  their  military  superiority, 
because  their  communications  with  the-  sea  had  been  cut.  The 
control  of  the  sea  therefore  contributes  indirectly  to  strengthen  a 
State,  even  if  its  fleets  are  not  able  to  give  direct  aid  to  its  army!' 
It  is  singularly  suggestive  to  see  a  writer  deeply  imbued  with 
military  doctrines,  the  undoubted  exponent  of  the  controlling  idea 
of  the  German  General  Staff,  affirm  so  clearly  the  very  important 
role  assigned  to  the  navy,  when  this  is  so  often  misunderstood, 
not  to  say  denied,  in  France,  even  by  seamen ;  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  Port  Arthur  would  never  have  been  taken  if  the  sea 
had  been  free. 

"  Though  wealth  greatly  augments  strength,  it  only  becomes 
fruitful  if,  AT  THE  PROPER  TIME,  every  sacrifice  is  made."  At  the 
proper  time !  A  world  is  contained  in  those  three  words  ;  all  possi- 

242 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ble  sacrifices  tardily  consented  to  could  not  make  up  for  initial 
negligences.  What  would  the  few  millions  necessary  to  prepare 
a  navy  strong  materially  and  morally  weigh  in  the  balance  of 
Spain's  accounts,  in  comparison  with  the  economic  breakdown 
which  came  to  that  nation  from  the  loss  of  Cuba?  Is  it  possible 
to  compare  the  eight  or  nine  hundred  millions  which  would  have 
been  the  cost  to  Russia  of  the  eighteen  battleships  necessary  to 
insure  the  success  of  her  policy  in  the  Far  East  with  the  thousands 
of  millions  that  an  unfortunate  war  has  made  her  lose,  without 
counting  the  loss  of  her  commercial  influence  in  Chinese  waters? 

In  a  more  familiar  field,  an  insurance  premium  costs  very  little 
in  comparison  with  the  accidents,  fire,  death  or  injury — against 
which  it  is  intended  to  protect  private  interests.  What  then  is 
preparation  for  war  if  not  the  premium  of  insurance  against  the 
risks  of  war,  the  only  efficient  one,  I  must  say,  that  has  thus  far 
been  found,  the  only  one  also,  I  firmly  believe,  that  ever  can  be 
found.  It  is  truly  so  that  the  sense  of  the  expression  "  at  the 
proper  time  "  must  be  understood,  and  it  cannot  be  too  often  re- 
peated that  sacrifices  agreed  to  in  order  to  have  a  powerful  army 
and  navy,  military  forces  in  a  word  capable  of  imposing  respect 
upon  all,  are  a  sure  economy.  The  painful  memory  of  the  loss  of 
two  provinces  and  the  ransom  of  five  milliards  is  enough  to  con- 
vince us  who  are  Frenchmen  of  the  great  importance  of  prepara- 
tion for  war.  May  that  hard  lesson  serve  us  and  teach  us  also  to 
be  prepared  as  regards  naval  war! 

I  have  already  had  occasion,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  to  cite  an 
opinion  of  the  author  we  are  now  considering  on  the  subject  of 
the  offensive. 

After  having  considered  the  comparative  advantages  of  the  de- 
fensive and  offensive,  as  well  as  their  disadvantages,  with  argu- 
ments that  we  already  know  of,  he  finally  pronounces  very  categor- 
ically for  the  latter,  of  which  he  says :  "  The  offensive  requires  a 
greater  activity  than  the  defensive;  that  alone  is  a  great  gain,  for 
of  two  adversaries  otherzvise  equal,  the  one  who  is  the  most  active 
will  conquer." 

The  question  here  is  definitely  as  to  the  influence  of  the  factor 
"  speed." 

That  which  gives  exceptional  value  to  the  military  writers 
whom  we  have  just  reviewed,  and  which  has  led  to  this  very  ex- 
tensive consideration  of  their  opinions,  is  that  those  opinions  are 

243     ' 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  result  of  profound  studies  of  the  experiences  of  great  wars, 
and,  as  far  as  the  two  last  are  concerned,  particularly  of  that  of 
1870,  which  will  long  remain  in  history  as  the  model  of  the  triumph 
of  methodical  preparation  for  war. 

Among  authors  who  have  more  especially  devoted  themselves 
to  the  study  of  naval  warfare,  the  choice  is  more  restricted ;  not 
that  there  is  not  an  abundance  of  naval  writings,  but  quality  is 
rather  rare;  at  least  that  which  we  ought  to  seek  for,  that  is 
sincerity  of  convictions  based  solely  upon  the  experimental  lessons 
of  war.  Before  Tsushima,  for  a  century  there  had  been  few  or  no 
examples  of  naval  battles  truly  worthy  of  the  name ;  perhaps  this 
poverty  of  facts  exclusively  naval  is  the  necessary  explanation  of 
the  result  that  so  many  writers  have  ridden  their  hobbies  instead 
of  endeavoring  to  free  themselves  from  prejudices  and  generalize 
great  principles. 

MAHAN. 

Mahan  won  his  very  great  and  deserved  fame  by  breaking  away 
from  the  sentimental  method,  which  opens  the  door  to  every 
sterile  discussion  and  never  puts  an  end  to  one  of  them. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  I  cannot  pretend  to  present  in  a  few 
pages  the  complete  work  of  the  eminent  American  writer ;  all  of 
it  should  be  read  and  re-read,  and  here  I  must  limit  myself  to  an 
explanation  of  his  theory.  This  appears  in  his  first  pages,  when, 
after  having  recalled  the  respective  advantages  formerly  attributed 
in  battle  to  the  windward  and  leeward  positions,  he  remarks  that 
henceforth  it  is  speed  which  will  permit  taking  the  most  favorable 
position.  It  is  worth  while  in  this  connection  to  recall  the  precise 
terms  by  which  he  indicates  what  should  be  understood  by  supe- 
riority of  speed :  "  This  does  not  mean  only  a  squadron  whose  indi- 
vidual ships  have  superior  speed,  but  also  one  which  has  the 
greatest  uniformity  of  action  through  the  homo  gene  ousness  of  its 
units." 

In  this  sentence  two  fundamental  principles  of  tactics  are  laid 
down:  the  importance  of  speed,  and  the  absolute  necessity,  so 
many  times  recognized,  so  often  unaccomplished,  of  homogeneous 
forces. 

These  two  principles  call  for  some  comments.  In  the  quest  of 
speed  a  chimerical  object  has  only  too  often  been  pursued,  one  in 
all  cases  unprofitable,  and  which  quite  a  large  number  of  writers 
even  of  our  time  define  thus :  the  possibility  of  accepting  or  refus- 
ing battle.  We  already  know  what  is  to  be  thought  of  this  wholly 

244 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

erroneous  conception  of  war,  which  tends  to  reduce  battle  to  the 
part  of  one  solution,  among  many  other  very  different  ones,  of  the 
problem  of  war,  while  it  really  is  the  only  solution.  It  is  therefore 
indispensable  to  dissip'ate  any  possible  misunderstanding  upon  this 
important  point  and  to  explain  how  the  following  sentence  of 
Mahan  must  be  interpreted :  "  The  power  to  assume  the  offensive 
or  to  refuse  battle  .  .  .  ." 

Whoever  is  penetrated  with  the  author's  thought  can  have  no 
doubt  on  this  subject ;  what  he  wished  to  point  out  is  that  superior 
speed  allows  engaging  in  battle  under  the  most  favorable,  chosen 
conditions,  and  remaining  master  of  one's  conduct.  It  is  truly 
thus  that  it  must  be  understood  The  power  of  the  guns,  the 
characteristics  of  the  individual  ships,  carry  with  them  limiting 
firing  distances  within  which  the  conditions  of  the  contest  are 
more  favorable ;  the  relative  position  of  the  sun  is  also  nowadays 
of  great  importance.  All  these  advantages  which  it  is  necessary 
to  strive  to  secure  in  entering  upon  an  engagement,  speed  alone 
can  give.  It  was  speed  that  enabled  Togo  to  turn  the  head  of  the 
Russian  column  at  Tsushima;  it  was  speed  also  to  which  Ito 
owed  his  ability  to  outflank  the  Chinese  right  wing.  Napoleon 
won  his  most  splendid  victories  by  his  constant  use  of  speed  on  the 
battle  field.  But  this  superiority  is  only  real  if  all  the  units  of  the 
naval  force  can  participate  in  it;  it  is  therefore  essential  that  all 
those  units  have  the  same  speed.  That  is  the  proved  truth,  and  a 
great  number  of  leaders  had  already  announced  it  in  all  countries 
before  Mahan.  The  speed  of  a  naval  force  is  always  equal  to  that 
of  the  slowest  ship  which  forms  a  part  of  it.  If  then  I  insist  upon 
this  observation,  it  is  because  this  eternal  truth  seems  to  have 
been  so  little  understood  in  France  that,  even  quite  recently,  the 
characteristics  of  a  great  ship,  the  Ernest-Renan,  were  modified, 
in  the  course  of  her  construction,  to  give  her  an  increase  of  speed. 
Such  measures  cannot  be  too  energetically  condemned,  being  a 
veritable  squandering  of  money,  seeing  that  this  ship,  necessarily 
forming  part  of  a  naval  force  of  slower  ships,  will  presumably  not 
have  the  opportunity  to  make  use  of  this  excess  of  speed.  The 
question  is  too  serious  for  me  not  to  insist  upon  it.  It  is  too  often 
'forgotten  that  a  war  ship  is  of  little  worth  by  itself,  but  is  above  all 
an  individual  in  a  fleet  which,  by  its  assemblage,  alone  constitutes 
material  force. 

I  have  too  often  already  affirmed  the  value  of  speed,  especially 
from  the  strategical  point  of  view,  for  my  opinion  on  this  subject 

245 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

to  be  misinterpreted ;  but  it  must  be  well  understood  that  in  advo- 
cating one  or  another  factor  of  naval  strength,  I  have  in  view  giv- 
ing it  to  the  fleet  and  not  merely  to  an  isolated  ship,  an  absolutely 
fruitless  result. 

It  is  particularly  interesting  to  seek  Mahan's  lesson  in  the  criti- 
cal study  of  the  naval  war  of  1778.  He  first  explains,  with  re- 
markable "clearness,  the  respective  situations  and  aspirations  of 
England  on  one  hand  and  of  the  allied  powers,  France  and  Spain, 
on  the  other,  at  the  opening  of  that  war.  The  legitimate  desire 
of  England  to  preserve  her  American  possessions  logically  placed 
her  in  a  defensive  position.  The  allies,  on  the  contrary,  under  the 
sentimental  pretence  of  aiding  an  oppressed  people  to  secure  its 
independence,  pursued  well  fixed  aims  of  conquest  or  annexation. 
Both,  besides  cherishing  the  hope  of  weakening  the  English  naval 
power  and  thus  taking  revenge  for  past  defeats,  aimed  at  territo- 
rial acquisitions ;  Spain  wished  to  reconquer  Gibraltar  and  Mahon, 
France  had  in  view  the  West  Indies.  These  various  motives  gave 
to  the  policy  of  the  Bourbons  an  offensive  character. 

This  interesting  observation  of  the  American  author  is  ex- 
tremely valuable  for  us,  for  it  will  enable  us  to  define,  with  a  pre- 
cision leaving  no  room  for  confusion,  what  up  to  the  present 
moment  we  have  meant  by  the  expression  "  offensive!' 

I  have  not  wished  to  speak,  in  fact,  of  a  political  offensive,  and 
to  advocate  for  our  country  an  aggressive  attitude  of  adventures 
and  conquests ;  when  we  speak  of  naval  strategy  and  tactics,  there 
can  be  no  question  of  assuming  the  air  of  a  mousquetaire,  fist  on 
hip  and  rolling  eyes.  For  us  the  offensive  is  merely  a  method  of 
making  war,  which  has  given  its  proofs,  and  which,  on  that  ac- 
count, appears  to  me  wholly  worthy  of  recommendation  when  it 
becomes  necessary  to  make  war,  whatever  the  character  of  the 
causes  which  have  brought  on  war,  even  should  it  be  purely  defen- 
sive. A  people  has  the  duty  not  to  attack  its  neighbors,  but  it  has 
no  right  not  to  know  how  to  make  war,  if  it  is  attacked. 

And  the  observation  is  the  more  essential  to  make  because,  by  a 
truly  disconcerting  contradiction,  while  the  political  objective  of 
the  allies  in  1778  was  so  frankly  offensive,  the  means  employed  by 
them  in  the  conduct  of  operations  preserved  to  the  end  the  de- 
fensive character.  The  English,  on  the  contrary,  adopted  most 
frequently  offensive  action.  As  may  be  seen,  it  was  not  useless  to 
elucidate  this  important  point. 

As  Mahan  very  justly  observes,  it  would  have  been  necessary, 

246 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

in  order  to  satisfy  the  objects  of  the  war  as  conceived  by  the 
allies,  to  seek  above  all  naval  supremacy,  particularly  in  the  West 
Indies,  in  general  over  the  whole  theater  of  the  war.  Every  con- 
quest made  without  this  primary  condition  could  have  evidently 
only  a  provisional  and  precarious  character ;  it  could  only  be  con- 
sidered definitive  when  the  English  war  flag  had  disappeared  from 
the  seas.  The  American  writer  is  very  right  then  to  say  that  "  the 
key  of  the  situation  in  the  West  Indies  was  the  fleet."  The 
struggle  against  the  English  naval  forces  was  truly  therefore  the 
principal  objective;  not  only  in  the  West  Indies,  but  also  in  the 
Indian  Ocean,  the  only  point  of  the  theater  of  war,  as  it  happened, 
where  the  chief  of  the  French  na*Val  forces  perceived  this  fact  and 
acted  accordingly.  The  taking  of  Trincomalee  was  not  in  deroga- 
tion of  this  principle ;  it  was  made  necessary  by  the  urgent  need, 
with  a  view  to  facilitating  the  offensive  against  the  English  squad- 
rons, of  giving  to  the  French  fleet  a  base  of  operations  which  it 
lacked,  and  of  allowing  it  to  shelter  itself  during  the  stormy  sea- 
son of  the  northeast  monsoon.  Suffren,  with  his  inspired  under- 
standing of  the  affairs  of  war,  well  knew  this  and  chose  his  point 
still  better,  to  windward  of  his  field  of  operations.  He  knew  how, 
moreover,  lacking  complete  command  of  the  sea,  skilfully  to  profit 
by  the  absence  of  his  adversary ;  this  exception  is  a  wonderful  con- 
firmation of  the  rule. 

The  errors  committed  by  England  in  the  course  of  this  war 
nevertheless  gave  the  allies  fine  opportunities.  The  total  naval 
forces  being  nearly  equal  on  the  two  sides  as  far  as  material  was 
concerned,  that  is  in  number  of  ships,  and  that  to  England's  disad- 
vantage, on  account  of  the  number  of  points  where  her  interests 
were  threatened,  that  power  committed  the  error  of  dividing  her 
forces  to  make  head  at  too  many  points,  and  also  the  error  of 
attempting,  by  continual  convoys  of  troops,  to  retain  her  American 
colony  under  her  dominion. 

With  skilful  leadership,  the  allies  had  therefore  the  best  chance ; 
but  for  that  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  break  with  established 
traditions  and  routines ;  I  ought  to  say,  more  exactly,  to  do  what 
the  government  as  well  as  the  leaders  of  the  two  countries  were 
incapable  of. 

On  Spain's  side,  her  obstinate  determination  to  retain  her  ships 
near  Gibraltar,  in  the  chimerical  hope  of  making  that  rock  fall 
into  her  hands,  and  also  the  independent  pursuit  of  her  personal 
aims  in  the  Floridas,  for  example,  had  an  evil  influence  on  the 

247 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

necessary  military  work.  In  the  councils  of  that  nation,  no  author- 
itative voice  was  raised  to  make  it  understood  that  the  rock  of 
Gibraltar  would  much  more  surely  become  again  national  terri- 
tory if  the  English  naval  forces  which  were  its  sole  bond  of  union 
with  Great  Britain  were  destroyed,  and  that,  by  this  same  prelimi- 
nary result,  the  world-wide  ambitions  of  the  nation  would  be  sat- 
isfied with  more  certainty. 

On  the  side  of  France,  though  there  was  greater  loyalty  in  the 
execution  of  the  alliance,  there  was  no  greater  sense  of  the  true 
plan  of  the  war.  To  speak  truly,  the  directing  authorities  were 
.wholly  under  the  influence  of  that  ill-omened  and  ancient  tradi- 
tion which  placed  first  among  the  objectives  of  war  the  pursuit  of 
enterprises  of  annexation  or  of  conquest,  or  the  execution  of  a 
mission,  and  relegated  battle  to  a  secondary  place. 

Thus  were  found  united  more  conditions  of  weakness  than  need- 
ful to  explain  how,  possessing  in  reality  superiority  of  numbers  at 
several  points  of  the  theater  of  war,  the  allies  never  had  the  idea 
of  profiting  thereby  to  beat  the  English  naval  forces ;  thus  to  con- 
quer command  of  the  sea  and  to  assure  in  that  way  the  success  of 
all  their  claims. 

Offensive  in  its  proper  character,  their  war  was  defensive  in  its 
execution,  and  for  that  very  reason  fruitless. 

THE  ENGLISH  TRADITION. 

Instructed  by  her  own  errors  in  the  course  of  this  war  of  Amer- 
ican Independence,  England  was  resolutely  to  take  the  offensive 
twenty  years  later  and  to  compose  thus,  from  1798  to  1805,  the 
most  glorious  pages  of  her  naval  history.  The  examples  of  Nel- 
son's method,  cited  many  times  in  Mahan's  fine  work,  although  the 
campaigns  of  the  great  English  admiral  were  subsequent  to  the 
period  which  is  there  specially  considered,  show  with  sufficient 
eloquence,  without  more  direct  quotations,  the'  doctrine  of  the 
American  publicist.  It  is  wholly  contained  in  one  simple  formula : 
battle  with  the  enemy  afloat. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  actual  successors  of  the  English 
admirals  of  1805,  and  in  ;i  more  general  way  the  English  Ad- 
miralty, have  piously  conserved  the  tradition  to  which  their  coun- 
try incontestably  owes  its  extraordinary  power  in  the  world.  I 
wish  no  better  proof  than  the  following  words,  taken  from  an 
essay  of  1898  by  Commander  Ballard,  crowned  by  the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution,  on  the  protection  of  English  commerce 

248 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

in  time  of  war :  "Those  who  have  thought  on  the  matter  at  all  will 
probably  agree  that  the  necessary  basis  of  any  protection  whatever 
must  be  a  sufficient  superiority  in  battleships  on  our  part  to  de- 
stroy, capture  or  blockade  in  their  own  ports  the  main  squadrons 
of  the  enemy  as  in  former  wars,  which  in  itself  would  constitute 
the  chief  source  of  safety  to  our  shipping,  and  without  which  it 
would  be  idle  to  talk  of  commerce  existing  at  all,  ....  unless 
(the  destruction  or  blockade  of  the  enemy's  squadrons  be)  success- 
fully effected,  it  would  be  useless  to  attempt  anything  else." 

"  It  obviously  follows,  however,  that  the  more  thoroughly  their 
duty  of  watching  the  enemy  is  performed,  the  greater  this  pro- 
tection will  be;  indeed,  the  opitfion  is  apparently  held  in  some 
quarters  that  this  is  all  that  is  required." 

There  is  the  doctrine  faithfully  transmitted  for  a  century,  and 
it  is  the  true  one.  No  example  could  show  better  than  this  the 
striking  truth.  When  interests  of  any  sort  are  threatened,  one 
can  choose,  to  protect  them,  between  two  systems,  and  only  two ; 
either  to  defend  them  directly  by  covering  them  with  a  force 
sufficient  to  impose  respect,  or  better  still  to  destroy  the  menace 
itself.  At  the  risk  of  appearing  to  make  a  comparison  a  little 
homely,  I  will  say  that  if  the  conditions  of  our  private  life  obliged 
us  to  return  home  late  at  night,  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  prowlers, 
two  procedures  of  self  defence  would  likewise  be  available  for  us. 
We  might  wear  constantly  a  coat  of  mail ;  but  it  would  be  equally 
permissible  to  supply  ourselves  with  a  good  revolver,  a  stout  cud- 
gel, or  even,  in  this  time  of  admiration  for  everything  Japanese, 
to  take  lessons  in  Jiu-jitsu,  to  put  the  said  robbers  promptly  out 
of  condition  to  harm  us.  The  second  procedure,  which  is  no  other 
than  the  defensive  offensive,  is  assuredly  the  better ;  who  could 
say,  moreover,  that  the  coat  of  mail  would  not  have  a  flaw  ?  In  the 
case  of  the  protection  of  the  English  commerce,  the  immense  net- 
work of  which  covers  the  whole  surface  of  the  seas,  what  protect- 
ing bands  of  ships  of  war  could  be  great  enough  not  to  have  flaws  ? 

In  Commander  Ballard's  viewr,  initial  protection  by  the  previous 
conquest  of  command  of  the  sea  is  a  settled  question.  So  his 
essay  considers  only  the  protection  of  commerce  against  the  iso- 
lated and  momentary  action  of  a  few  cruisers  that  have  accidentally 
succeeded  in  escaping  the  watchfulness  of  the  blockading  forces. 

This  is  the  same  fundamental  principle  that  Lord  Balfour 
adopted,  with  strong  conviction,  scarcely  a  few  months  ago,  when, 
in  the  English  Parliament,  replying  to  a  question  concerning  the 

249 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

defence  of  the  British  coast,  he  affirmed  that  so  long  as  the  Eng- 
lish squadrons  held  the  uncontested  supremacy  of  the  seas  there 
was  no  need  at  all  to  seek  a  better  arm  of  defence.  Oh !  I  know 
very  well  that  those  who  judge  superficially,  or  those  who  do  not 
wish  to  see,  will  not  fail  to  challenge  this  so  English  a  doctrine  on 
the  pretext  that  the  English  navy,  having  strength  and  numbers, 
has  an  evident  interest  in  its  adoption.  This  doctrine  is  in  no  way 
the  monopoly  of  one  nation ;  it  is  impersonal,  and  for  that  reason 
it  compels  acceptance.  We  have  seen  it  thoroughly  expounded  by 
military  writers,  outside  of  any  naval  consideration,  and  finally  if 
the  English  have  adopted  it,  that  is  because  by  it  they  have  always 
remained  victors. 

Furthermore,  the  German  generals  or  writers  of  the  present 
day,  Von  der  Goltz,  Janson,  Verdy  du  Vernois,  etc.,  have  adopted 
this  same  doctrine  and  demand,  with  the  Emperor,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  powerful  offensive  navy. 

This  conviction  imposes  itself  on  our  minds  with  such  force  that 
if  I  revert  to  the  conclusions  of  these  two  last  chapters  I  am  al- 
most afraid  again  to  have  heaped  up  commonplaces,  so  evident  do 
these  truths  appear.  In  the  preceding  chapter  I  allowed  the  facts 
of  history  themselves  to  speak ;  in  this  one  I  have  gathered  together 
the  words  of  the  most  justly  authoritative  writers ;  it  cannot  then 
be  a  chance  result  that  the  conclusions  are  so  concordant. 

Another  thought  is  worthy  of  our  consideration;  if  so  many 
illustrious  warriors,  if  so  many  famous  military  writers,  for  a 
century  past  and  still  in  our  time,  have  felt  obliged  to  continue  to 
express  certain  ideas  under  forms  scarcely  different  one  from  the 
other,  it  cannot  be  for  the  vain  satisfaction  of  reproducing  them. 
If  they  have  not  feared  to  keep  on  repeating  them,  it  is  because 
they  had  the  profound  conviction  that  these  truths  demand  more 
than  a  passing  and  as  it  were  complaisant  acceptance,  and  that  they 
ought  definitely  to  establish  themselves  in  minds  with  the  irrisist- 
ible  force  of  dogmas. 

This  result  attained  permits,  and  this  alone  permits,  in  examin- 
ing any  military  situation,  perceiving  the  errors  committed  at  the 
same  time  as  the  appropriate  remedies. 

THE  FRENCH  SYSTEM. 

I  have  believed  it  a  duty  to  insist  so  much  upon  principles  appar- 
ently so  simple,  because  at  this  very  moment  there  appears  to  be  a 
persistent  tendency  to  return  to  the  ill-omened  ideas  of  Rama- 
tuelle,  to  which  it  is  attempted  to  give  a  new  birth. 

250 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  almost  forgotten  personality  of  this  naval  writer  is  of  little 
importance ;  it  is  his  ideas  which  I  regard  as  deplorable  and  which 
I  combat  with  the  fiercest  energy ;  for  they  would  lead  us  straight 
to  defeat  as  they  led  our  fathers  there. 

In  expressing  them,  moreover,  he  has  only  reflected  the  state  of 
mind  of  the  French  sailors  of  the  i8th  century,  I  might  almost  say 
of  every  period,  which  makes  it  all  the  more  necessary  to  destroy 
forever  those  ancient  fallacies. 

Mahan  has  himself  called  attention  to  this  strange  doctrine, 
and  quoted  the  following  words  of  Ramatuelle :  "  The  French  navy 
has  always  preferred  the  glory  of  assuring  or  preserving  a  con- 
quest to  that  more  brilliant  perhaps,  but  actually  less  real,  of  cap- 
turing some  ships,  and  therein  has  approached  more  nearly  what 
should  be  regarded  as  the  true  end  of  war.  What,  in  fact,  could 
the  loss  of  a  few  ships  matter  to  the  English?  The  essential  point 
is  to  attack  them  in  their  possessions,  the  immediate  source  of 
their  commercial  wealth  and  their  naval  power." 

It  is  well  known  what  results  we  got,  a  hundred  years  ago,  from 
such  a  conception  of  war.  By  conquering  Egypt  Bonaparte  at- 
tacked England  directly  in  her  possessions,  for  he  thereby  threat- 
ened the  route  to  India ;  he  thought  that  he  could  do  so  without 
regard  to  the  active  naval  forces  of  England.  This  initial  error, 
in  conjunction  with  Bruey's  lethargy,  brought  about  Aboukir. 
The  same  forgetfulness  of  this  fundamental  truth,  that  before  all 
else  the  fleet  constitutes  the  effective  force,  led  Villeneuve  to 
Cadiz  and  Trafalgar. 

These  ideas  of  Ramatuelle  are  moreover  directly  contradictory 
of  the  sentence  with  which  he  begins  the  chapter  of  his  work  which 
is  entitled :  On  Battle.  "  The  battles  by  which  the  great  quarrels 
of  nations  and  sovereigns  ARE  ENDED  are  the  direct  and  final  object 
of  all  military  tactics." 

There  is  nothing  to  be  objected  to  in  this  definition,  which  em- 
phasizes the  preponderant  role  of  battle  in  the  problem  of  war. 
It  indicates,  in  fact,  that  by  it,  and  by  it  alone,  are  conflicts  settled. 
And  it  is  quite  surprising  to  find  again,  from  this  pen,  the  very 
logical  idea  that  the  breaking  of  the  equilibrium  of  the  opposing 
forces  alone  is  capable  of  putting  an  end  to  the  struggle ;  for  after 
all,  as  long  as  that  equilibrium  lasts,  that  is  to  say  until  the  meet- 
ing of  the  forces  has  occurred,  how  could  it  be  hoped  "  to  assure 
or  preserve  a  conquest,"  as  is  counseled  in  the  preceding  quota- 

251 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tion?     It  is  therefore  by  a  curious  irony  of  fate  that  we  borrow 
from  Ramatuelle  himself  the  logical  conclusion  of  this  chapter. 

The  aim  as  well  as  the  principal  objective  of  war,  the  surest  way 
of  fulfilling  its  objects,  is  and  always  will  be  battle,  and  by  its 
means  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  afloat. 

NECESSITY  OF  AN  INITIAL  DOCTRINE. 

Before  ending  this  chapter,  it  seems  to  me  quite  indispensable  to 
go  back  to  the  motives  which  led  me  to  choose  the  method  of  ex- 
position of  naval  strategy  and  tactics  which  I  am  following,  in 
order  to  point  out  its  precise  scope  and  to  dissipate  all  causes  of 
misunderstanding  which  might  arise  on  that  subject.  I  made  my 
choice  deliberately  and  after  careful  thought.  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  I  recall,  that  I  could  have  decided  upon  another  and 
quite  different  method,  which  consists  of  taking  a  particular  war 
or  battle,  of  investigating  it  to  the  smallest  details,  of  bringing  out 
the  errors  made  as  well  as  the  operations  which  were  correct,  and 
finally  showing  the  acts  which  would  have  modified  the  results, 
in  order  to  derive  from  all  this  an  important  military  lesson.  This 
method  is  the  one  followed  in  most  military  works  in  which  a  cam- 
paign is  thoroughly  studied.  It  is  also  that  of  the  Military  Acad- 
emy of  Berlin.  These  two  facts  can  hardly  fail  to  raise  some 
doubts,  and  that  is  why  I  think  that  I  ought  to  explain  my  position 
as  clearly  as  possible. 

Such  a  method,  assuredly  the  most  perfect  for  teaching  the  mili- 
tary art,  requires,  to  be  fruitful,  one  absolutely  necessary  prelimi- 
nary condition ;  that  is  that  all  to  whom  it  is  applied  possess  a 
certain  minimum  store  of  ideas  in  common  regarding  the  most 
essential  truths.  It  is  this  that  General  Bonrial  wishes  to  express 
when  he  says:  "Initiative,  that  quality  of  character  which  nothing 
can  replace,  can  act  usefully  only  to  the  extent  that  it  is  directed 
by  community  of  thought;  in  other  words  by  a  doctrine  common 
to  all  the  members  of  the  army."  In  his  The  Nation  Armed,  Von 
der  Goltz  also  writes :  "  The  principles  of  Napoleon  form  even  to 
this  day  the  basis  of  our  doctrine." 

And  at  once  the  question  arises  whether  we  have  attained  in  the 
navy  to  this  community  of  thought,  to  this  general  orientation  of 
minds  towards  a  single  doctrine,  without  which  military  studies 
lack  a  base. 

To  reply  to  this  question,  it  is  sufficient  to  propose  for  general 
consideration  a  concrete  problem,  as  for  example  that  of  the  most 

252 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

efficient  means  to  be  used  to  sustain  a  war  with  England,  with  the 
naval  resources,  truly  very  inferior  to  hers,  now  at  our  disposal. 
The  most  widely  different  solutions,  and  often  even  the  most  unex- 
pected, will  be  found  proposed.  I  have  myself  brought  together 
numerous  examples  of  them,  and  yet,  if  we  truly  possessed  a 
doctrine,  there  ought  not  to  be  any  divergence  of  views  as  to  the 
principles  themselves  of  this  war.  I  showed  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter that  regarding  another  general  principle,  that  of  the  objective 
which  Rozhestvensky  ought  to  have  fixed  upon,  there  was  also 
no  agreement.  If  then,  upon  propositions  so  fundamental,  there 
is  no  community  of  thought,  what  conclusion  can  be  drawn  except 
that  naval  minds  are  not  yet  ripe  for  a  wholly  rational  instruction 
in  the  military  art  ?  We  need  not  be  surprised  at  this ;  the  Naval 
War  College  is  of  too  recent  creation  to  have  been  able  in  so  few 
years  to  impose  upon  all  in  our  corps,  I  will  even  say  upon  all  the 
officers  who  have  had  the  advantage  of  its  instruction,  that  unity 
of  views  and  conceptions  which,  in  all  the  problems  of  war,  dic- 
tates to  all,  by  its  irresistible  obsession,  the  same  solutions. 

It  is  not  just  then  to  compare  the  methods  of  teaching  adopted 
at  this  time  in  the  two  war  colleges  of  the  army  and  of  the  navy. 
To  make  a  few  comparisons,  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  back  to 
what  the  Army  War  College  was  only  a  few  years  after  1870. 

General  Bonnal  informs  us  regarding  this  in  the  following 
words  which  date  from  1892,  twenty-two  years  after  the  "  terrible 
year  " :  "  The  ignorance,  which  reigned  in  our  army  of  1870,  in 
the  matter  of  practical  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  war,  is  known  to 
every  one." 

"  The  lesson  which  events  have  given  to  us  has  not  been  lost; 
for  never,  at  any  epoch  of  our  history,  has  an  activity  been  seen 
comparable  to  that  which  manifested  itself  after  the  late  war. 

"  Confused  in  the  beginning,  ideas  have  little  by  little  formed 
themselves  into  groups  about  a  few  great  principles  of  experience 
that  have  formed  the  basis  of  a  doctrine  aiming  at  discipline  of  the 
mind,  to-day  in  full  period  of  development,  in  which  the  War 
College  has  taken  a  large  part. 

"  A  doctrine  of  war  does  not  impose  itself ;  it  is  born  of  the 
unanimous  concurrence  of  understandings  under  the  empire  of 
convictions  PROGRESSIVELY  acquired." 

The  idea  could  not  be  better  expressed,  especially  to  show  the 
needfulness  of  time  for  accomplishing  a  lasting  work  in  any  mili- 
tary institution. 

253 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

That  of  the  Military  Academy  of  Berlin,  which  has  conducted 
the  German  army  to  the  wonderful  results  we  know  of,  did  not 
escape  from  this  natural  rule.  In  1806,  Scharnhorst,  who  was  the 
real  promoter  of  the  new  methods,  adopted  the  study  of  Napo- 
leon's campaigns  as  the  course  of  instruction  of  the  academy.  But 
the  true  masters  of  the  German  General  Staff  were  beyond  con- 
tradiction Clausewitz  and  Willisen :  it  is  they  who  brought  forth, 
from  the  constant  study  of  the  philosophy  of  the  facts  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  the  whole  body  of  doctrines  with  which  the 
German  army  is  so  thoroughly  indoctrinated,  and  by  which 
Marshall  v.  Moltke  profited  so  wonderfully. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  patient  labor  of  adaptation  has 
required  no  less  than  half  a  century ;  and  this  observation  enables 
us  to  estimate  the  part  necessarily  played  by  time  in  the  long 
drawn-out  work  of  preparation  for  war,  especially  if  it  "is  needful 
to  discipline  ideas,  as  is  urgently  the  case  in  our  navy. 

If  Von  Moltke  was  able  to  perfect  the  method  which  he  had  in- 
herited from  his  predecessors,  first  by  twofold  exercises  on  the 
map  and  in  the  field,  and  then  by  still  more  profound  critical 
examinations  of  the  campaigns  of  the  "  great  master,"  it  is  be- 
cause, more  favored  than  his  predecessors,  he  knew  the  orders  and 
intentions  as  well  as  the  principal  instructions  of  Napoleon.  In 
the  comparison  of  the  great  captain's  directing  thought  and  its 
execution,  he  found  the  elements  of  a  marvelous  teaching. 

The  mode  of  procedure  is  not  otherwise  to-day  in  the  French 
army,  and  there  will  surely  come  a  time,  not  far  off,  when  we  shall 
be  inspired  by  a  similar  method  in  the  navy.  But  for  the  moment 
a  more  pressing  need,  let  it  not  be  forgotten,  claims  our  whole 
attention  ;  let  us  learn  to  think  in  the  same  way  about  fundamental 
truths,  and  when  this  result  is  attained,  the  French  navy  also  will 
be  in  possession  of  a  doctrine. 

Yet  it  must  be  observed  in  closing  that  even  to  this  day  no  har- 
vest nearly  so  abundant  as  those  of  the  wars  of  the  Consulate  and 
the  Empire  is  offered  to  us  in  the  field  of  naval  warfare.  I 
can  see,  in  modern  times,  only  the  Russo-Japanese  war  and  the 
battle  of  Tsushima  which  are  of  sufficient  scope  to  furnish  a  rea- 
sonable instruction.  To  utilize  them  fully  it  will  be  necessary 
to  wait  for  a  knowledge  of  a  great  number  of  details  which  remain 
very  obscure  and  especially  of  what  the  motives  of  the  comman- 
ders-in-chief  were. 


254 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

GENERAL  POLICY  OF  NATIONS;   ITS   CLOSE   CONNECTION   WITH 
STRATEGY.     APPLICATION  TO  THE  FRENCH   NAVY  :  HERED- 
ITARY ADVERSARIES  ;  ENGLISH  POLICY  ;  GERMAN  POLICY  ; 
NEW   NATIONS. 

It  is  chiefly  in  taking  up  this  chapter  that  I  feel  all  the  difficulties 
of  my  task.  In  the  short  space  at*rny  disposal,  I  ought  to  pass  in 
review  all  the  elements  which  make  up  the  foreign  policy  of  a 
great  nation,  to  show  how  it  acts  as  the  motive  and  regulator  of 
strategy.  This  magnificent  study,  too  vast  for  our  limited  pro- 
gram, would  moreover  exceed  my  ability.  And  yet  it  is  indispen- 
sable for  me  to  show,  were  it  only  in  a  brief  statement,  the  intimate 
connection  which  makes  military  conceptions  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  political  conceptions.  There  is  no  study  of  strategy  pos- 
sible without  that.  It  has  become  a  common  saying  that :  "  A 
tiation  must  have  the  fleet  which  corresponds  to  its  policy.''  To 
understand  the  full  value  of  this  expression,  it  suffices  to  imagine 
the  two  extreme  possible  conclusions  of  the  policy  of  a  given 
nation :  conflict  with  England  or  with  the  Swiss  Confederation. 
And  at  once  it  is  clearly  apparent,  not  only  that  the  conduct  of  the 
war  evidently  cannot  be  the  same  in  the  one  as  in  the  other  case, 
but  furthermore  that,  between  these  two  limiting  cases  of  an  ex- 
clusively naval  power  and  another  with  land  forces  only,  there 
exists  an  infinity  of  mixed  solutions  in  which  the  relative  value  of 
the  naval  force  is  more  or  less  great  in  comparison  with  the  total 
military  force. 

The  point  of  departure  being  thus  clearly  defined,  it  results 
therefrom  that  the  future  conduct  of  the  operations  of  war,  de- 
pending necessarily  upon  the  composition  of  the  adversary's 
forces,  demands  prior  knowledge  of  the  political  objectives.  There 
is  no  possible  strategy,  using  the  expression  in  its  broadest  sense, 
that  is  in  its  relation  with  preparation  for  war  during  peace  times 
as  well  as  in  its  connection  with  the  direction  given  to  actual  opera- 
tions, unless  at  the  very  beginning  the  probable  adversary  or  ad- 
versaries are  known.  Even  more,  it  is  usually  from  the  prior 

255 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

political  action  that  military  strategy  derives  its  fundamental  prem- 
ises, knowledge  of  the  enemy,  of  his  weak  points  as  well  as  of 
the  resources  at  his  disposal,  of  his  moral  state  as  well  as  of  his 
material  situation ;  in  short  all  the  information  the  utilization  of 
which  is  the  most  valuable  element  in  success.  Finally,  it  is 
through  politics  alone  that  the  military  art  can  emerge  from  pure 
abstraction,  wholly  speculative,  to  solve  concrete  cases ;  it  is  poli- 
tics which  makes  it  fruitful. 

The  very  foundations  of  the  military  structure  rest  then  upon 
the  precise  designation  of  the  nations  with  which  causes  of  conflict 
are  permanent  or  even  liable  to  occur.  And  it  is  because  the  study 
of  strategy  would  be  absolutely  sterile  without  this  essential  datum 
that  I  have  undertaken  to  write  this  chapter. 

I  scarcely  need  to  observe  that  I  have  no  means  of  knowing  the 
government's  ideas.  The  following  ideas,  therefore,  should  be 
taken  only  as  the  statement  of  my  personal  views.  For  that  very 
reason,  doubtless,  they  will  lose  much  of  their  influence,  but  still 
they  will  not  have  been  useless  if,  even  taken  as  mere  hypotheses, 
they  serve  to  indicate  the  method.  Truly  also  I  would  have  hesi- 
tated to  express  my  full  thought  if  at  home  or  abroad  anyone  could 
be  led  to  see  in  it  the  reflection  of  that  which  inspires  and  directs, 
in  a  practical  way,  French  politics. 

THE  BRITISH  POLICY. 

As  soon  as  the  problem  is  set  to  ascertain  in  what  possible  con- 
flicts our  country  can  find  itself  involved,  our  thought  inevitably 
turns  towards  England,  not  only  from  sentimental  suggestion, 
under  the  influence  of  the  acute  memory  of  past  defeats,  but  espe- 
cially from  intuition  of  the  aggressive  maritime  role  which  her 
privileged  insular  position,  as  well  as  her  immemorial  policy,  as- 
sign to  that  nation  in  respect  to  all  other  aspirants  to  economic 
power. 

Doubtless  for  us  seamen,  and  especially  for  the  populations  of 
the  Channel  coast,  at  Dunkirk,  Calais,  Boulogne,  etc.,  who  have 
preserved  so  vividly,  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  two  centuries, 
the  hated  memory  of  the  invader,  the  English  represent  always  the 
hereditary  enemy;  but  in  our  utilitarian  epoch  these  traditions 
would  not  be  enough  to  justify  counsels  of  military  preparation 
against  Great  Britain,  if  motives  of  a  more  urgent  nature  did  not 
compel  us  to  face  war  with  her  as  an  eventuality  never  to  be 
overlooked. 

256 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

At  the  very  moment  when,  on  both  sides  of  the  Channel,  people 
seem  to  be  celebrating  with  equal  enthusiasm  the  benefits  of  the 
entente  cordiale,  hailed  as  the  symbol  of  an  indestructible  peace 
between  two  nations,  formerly  irreconcilable,  my  words  appear  a 
rude  interruption  of  the  general  rejoicing. 

"  Embrassons  nous,  Folleville."  So  let  it  be,  provided  it  be  on 
the  condition  that  we  forget  nothing  of  the  past ;  I  do  not  mean 
the  resentments  unworthy  of  a  great  nation  conscious  of  its 
strength  and  master  of  its  destinies,  but  the  lessons  which  that 
past  contains,  as  well  as  the  warnings  which  it  gives  us  against 
the  menace  of  the  future. 

The  attentive  study  of  that  past'is  in  fact  singularly  suggestive, 
and  marvelously  illumines  the  motives  of  British  policy.  Finding 
there  the  evidence  of  many  other  ententes  cordiales,  we  are  nat- 
urally led  to  accord  to  the  one  of  1905  the  exact  value  which  it 
ought  to  have,  that  of  an  accidental  agreement  which  will  last,  like 
the  preceding  ones,  as  long  as  the  economic  development  of  France 
does  not  give  offence  to  her  powerful  neighbor. 

It  is  well  to  observe  first  of  all  that  geographic  conditions  have 
fixed  the  destinies  of  England.  Her  dwelling  on  an  island  of 
harsh  climate  predestined  her  people  to  hardy  enterprises,  to  con- 
tinuous maritime  expansion.  What  her  first  inhabitants  were  led 
to  do,  at  first  by  the  necessity  of  going  to  seek  afar  off  the  essential 
objects  which  they  lacked,  then  to  engage  in  barter,  and  even  to 
secure  the  wood  necessary  for  the  construction  of  their  ships,  their 
successors  continued  to  do,  to  increase  the  wealth  of  their  country 
and  finally  to  sustain  their  traditions  of  conquest. 

The  first  manifestations  of  a  policy  which  still  endures  in  our 
day,  after  having  proved  by  a  long  continuity  of  effort  the  mari- 
time and  commercial  genius  of  England,  go  back  to  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth.  * 

The  enjoyment  of  a  long  peace  allowed  English  commerce  to 
take  an  unexpected  development.  Thanks  to  an  activity  unknown 
till  then,  their  enterprises  were  each  day  extended  further,  until 
they  reached  the  borders  of  the  new  world,  whither  they  were 
drawn  by  legendary  stories  of  unimaginable  riches.  In  this  new 
field  a  prior  occupant  had  seated  himself,  and  a  rivalry,  daughter 
of  the  ancient  quarrel  of  Rome  and  Carthage,  was  fatally  to  arise 
between  the  fortunate  possessor  and  the  new  comer  with  long 
teeth. 

257 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

THE  DOWNFALL  OF  SPAIN. 

This  first  phase  of  England's  long  struggle  for  the  conquest  of 
maritime  empire  had  for  objective  the  destruction  of  the  till  then 
uncontested  naval  supremacy  of  Spain.  That  nation,  then  the  first 
in  Europe,  assumed  to  forbid  English  commerce  to  take  its  share 
of  the  incalculable  riches  with  which  she  herself  loaded  her  gal- 
leons. The  rights  which  she  invoked  to  support  her  claim  to  this 
monopoly  were  weak  indeed,  unless  supported  by  the  most  power- 
ful of  all ;  that  which  might  gives.  What  truly  could  a  solemn 
Bull  of  the  Pope  count  in  the  eyes  of  a  bold  and  enterprising  peo- 
ple, having  the  blood  of  the  Normans,  and  already  conscious  of  its 
vocation  as  well  as  of  its  strength?  It  was  necessary,  as  in  the 
time  of  the. Punic  wars,  that  one  of  the  two  maritime  powers 
should  make  way  for  the  other,  since  the  world  was  not  vast 
enough  to  satisfy  them  both. 

Such  is  in  fact  the  true  origin  of  a  conflict  that  ended  in  the 
effacement  of  the  first  great  maritime  power  which  the  world-wide 
British  expansion  met  in  its  path.  Spain's  pretension  to  preserve 
her  monopoly  was  only  the  outward  pretext  of  this  struggle. 

A  great  seaman,  Drake,  was  the  instrument  of  England's  policy, 
as  Nelson  was  likewise  to  be  two  centuries  later.  Drake  captured 
San  Domingo  and  ravaged  the  coasts  of  Spain,  notably  Cadiz  as 
well  as  Carthagena,  which  he  reduced.  Philip  II  armed  the  Invin- 
cible Armada,  in  1588,  to  avenge  these  depredations,  and  especially 
to  crush  this  young  and  very  pushing  rival.  The  Spanish  fleet  had 
superiority  of  numbers,  but  only  the  appearance  of  strength.  Dis- 
persed by  a  storm  in  the  Channel,  after  an  indecisive  naval  battle 
off  Gravelines,  it  disappeared  as  a  naval  force,  and  with  it  was 
likewise  wrecked  Spain's  maritime  supremacy.  It.  is  from  this 
period,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  ever  growing  power  of  England 
dates  its  awakening.  And  this  date  is  the  more  interesting  to 
observe  because  it  marks  the  birth  of  a  new  method  of  naval  war 
which  the  English  nation  will  so  well  succeed  in  appropriating 
and  making  profitable  that  to  it  she  will  owe  the  secret  of  her  un- 
exampled prosperity. 

To  the  great  Armada,  the  English  fleet  could  oppose  only  ap- 
proximately equal  forces  in  respect  to  numbers  of  men  and  ships ; 
perhaps  the  Spanish  ships  might  even  be  thought  the  stronger. 
But  the  preparation  was  far  from  being  equal  on  the  two  sides ; 
the  Spanish  vessels  were  less  well  armed ;  and,  finally  and  more 

258 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

important  than  anything"  else,  the  better  trained  English  crews 
were  greatly  the  superior.  In  short,  the  moral  forces  of  every 
nature  were  the  greater  on  the  English  side,  and,  as  always,  they 
inclined  the  balance  of  fortune. 

We  already  have  a  clear  grasp  on  the  idea  of  the  primary  im- 
portance of  preparation  for  war.  The  intoxication  of  riches  ac- 
quired without  reckoning,  the  indolence  which  comes  from  their 
too  long  enjoyment,  the  careless  peace  of  mind  derived  from  a 
monopoly  so  long  uncontested,  had  made  Spain  forget  that  a  for- 
midable force  alone  is  capable  of  restraining  dangerous  desires. 

Until  the  last  years  of  Elizabeth's  reign,  in  spite  of  the  battle  of 
Gravelines  and  the  attempt  of  the  Armada,  the  character  of  the 
English-Spanish  hostilities  was  rather  that  of  a  war  of  commerce- 
destroying  than  that  of  a  war  of  great  military  masses.  It  is  par- 
ticularly after  her  death  and  under  Raleigh's  energetic  impulsion, 
that  England,  conscious  of  her  strength,  was  to  adopt  definitely, 
for  the  triumph  of  her  naval  policy,  the  true  military  plan.  It  is 
by  his  words,  as  well  as  by  his  pen  and  his  deeds,  that  Raleigh 
preaches  the  new  doctrine.  I  take  from  Seeley1  a  characteristic 
passage  of  one  of  Raleigh's  letters :  "  Yea  in  eighty  eight,  when  he 
made  his  great  and  fearful  fleet,  if  the  queen  would  have  hearkened 
to  reason,  we  had  burnt  all  his  ships  and  preparation's  in  his  own 
ports  as  we  did  afterwards  upon  the  same  intelligence  and  doubt 
in  Cadis.  He  that  knows  him  not,  fears  him,  but  excepting  his 
Low  Country  army,  which  hath  been  continued  and  disciplined 
since  Charles  V's  time,  he  is  nowhere  strong." 

As  may  be  seen,  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  merely  falling 
upon  Spanish  commerce  and  capturing  a  few  ships,  assuming  the 
restricted  role  of  pirate ;  ambition  has  a  higher  aim,  nothing  less 
than  to  destroy  the  world-wide  power  of  the  King  of  Spain  and  to 
put  England  in  his  place. 

Raleigh  expresses  himself  on  this  subject  with  perfect  clearness : 
"  If  the  late,  queen  would  have  believed  her  men  of  war,  as  she  did 
her  scribes,  we  had  in  her  time  beaten  that  great  empire  in  pieces 
and  made  their  kings  kings  of  figs  and  oranges,  as  in  old  times." 

These  lines  of  Raleigh  also  contain  a  whole  system  of  strategy, 
which  thenceforth  for  centuries  will  be  that  of  the  English  navy. 
This  strategy,  very  far  from  scattering  efforts  upon  enterprises  of 

1  The  Growth  of  British  Policy,  by  Sir  J.  R.  Seeley. 

259 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

small  scope,  such  as  attacks  upon  commerce  or  upon  territorial 
possessions  necessarily  are,  will  take  as  principal  objective  the  de- 
struction of  the  enemy's  naval  force,  thus  realizing  at  one  stroke 
the  aim  of  the  war. 

It  is  right  to  recall  that  Drake  had  had  the  same  prophetic  views, 
but,  less  fortunate  than  Raleigh,  he  had  not  the  satisfaction  of  mak- 
ing them  triumph,  because  held  back  by  the  queen's  desire  for 
peace.  As  early  as  the  time  when  the  Armada  was  being  pre- 
pared, he  wrote :  "  Her  Majesty  and  people  are  not  to  fear  any  in- 
vasion in  her  own  country,  but  to  seek  God's  enemies  and  her 
Majesty's  where  they  may  be  found,  ....  for  with  fifty  sail  of 
shipping  we  shall  do  more  good  upon  their  own  coast,  than  a  great 

many  more  will  do  here  at  home These  vast  preparations 

of  the  Spaniard  may  be  speedily  prevented,  as  much  as  in  your 
Majesty  lieth,  by  sending  your  forces  to  encounter  them  somewhat 
far  off,  and  more  near  their  oivn  coast,  which  will  be  the  better 
cheap  for  your  Majesty  and  people  and  much  the  dearer  for  the 
enemy." 

Observe  in  passing  the  remarkable  agreement  in  opinion  of  the 
best  among  the  English  seamen  of  the  time  in  favor  of  the  offen- 
sive. By  the  employment  of  this  offensive  an  English  squadron 
under  Raleigh's  orders  in  1596  destroyed  an  important  Spanish 
fleet  in  Cadiz  and  burned  the  city.  These  considerations  lay  bare 
for  us  the  intimate  relation  which  exists  between  the  general  policy 
of  a  great  nation  and  the  military  combinations  whose  object  it  is 
to  make  that  policy  triumph. 

We  shall  find  new  evidence  of  this  in  the  course  of  history.  The 
end  of  the  i6th  century  and  the  beginning  of  the  I7th  ^mark  the 
decline  of  Spain's  maritime  power.  There  will  be  a  few  more 
attempts  on  her  part  to  reconquer  the  empire  of  the  world,  but 
they  will  be  fruitless,  and  this  nation,  formerly  so  prosperous, 
will  never  more  be  able  to  disturb  the  new  Empress  of  the  seas. 

RIVALRY  WITH  HOLLAND. 

But  this  period  witnessed  also  the  birth,  as  it  were,  and  the 
growing  up  of  a  new  maritime  power,  the  rapid  and  formidable 
expansion  of  which  was  again  to  awaken  England's  jealous  atten- 
tion. The  Dutch  had  also  entered  upon  the  path  of  commercial 
maritime  development  and  had  grown  rich  upon  the  spoils  of 
Spain.  Everything  urged  them  to  this  course ;  the  unf ruitfulness 

260 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

of  their  land,  its  harsh  climate  and  its  geographic  configuration. 
They  feel  themselves  drawn  to  a  seafaring  life  and  succeed  in  it 
so  well  that  they  take  the  lead  in  the  economic  movement.  Well 
before  England,  they  found  colonies  in  the  New  World,  create  all 
at  once  a  powerful  commercial  fleet  which  furrows  the  seas,  trans- 
porting the  products  of  exchange,  even  for  the  account  of  Span- 
iards in  the  time  of  their  splendor,  and  justify  finally  the  title 
"  Ocean  Tramps  "  which  has  been  given  them. 

The  1 7th  century  was  to  be  made  notable  by  the  inevitable  con- 
flict of  the  "  sea  powers  " ;  for,  vast  as  was  the  ocean's  extent,  it 
was  not  large  enough  to  permit  two  nations  having  the  same  de- 
sires to  expand  upon  it  side  by  sicle.  The  first  attack  made  upon 
the  commercial  prosperity  of  Holland  was  Cromwell's  famous 
Navigation  Act,  in  1651.  By  reserving  for  the  future  to  the  Brit- 
ish flag  alone  the  monopoly  of  the.  transport  of  English  products 
and  merchandise,  he  seriously  disturbed  the  Dutch  in  their  own 
monopoly,  which,  though  based  upon  old  custom  and  the  existing 
situation,  was  none  the  less  powerful  from  the  importance  of  its 
apparatus.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  in  the  following 
year  they  came  to  blows ;  but  it  is  particularly  curious  to  note  that, 
hardly  a  few  months  before  the  promulgation  of  the  "  Navigation 
Act/'  the  two  naval  powers  had  drawn  up  a  plan  of  union,  which 
came  to  nothing,  but  which  suffices  to  show  that  agreements  be- 
tween nations  are  very  precarious,  if  they  are  not  based  upon 
great  social  interests.  In  reality,  this  manifestation  of  hostility 
only  emphasized  the  smothered  rivalry  existing  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  century  between  England  and  Holland. 

War  was  therefore  inevitable,  and  it  was  conducted  by  the 
English  sailors  with  that  spirit  of  decision  which  has  persisted 
with  them  as  the  characteristic  trait  of  their  offensive  method.  By 
throwing  himself  upon  a  flotilla  of  fishermen,  and  capturing  or  de- 
stroying the  Dutch  war  ships  which  guarded  them,  Blake  showed 
himself  the  worthy  heir  of  Drake  and  Raleigh,  and  the  recognized 
precursor  of  Nelson ;  the  English  navy  possessed  from  that 
moment  the  true  doctrine  of  war,  represented  by  energetic  and 
resolute  attack.  In  this  conflict,  the  naval  war  forces  were  sensi- 
bly equal  in  nominal  value ;  but,  under  the  all  powerful  influence 
of  the  great  Oliver,  that  of  England  had  benefited  by  the  military 
and  combative  spirit  which  the  Protector  had  inspired  in  his  peo- 
ple. The  British  navy  was  therefore  to  triumph  in  this  struggle, 

261 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

in  spite  of  temporary  set  backs  due  to  the  exceptional  worth  of 
Dutch  seamen  like  Ruyter  and  Tromp.  Furthermore,  this  strug- 
gle was  ruinous  for  the  Dutch.  That  nation  of  traders,  accustomed 
to  have  everything,  even  to  the  most  essential  supplies,  brought 
from  abroad,  suffered  incalculable  damages  from  the  obstacles  to 
the  free  movements  of  her  supply  ships  caused  by  the  state  of  war. 
Finally,  by  the  very  nature  of  her  political  constitution,  she  was 
little  prepared  to  adopt  the  sole  measures  capable  of  assuring  to 
her  the  integrity  of  her  economic  power. 

A  coalition  of  identical  general  interests  rather  than  a  national 
unity,  the  government  of  the  Low-Countries  could  with  difficulty 
understand  that  the  preparation  of  a  powerful  war  fleet  was  not  an 
unnecessary  expenditure,  abstracted  from  commercial  wealth. 
They  haggled  over  the  expenses  of  arming  and  getting  ready  ships 
of  war,  and  deserved  Ruyter 's  threat  to  take  the  sea  no  more  if 
the  number  as  well  as  the  strength  of  his  ships  was  not  increased. 

Such  doings  are  common  to  all  periods,  and  that  is  why  they 
should  be  remembered.  Very  few  people,  even  in  our  times,  are 
capable  of  assimilating  this  fundamental  idea  ;  that  only  the  power- 
ful are  respected  and  can  enjoy  their  possessions  in  peace ;  that, 
consequently,  it  is  indispensable  to  be  strong.  But,  to  be  strong,  it 
is  necessary  to  know  how  to  expend  properly  the  premium  of  in- 
surance against  the  risks  of  war,  and  that  premium  is  nothing  else 
but  good  preparation ;  it  is  a  wise  economy.  Very  small  would 
have  been  the  expense  of  construction  and  maintenance,  for  Spain 
first,  then  for  Holland,  of  fleets  of  sufficient  strength  to  intimidate 
England  and  cut  off  at  their  roots  her  aggressive  inclinations, 
when  compared  with  the  immense  losses  sustained  by  those  two 
nations  in  their  loss  of  maritime  supremacy. 

In  her  duel  to  the  death  with  England,  Holland  was  therefore 
to  succumb.  If  this  result  was  not  completely  secured  in  the  first 
war,  she  was  already  struck  to  the  heart ;  if,  in  the  second  war,  her 
admirals  won  the  naval  Battle  of  the  Four  Days,  that  isolated  suc- 
cess was  but  the  last  desperate  effort  before  the  final  overthrow. 
The  Dutch  marine,  struck  in  its  vital  parts,  thenceforth  declined, 
and  retained  a  few  traces  of  its  ancient  prosperity  only  on  condi- 
tion of  following  thereafter  in  the  track  of  its  all-powerful  rival. 

The  i6th  century,  then  the  I7th,  were  two  successive  stages  in 
the  continuous  enhancement  of  the  maritime  power  of  England, 
characterized,  the  first  by  the  weakening  of  Spain,  the  "second  by 

262 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  defeat  of  Holland.    With  the  end  of  the  I7th  century  and  the 
1 8th  century,  the  turn  of  another  nation,  France,  was  to  come. 

THE  CONTEST  WITH  FRANCE. 

We  meet  the  first  "  entente  cordiale  "  in  1657,  under  the  form  of 
a  veritable  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  between  England  and 
France.  It  had,  however,  but  a  brief  existence,  since  less  than 
thirty-five  years  later  the  two  allied  navies  fought,  first  at  Beachy 
Head  and  then  at  La  Hogue.  If  that  period,  very  short  as  it  is 
in  the  life  of  peoples,  sufficed  to  transform  so  radically  the  rela- 
tions of  the  two  nations,  it  is  because  their  respective  situations 
were  considerably  changed  in  tlie  interval.  At  the  time  of  the 
agreement  arranged  between  Cromwell  and  Mazarin,  France,  as  a 
naval  power,  had  no  existence ;  scarcely  emerged  from  that  terrible 
internal  crisis,  the  war  of  the  Fronde,  still  struggling  with  a  war 
against  Spain,  she  was  sufficiently  occupied  besides  with  the  work 
of  recuperation  not  to  be  able  to  give  offence  to  the  Protector. 

To  England,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  above  all  important  to 
give  the  coup  de  grace  to  Spain,  already  very  enfeebled,  and  to 
dominate  Holland  with  equal  completeness.  But  a  few  years  later 
conditions  were  no  longer  the  same. 

With  the  effective  accession  to  power  of  Louis  XIV,  there  at 
once  opened  for  France  an  era  of  extraordinary  grandeur,  of 
power  and  of  conquests  whose  radiance  could  but  awaken  the 
jealousies  of  England. 

The  whole  policy  of  the  Grand  Monarch  consists  in  fact  of  a 
persistent  effort  to  absorb  to  his  own  profit,  at  first  by  force  and 
later  by  alliances,  the  King  of  Spain's  heritage  of  glory  and  power. 
And  from  the  first  manifestation  of  this  ambition,  two  contin- 
gencies are  of  a  nature  to  alarm  England  most  particularly. 

The  heritage  of  Spain  includes,  in  fact,  the  Spanish  Low-Coun- 
tries, that  is  Antwerp ;  and  the  mere  idea  that  that  port,  which  has 
been  one  of  the  busiest  in  the  whole  world,  which  is  destined  by 
its  favored  situation  still  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  economic  war- 
fare, can  fall  into  the  hands  of  an  enterprising  and  expanding 
nation,  is  quite  insupportable  to  the  British  people.  This  is  not 
all ;  the  heritage  of  Spain  contains  still  other  crumbs  of  past  gran- 
deur and  of  real  absolute  dominion  over  the  seas.  Who  could 
affirm  that  'the  heir,  full  of  spirit  and  ardor,  will  not  claim  all  the 

263 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

fruits  of  his  conquest  and  will  not  wish  to  take  up  for  his  own  ac- 
count the  ancient  commercial  splendor  of  Spain  ? 

There  are  more  motives  than  would  be  necessary  to  make  Eng- 
land feel  her  paramount  maritime  power  to  be  seriously  threatened. 
She  has  the  more  right  to  be  anxious  because  the  patient  and 
methodic  labor  of  Colbert  has  supplied  his  king  with  wonderful 
instruments  for  carrying  out  his  policy ;  a  powerful  naval  force 
and  maritime  institutions  which  favor  economic  expansion. 
Henceforth,  France  will  be  the  enemy ! 

Under  the  reign  of  Charles  II,  so  obstinately  favorable  to  the 
maintenance  of  good  relations  with  Louis  XIV,  the  dawning  de- 
velopment of  the  French  navy  began  to  excite  the  English  suspi- 
cions ;  that  monarch  himself  expressed  them  in  a  letter  to  the  King 
of  France,  quoted  by  Mahan :  "  There  are  two  impediments  to  a 
perfect  understanding.  The  first  is  the  gre\at  effort  that  France  is 
now  making  to  create  a  commerce  and  become  a  powerful  mari- 
time empire.  This  is  so  greatly  suspicious  to  us,  who  are  only  im- 
portant through  our  commerce  and  our  naval  forces,  that  every 
step  that  France  takes  in  that  direction  will  perpetuate  the  jealousy 
betzveen  the  two  nations." 

There  may  be  seen  laid  bare  the  heart  of  England's  political 
doctrine,  and  when  it  is  considered  that  this  was  thus  proclaimed 
with  such  clearness  hardly  a  few  years  after  the  understanding  of 
1657,  it  may  be  understood  exactly  what  degree  of  vitality  must  be 
accorded  to  a  reconciliation  born  of  transitory  conditions  and  as 
ephemeral  as  they. 

To  make  front  against  this  new  storm  that  was  brewing  Eng- 
land formed  the  Triple  Alliance.  In  joining  herself  to  the  United 
Provinces,  she  appeared  to  forget  old  grudges  in  order  to  ward  off 
a  more  pressing  danger;  but  in  reality  she  pursued  a  double  ob- 
ject, since  Holland,  already  weakened,  would  find  herself  the  more 
directly  exposed  to  the  blows  of  France,  and,  by  serving  as  a  sort 
of  shield  to  her  ally,  would  withdraw  from  the  struggle  still  more 
enfeebled.  The  correctness  of  the  views  of  the  English  policy 
was  demonstrated  by  the  events  of  1672,  the  fall  of  de  Witt's 
government  and  the  almost  complete  ruin  of  the  United  Provinces. 

But  it  was  above  all  under  the  reign  of  William  of  Orange,  who, 
by  uniting  upon  his  head  the  two  crowns  of  the  Low-Countries 
and  England,  sealed  the  close  union  of  interests  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, that  the  opposition  to  the  aggrandizement  of  France  took  its 

264 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

most  energetic  and  decisive  form.  The  disaster  of  La  Hogue,  in- 
flicted on  the  French  fleet  under  Tourville,  was  the  result  of  this 
opposition. 

The  consequences  of  this  naval  defeat  were  considerable,  for  it 
was  the  beginning  of  a  period  of  almost  complete  eclipse  of  the 
French  navy.  And  yet  never  perhaps  would  a  powerful  and  for- 
midable fleet  have  been  more  necessary  to  France,  to  sustain  the 
long  and  important  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  which  was  to 
begin  very  soon  and  to  open  anew  the  question  of  maritime  supre- 
macy. A  page  of  Seeley  admirably  expounds  the  philosophy  of 
this  important  struggle. 

"  William's  work  has  hither  to*  consisted  in  raising  the  British 
state  to  a  position  in  the  world  similar  to  that  which  had  been 
hitherto  occupied  by  Spain.  He  unites  the  two  maritime  Poivers 
which  on  the  sea  and  in  the  Ne^v  World  are  the  successors  of 
Spain.  The  British  Trade  Empire  which  now  begins  to  take  shape 
can  only  flourish  at  the  expense  of  Spain.  The  maritime  sceptre 
is  about  to  pass  from  Spain  and  seems  likely  to  pass  to  Britain. 
The  question  of  the  Spanish  Succession  is  thus  twofold;  it  is  the 
question  not  only  who  shall  be  Spanish  King  on  the  death  of 
Charles  II,  but  also  who  shall  succeed  to  the  ancient  maritime  and 
colonial  monopoly  of  Spain. 

"  France  will  put  in  her  claim  to  the  latter  succession  as  well  as 
to  the  former.  For  France  too  has  experienced  that  singular  trans- 
formation which  marks  in  England,  as  ive  have  seen,  the  age  of  the 
second  Revolution.  French  politics  too  have  been  passing  into 
the  commercial  phase.  It  could  not  be  otherwise*  since  the  position 
of  France  and  her  relation  to  the  Spanish  monopoly  was  very  simi- 
lar to  that  of  England.  If  England  was  insular  and  oceanic, 
France  too  has  a  long  sea-board,  facing  at  once  the  Northern  Seas, 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Mediterranean.  She  has  nourished  hitherto 
upon  the  spoils  of  Spain,  why  should  she  not  acquire  the  most 
precious  of  all  Spain's  treasures,  her  colonial  monopoly?  She  is 
prepared  to  do  so,  for  of  all  the  many  developments  of  French 
activity  in  that  age,  in  which  she  was  so  active,  perhaps  the  most 
remarkable  ivas  that  to  which  Colbert  gives  his  name.  With  him 
she  had  entered  into  commercial  and  maritime  policy,  and  before 
the  battle  of  La  Hogue  she  had  ranked  as  the  first  maritime 
Power/' 

These  lines  contain  the  substance  of  the  causes  of  the  perrnanent 

265 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

hostility  of  England  towards  France.  This  memorable  war  defi- 
nitely opens  a  period  of  almost  continual  conflicts  between  the  two 
nations,  a  period  which  covers  the  i8th  century  and  only  ends  in 
1815,  with  the  final  crushing  of  France's  pretensions  to  maritime 
supremacy.  All  these  conflicts  were  really  the  effects  of  a  single 
cause:  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  to  the  economic,  commer- 
cial and  colonial  development  of  her  rival.  The  war  of  the  Span- 
ish Succession  is  also  notable  for  an  occurrence  of  the  utmost  in- 
terest for  us.  I  refer  to  the  capture  of  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon 
by  England.  This  event  is  of  capital  importance,  for  it  inaugu- 
rated the  system  which  that  nation  will  thenceforth  apply  with 
remarkable  logic,  and  by  which  she  will  assure  to  herself  the  strate- 
gic bases  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  her  maritime  monop- 
oly. In  proportion  as  this  dominion  takes  on  greater  proportions 
and  extends  its  immense  net  over  all  the  seas  of  the  world  its 
security  will  require  points  of  re-enforcement  where  the  meshes  of 
this  net  will  find  themselves  strengthened ;  and  it  is  thus  that 
little  by  little  the  English  policy  will  sow  over  the  whole  face  of 
the  earth  the  bases  of  operations  and  advanced  bases  which,  at 
least  as  much  as  her  squadrons,  and  because  without  them  those 
squadrons  would  have  but  a  precarious  strength,  will  be  the  princi- 
pal elements  of  the  British  power. 

I  have  said  English  Policy,  for  it  is  truly  only  to  the  directing 
power  of  a  great  nation  that  can  be  attributed  the  comprehensive 
views,  the  breadth  of  far  sighted  plans,  the  patient  continuity  of 
effort,  which  have  brought  about  this  methodical  grouping  of 
stations,  always  chosen  at  suitable  points,  by  which  the  English 
government  has  secured  maritime  supremacy.  No  example  shows 
better  than  this  one  that  the  very  foundations  of  military  strategy 
rest  upon  politics. 

The  year  1717  brings  about,  between  France  and  England,  a 
new  friendly  understanding  the  memory  of  which  is  surely  one  of 
the  most  humiliating  in  our  history.  It  was  the  outcome,  in  fact, 
of  a  haughty  and  despotic  domination  on  the  part  of  our  ancient 
enemies,  and  of  a  base  subserviency  of  the  hateful  policy  of  the 
regent  and  Cardinal  Dubois. 

The  most  substantial  guarantee  of  the  solidity  of  the  under- 
standing was  the  intentional  weakness  of  our  navy ;  no  longer 
strong,  we  were  no  longer  to  be  feared,  and  England  could  give 
us  the  alms  of  disdainful  friendship.  Moreover,  wishing  to  do  the 

266 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

most  urgent  thing  first,  she  was  above  all  anxious  to  crush  in  its 
incipiency  the  attempt  at  building  up  again  the  Spanish  power 
under  Alberoni's  energetic  impulse.  And  after  this  result  had 
been  attained,  thanks  to  the  blindness  of  the  government  of  France, 
there  was  no  navy  left  strong  enough  to  oppose  the  overwhelming 
naval  strength  of  Great  Britain.  We  find  this  statement  in  the 
celebrated  Memoires  of  Saint-Simon  :  "  There  is  no  counter  weight 
to  the  naval  power  of  England,  whose  ships  cover  every  sea.  Hol- 
land, while  inwardly  lamenting  it,  dares  not  show  her  feelings. 
Spain  will  not  be  able  for  a  long  time  to  recover  from  the  fatal 
assistance  that  we  have  lent  to  England  in  ruining  her  navy  and 
crippling  her  commerce  and  her  establishments  in  the  Indies;  and 
France  would  need  thirty  years  of  peace,  and  of  the  wisest  govern- 
ment, to  bring  her  navy  back  to  the  point  where  Colbert  and 
Seignelay  left  it." 

It  is  important  to  find  from  this  eminent  writer  and  diplomat  the 
affirmation  of  the  need  of  a  powerful  navy. 

The  new  understanding  was  also  to  be  a  very  insecure  one. 
since  it  did  not  withstand  the  first  signs  of  a  darkening  of  the 
political  heavens,  and  less  than  a  quarter  century  was  needed  to 
change  agreement  into  armed  strife. 

It  did  not  need  much  to  excite  again  England's  suspicious  tem- 
per. A  renewal  of  commercial  activity  and  economic  prosperity, 
the  appearance  of  a  revival  of  the  French  merchant  marine, 
brought  about  by  the  business  transactions  of  the  new  East  Indian 
Company,  no  doubt  also  the  renewed  energy  instilled  into  the  Navy 
by  Maurepas,  were  enough  to  make  that  jealous  nation  think  its 
despotic  control  of  the  ocean  threatened.  The  maritime  war  of 
1743  had  no  cause  more  pressing.  The  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
which  put  an  end  to  it,  brought  about  in  reality  only  a  short  truce 
in  an  almost  uninterrupted  period  of  tension  and  hostilities,  and 
it  could  not  be  otherwise,  for  the  genius  of  Dupleix  and  his  accom- 
plishments in  India  fully  compensated  for  the  cowardice  of  the 
French  government  as  well  as  its  incurable  weakness  in  arousing 
in  the  English  public  mind  an  ardent  wish  to  destroy  France.  The 
elder  Pitt,  a  man  great  by  eloquence,  by  talent  and  by  the  intensity 
of  his  patriotism,  stirred  up  the  glowing  fire  of  hate  which  was 
thenceforth  to  let  England  loose  against  France,  the  nation  which, 
through  the  whole  century,  embodied  the  spirit  of  resistance  to 
her  growing  power. 

267 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

And  it  is  Pitt  who,  faithful  guardian  of  the  tradition  bequeathed 
by  the  statesmen  of  the  British  Empire,  condemned  in  the  follow- 
ing terms  a  new  truce  granted  to  France  in  that  merciless  strife : 
"  France  is  chiefly  formidable  to  us  as  a  maritime  and  commercial 
power.  What  we  gain  in  this  respect  is  valuable  to  us  above  all 
through  the  injury  to  her  which  results  from  it.  You  leave  to 
France  the  possibility  of  reviving  her  navy." 

We  must  recognize  that  our  implacable  adversary  saw  clearly ; 
for,  under  the  skilful  guidance  of  the  due  de  Choiseul,  the  French 
navy  was  to  be  again  brought  to  a  point  of  readiness  and  strength 
such  as  it  had  not  known  since  Seignelay.  This  was  also  the  time 
when  the  ardent  wish  to  shake  off  the  English  yoke,  and  to  strike 
through  the  invulnerable  girdle  of  her  fleets  at  her  heart,  gave 
birth  to  numerous  projects  of  invasion,  among  which  the  most 
famous,  and  justly  so,  is  that  of  the  Comte  de  Broglie. 

Finally,  after  fifteen  years  of  reconstruction  and  recuperation, 
the  struggle  for  American  independence  was  to  suggest  to  France 
the  idea  of  taking  her  revenge  for  the  humiliating  exactions  of  the 
treaty  of  Paris  and  of  profiting  by  the  straits  of  her  hereditary 
rival  to  regain  world-wide  dominion.  It  is  unfortunate  that  her 
navy  did  not  have  at  its  head,  at  this  time,  a  man  who  knew  how 
to  make  war;  the  moment  was  favorable  for  the  success  of  these 
views,  but  the  instrument  was  lacking.  Suffren  alone  fully  under- 
stood the  true  doctrine  of  war,  but  being  at  a  point  too  far  re- 
moved from  the  center  of  the  theater  of  hostilities,  his  successes 
could  have  but  little  influence  on  the  final  result.  At  the  head  of 
the  French  fleets  in  America,  without  doubt  he  would  have 
changed  the  current  of  events.  But  of  what  avail  could  be  men 
like  d'Estaing  and  de  Grasse  against  Hoods  and  Rodneys  ?  These 
two  latter  names  do  but  summarize  the  long  period  of  preparation 
for  battle  which,  without  weakness  or  hesitation,  by  the  sole  force 
of  heredity,  had  preached  to  the  English  sailors  for  two  hundred 
years  the  religion  of  action. 

But,  though  the  attempt  failed,  the  memory  of  it  has  remained, 
and  all  the  more  painful  to  England  because  it  recalls  to  her  the 
loss  of  her  finest  colonies  in  America.  In  the  younger  Pitt  she  will 
have  an  active  agent  of  this  resentment  against  France ;  having 
taken  up  his  father's  quarrel  and  sworn  absorbing  and  implacable 
hatred  to  that  country,  he  will  seize  every  opportunity  to  injure 
her  and  strike  her  down.  It  is  thus  that  he  will  let  loose  against 

268 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

her  the  savage  wars  of  the  Republic  and  of  the  First  Empire,  still 
more  infuriated  against  Napoleon  because  that  great  man  will 
threaten  more  directly  the  English  power. 

On  October  21,  1805,  Nelson  consummated  the  defeat  of  the 
French  fleet  and  closed,  to  the  profit  of  his  country,  the  third  chap- 
ter of  the  magnificent  work  of  building  up  the  English  power  be- 
gun under  Elizabeth. 

Beginning  with  1815  France  experiences  a  period  of  repose  dur- 
ing which  she  heals  her  wounds  and  appears  to  disregard  maritime 
affairs.  In  1830,  nevertheless,  the  Algerian  expedition  gives  no- 
tice of  her  awakening,  and  nothing  more  is  needed  for  British  in- 
terests to  think  themselves  threatened.  The  energetic  attitude  of 
the  Minister  d'Haussey  was  necessary  to  make  our  irritable  neigh- 
bor admit  our  right  to  make  France  respected  by  a  petty  king  of 
pirates. 

I  was  unwilling  to  omit  this  well  known  incident  precisely  be- 
cause it  shows,  with  much  precision,  how  the  ministers  of  his 
Britannic  Majesty  at  all  times  regard  the  attempts  of  other  coun- 
tries to  expand  even  in  a  small  way. 

Much  might  still  be  said  about  the  period  which  comprises  the 
greater  part  of  the  igih  century,  although  it  furnishes  us  with  no 
example  of  great  naval  wars  comparable  to  those  of  the  preceding 
centuries.  It  affords  on  the  contrary  the  spectacle  of  a  great 
apparent  cordiality  of  relations  between  France  and  England, 
which  leads  them  to  seal  the  two  ententes  cordiales  of  1843  and 
1856,  and  even  to  fight  as  allies  for  the  same  cause  against  Russia 
in  1854;  it  also  reminds  us  that  before  1870  the  trend  of  opinion 
at  the  Imperial  court  was  openly  towards  the  entente  cordiale. 
The  word  and  the  thing,  as  may  be  seen,  are  not  new. 

But  I  am  anxious  to  reach  a  more  important  stage  in  the  sub- 
ject, not  only  because  it  is  closer  to  us,  but  especially  because  it 
brings  the  logical  and  concordant  conclusion  of  this  too  short 
resume  of  the  history  of  the  naval  greatness  of  England. 

After  the  disasters  of  the  terrible  year,  our  unhappy  country, 
mutilated  by  the  loss  of  two  provinces,  wholly  absorbed  in  the  work 
of  recuperation,  first  made  good  her  military  deficiencies.  She 
laid  the  solid  foundations  of  what  had  been  wanting  to  her  during 
the  war,  that  is  to  say  a  strong  army ;  then,  feeling  once  more  a 
warmer  blood  flowing  strongly  in  her  veins,  she  sought  in  colonial 
expansion  a  powerful  remedy  for  her  recent  misfortunes.  And  in 

269 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

a  few  years  Tonkin,  Madagascar,  Dahomey,  the  Congo,  etc.,  made 
tip  again  for  her  an  immense  colonial  empire  comparable  to  the 
one  she  had  lost  in  the  preceding  century. 

Certain  of  her  traditional  enemies,  far  from  being  disturbed  by 
this,  saw  with  friendly  eyes  her  entrance  upon  this  path.  But  it 
led  straight  to  territories  which  England  assumed  to  reserve  for 
herself,  in  virtue  of  her  favorite  adage  that  what  belongs  to  no  one 
must  evidently  belong  to  her,  and  so  our  colonial  policy,  joined  to 
other  causes  that  I  shall  point  out,  brought  on  the  two  very  grave 
crises  of  the  year  1898,  the  Niger  and  Fashoda. 

That  in  so  short  a  space  of  time,  at  two  very  different  points  of 
the  colonial  chess  board,  we  should  have  verged  upon  war  with 
England  twice,  the  first  time  in  the  spring,  the  second  in  the  au- 
tumn, shows  that  there  evidently  must  have  been  between  the  two 
nations  causes  of  disturbance  more  active  and  vigorous  than  those 
officially  given  out  to  the  world. 

Circumstances  placed  me  in  a  position  to  see  close  at  hand  the 
consequences  of  the  alarm  of  the  Niger,  and  to  experience  the  un- 
forgetable  hours  of  the  sharp  tension  of  Fashoda.  That,  without 
doubt,  is  why  I  remain  profoundly  sceptical  regarding  the  sincerity 
and  durability  of  friendly  understandings,  for  it  is  not  without 
profit  to  be  forced  by  the  grave  events  of  this  world  to  weigh  the 
real  and  profound  motives  of  great  conflicts  of  peoples ;  and  these 
motives  have  nothing  in  common  with  sentimentality. 

A  few  lines  taken  from  a  document  of  that  period  are  wonder- 
fully appropriate  to  this  part  of  my  book  and  will  enable  me  to 
throw  special  light  upon  the  question  we  are  now  considering. 
This  document,  which  dates  from  August,  1898,  is  the  reflection 
of  impressions  gathered  together  after  the  excitement  of  the  spring 
of  that  year  had  subsided,  and  (a  statement  the  importance  of 
which  needs  no  emphasis)  it  at  the  same  time  prophesies  the  new 
difficulties  which  are  to  arise  a  few  months  later. 

"All  these  preparations  (the  question  was  of  the  precautions 
taken  on  the  occasion  of  the  Niger  affair)  as  well  at  home  as  in  the 
colonies,  were  useless.  But  the  apprehensions  which  had  given 
birth  to  the  fear  of  an  immediate  conflict  with  England  continued 
none  the  less  to  exist ;  it  may  be  said  that  they  still  continue.  We 
must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  that  the  policy  followed  b\  our 
government  and  our  alliance  with  Russia,  despite  the  Tsar's  peace- 
ful intentions,  have  alienated  from  us  the  sympathies  of  England, 

270 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

which  is  persuaded  that  by  striking  France  she  would  take  away 
from  Russia  the  principal  source  of  her  revenues;  in  short  that 
English  public  opinion  shows  itself  very  favorable  to  a  ivar  against 
France.  The  reasons  which,  last  March,  led  to  the  belief  that  war 
with  England  ivas  to  break  out  have  lost  nothing  of  their  force, 
and,  though  the  conflict  no  longer  appears  so  imminent,  no  one  can- 
say  that,  one  day  or  another.,  on  the  occasion  of  such  or  such  an 
event,  that  cannot  be  foreseen,  we  shall  not  be  the  victims,  as  life 
were  on  the  verge  of  being,  of  a  brutai  and  sudden  attack. 

"  If  then,  though  warned  by  a  recent  past,  we  have  not  made  all 
the  arrangements  demanded  by  the  situation;  if  we  have  not  made 
all  the  necessary  sacrifices,  will  not  a  heavy  responsibility  weigh 
upon  us?  " 

These  fears  were  only  too  well  founded,  for  hardly  a  few  weeks 
had  elapsed  after  they  were  formulated  when  the  grave  incident  of 
Fashoda  happened.  I  have  written  "  incident "  intentionally ;  it 
was,  in  fact,  only  an  incident  skilfully  exploited  to  put  an  end  to 
a  latent  condition  of  more  general  difficulties.  It  is  easy  to  con- 
ceive that  the  disproportion  existing  between  the  possession  of 
a  fever-stricken  waste  of  land  and  a  war  as  formidable  as  that 
with  which  we  were  threatened  does  not  permit  regarding  the 
former  as  the  cause  of  the  latter.  The  premonitions  of  this  crisis 
could  have  their  source  only  in  a  deep-seated  organic  trouble.  To 
explain  it,  all  the  symptoms  of  an  uneasy  feeling  between  the  two 
nations  must  be  brought  together  and  considered  as  a  whole. 

This  study  is  so  much  the  more  necessary  because,  before  the 
year  1898,  the  sincere  friendship  of  England  was  an  immutable 
article  of  faith  for  the  majority  of  the  deluded  French  people ;  im- 
mutable to  such  a  point  that,  in  spite  of  a  first  thunder  clap  in  the 
month  of  March,  many  of  them,  and  not  those  of  little  conse- 
quence, were  pleased  to  make  a  mock  of  it  when  in  October  the 
probability  of  an  armed  conflict  was  spoken,  of.  One  more  quiet 
friendly  understanding  bordering  very  closely  upon  a  quarrel. 

And  yet  the  nature  of  the  English  sentiments,  at  this  difficult 
hour,  was  not  doubtful  to  anyone  who  wished  to  see.  Public  opin- 
ion, on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel,  unanimously  regarded 
French  diplomacy  as  a  constant  annoyance,  in  direct  opposition  to 
England's  plans  everywhere  in  the  world ;  in  Egypt,  in  Africa,  in 
Siam  and  in  China.  The  principal  grievance  formulated  against 
France  was  based  on  our  policy  of  protection,  which,  by  closing 

271 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  French  market  to  English  commerce,  took  away  from  it  con- 
siderable openings  and  thus  did  great  injury  to  it.  Even  the 
French-Russian  alliance  was  a  cause  of  irritation  to  the  English 
people,  for  they  saw  in  it  a  threat  against  themselves,  Russia's 
constant  advance  towards  India  making  her  a  probable  adversary. 

This  state  of  mind  was  carefully  fostered  by  English  statesmen, 
by  the  press  and  by  the  theater,  in  every  sort  of  way. 

One  must  have  read  with  the  interest  imparted  by  the  anxiety  of 
serious  hours  of  life  this  page  of  our  contemporary  history,  at  the 
very  instant  it  was  recorded,  to  understand  the  value  to  be  given 
to-day  to  too  loud  protestations  of  friendship.  Among  the  propo- 
sitions most  frequently  advanced  to  stir  up  English  antipathies 
against  France,,  there  is  one  which  must  be  mentioned.  It  is  con- 
tained in  an  aphorism  enunciated  by  the  Prime  Minister,  Lord 
Salisbury :  "  The  decadent  nations  are  a  danger  to  peace,"  and  at 
once  applied  to  France :  C(  France  is  in  decadence,  therefore  she 
constitutes  a  danger;  she  must  be  suppressed.3'  The  National  Re- 
view, in  a  sensational  article  of  November,  1898,  drew  a  compari- 
son between  France,  England  and  Germany.  After  having  shown 
for  our  country  the  constantly  diminishing  birth  rate  and  pointed 
out  the  continuous  increase  of  population  of  the  two  others,  that 
review  compared  the  economic  statistics  of  the  three  nations  to  de- 
rive from  them  the  definite  conclusion  that  France  is  growing  pro- 
gressively weaker  and  the  other  two  countries  are  constantly  in- 
creasing in  strength. 

From  this  to  representing  our  country  as  incapable  of  develop- 
ing the  immense  colonial  empire  conquered  fifteen  years  before 
was  but  a  step  and  one  quickly  taken ;  and  at  once  the  motive  ap- 
peared ;  England,  on  the  other  hand,  through  her  immense  re- 
sources, her  activity,  and  her  overflowing  population,  was  clearly 
indicated  as  the  one  to  take  up  the  burden  too  heavy  for  our  weak 
shoulders. 

Even  our  sad  internal  dissensions  were  devilishly  exploited  to 
prove  the  need  of  destroying  the  corrupting  action  of  the  latin 
races  by  the  triumphant  and  civilizing  supremacy  of  the  anglo- 
saxon  races. 

This  whole  campaign,  carried  on  in  the  way  best  fitted  to  ex- 
cite popular  feeling,  in  reality  masked  the  true  motive,  always  the 
same,  which  for  three  centuries  has  inspired  British  policy.  The 
national  prosperity  of  that  people  is  built  upon  an  indefinite  ex- 

272 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tension  of  commerce,  free  markets  and- naval  supremacy,  the  third 
of  which  is  the  guarantee  of  the  first  two. 

But  official  statistics  showed  already,  in  1898,  that  in  the  seven 
previous  years  the  sum  total  of  English  exports  had  diminished 
5  per  cent,  while  that  of  imports  had  increased  4  per  cent.  These 
figures  indicated  a  retrograde  movement  of  British  commerce,  and 
its  importance  was  accentuated  by  the  fact  that  the  same  docu- 
ments showed  an  opposite  condition  of  affairs  in  other  countries. 
A  no  less  serious  evolution  of  the  great  English  Colonies  also 
threatened  England  in  her  economic  outlets.  India,  Canada  and 
Australia,  in  their  turn  becoming  manufacturing  countries,  es- 
caped from  the  guardianship  of  metropolitan  industries ;  and  the 
search  for  new  markets,  for  new  customers,  took  on  the  character 
of  a  pressing  necessity.  It  is  at  this  very  moment  that  France, 
on  the  one  hand  closed  by  prohibitive  import  duties,  on  the  other 
interferes  with  England  in  her  necessary  expansion  by  her  Afri- 
can colonial  policy  and  her  alliance  with  Russia,  which  brings  the 
Far  East  into  the  question. 

Finally,  the  considerable  development  of  the  different  European 
navies  is  a  threat  to  the  fortunate  possessor,  up  to  that  time,  of 
maritime  supremacy,  and  these  three  causes  together  logically  im- 
pose upon  England  an  aggressive  policy  in  regard  to  France. 

By  destroying  the  French  fleet,  the  most  powerful  after  her  own, 
she  would  make  sure  of  her  domination  over  other  navies  for  many 
years.  By  taking  from  France  her  colonial  empire,  and  notably 
Burmah  and  Siam,  she  would  give  new  and  immense  outlets  to  her 
commerce.  Finally,  and  above  all,  she  would  yield  to  her  eco- 
nomic destiny,  which  inexorably  compels  her  to  crush  her  rivals, 
in  order  not  to  be  absorbed  by  them. 

That  this  war  did  not  take  place  for  sentimental  reasons,  attribu- 
table to  the  queen,  it  is  said,  takes  away  nothing  from  the  strength 
of  the  arguments  which  incited  to  it ;  I  will  even  add,  as  my  inde- 
pendent opinion,  that,  in  giving  it  up,  the  English  government  on 
this  occasion  lost  sight  of  the  doctrine  of  Raleigh,  Cromwell, 
Shaftesbury  and  the  two  Pitts. 

Less  than  seven  years  after  a  storm  so  violent  that  one  of  the 
most  authoritative  organs  of  the  English  press  declared  that  "  con- 
flict between  the  two  great  powers  was  inevitable  sooner  or  later/' 
Lamourette  kisses  are  being  exchanged,  and  there  is  no  longer 
question  of  anything  but  peace  and  concord.  Those  who,  in  this 

273 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

"  entente  cordiale,"  see  anything  but  a  momentary  expedient,  in- 
tended to  make  head  against  more  imminent  dangers,  have  not 
studied  the  causes  -and  the  necessities  of  English  power. 

THE  MODERN  CARTHAGE. 

A  new  adversary,  more  dangerous  than  France  for  the  mo- 
ment, appears  on  the  economic  and  maritime  horizon  ;  all  the  atten- 
tion and  all  the  resources  of  Great  Britain  are  not  too  much  to 
guard  against  her  encroachments. 

Against  the  more  threatening  storm  from  the  quarter  of  Louis 
XIV,  England  designed  the  Triple  Alliance,  in  which  Holland,  her 
aforetime  enemy,  figured ;  against  the  darker  heavens  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Germany,  this  same  England  to-day  has  found  the  shelter 
of  an  understanding  with  a  nation  but  yesterday  regarded  as  the 
irreconcilable  adversary.  The  method  is  always  the  same.  And 
moreover,  since  1870,  a  gathering  storm  much  more  dangerous  to 
the  world-wide  power  of  England  than  any  previous  one  has  arisen 
in  the  political  heavens.  The  reconstitution  of  the  German  Empire 
has  given  a  splendid  impetus  to  the  commercial  expansion  of  that 
country ;  her  merchant  fleet,  negligible  less  than  forty  years  ago, 
to-day  comes  next  after  England's,  and  its  tonnage,  which  has 
more  than  doubled  in  a  short  interval  of  ten  years,  while  that  of 
England  has  only  increased  40  per  cent,  is  increasing  with  extra- 
ordinary rapidity.  German  freighters  furrow  the  seas,  and  under 
the  enthusiastic  propaganda  of  the  Flottenverein,  itself  inspired  by 
the  Emperor,  use  every  means  to  become  in  their  turn  the  "  tramps 
of  the  ocean."  Still  more,  the  German  "  salesman  "  travels  every- 
where to-day,  and  by  his  savoir-faire,  his  inexhaustible  readiness 
to  meet  every  wish  of  his  customer,  carries  off  orders  under  the 
very  noses  of  the  English  merchants  in  the  very  markets  where 
they  were  most  successful. 

And  that  is  not  yet  all ;  the  economic  policy  of  Germany  gives 
England  other  causes  of  anxiety.  She  is  in  the  way  of  absorbing 
patiently  and  surely,  at  least  commercially,  if  not  materially,  the 
Netherlands.  Statistics  are  instructive  on  this  point ;  the  increase 
of  traffic  of  the  port  of  Rotterdam  is  extraordinary,  since  it  has 
quadrupled  in  thirteen  years ;  but  70  per  cent  of  this  traffic  is  by 
the  interior  water-ways,  and  these  ways  lead  to  Germany. 

As  if  better  to  indicate  the  trend  of  events,  Amsterdam,  Rotter- 
dam's commercial  rival,  is  seeking  likewise  to  connect  herself  with 

274 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  Rhine  by  a  canal.  A  new  Holland  question,  of  an  unusual  sort, 
has  therefore  arisen  for  England,  as  big  with  consequences  as  the 
old  ones,  though  apparently  more  inoffensive. 

It  is  not  alone  in  the  direction  of  Holland  that  the  continuous 
expansion  of  the  Germans  threatens  and  disturbs  England.  The 
subjects  of  Emperor  William  monopolize  each  day  more  and  more 
the  city  and  port  of  Antwerp,  which  grow  German,  if  not  in 
nationality,  at  least  in  fact. 

To  take  account  of  this  slow  and  methodical  infiltration,  which 
will  necessarily  end  in  conquest,  peaceful  or  not,  but  real,  the  mag- 
nificent work  of  M.  Maurice  Schwob,  which  appeared  in  the  Ligue 
Maritime,  must  be  read  in  its  entirety.  Any  quotation  which  I 
might  make  from  it  would  be  inadequate. 

There  is  not  therefore  merely  a  modern  question  of  Holland ; 
but  the  entire  question  of  the  Netherlands  has  come  to  life  anew 
after  the  lapse  of  more  than  two  centuries. 

And  finally,  beyond  and  above  all  that,  the  construction  by  Ger- 
many of  a  powerful  war  fleet,  its  disquieting  increase,  the  clearly 
offensive  character  of  its  conception,  show  plainly  to  England  that 
this  time  her  ancient  maritime  tyranny  is  in  danger.  This  peril  is 
so  much  the  more  serious  because  the  new  adversaries  do  not  seem 
likely  to  commit  the  same  errors  which  formerly  cost  to  Spain,  to 
Holland  and  to  France  their  finest  colonies  and  their  influence  in 
the  world.  They  know  that  to  be  lasting  economic  prosperity  must 
of  necessity  be  based  on  force,  in  order  to  impose  respect,  and  they 
are  working  to  obtain  that  result. 

One  of  their  military  writers,  Colonel  Goedke,  said  recently: 
"  The  fairest  memories  of  our  commercial  days  attach  to  the  time 
when  the  Hanseatic  League  dominated  the  sea,  and  we  can  recall 
that  time  with  pride  now;  for  at  the  moment  ^vhen  the  liberal  mid- 
dle-class, after  centuries  of  lamentable  decay,  prepares  to  retake 
the  place  which  belongs  to  it  in  the  State,  it  at  the  same  time  re- 
vives the  idea  of  clearing  the  abandoned  road  which  zvill  lead  us  to 
supremacy  on  the  sea  by  the  creation  of  a  German  fleet.  It  zvould 
be  a  renunciation  of  the  finest  traditions  of  the  liberal  middle-class 
and  a  most  serious  misunderstanding  of  its  vital  interests,  to  turn 
the  heart  of  the  democracy  from  an  increase  and  strengthening  of 
the  naval  forces  of  Germany  now  and  in  the  future/' 

And  better  still  to  explain  his  thought,  the  same  writer  adds : 
ff  If  Russia  had  had  in  the  Far  East,  two  years  ago,  a  few  big 

275 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

battleships  and  a  number  of  armored  cruisers  she  would  still  pos- 
sess Port  Arthur,  Manchuria  and  Korea.  Japan  could  not  have 
thought  of  making  war  upon  her  ....  NOWHERE  HAVE  DELAYS 

MORE  EFFECT,  NOWHERE  DO  THEY  COST  MORE  DEAR  THAN  IN  WHAT 

CONCERNS  THE  FLEET.  No  longer  like  the  Romans  can  we  build  a 
fleet  in  three  months;  we  need  for  that  a  continuous  effort  during 
twenty  years,  without  losing  sight  of  the  object,  and  that  is  ex- 
actly why  we  have  no  time  to  lose!' 

All  that  precedes  throws  a  vivid  light  upon  the  present  attitude 
of  England  and  her  very  rapid  change  of  front. 

To-day  it  is  against  Germany  that  are  directed  the  efforts  of  her 
statesmen,  of  her  press  and  of  public  opinion ;  it  is  Germany  that 
has  replaced  us,  in  less  than  seven  years,  as  the  point  of  aim  for  the 
violent  attacks  of  the  English  people. 

And  in  this  England  follows  logically  the  unchangeable  princi- 
ple of  her  policy.  In  the  stubborn  onward  march,  with  eyes  con- 
stantly fixed  upon  her  single  aim,  economic  greatness,  she  takes 
inspiration  from  the  watch-word  set  by  Shaftesbury :  "  Carthage 
must  be  destroyed,"  and  for  her  Carthage  has  been  successively 
Spain,  Holland,  France ;  to-day  her  name  is  Germany  and  perhaps 
to-morrow  she  will  again  be  called  France,  or  very  likely  the 
United  States  or  Japan.  Necessarily  pledged  to  violence  to  pre- 
serve the  maritime  power  which  is  the  nourishment  indispensable 
to  her  life,  she  will  see  a  new  Carthage  in  every  nation  which 
seeks  to  acquire  a  portion  of  the  empire  of  the  seas. 

This  manner  of  looking  at  things  is  so  little  exaggerated  that, 
on  November  9,  1905,  in  an  address  delivered  at  the  Lord  Mayor's 
banquet,  Mr.  Balfour,  the  Prime  Minister,  said  in  exact  terms: 
"/  believe  that  in  future  we  shall  not  see  war,  UNLESS  WE  CAN 

CONCEIVE  THAT  EITHER  A  NATION  OR  A  RULER  WILL  ARISE  WHO 
CANNOT  CARRY  OUT  THEIR  SCHEME  OF  NATIONAL  AGGRANDIZEMENT 
EXCEPT  BY  TRAMPLING  ON  THE  RIGHTS  OF  THEIR  NEIGHBOR/'' 

It  is  enough  to  recall  how,  in  the  course  of  history  the  English 
have  always  interpreted  their  rights  to  understand  the  full  scope  of 
the  warning  concealed  under  these  flowers.  If  I  have  succeeded  in 
this  too  short  summary  in  bringing  out  the  inflexible  character  of 
English  policy,  it  will  be  understood  why  preparation  for  war 
against  England  is  a  sacred  duty  for  every  country  animated  with 
the  legitimate  desire  to  spread  the  rays  of  its  progress  beyond  its 
sea  frontiers ;  it  is  therefore  a  prime  necessity  for  us  if,  refusing, 

276 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

as  it  is  to  be  hoped  we  will,  to  remain  fixed  in  our  commercial 
debility,  we  proceed  to  resume  at  once  in  the  economic  world  the 
position  which  belongs  to  us. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter,  I  have  given  the  principal 
place  to  the  consideration  of  England ;  this  is  because  England's 
example  shows  better  than  that  of  any  other  combatant  how  the 
general  policy  of  a  people  rigidly  controls  their  strategy  and  in 
what  narrow  dependency  it  fixes  the  orientation  of  that  important 
part  of  the  military  art.  No  other  example  could  be  more  valua- 
ble than  England's  in  this  respect. 

Certain  publicists,  it  is  true,  and  not  among  the  least,  on  account 
of  the  positions  which  they  have  occupied,  have  many  times  argued 
and  even  lately  declared  that,  in  the  field  of  naval  warfare,  a  con- 
test with  Great  Britain  was  impossible.  I  will  not  discuss  this  in- 
correct statement,  and  moreover  one  insulting  to  a  great  nation, 
rich  as  is  ours  in  a  glorious  past.  No  contest  is  impossible,  except 
to  nations  who  give  up  in  despair,  and  such  nations  are  ripe  for 
slavery. 

THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  FEUD. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  enter  into  long  arguments  to  show 
why  we  should  face  the  eventuality  of  an  armed  conflict  with 
Germany;  the  evocation  of  very  recent  differences  would  amply 
suffice  to  demonstrate  it.  The  possibility  of  a  new  encounter  with 
that  Power  does  not  arise,  as  in  the  case  of  England,  from  causes 
so  to  speak  impersonal.  While  the  character  of  the  British  hos- 
tility is  as  it  were  general  and  derives  from  an  unchangeable 
principle,  applicable  to  all  the  adversaries  successively  opposed,  a 
war  with  our  Eastern  neighbor  would  be  but  the  renewal  of  a 
quarrel  already  more  than  two  centuries  old.  This  is  not  an  eco- 
nomic struggle,  it  is  an  essentially  political  antagonism. 

It  is  not  without  reason  that  the  Emperor,  on  the  frequent  occa- 
sions which  are  afforded  to  him  for  expressing  his  ideas,  said  in 
speaking  of  France,  "  the  hereditary  enemy."  This  expression, 
which  betrays  an  active  grudge,  sums  up  in  fact  the  history  of  the 
hostile  relations  between  the  two  countries,  the  continuous  growth 
of  the  little  state  of  Brandenburg  from  the  second  half  of  the  I7th 
century  to  the  reconstitution,  to  its  profit,  of  the  German  Empire, 
and  the  constant  opposition  made  by  France  to  that  development. 

Everything,  even  to  the  resentment  of  the  French  Protestants 

277 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

who  were  driven  out  by  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  and 
who  built  up  Berlin,  has  contributed  to  sow  seeds  of  discord  be- 
tween the  two  States. 

This  union  of  Germany  which  French  diplomacy  not  only  did 
not  know  how  to  prevent,  but  on  the  contrary,  helped  to  establish 
by  the  multiple  errors  of  its  policy,  constitutes  for  us  to-day  a 
constant  menace.  The  uninterrupted  increase  of  her  population, 
still  more  than  all  the  other  forms  of  her  activity,  prepares  for  us 
in  the  future  formidable  dangers,  because  it  will  facilitate  for  our 
adversaries  the  possession  of  that  important  factor  of  success, 
superiority  of  numbers,  and  this  so  much  the  better  as  our  birth 
rate  is  the  less.  When,  to  satisfy  traditional  rivalry,  and  also  in 
dispute  over  the  heritage  of  Charles  V,  the  Bourbons  and  Haps- 
burgs  gave  each  other  such  hard  knocks,  they  did  not  foresee  that, 
thanks  to  their  dissensions,  a  third  marauder  would  one  day  seize 
upon  the  spoil. 

French  diplomacy  perceived  one  fine  day  that  it  had  weakened 
in  Austria  the  necessary  counterpoise  to  the  disquieting  encroach- 
ments of  Prussia,  and  it  made  the  Seven  Years  War ;  but  it  was 
too  late.  The  great  Frederick  had  already  conquered  Silesia  and 
directed  minds  towards  the  Germanic  idea,  the  definite  evolution 
of  which  nothing  could  thenceforth  arrest.  In  the  very  serious 
match  which  he  entered  upon  against  France,  he  was  to  win  for 
his  people  the  first  game  at  Rossbach. 

Though  Prussia  finally  lost  the  second  game  at  lena,  she  was 
to  win  the  deciding  one  at  Sedan.  The(  blindness  of  France, 
whose  successive  governments  transmitted  as  an  article  of  faith 
the  necessity  of  destroying  the  house  of  Austria,  had  prevented 
her  from  seeing  a  danger  more  to  be  feared.  It  is  not  impossible 
to  attribute  to  an  unconscious  revival  of  this  same  fixed  idea  the 
passive  acquiescence  of  the  Second  French  Empire  in  1866,  in 
face  of  the  new  weakening  of  Austria  by  Prussia  at  Sadowa,  a 
new  error  initiative  of  our  own  defeat. 

It  is  therefore  truly  as  much  through  the  accumulated  errors 
of  French  policy  as  by  the  persistent  efforts  of  her  own  workers 
that  German  unity  has  been  brought  about. 

After  this  long  duel,  of  which  the  special  and  exclusive  charac- 
ter is  undoubted,  and  which  settled  the  dispute  by  the  definite  loss 
of  the  match  on  the  part  of  France,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent 
an  equally  definite  reconciliation  between  the  two  peoples.  Just 

278 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

as,  in  individual  encounters,  forgetfulness  of  reciprocal  grievances 
is  sealed  on  the  field  of  combat,  France  and  Germany  could  very 
well  after  1870  have  made  a  truce  to  their  quarrels.  The  satis- 
faction to  our  enemy  of  having  attained  his  object,  in  spite  of  our 
desperate  centuries-long  resistance,  was  fine  enough  to  dictate 
forgetfulness  of  past  injuries ;  on  our  side,  the  souvenirs  of  glory 
were  numerous  enough  for  the  passage  of  time  to  be  able  to 
soften  the  painful  impression  of  defeat.  Considering  everything, 
the  Germans  had  Sedan,  but  we  kept  lena. 

Such  was  truly  the  dominant  feeling  among  our  adversaries, 
for  naval  officers  have  preserved  the  memory  of  the  eager  civility, 
too  demonstrative  not  to  be  according  to  orders,  which  was  shown 
to  them  by  their  comrades  of  the  German  navy,  even  several  years 
after  the  war,  on  all  occasions  when  their  common  profession 
brought  about  meetings  throughout  the  world. 

To  occupy  the  position  of  taking  only  the  unequivocal  expenses 
of  the  war,  it  would  have  been  necessary  not  to  ask  of  us  a  too 
exorbitant  amount,  and  it  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  that 
France,  shorn  of  two  provinces,  and  with  still  bleeding  side, 
would  forget  so  cruel  a  wound. 

The  tearing  away  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  the  mother 
country  by  violence  has  dug  so  deep  a  pit  between  Germany  and 
France  that  nothing  will  be  able  to  fill  it  up.  And,  as  though  this 
operation  in  the  living  flesh  was  not  enough,  it  was  aggravated  by 
the  Draconian  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  Frankfort,  extorted 
with  knife  to  throat,  and  which  place  our  country  in  a  real  con- 
dition of  economic  slavery.  This  rigor  of  the  harsh  law  of  the 
conqueror  would  by  itself  alone  justify  the  revolt  of  a  free  people. 

Therefore  it  is  not,  as  beyond  the  Rhine  they  are  too  much 
pleased  to  say,  because  our  hostility  is  ineradicable  that  it  is  our 
imperious  duty  to  foresee  war  with  Germany,  nor  is  it  because  we 
were  beaten ;  but  it  is  because  our  defeat  was  consummated  with  a 
useless  refinement  of  cruelty  of  which  the  acute  memory  cannot 
be  effaced  by  time.  The  wound  is  always  open  and  cannot  heal. 

I  say  useless  cruelty,  because  the  higher  objective  fixed  two 
centuries  ago  by  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  was  attained  without 
that.  That  Germany  committed  a  grave  error  in  exacting  the  ran- 
som of  a  portion  of  French  territory,  I  for  my  part  am  absolutely 
convinced,  for  it  has  rendered  forever  impossible  a  reconciliation 
between  the  two  nations,  and,  in  spite  of  an  apparent  forgetful- 

279 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

ness,  this  thought  keeps  up  in  French  hearts  the  small  but  never 
extinguished  flame  of  hope. 

It  is  the  military  party,  all  powerful  in  Germany,  which,  it  is 
said,  demanded  that  condition ;  it  is  none  the  better  for  that. 
Louis  XIV  had  no  cause  to  congratulate  himself,  either,  upon  the 
policy  of  Louvois  and  the  military  party.  In  both  cases  the 
strategy  was  bad :  under  Louvois,  in  sacrificing  the  navy,  of  which 
the  role  ought  to  be  preponderant ;  under  Moltke,  in  creating  for 
the  future  a  permanent  cause  of  reprisals. 

And,  if  I  repeat  again  that  in  my  opinion  Germany  made  a  mis- 
take, it  is  because  I  consider  that  she  will  not  have  too  much  with 
all  her  forces,  all  her  resources,  and  all  her  faculties,  to  oppose  a 
formidable  danger  which  threatens  her  and  by  which  she  may  well 
lose  the  profit  of  two  hundred  years  of  perseverence.  The  eco- 
nomic conditions  of  Germany  have  undergone  profound  transfor- 
mations in  the  past  thirty-five  years.  The  trend  of  her  people  has 
changed ;  from  agricultural  it  has  become  industrial  and  commer- 
cial. The  modern  Carthage,  she  has  obeyed  with  extraordinary 
enthusiasm  the  watch-word  of  her  Emperor,  who  has  said  to  her, 
"  The  future  is  on  the  sea,"  and  she  lives,  especially  to-day,  upon 
the  ocean.  But  also  for  her,  as  of  old  for  the  daughter  of  Tyre, 
"  danger  is  on  the  sea!'  The  unprecedented  impulse  of  her  eco- 
nomic prosperity  necessarily  draws  her  towards  the  granite  rock 
of  the  British  power ;  she  may  well  be  dashed  to  pieces  upon  it. 

Is  it  not,  moreover,  the  very  plain  expectation  of  necessary 
future  encounters  which  impels  the  Kaiser  now  to  seek  a  quarrel 
with  us?  Are  not  we  the  mere  screen  behind  which  he  seeks  to 
reach  the  true  adversary  ?  Ah !  if  there  were  not  an  always  acute 
question  of  Alsace,  perhaps  a  glimpse  could  be  caught,  for  the  first 
time  in  four  hundred  years,  of  the  possibility  of  throwing  off  the 
maritime  yoke  of  England.  Germany  has  not  wished  it  so,  and 
that  is  why  we  ought  to  anticipate  a  war  against  her  which,  this 
time,  will  be  waged  on  the  sea  as  well  as  on  the  land. 

A  singularly  prophetic  and  disquieting  voice  has  already  made 
itself  heard  on  this  subject.  Louis  Blanc,  in  his  Ten  years  of  the 
English  people's  history,  indeed  wrote :  "  Alongside  of  the  gigan- 
tic struggles  that  Germany  armed  might  provoke-  and  carry  on, 
the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  and  of  the  Empire  -would  be 
no  more  than  children's  games.  Napoleon,  whose  point  of  de- 
parture was  at  one  of  the  extremities  of  Europe,  had  a  long  dis- 

280 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

tance  to  go  before  striking  at  the  gates  of  coveted  Capitals,  and  no 
one  is  unaware  that  his  eagles  were  overcome  with  fatigue  on  the 
road  from  Moscow  to  Paris;  but  a  German  Napoleon  would  reach 
in  a  few  leaps  all  the  Capitals  of  Europe,  except  Rome.  Germany 
with  a  military  organization  and  SUPPLIED  WITH  A  FLEET  would 
therefore  be  nearer  than  France  to  universal  domination." 

These  two  contingencies  create  a  very  delicate  situation  for  the 
French  foreign  policy  of  our  times  and  toss  it  ceaselessly  between 
the  two  opposite  poles  of  anglophilia  and  germanophilia,  about 
the  axis  of  which  our  diplomatic  world  turns  indefinitely.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  show,  in  this  connection,  what  an  un- 
doubted strategical  error  is  contained  in  the  French  policy  of  the 
seven  last  years,  oscillating  in  short  between  Fashoda  and  Tan- 
gier ;  but  I  am  bound  to  limit  myself. 

It  is  easily  understood  that  it  would  not  be  possible  for  me  to 
pass  in  review  all  the  special  cases  of  conflict  that  can  be  im- 
agined ;  moreover  such  a  review  would  be  useless,  for  not  claim- 
ing to  do  a  diplomat's  work  here,  but  having  merely  sought  to  in- 
dicate by  concrete  examples  how  what  I  shall  call  political  strat- 
egy can  be  treated,  I  consider  that  the  two  principal  cases  just 
studied  are  sufficient. 

THE  AMERICAN  CLOUD. 

Nevertheless  there  are  two  other  cases  that  I  shall  treat  briefly, 
because  for  several  reasons  they  are  of  very  great  interest.  The 
question,  moreover,  concerns  powers  newly  come  upon  the  world's 
stage,  but  whose  role,  each  day  enlarging,  attracts  attention. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  division  of  strategy  that  we  are 
studying  at  this  moment,  these  two  cases  constitute  excellent 
lessons. 

I  have  already  had  occasion,  a  propos  of  the  Spanish-American 
war,  to  show  the  very  old  beginnings  of  that  conflict.  Its  elemen- 
tary causes  are  of  a  general  nature  and  are  not  special  to  the  sin- 
gle case  of  Spain. 

The  great  island  of  Cuba  was  the  first  objective  of  the  policy  of 
the  United  States,  because,  on  account  of  its  value,  extent,  and 
riches,  it  deserved  to  be  so  favored.  But  it  is  not  so  much  because 
the  American  government  saw  in  Cuba  a  good  opportunity  as  be- 
cause she  lay  within  the  sphere  of  attraction  traced  by  the  Monroe 

281 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Doctrine,  that  her  divorce  from  Spain  was  consummated  by  force 
after  long  and  patient  attempts  at  a  mutual  agreement. 

But  this  famous  doctrine,  which  is  the  fanatical  Credo  of  the 
Union's  policy,  was  by  no  means  conceived  for  an  isolated  case ; 
it  applies  marvelously  to  all  occasions  which  afford  opportunity 
to  increase  the  patrimony  of  the  star  spangled  banner.  And  Cuba 
is  not  at  all,  far  from  it,  the  only  satellite  which  gravitates  around 
that  mighty  star,  the  United  States.  Many  other  islands  in  the 
West  Indies  are  still  foreign  to  them,  and  it  is  on  that  account  that 
several  European  powers,  ourselves  in  particular,  have  an  interest 
of  the  first  order  in  following  with  the  most  extreme  attention  the 
manifestations  of  public  opinion  in  America. 

The  very  rapid  strides  of  imperialism  in  that  country,  under 
the  strong  impulsion  of  that  admirable  statesman,  President 
Roosevelt,  the  feverish  activity  with  which  the  war  fleet  grows, 
until  able  very  soon  to  dispute  successfully  the  second  place  in 
the  world,  are  so  many  undeniable  symptoms  of  the  state  of  mind 
which  now  directs  the  policy  of  that  people. 

For  what  purpose  is  the  instrument  of  force,  which  in  a  very 
short  time  the  powerful  navy  now  being  built  in  America  will  be, 
if  it  is  not  in  case  of  need  to  compel  the  acceptance  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine?  Mahan's  lessons,  as  well  as  those  of  the  war  of  1898, 
have  not  been  thrown  away ;  beyond  the  Atlantic  the  indispensable 
weapon  of  maritime  power  is  being  forged,  with  full  knowledge 
of  its  influence  in  history. 

That  the  conviction  that  sooner  or  later  they  are  to  realize  the 
dream  of  "  America  for  the  Americans  "  is  deep  rooted  in  the 
heart  of  every  Yankee,  cannot  be  doubted  by  anyone  wrho  atten- 
tively follows  their  remarkable  evolution.  Already  constrained 
for  many  years  past  in  this  way  by  the  teachings  of  their  states- 
men, they  have  found  at  the  most  favorable  moment,  in  their  pres- 
ent President,  an  incomparable  professor  of  the  doctrine  of 
energy. 

It  is  for  that  reason  that  none  of  the  acts,  none  of  the  words  of 
this  popular  leader  can  be  indifferent  to  us.  Scarcely  a  few 
months  ago,  in  a  much  talked-of  speech,  President  Roosevelt,  al- 
luding to  the  role  of  the  United  States  in  the  West  Indian  seas, 
developed  the  idea  that,  without  meaning  to  attack  acquired  rights 
on  those  shores,  it  was  the  Union's  duty  not  to  neglect  anything 
going  on  there,  and  that  by  a  sort  of  natural  right  they  had  a 

282 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

mission  of  surveillance  and  even  "  of  high  police,  to  establish 
order  there  if  it  was  necessary." 

The  gravity  of  such  a  declaration,  especially  as  coming  from 
such  a  mouth,  could  escape  no  one ;  it  is  increased,  furthermore, 
by  the  very  fact  of  its  vagueness. 

Many  good  people,  who  think  no  one  is  moving  in  the  world 
because  they  themselves  remain  congealed  in  immobility,  affect  to 
see  in  these  words  merely  a  warning  to  the  opera-bouffe  republics 
of  Haiti  and  San  Domingo;  they  would  even  freely  applaud  the 
intervention  of  the  good  policeman,  but  they  forget  that  policemen 
often  calm  disorders  by  dragging  everybody  to  the  guard-house. 

They  likewise  lose  sight,  even  regarding  this  interpretation  as 
correct,  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  such  encouragement  to  con- 
tinue as  a  first  success.  After  having  confiscated  the  actual  thea- 
ter of  the  disorder  in  order  to  suppress  that  disorder,  who  could 
say  that  the  other  West  Indian  Islands  will  not  have  their  turn? 
It  is  so  tempting  to  offer  one's  good  services  when  the  proprietor 
is  not  at  home  and  Europe  is  so  far  away ! 

But  there  exists,  it  will  be  said,  no  pretext  for  intervention  in 
the  islands  still  belonging  to  European  powers.  That  is  perhaps 
true  to-day,  but  it  will  no  longer  be  so  to-morrow  ;  the  method  has 
undergone  the  test  of  experience  in  the  case  of  Cuba ;  in  the  mes- 
sage sent  to  Congress,  two  years  before  the  war,  President  Cleve- 
land laid  particular  stress  upon  the  great  interest  to  Americans  of 
peace  being  established  in  Cuba. 

He  neglected  to  admit  that  the  fires  of  insurrection  were  stirred 
up,  on  one  hand  upon  Union  soil  by  Cuban  refugees  who  were  re- 
ceived there  with  open  arms,  and  on  the  other  hand  upon  the 
shores  of  the  island  by  former  revolutionists  who  had  become 
naturalized  American  citizens  the  better  to  plot  without  danger, 
under  the  shelter  of  a  powerful  protection. 

The  method  is  not  even  American,  for  it  has  long  been  known 
and  practiced  in  the  world.  In  what  concerns  us  more  directly, 
and  without  meaning  to  advance  ill  founded  opinions,  it  may 
nevertheless  be  asked  if  the  frequency  of  disturbances,  during 
recent  times,  in  the  French  West  Indian  islands,  really  has  its  sin- 
gle origin  in  internal  political  difficulties. 

One  fact,  in  appearance  without  significance,  well  indicates, 
furthermore,  the  powerful  interest  with  which  the  government  of 
the  United  States  watches  everything  that  concerns  the  West  In- 

283 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

dies.  After  the  catastrophe  of  Martinique,  the  eagerness  with 
which  this  foreign  government  brought  the  first  assistance,  and 
the  exceptional  generosity  of  her  share  in  the  work  of  relief  in  a 
country  so  cruelly  tried,  show  that  she  follows  with  attentive  eye 
all  the  destinies  of  the  American  islands.  It  is  permitted  to  think 
that  this  generous  impulse  would  have  been  colder  if  an  island 
much  farther  off,  Corsica  for  example,  had  been  its  cause.  Recent 
events  in  Jamaica  have  given  new  strength  to  these  impressions. 

When  such  suggestive  symptoms  are  pointed  out,  incorrigible 
sceptics  of  the  class  so  numerous  in  France,  of  those  to  whom 
disasters  have  never  taught  anything,  reply  that  the  memory  of 
services  rendered  and  the  similarity  of  forms  of  government  guar- 
antee an  eternal  peace  between  France  and  the  United  States. 

As  to  the  first  point,  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  events  of  1778 
are  rather  far  removed  from  us  for  their  memory  to  be  so  lively, 
and  moreover  there  is  no  such  thing  as  eternal  gratitude.  Finally, 
as  to  the  second  guarantee,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  though  the 
name  is  the  same  for  the  two  countries,  the  thing  is  very  different. 

All  this,  moreover,  is  of  dreamland.  History,  with  its  brutal 
frankness,  teaches  us  that  the  policy  of  sentiment  is  at  most  good 
for  the  Latin  races ;  the  Anglo-Saxons  have  never  made  use  of  it. 

The  danger  exists  in  a  latent  state,  but  it  is  sure;  if  it  can  be 
considered  as  still  far  distant,  it  is  none  the  less  necessary  to  ex- 
amine it  with  all  possible  care. 

Strategy  offers  us  two  ways  of  preparing  for  it,  and  two  only : 
either  to  sell  the  French  West  Indies  to  the  highest  bidder  at  the 
best  price  possible ;  or  to  get  our  forces  ready  in  anticipation  of  a 
possible  conflict  with  America,  and,  in  the  latter  event,  the  lessons 
of  the  Spanish-American  war,  derived  above  all  from  Spain's 
errors,  dictate  to  us  the  necessity  of  establishing  at  Fort-de- 
France  an  immense  base  of  operations,  capable  of  sufficing  to  our 
entire  fleet. 

The  second  solution  would  be  extremely  costly,  for  it  is  only  by 
expenditures  of  hundreds  of  millions  that  there  could  be  accumu- 
lated at  Martinique  the  stores  of  all  sorts,  the  docks,  the  defensive 
works,  etc.,  for  a  naval  force  insuring  superiority  of  numbers 
over  the  very  important  fleet  which  is  now  ready  to  leave  the  ship- 
yards of  America. 

Moreover,  would  that  nation  allow  us  to  make  such  an  immense 
effort,  out  of  proportion  to  the  value  of  our  possessions?  I  do 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

not  think  so ;  for  after  all  the  effort  would  be  directed  solely 
against  herself,  no  military  interest  except  that  justifying  any 
important  sacrifice  in  the  West  Indies. 

By  selling  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe  to  the  United  States,  we 
would  accomplish  a  fine  and  good  piece  of  strategy ;  I  insist  upon 
the  word  for,  far  from  deviating  from  our  subject,  we  are  show- 
ing by  this  striking  example  of  what  farseeing  conceptions  the 
military  art  is  made.  Unhappily  we  shall  have  been  able  scarcely 
to  glance  at  the  question,  but  that  will  have  sufficed  to  make  us 
divine  the  infinitely  varied  resources  which  politics  brings  to 
strategy ;  one  is  inseparable  from  the  other. 

Though  these  two  islands  are  of  little  value  to  us,  for  they  con- 
stitute a  costly  luxury,  they  would  have  much  value  for  the  United 
States,  on  account  of  their  position  of  advance  guard  to  windward 
of  the  West  Indian  sea.  Fort-de-France  especially  would  be  for 
the  Americans  a  naval  base  of  exceptional  strategic  advantage 
when  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  to  universal  commerce 
has  drawn  into  the  West  Indian  sea  the  fleets  of  all  countries.  It 
is  an  incomparable  advance  post.  The  operation  would  therefore 
be  an  excellent  one ;  it  would  be  a  most  conservative  investment 
on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  would  relieve  us  of  a  real 
anxiety. 

In  what  way  would  it  be  more  extraordinary  than  the  cession 
of  Louisiana,  made  by  Napoleon  in  1803?  The  Emperor  did  an 
excellent  piece  of  strategy  that  time. 

In  any  event,  between  these  two  alternatives,  there  is  no  possi- 
ble half-measure.  Above  all,  let  us  not  do  as  Spain  did  when, 
in  1848,  wrapping  her  tattered  cloak  about  her,  she  proudly  re- 
plied to  the  definite  propositions  of  the  United  States  to  purchase 
Cuba :  "  Rather  let  the  island  be  engulfed  in  the  sea."  Fifty  years 
later  Spain  was  to  lose  Cuba,  without  getting  any  payment. 

THE  YELLOW  PERIL. 

The  actuality  of  the  events  which  have  just  happened  in  the  Far 
East,  which  makes  them  still  vivid  in  the  minds  of  all,  will  exempt 
me  from  a  long  argument  to  explain  the  reasons  which  render  the 
extraordinary  development  of  Japan  a  future  menace  to  us.  That 
nation,  born  to  European  life  and  progress  less  than  forty  years 
ago,  has  not  halted  in  its  advance,  and  has  gained  the  first  rank  of 
world  powers. 

285 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

It  is  for  reasons  of  a  general  nature  that  that  enterprising  peo- 
ple should  be  watched,  and  that  preparation  for  war  against  them 
should  be  seriously  faced.  They  also,  obeying  the  excitations  of 
their  leaders,  cherish  I  know  not  what  Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine, 
imagining  an  Empire  of  the  yellow  world  under  the  domination 
of  a  "  Greater  Japan."  Everything  urges  them  towards  this 
dream  of  glory :  pride  in  their  extravagant  successes ;  their  limit- 
less ambition ;  their  race  hatreds  against  Europeans ;  the  desire  to 
free  from  servitude  their  yellow  brothers ;  their  unlimited  increase 
of  population,  the  surplusage  of  which  overflows  their  sea  fron- 
tiers; and  finally  their  geographical  position,  which  with  its  in- 
sular character  imposes  upon  them  necessities  similar  to  those  of 
England,  and  also  the  same  desires  and  the  same  vocation. 

The  disclosure  of  Baron  Kodama's  report,  which  attracted  so 
much  attention  a  few  months  ago,  therefore  could  surprise  only 
those  who  had  not  followed  the  evolution  of  the  Japanese  Empire, 
or  who  were  not  informed  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  Japanese  in 
our  Indo-Chinese  colony. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Japan,  weakened  by  her  very  victories, 
will  be  compelled  for  not  a  few  years  yet  to  observe  a  policy  of 
retrenchment,  to  repair  her  losses,  to  recuperate  her  overburdened 
finances  and  to  prepare  for  new  exploits.  But  even  now  the 
moment  can  be  foreseen  when,  freed  from  her  passing  embarrass- 
ments, she  will  resume  her  racial  policy.  On  that  day  France, 
which  has  become  a  great  Asiatic  power,  will  have  to  reckon  very 
seriously  with  Japan.  It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that,  beyond 
the  principle  of  the  application  of  her  doctrine,  Indo-China,  an  im- 
mense granary  of  rice,  is  for  Japan  an  economic  spoil  worthy  in 
all  respects  of  her  desires. 

That  restless  nation,  animated  by  a  warlike  spirit,  penetrated, 
from  the  highest  to  the  lowest  of  her  subjects,  with  the  grandeur 
of  the  mission  which  has  been  given  them,  aspires  to  guide  the  des- 
tinies of  Asia.  Under  such  a  master,  conscious  of  his  strength 
and  intelligence,  the  "  yellow  peril "  is  not  a  myth. 

For  us  Frenchmen,  if  we  wish  to  retain  Indo-China,  if  we  con- 
sider that  magnificent  colony  necessary  to  us  in  view  of  our  eco- 
nomic development,  we  have  only  the  time  strictly  needful  to  make 
efficient  arrangements  to  meet  an  onset  which  is  inevitable  but 
which  will  be  the  more  delayed  and  the  less  menacing  in  propor- 
tion as  we  shall  have  succeeded  in  being  stronger. 

286 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  point  out  in  what  should  consist,  for  us, 
the  effort  to  make  to  defend  victoriously  Indo-China  against  the 
Japanese  desires ;  that  question  lies  outside  of  the  fixed  scope  of 
my  work,  but  nevertheless  I  will  say  that  we  must  expect  this 
effort  to  be  considerable.  Let  us  remember  Spain  in  Cuba,  and 
Russia  in  Manchuria,  and  we  will  then  think  that,  however  great 
the  expenditures  to  be  made  in  our  Asiatic  possessions  to  allow 
us  to  retain  them,  they  are  nothing  in  comparison  with  what  we 
should  lose  in  a  disastrous  war. 

And  here  again  it  is  necessary  to  weigh  the  expense  which  the 
assured  protection  of  the  colony  would  require  against  the  value 
of  that  colony.  If  the  latter  is  greater,  no  hesitation  is  permissi- 
ble :  we  must  prepare  for  the  contest,  and  that  without  loss  of 
time,  to-day  even,  in  order  to  put  a  timely  restraint  upon  appe- 
tites that  we  recognize.  Finally,  one  single  thing  is  not  permis- 
sible, and  that  is  the  policy  of  bandaged  eyes  and  ears,  which  per- 
ceives the  storm  only  when  it  breaks  and  when  it  is  too  late. 

If  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  it  has  been  possible  for  a 
moment  to  believe  that  I  wandered  from  the  subject  in  taking  up 
the  questions  which  are  treated  in  it,  I  dare  to  hope  that  such  an 
impression  has  little  by  little  passed  away. 

Nothing  is  more  necessary  to  strategy  than  the  precise  deter- 
mination of  objectives,  and  I  have  wished  to  show  above  all  that 
their  selection  ought  not  to  be  the  outcome  of  a  simple  outburst  of 
sentiment,  of  temporary  conditions  or  chance,  but  that  it  ought  to 
depend  upon  the  permanent  interests  of  the  country. 

I  repeat  it  once  more,  because  the  subject  is  too  serious  not  to 
permit  reiteration — it  is  by  a  never  ceasing  collaboration  of  poli- 
tics and  of  purely  military  strategy  that  one  prepares  himself  for 
war. 

Is  it  not  also  the  former  which  arranges  the  alliances  whose 
conclusion  has  a  direct  effect  on  military  strength  ?  At  each  page, 
so  to  speak,  of  maritime  history,  we  meet  examples  of  these  al- 
liances, between  England  and  France,  between  England  and  Hol- 
land, between  France  and  Spain  .  .  .  . ;  but  these  alliances,  put- 
ting in  play  military  forces  whose  relative  displacement  exercises 
an  immense  influence  in  the  final  balance,  concern  military  strat- 
egy primarily.  General  strategy  is  made  of  their  aggregate. 

Finally,  were  it  only  for  a  single  result,  this  chapter  will  not 
have  been  useless.  It  will  have  shown  us,  in  fact,  in  the  four  ex- 

287 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

amples  which  I  chose  solely  because  they  concern  us  to  the  highest 
degree,  peoples  on  a  continuous  and  persevering  march  towards 
an  always  greater  development.  Whether  we  consider  England, 
Germany,  the  United  States,  or  Japan,  we  see  nations  knowing 
admirably  what  they  want  and  wanting  that  strongly.  And  to  at- 
tain to  it,  they  utilize  the  two  most  powerful  factors  of  strategy : 
continuity  of  effort  and  national  energy. 


288 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PREPARATION   FOR  WAR  :   ITS  PRINCIPAL   DIVISIONS  ;  WEAPONS 

AND  THEIR  EMPLOYMENT;  PROBLEM  OF  THE  BATTLE 

FLEET;  NAVY  YARDS,  ETC. 

If,  as  I  believe,  all  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  preceding  chapters 
have  produced  a  lasting  mental  impression,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
insist  upon  the  exceptional  importance  of  the  subject  we  are  now 
to  take  up.  It  dominates  the  whole  military  art,  and  final  success 
in  war  depends  strictly  upon  the  good  or  bad  application  of  the 
principles  upon  which  the  vast  program  of  preparation  for  war 
is  based.  • 

If  we  but  glance  at  the  past,  many  memories  will  come  throng- 
ing upon  us.  Spain,  Holland  and  France  successively  lost  the 
empire  of  the  seas  because  they  had  not  prepared  for  war.  Eng- 
land conquered  France  in  1805  through  the  genius  of  Nelson  and 
the  excellence  of  her  fleets,  but  she  also  benefited  largely  by  the 
naval  improvidence  of  her  adversary  and  the  lack  of  training  of 
his  squadrons. 

Italy  was  beaten  at  Lissa  because  she  thought  that  an  assem- 
blage of  materially  powerful  ships  was  enough  to  insure  naval 
victory  ;  she  forgot  that  a  fleet  without  a  leader,  without  instructed 
and  trained  crews,  is  but  a  body  without  a  soul. 

Spain  lost  'Cuba  from  having  adopted  the  stupid  policy  of  the 
ostrich,  that  hides  its  head  under  the  pebbles  so  as  not  to  see  the 
danger;  the  lamentable  Odyssey  of  Cervera  is  not  of  those  that 
can  be  forgotten. 

Finally,  the  overthrow  of  the  power  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East 
was  due  to  her  not  having  for  a  moment  anticipated  that  another 
nation  which,  for  its  part,  had  long  been  preparing,  would  one  day 
stand  up  against  her. 

Thus,  whether  the  question  be  looked  at  from  one  side  or  the 
other,  from  that  of  the  conquered  or  from  that  of  the  conquerors, 
the  evidence  of  the  preponderant  and  decisive  importance  of  prep- 
aration is  plainly  to  be  seen. 

This  proposition  no  one  denies,  because  the  experience  of  all 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

times  is  too  conclusive  to  permit  doubting  it,  and  no  principle  is 
less  disputed. 

It  is  when  the  question  of  applying  it  arises  that  difficulties 
begin ;  for  if  there  exists  but  a  single  correct  and  sure  method  of 
preparing  for  war,  as  I  hope  to  demonstrate,  on  the  other  hand 
there  are  a  thousand  sentimental  ways  of  understanding  that 
preparation. 

And  immediately  an  important  question  requires  elucidation. 
Ought  we  to  study  this  preparation  counting  only  on  the  resources 
that  we  have  at  the  moment,  or  seeking,  with  a  view  to  gathering 
them  together,  those  that  we  ought  to  have?  The  question  is  a 
large  one,  as  may  be  seen,  but  it  must  be  answered.  I  shall  do  so 
with  the  entire  frankness  that  the  most  elementary  professional 
honesty  imposes  upon  me ;  and  that  is  why  we  are  to  study,  before 
anything  else,  in  this  chapter,  the  means  that  would  be  indispensa- 
ble in  order  to  carry  on  a  war  Avith  a  chance  of  success. 

No  doubt  can  exist  when  the  question  concerns  a  nation  like 
England,  habituated  through  long  centuries  of  usage  always  to 
follow  the  same  way,  regardless  of  change  of  instruments ;  she 
has  but  a  single  method  of  preparing  for  war,  the  good  one,  with 
tools  that  she  has  known  how  to  make  in  time. 

But  it  is  not  the  same  for  most  nations,  who  have  experienced 
successive  phases  of  wise  plans  and  of  weaknesses.  If  we  were 
not  so  pressed  for  time,  it  would  be  of  the  highest  interest  for  us, 
Frenchmen,  to  study  throughout  our  naval  history  the  ups  and 
downs  of  our  preparedness  for  war  and  the  influence  of  the  lofty 
views  of  Richelieus  and  of  Colberts  upon  our  success  in  warlike 
operations.  As  things  are,  practically,  for  a  people  resolved  to 
break  definitely  with  worn  out  methods  and  frankly  to  adopt  an 
organization  conforming  to  military  principles,  there  ought  to  be 
two  distinct  preparations.  The  first,  wholly  one  of  transition,  in- 
tended to  meet  the  most  urgent  needs,  will  base  its  combinations 
upon  the  existing  means,  whether  sufficient  or  insufficient ;  the 
second,  simultaneously,  will  establish  the  really  necessary  require- 
ments called  for  by  the  military  conception  and  will  gradually  take 
the  place  of  the  first  until  it  wholly  replaces  it  when  the  task  is 
definitely  completed. 

It  was  very  late  for  Spain  to  prepare  for  war,  in  1898,  with 
what  she  could  call  then  "the  actual  means";  likewise  there  was 
no  longer  time  for  Russia,  in  1904,  in  similar  circumstances. 

290 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  French  effort  of  the  autumn  of  1898,  to  stand  up  against 
the  alarm  of  Fashoda,  was  itself  also  very  tardy.  Nations  which 
allow  themselves  to  be  surprised  by  Fashodas  must  be  severely 
blamed  and  also  pitied ;  they  leave  nothing  to  their  navies  but  a 
single  duty,  that  of  saving  the  national  honor  by  a  desperate  re- 
sistance. Great  designs  are  forbidden  to  them. 

To  comprehend  why  I  shall  only  treat  of  preparation  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  enough  to  consider  for  a  moment 
that  the  employment  of  existing  means  falls  within  the  province 
of  the  General  Staff,  that  I  have  in  no  way  knowledge  of  its  views 
and  that  I  should  even  be  much  embarrassed  if  I  had  to  set  them 
forth,  not  only  on  account  of  their  confidential  character  but  par- 
ticularly because,  in  complete  ignorance  of  certain  higher  reasons, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  me  well  to  explain  the  facts. 

To  cite  but  one  example,  while  history  teaches  us,  and  I  am 
truly  obliged  also  to  affirm  it,  that  the  principle  of  homogeneity 
of  forces  is  fundamental,  our  Northern  Squadron  yesterday  was 
still  a  heterogeneous  assemblage  without  cohesion  and  conse- 
quently without  well  balanced  strength.  And  there  is  still  more ; 
we  know  likewise  that  "  concentration  of  efforts  "  and  "  the  ex- 
clusive character  of  the  aim"  are  incontestable  truths.  How 
should  I  succeed  in  reconciling  the  actual  scattering  of  our  naval 
forces,  in  formal  violation  of  these  principles,  with  the  lessons  of 
experience  and  my  exposition  of  the  doctrine  ? 

I  should  be  obliged  to  conclude  that,  if  our  Northern  Squadron 
is  to  this  day  a  composite  of  diverse  units,  if  we  are  weak  every- 
where, it  is  because  there  are  profound  reasons  of  which  I  am 
ignorant,  and  this  response  would  satisfy  no  one,  especially  not 
myself. 

Another  argument  can  be  furnished  which  militates  in  favor  of 
a  study  quite  general  in  its  nature,  in  conformity  with  the  doctrine. 
If  I  take  a  question  haphazard  in  the  very  overloaded  program  we 
are  to  accomplish,  let  us  say,  for  example,  the  store  of  coal  at  Sai- 
gon, and  if  I  say  that  we  actually  have  in  that  port  a  stock  fixed 
by  regulation  at  12,000  tons,  every  one  will  ask  of  me:  "Why 
12,000  and  not  10,000  or  14,000?"  And,  in  fact,  we  put  our 
finger  on  the  knotty  point. 

Even  the  simplest  acts,  the  most  unimportant,  which  have  war 
for  their  object,  ought  all  to  be  inspired  by  a  military  idea.  In 
order  that  the  figure  cited  above  may  be  accepted,  it  is  wholly  nec- 

291 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

essary  to  say  what  the  naval  force  is  whose  needs  it  ought  to 
satisfy,  and  also  what  is  the  predestined  employment  of  that  naval 
force,  or,  to  speak  more  exactly,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  first 
of  all  what  the  naval  force  is  that  satisfies  a  precise  military  ob- 
jective, to  decide  upon  the  operations  that  will  be  intrusted  to  it 
both  as  to  number  and  duration,  and  finally  to  calculate  as  the  last 
step  the  quantities  of  fuel  indispensable  to  permit  the  said  opera- 
tions. In  a  word,  the  stock  of  coal  is  the  unknown  quantity  of  a 
military  problem.  We  could  multiply  examples,  we  shall  always 
reach  this  same  conclusion. 

So  it  is  in  this  manner  that  we  shall  proceed ;  it  matters  little, 
moreover,  whether  the  results  at  which  we  arrive  are  more  or  less 
exact ;  I  do  not  pretend  to  undertake,  by  myself  alone,  a  colossal 
task  which  belongs  to  the  General  Staff.  The  method  alone  is  to 
be  borne  in  mind.  Any  other  would  lead  to  writing  a  book  of  in- 
structions without  scope  and  without  connection,  by  the  use  of  fig- 
ures taken  from  the  various  bureaus  of  the  Navy  Department. 

I  cannot  insist  too  strongly  upon  the  necessity  of  a  military  rea- 
son as  the  basis  of  decisions  apparently  most  insignificant ;  for,  in 
many  countries,  too  often,  especially  in  what  concerns  the  fur- 
nishing with  stores  and  the  enlargement  of  stations  of  repair  and 
supply,  etc.,  the  adopted  procedures  have  been  inspired  by  the 
narrow  intelligences  of  bookkeepers  exalted,  through  the  favor  of 
those  in  power  or  of  circumstances,  to  functions  too  lofty  for  their 
puny  capacities.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  military  chiefs  to  order  these 
subalterns  back  to  the  ranks  with  an  energetic :  "  Cobblers,  stick  to 
your  lasts/' 

Thus  set  forth,  the  subject  discloses  immense  complexity,  and 
we.  ought  to  think  ourselves  fortunate  if,  in  the  space  which  is  par- 
simoniously measured  out  to  us,  we  succeed  in  sketching  it  in 
broad  outline. 

THE  PREPARATION  OF  WEAPONS. 

THE  GUN. — Battle  ought  to  be  the  objective  of  every  war ;  but, 
to  fight,  weapons  are  necessary,  and  it  follows  that  the  study  of 
the  weapons  best  suited  to  the  struggle  which  it  is  proposed  to 
sustain  is  the  most  urgent  of  prerequisites.  Among  the  various 
weapons  that  can  be  imagined,  there  is  one  to  which  the  very 
human  wish  to  crush  one's  adversary  the  soonest  and  the  furthest 
off  possible  has  long  ago  assured  the  first  place. 

202 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

The  most  urgent  first  requisite  ought  therefore  to  be  to  study 
the  role  of  the  gun  and  the  method  of  using  it  and  to  choose  its 
characteristics  with  a  definite  military  point  of  aim.  Although  the 
expression  point  of  aim  has  a  double  meaning,  in  both  senses  it 
represents  very  well  what  I  wish  to  say.  It  is,  in  fact,  in  its  rela- 
tion to  the  targets  against  which  it  is  proposed  to  use  it  that  the 
gun  must  be  chosen. 

The  detailed  and  minute  examination  of  the  war  ships  of  the 
powers  with  which  we  are  liable  to  have  conflict  is,  consequently, 
also  a  necessity  to  some  extent  disadvantageous.  It  would  suffice, 
besides  many  other  reasons,  to  explain  why  it  is  indispensable  to 
fix  initially  tne  political  objectives.  That  point  settled,  the  task  of 
the  military  man  ought  not  be  limited  to  inquiring  what  are  the 
probable  effects  of  the  projectiles  at  his  disposal  against  foreign 
ships  in  service.  By  so  proceeding  he  would  commit  a  great 
error ;  to  avoid  it,  the  fact  that  the  weapon  proposed  to  be  forged 
will  not  be  ready  till  several  years  have  elapsed  must  be  taken  ac- 
count of.  Therefore  the  ballistic  power  of  one's  artillery  ought  to 
be  established  so  as  to  suffice  for  the  attack  of  the  fighting  units 
which  are  themselves  in  preparation  in  foreign  countries. 

It  is  painful  to  have  to  state  that,  in  the  French  navy,  this  fault 
has  constantly  been  committed ;  and  yet  it  violates  an  unchanging 
tradition,  familiar  to  all,  in  the  amiable  and  profitable  struggles  of 
industry  and  commerce.  When  a  manufacturer,  in  fact,  wishes  ^to 
beat  a  competitor,  he  does  not  limit  himself  to  seeking  an  improve- 
ment which  would  put  himself  simply  on  an  equality;  he  endea- 
vors to  study  the  methods  of  his  colleague,  and  the  trend  of  his 
ideas,  in  order  to  realize  before  him  an  undoubted  betterment.  In 
war  the  method  is  the  same. 

A  concrete  example  will  better  explain  my  thought.  Very  few 
people  in  our  profession  would  to-day  deny  that  the  battleships 
of  the  Patrie  class  will  be  somewhat  out  of  fashion  on  the  day 
when  they  join  the  fleet  for  service.  This  is  not  at  all  due  to  the 
slowness  of  their  construction ;  they  had  within  them,  in  fact,  this 
original  defect  even  on  the  day  of  their  conception. 

I  shall  probably  treat  this  whole  question  later  with  the  attention 
it  deserves.  For  the  moment,  the  gun  only  concerns  me.  Now 
the  explanatory  statement  relative  to  the  program  of  these  pro- 
jected ships,  alluding  to  their  armament  of  four  12-inch  and 
eighteen  6.5-inch  guns,  contains  the  following  phrase :  "  With  such 

293 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

arrangements,  this  battleship  is  the  most  formidable  engine  of  war 
which  has  yet  been  built  by  any  navy"  One  cannot  help  being 
struck  by  the  surprising-  error  contained  in  these  few  words ;  I 
pass  over,  be  it  understood,  the  venial  one  of  the  wording  which 
applies  the  precise  term  built  to  a  projected  ship,  and  I  come  to 
objections  altogether  serious.  The  above  phrase,  as  well,  more- 
over, as  the  entire  explanatory  statement,  in  the  comparison  with 
foreign  battleships,  is  absolutely  silent  as  to  the  characteristics  of 
the  projects  likewise  being  studied,  at  that  very  moment,  in  rival 
navies. 

This  omission  is  the  more  regrettable  because  England  was  pre- 
paring the  King  Edward  VII  class,  notably  superior  to  the  For- 
midable and  Majestic  classes,  etc.,  which  were  alone  cited  in  the 
program  of  1900.  To  further  emphasize  the  error  of  principle,  I 
will  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  King  Edward  is  already  in 
service,  several  years  consequently  before  the  Patrie  and  her  sis- 
ters. Therefore  the  guns  of  our  I4,ooo-ton  battleships  should 
have  been  designed  to  fight  efficiently  ships  like  the  King  Edward. 
The  rigorous  proof  that  this  is  not  the  case,  beyond  those  already 
given,  is  found  in  this  statement  that  the  6.5-inch  gun,  at  the  prac- 
tical fighting  distances  adopted  at  the  battle  of  Tsushima,  is  quite 
impotent  against  the  thin  armor  of  the  English  battleship. 

It  might  be  alleged  in  excuse  that  in  1900  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  had  not  taken  place  and  that,  consequently,  lessons  yet  to  come 
could  not  be  profited  by.  To  show  the  exact  value  that  must  be 
given  to  this  excuse,  I  will  observe  that  Tsushima  did  but  afford  a 
striking  confirmation  of  ideas  already  brought  into  prominence  by 
the  Yalu  and  advocated  since  then  in  all  navies,  including  our  own, 
notably  in  1896  and  1897.  The  unfolding  of  these  ideas  coincided 
with  the  appearance  of  the  rapid-firing  gun  and  smokeless  powder 
which,  by  permitting  regulation  of  gun  fire  at  any  distance,  have 
favored  the  intuitive  and  unconscious  progress  of  humanity  in  the 
search  for  battle  at  long  range. 

And  immediately  we  perceive  what  an  exceptional  place  the  log- 
ical choice  of  weapons  holds  in  the  chapter  of  preparation  for  war. 
It  is  very  late  to  question  in  private  life  how  to  repel  an  aggression 
if  one  has  with  him  only  a  slender  switch ;  care  should  have  been 
taken,  before  going  out,  to  provide  oneself  with  a  stout  cudgel. 
It  is  likewise  too  late  to  discover  that  one's  guns  are  insufficient 
once  they  have  been  built. 

294 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Once  more,  therefore,  the  study  of  this  chapter  must  be  based 
upon  what  we  ought  to  have. 

"  Experience  is  the  only  source  of  truth;  it  alone  can  teach  us 
anything  new,  it  alone  can  give  us  certainty"  (Science  and  hy- 
pothesis. M.  Poincare.)  We  shall  establish  our  method  of  select- 
ing weapons  upon  this  fine  maxim ;  we  shall  demand  from  experi- 
mental facts  the  data  necessary  to  determine  our  choice. 

And,  consequently,  every  time  that  the  features  of  a  program  of 
new  ships  are  to  be  prepared,  it  will  be  necessary  to  recur  also  to 
this  method.  What  are  the  ships  that  are  being  prepared  by  our 
neighbors,  what  are  the  dimensions  and  what  the  thickness  of  the 
different  parts  of  the  hull,  what  resistance  will  they  offer  to  the 
penetration  of  projectiles,  at  the  extreme  fighting  ranges  practi- 
cally used  in  known  wars — such  is  the  logical  and  rigorous  analy- 
sis of  the  problems  of  detail  which  it  will  be  necessary  successively 
to  resolve.  The  perforating  power  to  require  of  the  projectile,  and 
consequently  the  minimum  caliber  of  gun  furnishing  the  required 
useful  effect,  will  naturally  derive  thence. 

This  manner  of  acting  is  the  only  one  which  suppresses  the 
vague  solutions  of  sentiment  and  reduces  to  a  minimum  the  part 
played  by  chance. 

THE  TORPEDO. — The  process  is  the  same  for  the  torpedo,  and, 
in  a  general  way,  for  all  weapons.  The  solutions  thus  far  accepted 
for  the  use  of  the  torpedo  show  the  effects  of  the  dearth  of  ex- 
perimental facts  concerning  it.  Moreover,  its  adoption  for  the 
armament  of  ships  of  war  has  occasioned  the  most  varied  trans- 
formations, without  the  principle  itself,  any  more  than  the  varia- 
tions, having  received  the  sanction  of  experimental  test.  Are 
under-water  tubes  preferable  to  those  above  water  ?  The  question 
doubtless  merits  discussion ;  but  another  of  much  greater  impor- 
tance ought  first  to  be  settled,  which  is  whether  the  torpedo  is 
truly  a  weapon  for  ships  of  the  line.  It  may  easily  be  understood 
that,  if  this  essential  point  be  decided  negatively,  the  discussion  of 
details  would  not  even  be  proposed. 

It  is  therefore  the  organic  principle  that  needs  to  be  elucidated, 
and  in  this  respect  the  teachings  of  the  late  war  will  be  very  useful 
to  us.  In  reality,  it  is  in  their  intimate  relations  with  each  other 
that  the  different  weapons  must  be  studied.  United  upon  one  ship, 
they  converge  towards  a  single  effort,  the  destruction  of  the  ad- 
versary, and  the  action  of  each  of  them  is  necessarily  dependent 

295 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

upon  that  of  the  others.  It  is  therefore  quite  inexact  to  reason  as 
has  always  been  done,  as  is  too  often  still  done,  upon  the  isolated 
role  of  each  of  them. 

For  the  torpedo  a  new  development  also  is  foreshadowed,  and 
it  seems  as  if  a  struggle  similar  to  that  which  still  continues  be- 
tween gun  and  armor  is  about  to  open.  The  resistance  of  the 
special  protection  of  the  Cesarevitch  to  the  explosion  of  a  tor- 
pedo, in  the  night  of  February  8,  1904,  has  awakened  many  hopes. 
To  appreciate  their  value,  there  is  need  to  investigate  what  new 
conditions  of  power  the  torpedo  must  satisfy,  in  the  future,  to  de- 
stroy these  hopes,  and  whether  such  conditions  are  attainable.  For 
this  weapon,  as  for  the  gun,  it  is  therefore  truly  towards  the 
future  that  we  still  must  look  and  not  towards  an  insufficient 
present. 

THE  RAM. — I  wrote,  a  few  lines  above,  that  weapons  examined 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  real  value  of  their  action  were  in- 
separable one  from  the  other.  I  find  a  striking  example  of  this  in 
the  case  of  the  ram. 

No  weapon  has  given  occasion  to  overflowing  enthusiasm  more 
than  this  one ;  it  has  had  and  it  still  has  fervent  and  convinced  ad- 
vocates. And  yet,  to  support  such  very  strong  convictions,  there 
exist  after  all  only  very  meager  experimental  data,  that  is  to  say 
a  few  isolated  scenes  of  the  rather  restricted  theater  of  the  War 
of  Secession,  and  the  incident  of  the  Ferdinand  Max  and  the  Re 
d'  Italia  at  the  battle  of  Lissa.  In  this  almost  general  infatuation 
which  still  lasts,  no  voice  of  reason  has  been  raised  modestly  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  gun  in  neither  case  took  any  part. 
It  is  therefore  truly  the  separate  examination  of  a  weapon  without 
connection  with  other  weapons  which  has  had  such  a  remarkably 
lasting  influence  upon  opinions. 

If  the  question  of  the  use  of  the  ram  is  to  be  opened  anew  and 
fully  considered,  it  is  indispensable  to<  examine  it  in  the  light  of 
more  modern  examples. 

THE  FIGHTING  SHIP. 

With  what  we  have  already  learned,  we  possess  henceforth  the 
desired  data  for  taking  up  the  complex  and  important  problem 
of  the  fighting  ship.  I  have  well  said  important!  What  then  is 
the  prime  necessity,  in  the  infinite  unlimited  field  of  preparation 
for  war,  which  can,  in  fact,  in  the  material  order  take  precedence 

296 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

of  that  of  giving  to  one's  country  the  most  suitable  instrument  for 
imposing  respect  upon  all?  Has  not  preparation  for  war  been 
justly  symbolized,  always,  by  the  popular  expression  to  forge  its 
weapons? 

Few  problems  are  so  difficult  to  solve  as  this  one,  for  it  appar- 
ently admits  of  an  infinity  of  solutions.  It  is  not  sufficient,  in  fact, 
to  place  weapons  on  a  war  ship ;  it  is  further  necessary  to  protect 
them  from  the  adversary's  blows,  it  is  also  necessary  to  protect  the 
ship  itself,  in  such  a  way  that  an  unfortunate  blow  may  not  in- 
stantly suppress  the  weapons  by  destroying  the  stability  or  the 
buoyancy  of  their  floating  platform. 

It  is  no  less  indispensable  to  endow  that  floating  platform  with 
qualities  of  enduring  mobility,  which  enable  it  to  be  brought  at 
the  right  moment  to  the  place  of  action. 

Up  to  this  point  everybody  is  in  agreement ;  but  the  difficulties 
begin  when  the  question  arises  of  determining  to  what  extent  the 
fighting  ship  shall  be  provided  with  the  diverse  qualities  we  have 
just  enumerated,  when,  in  a  word,  each  of  those  qualities  is  to  be 
measured  out  so  as  to  reach  the  final  compromise  which  every  war- 
ship is.  To  note  the  passionate  controversies  which,  to-day  as  al- 
ways before,  go  on  about  the  most  widely  different  types,  it  would 
seem  that  the  problem  was  in  fact  impossible ;  but,  if  these  various 
special  pleadings  are  attentively  read,  it  is  quickly  perceived  that 
they  are  almost  all  based  upon  the  same  system ;  affirmation  with- 
out proofs,  sentimental  opinions  beyond  verification.  '  Military  in- 
spiration, the  master  thought  of  every  preparation  for  war,  is  lack- 
ing to  them,  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  guiding  thread 
which  must  never  be  abandoned  in  order  not  to  be  lost  in  the  chaos 
of  ready-made  ideas. 

In  speaking  of  the  battleships  of  Patrle  type,  then  projected,  to 
compare  them  with  foreign  ships,  an  official  document  was 
couched  in  these  terms :  "  None  is  better  protected,  better  armed, 
or  faster." 

Whatever  the  respect  which  I  profess  for  the  opinions  of  others, 
and  particularly  when  they  emanate  from  those  who  direct  our 
navy,  it  is  impossible  for  me,  here,  not  to  point  out  the  very  gross 
error  contained  in  the  few  words  I  have  just  quoted.  If  such  con- 
tradictory conditions  could  be  simultaneously  realized,  the  philoso- 
pher's stone  would  have  pretty  nearly  been  found. 

In  the  compromise  which  a  fighting  ship  really  is  between  these 

297 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

multiple  requirements,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  sacrifice  some 
qualities  to  others ;  the  only  difficulty,  I  repeat,  lies  in  the  measure 
of  this  sacrifice.  And  the  guiding  thread  of  which  I  spoke  above, 
the  military  doctrine,  alone  will  permit  us  to  determine  this 
measure. 

With  the  great  captains  of  all  epochs,  Alexander,  Caesar,  Han- 
nibal, Frederick  and  Napoleon,  with  Suffren  and  Nelson,  also 
with  the  great  military  writers,  Clausewitz,  Rustow  and  Von  der 
Goltz,  and  finally  with  Mahan,  we  admit  the  capital  strategic  value 
of  the  offensive. 

It  is  therefore  to  the  offensive  weapon  par-excellence,  the  gun, 
that  the  paramount  position  ought  to  be  given  on  a  fighting  ship. 
The  greatest  possible  number  of  guns,  of  those  which  meet  the 
minimum  conditions  requisite  for  that  weapon,  such  is  the  formula. 

A  second  factor  of  the  offensive  is  speed :  its  requirements  can- 
not be  neglected,  and  its  role  admits  of  a  discussion  the  more  pro- 
found that  agreement  as  to  its  value  is  rare ;  and  that  value  is  it- 
self also  necessarily  relative.  To  determine  it,  it  is  likewise  im- 
portant to  establish  a  comparison  with  ships  projected  in  other 
countries.  All  the  problems  of  war  are  concrete  problems. 

It  remains  to  assure  protection,  and  it  is  principally  on  this 
point  that  there  are  disclosed  numerous  heresies  daily  set  forth. 
They  all  derive  from  that  limitless  trust,  to  some  extent  innate, 
which  men  accord  to  protection,  and  which  leads  them  uncon- 
sciously to  exaggerate  it.  It  is  this  state  of  mind  that  has  given 
birth  on  shore  to  fortresses  with  enormous  walls  and  on  board 
ship  to  water-line  belts  whose  armor  was  never  thick  enough. 

Instinct,  from  the  beginning  of  the  earliest  hostilities,  has  im- 
pelled men  to  seek  shelters  from  behind  which  they  could  give 
blows  without  receiving  any.  The  long  education  of  centuries  of 
warfare,  stimulated  by  the  initiative  of  a  few  great  captains,  has 
been  necessary  to  show  that  there  exists  a  surer  method  of  defend- 
ing oneself,  which  consists  in  destroying  the  adversary  by  attack- 
ing him  with  fury.  This  instinct  of  self  preservation  is  so  strong 
that  the  valuable  idea  under  discussion  is  not  even  at  this  moment, 
as  we  must  admit,  understood  except  by  the  elite. 

"  The  best  protection  that  we  can  have  against  the  enemy's  fire 
is  a  well  directed  fire  from  our  own  guns."  No  one  was  better 
qualified  than  Farragut  to  express  himself  thus,  and  his  deeds 

298 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

have  proved  the  excellence  of  this  opinion.     It  is  one  which  the 
search  for  basic  principles  has  suggested  also  to  us. 

The  rage  for  excessive  protection  has  not  its  only  source  in  in- 
stinct; it  is  also  nourished  by  the  chimerical  and  barren  hope  of 
reducing  risks.  The  association  of  these  two  impulsive  senti- 
ments always  causes  the  risks  to  be  seen  through  a  magnifying 
glass.  The  military  idea  alone  can  save  us  from  exaggerations. 

FLEETS. 

It  is  particularly  in  the  preparation  of  fleets  that  the  military 
idea  must  be  called  upon  to  give  us  sure  guidance  in  the  task  of 
multiplying  the  fighting  unit  thus  decided  upon  in  order  to  secure 
real  naval  strength.  The  constitution  of  fleets  appears,  indeed, 
to  be  one  of  the  most  important  factors  of  war.  However  great 
may  be  the  value  of  an  isolated  fighting  ship,  yet  it  is  but  a  single 
unit,  and  forces  are  necessary  to  obtain  superiority.  The  asso- 
ciation of  several  units,  that  is  to  say  the  fleet,  or,  using  a  more 
modern  appellation,  the  squadron,  is  the  material  embodiment  of 
the  idea  of  naval  force. 

The  figure  fixing  the  number  of  the  units  that  ought  to  com- 
pose this  elementary  naval  force  evidently  cannot  be  an  arbitrary 
one ;  it  ought  necessarily  to  flow  from  the  principles  of  war  and 
from  experience.  Our  squadrons  in  France  comprise  six  ships ; 
why?  It  is  something  about  which  we  cannot  remain  silent,  for 
it  does  not  suffice  to  evade  the  difficulty  by  the  vague  formula: 
"  It  is  generally  admitted  that  squadrons  should  have  six  units." 
This  generally  is,  moreover,  limited  to  the  French  navy ;  since  in 
Germany  as  well  as  in  England  the  squadrons  of  ships  of  the  line 
are  composed  of  eight  or  nine  battleships. 

The  choice  must  be  made  by  weighing  all  the  considerations, 
strategical  and  tactical,  which  permit  combining  the  maximum 
manoeuvering  facility  of  the  adopted  grouping  with  the  minimum 
division  of  command. 

The  main  fleet  once  constituted,  there  is  need  to  determine  the 
practical  conditions  of  its  employment.  The  function  of  this  main 
fleet  is  to  move  about  in  order  to  offer  battle ;  it  is  necessary  to 
precede  it  with  look-outs  for  the  same  reason  that  an  army  on  the 
march  has  need  itself  to  reconnoitre.  And  at  once  there  is  occa- 
sion to  throw  a  little  light  into  a  corner  of  the  subject  which  dis- 

299 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

sertations  more  numerous  than  the  grains  of  sand  on  the  seashore 
have  not  a  little  contributed  to  obscure. 

I  have  only  spoken  until  now,  it  will  be  noted,  of  a  single  type 
of  fighting  ship,  as  being  in  fact  the  unique  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem set  and  solved  by  the  military  doctrine ;  and  if  I  have  made  no 
allusion  to  others,  it  is  because  there  are  no  others. 

There  are  frequent  occasions  to  observe  an  abuse,  in  writings 
upon  this  subject,  of  a  familiar  expression :  "  the  division  and 
specialization  of  labor!'  when  the  question  concerns  the  advocacy 
of  such  or  such  a  type  of  ship.  This  law,  constantly  applied  in 
trades,  can  very  well  be  justified  in  the  affairs  of  war,  but  upon 
one  definite  condition :  that  is,  that  it  be  not  applied  at  random, 
as  is  most  frequently  the  case.  This  law  is  invoked  to  justify  the 
conception  of  new  types,  not  differing  in  any  essential  way  from 
ships  of  the  line  properly  so-called,  and  to  which  there  is  assigned 
I  know  not  what  vague  and  indefinite  role  in  far  off  seas.  It  is  not 
observed  that  thus  the  first  step  is  taken  on  the  downward  path 
which  leads  to  the  specialized  classes  of  the  colonial  fleet,  which 
were  explicable  when  powerful  navies  were  localized  in  European 
waters,  while  the  war  ships  on  far  off  stations  found  only  savages 
to  combat.  All  navies  have  given  up  these  foreign-station  fleets, 
we  ourselves  have  abandoned  them  with  much  regret ;  this  is  not 
the  time  to  make  them  rise  again  from  their  ashes. 

We  must  not  for  a  single  moment  forget  that  it  is  the  labor 
which  it  is  necessary  to  divide  and  not  the  tool.  But  the  labor 
which  we  are  here  considering  is  war ;  the  main  business  of  that 
labor  is  fighting,  and  we  have  rightly  set  apart  for  it  the  fighting 
ship.  This  ship  will  be,  moreover,  of  a  single  type,  since  to-day 
fighting  is  carried  on  the  same  in  the  Sea  of  Japan  as  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, in  the  United  States  the  same  as  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  But  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  principal  task, 
other  labors  of  lesser  importance,  such  as  the  lookout  service  and 
reconnoitering  for  example,  will  be  usefully  intrusted  to  ships  in 
which  everything  will  be  sacrificed  to  the  perfect  accomplishment 
of  their  accessory  labors.  These  will  be  fast  ships,  good  sea  boats, 
having  no  other  function  than  to  see  and  to  watch  for  the  main 
fleet.  It  is  the  province  of  the  General  Staff  to  decide  upon  the 
general  features  of  these  ships,  ceaselessly  guided  by  the  neces- 
sities of  war. 

Other  ships,  normally  employed  in  peaceful  pursuits,  passenger 

300 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

or  freight  carriers,  can  very  well  fill  this  role  in  time  of  war.  But 
it  is  during  the  period  of  peace  that  it  is  needful  to  regulate  to 
their  smallest  details  the  armament,  mobilization  and  future  em- 
ployment of  these  auxiliary  cruisers. 

In  this  connection,  I  greatly  desire  to  refute  at  once  a  reasoning 
by  which  it  is  pretended  to  assign  nowadays  the  function  of  look- 
out which  we  are  discussing  to  the  class  of  ships  commonly  called 
armored  cruisers.  Let  us  observe  that  these  ships  are  themselves 
fighting  ships  and  that  already,  by  assigning  them  to  this  too  un- 
important use,  the  true  principle  of  the  division  of  labor  is 
violated. 

But  it  is  said :  "  To  push  back  the  enemy's  lookouts,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  have  some  that  are  more  powerful  than  they  are,  and  as 
those  ships  will  encounter  in  their  turn  similar  ships,  they  must 
be  able  to  fight."  This  argument  is  so  insidious  that  it  is  readily 
accepted  and  we  are  then  fatally  led  on  by  it  to  types  of  cruisers 
bigger  and  bigger,  more  and  more  armored,  and  to  building  a  new 
fighting  fleet  alongside  of  the  first  one.  I  will  add  that  we  would 
infallibly  arrive  at  an  identical  result  by  similar  reasoning  with 
the  torpedo-boat  taken  as  the  starting  point.  This  is  further  evi- 
dence that  it  is  necessary  to  hold  tightly  on  to  the  guiding  thread 
of  military  doctrine  so  as  not  to  go  astray. 

Whether  the  question  concerns  the  construction  of  fighting 
ships  or  of  scouts,  this  military  idea  imposes  homogeneity.  It  dic- 
tates the  number  of  absolutely  like  units  which  it  is  necessary  to 
build  at  the  same  time,  in  order  to  substitute  a  new  naval  force  for 
another  one  actually  existing  and  composed  of  old  units.  And,  in 
fact,  navies  should  be  strengthened  and  kept  up  to  date  by  adding 
to  them  homogeneous  naval  forces,  not  units.  The  former  sys- 
tem, by  maintaining  the  principle  of  homogeneity,  preserves  the 
correct  balance  of  the  forces ;  the  latter  constantly  compromises 
that  principle,  and  ends  by  making  the  national  fleet  what  has  very 
justly  been  called  a  museum  of  samples,  under  the  appearance  of 
making  each  of  the  successive  units  profit  by  actual  improvements. 
And  this  result  always  comes  precisely  from  lack  of  foresight. 

An  example  very  much  to  the  point  is  at  hand  to  illustrate  this : 
It  is  well  known  that  in  the  course  of  their  construction  several 
battleships  of  Patrie  type  had  their  armament  changed,  their 
164.7  mm-  guns  being  replaced  by  194.4  mm.  guns.  This 
measure,  in  itself  excellent,  the  increase  of  power  due  to  the  sub- 

301 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

stitution  being  considerable,  is  to  be  regretted  in  its  application, 
because  it  was  not  applied  to  all  ships  that  are  to  constitute  the 
naval  force.  The  six  battle-ships  of  Patrie  type  are  in  fact  in- 
tended to  fight  always  grouped  together ;  it  follows  that  the  fight- 
ing range  favorable  for  the  194.4  mm.  guns  will  render  in- 
efficient the  intermediate  batteries  of  the  battleships  that  are  not 
provided  with  that  caliber,  and  that  any  other  range,  favorable  for 
the  164.7  mm-  guns>  wiU  make  superfluous  the  excess  of  power 
of  the  armament  of  the  other  units.  The  change  should  have  been 
made  on  all  six  ships  or  on  none.  This  measure  is  bad,  because  it 
does  not  accord  with  the  military  idea. 

Yes,  beyond  a  doubt,  the  improvements  of  all  sorts  that  the  in- 
dustrial world  offers  for  the  use  of  the  navy  cannot  be  too  largely 
applied  to  the  bettering  of  fighting  ships  building  or  projected; 
but  they  ought  to  be  utilized  in  successive  stages  by  applying  them 
to  each  of  the  strictly  homogeneous  squadrons  successively  con- 
structed and  not  to  units. 

This  question  of  naval  progress  is  one  of  the  greatest  cares  of 
preparation  for  war,  and,  on  that  account,  it  ought  to  be  strictly 
subjected  to  the  directing  body  which  bears  the  heavy  responsi- 
bility of  that  preparation.  No  good  military  prevision  is  possible 
if  a  single  wheel  in  the  train  escapes  this  control.  To  this  direct- 
ing body,  and  to  it  alone,  it  belongs  to  give  the  impulse  which 
guides  all  investigations  having  naval  progress  in  view,  because  it 
alone  unfolds  the  military  idea.  On  this  account  all  the  services 
of  investigation  and  experiment,  laboratories,  proving  grounds, 
experimental  commissions,  etc.,  ought  to  be  rigorously  subordi- 
nated to  it ;  it  alone  is  capable  of  dictating  the  programs  of  inves- 
tigation, of  pointing  out  the  way  in  which  it  is  necessary  to  pur- 
sue them,  for  it  alone  determines  the  objectives.  An  improve- 
ment may  be  wonderful  when  considered  by  itself,  and  yet  have 
no  value  if  it  fails  to  meet  the  higher  aims  of  war. 

Military  needs  exercise  their  controlling  influence  upon  even  the 
smallest  details  of  ships,  not  at  all,  I  hasten  to  say,  to  interfere  in 
their  management  or  their  selection — that  is  the  engineer's  affair 
— but  to  determine  the  adoption  of  their  principle  itself.  In  this 
connection,  it  is  not  bad  to  recall  the  perfectly  useless  discussion 
which  began  in  the  navy,  and  which  is  still  going  on,  upon  the 
question  of  boilers. 

I  am  far  from  ignoring  the  excellence  of  the  reasons  that  have 

302 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

been  given  on  one  side  and  the  other,  by  experienced  technicians, 
in  advocacy  of  such  or  such  a  model;  but  these  reasons  are  the 
arguments  of  workmen,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  and,  whatever 
their  importance,  they  would  have  no  weight  if  sure  military  ad- 
vantages were  found  on  the  other  side. 

Finally  the  simplification  of  the  complicated  mechanism  of  our 
modern  ships  is  also  the  constant  concern  of  preparation  for  war, 
since  it  exercises  a  direct  influence  upon  supplies. 

The  greater  the  variety  of  apparatus  in  service  use  on  board 
ships,  the  correspondingly  more  numerous  are  the  classes  of  spare 
parts,  and  also  the  more  complicated  and  costly  will  be  the  task, 
already  colossal,  of  preparing  the  supplies  of  every  kind  which 
support  the  life  of  fleets.  It  is  therefore  a  necessity  of  the  first 
order  to  facilitate  this  task,  already  overwhelming  by  itself  and  a 
military  necessity,  for  the  financial  resources  available  for  prep- 
aration for  war  are-  necessarily  limited  in  every  country  in  the 
world.  The  quest  of  the  greatest  military  return  from  a  given 
financial  effort  is,  in  reality,  the  principal  problem  of  the  prepara- 
tion. Therefore  every  measure  that  tends  to  diminish  passive  re- 
sistances, that  is  to  say  small  unproductive  expenditures,  in  order 
to  transfer  them  to  the  augmentation  of  forces,  thereby  increases 
the  military  return  and  the  national  strength. 

That  is  why,  and  no  serious  objection  can  be  raised  on  this 
point,  "  the  last  say,"  as  the  English,  who  are  good  judges,  call  it, 
ought  always  to  belong,  in  all  naval  discussions  without  any  ex- 
ception, to  the  body  alone  responsible  in  the  wars  to  come,  the 
General  Staff. 

TACTICAL  EXERCISES. 

Our  fleets  are  ready ;  they  have  been  constituted  with  a  view  to 
war,  it  is  now  necessary  to  put  life  into  them,  to  prepare  them 
with  a  view  to  battle. 

The  division  of  the  preparation  for  war  which  has  very  improp- 
erly been  called  Tactics  has  but  very  distant  relations  with  naval 
tactics.  There  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  word  that  it 
would  be  very  desirable  to  get  rid  of  by  choosing  another  expres- 
sion like  " School  of  Signals  and  Evolutions"  for  example,  as,  in 
the  same  order  of  ideas,  we  speak  of  the  school  of  the  soldier,  of 
the  company,  battalion,  regiment,  etc.,  or  of  schools  of  gunnery. 

Reduced  to  these  proportions  which  are  alone  exact,  it  occupies 

303 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

nevertheless  a  considerable  place  in  the  patient  and  laborious  labor 
of  times  of  peace. 

Squadrons  are  prepared  to  execute  in  presence  of  the  enemy 
the  combinations  of  battle  tactics  by  practice  exercises  and  a  reg- 
ular methodical  training  accustoming  the  units  to  manceuver  to- 
gether. The  necessary  readiness  in  the  attacks  and  replies  which 
take  place  on  the  field  of  naval  battle  can  only  be  acquired  by  a 
long,  very  long  practice  in  the  fleet  evolutions  of  peace  times. 
It  is  only  possible,  at  that  decisive  moment,  if  the  personnel  which 
directs  the  different  units  of  the  group  possesses  the  confidence 
borne  of  the  practice  of  frequent  exercises.  This  necessity  of 
training  appears  so  much  the  more  urgent  because  the  use  of  sig- 
nals during  action  must  be  restricted.  Perfect  obedience  to  the 
instructions  of  the  chief  on  the  field  of  action  itself  can  evidently 
only  be  secured,  without  signals,  if  all  the  subordinate  leaders  of 
the  naval  force  have  identified  themselves,  so  to  speak,  with  the 
idea  of  the  chief,  by  the  constant  practice  of  manoeuvers  in  com- 
mon. 

A  result  so  important  evidently  cannot  be  secured  without  fre- 
quent puttings  to  sea  of  the  squadrons,  without  exercises  that,  as 
nearly  as  possible,  resemble  probable  occurrences  of  warfare,  with- 
out spending  money,  consequently.  Above  all  it  cannot  be  at- 
tained except  under  the  guidance  of  the  military  idea  which  con- 
trols the  preparation  of  war. 

Whatever  may  be  the  ability  of  those  who  command  the  squad- 
rons, it  is  not  in  accord  with  good  preparation  for  war  to  leave  to 
them  the  initiative  of  the  method  of  training  those  naval  forces. 
Their  task  of  carrying  out  of  that  training  is  sufficiently  import- 
ant to  require  their  full  attention.  But  in  order  that  the  result 
obtained  may  be  beneficial,  it  is  wholly  necessary  that  the  method 
of  instruction  be  general  and  dictated  by  a  superior  will,  the  very 
one  which  bears  the  heavy  responsibility  of  future  war. 

Any  other  procedure  is  eminently  bad,  since  it  leaves  to  intelli- 
gences, to  capacities  and  to  temperaments  which  are  essentially 
variable,  since  the  commanders-in-chief  themselves  change,  the 
care  of  one  of  the  principal  duties  in  the  preparation  for  war.  We 
must  not  be  surprised  therefore  if  profound  modifications  in  the 
direction  of  evolution  of  the  naval  forces,  in  the  ideas  that  are 
revealed  by  the  manoeuvers  and,  what  is  more  serious,  in  the  very 
principles  of  fighting,  happen  in  turn  in  the  course  of  a  few  years. 

304 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

I  do  not  propose  to  stifle  individual  initiatives ;  no  navy  in  the 
world  has  as  much  of  that,  perhaps,  as  ours,  but  it  is  necessary  to 
direct  them  in  certain  channels.  And,  in  saying  this,  I  think  in 
spite  of  myself  of  a  frequent  scene  in  our  life  on  board  ship,  and 
one  very  familiar  to  us.  The  watch  has  manned  the  falls  to  hoist 
a  boat ;  the  men  strain  on  the  ropes  but  still  the  boat  does  not 
budge.  Look  closely  at  the  conditions  under  which  those  men 
work ;  each  is  exerting  himself  individually,  but  the  fatal  discord 
of  wills  produces  the  disaccord  of  forces  which  mutually  interfere, 
and  the  resultant  is  nil.  Suddenly  the  boatswain's  pipe  sounds 
and  the  scene  changes ;  its  modulations  as  they  rise  and  fall  mark 
time  for  the  elementary  efforts*  which  become  synchronous  and 
multiply  their  actions.  The  boat  is  hoisted. 

I  ask  nothing  but  this  for  preparation  for  war ;  it  is  necessary 
that  everybody  obey  the  pipe  of  the  boatswain,  who  in  this  case  is 
the  directing  body  of  the  General  Staff.  To  realize  what  is  the 
devout  wish  of  -all,  the  "  greatest  navy/'  an  outward  discipline 
that  is  often  a  mere  mask  is  not  enough,  there  is  needed  above  all 
the  discipline  of  thought  which  is  the  ideal  that  the  establishment 
of  the  Naval  War  College  was  precisely  intended  to  bring  about. 

Squadrons  can  only  be  successfully  trained  by  a  methodical 
graduation  of  exerciseSj  impossible  to  realize  without  the  con- 
tinuity of  convictions  that  a  central  directing  body  alone  possesses. 
This  is  so  well  understood  in  all  the  thriving  navies,  that  the  pro- 
gram of  squadron  exercises  is  drawn  up  by  the  General  Staff,  or 
whatever  takes  its  place,  for  a  whole  year,  and  regulates  the  pro- 
gression of  the  instruction,  beginning  with  that  of  each  ship,  then 
continuing  with  that  of  the  divisions  forming  the  elementary 
grouping,  next  with  the  squadrons,  and  finally  concluding  with 
the  annual  grand  manceuvers.  It  has  been  too  often  forgotten,  in 
France,  that  the  full  benefit  can  only  be  derived  from  an  assem- 
blage of  units  if  each  of  them  has  received,  as  a  preliminary  and 
by  itself,  its  individual  initiation.  The  assemblage  of  units  can 
give  only  bad  results,  if  the  ships  have  not  freedom  to  work  alone 
as  often  as  possible. 

NAVY  YARDS. 

The  instrument  being  prepared  and  quite  ready,  more  still  re- 
mains to  do.  In  preparing  for  war,  we  are  doing  above  all  a  work 
of  prevision,  and  consequently  it  is  indispensable  to  think  of  the 

305 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

maintenance  of  this  instrument,  taking  the  word  maintenance  in 
its  broadest  sense.  Thus  it  is  that,  concurrently  with  the  construc- 
tion of  a  new  fleet,  there  arises  the  obligation,  from  which  no 
country  can  escape,  to  build  dry  docks,  workshops,  tugs,  lighters, 
coal  barges  and  storehouses,  in  a  word  the  means  of  action  that 
sustain  the  life  of  this  fleet.  I  strongly  insist  on  the  word  con- 
currently, since  it  would  be  too  late  to  await  the  entry  of  the  new 
fleet  into  service  before  solving  these  apparently  secondary  prob- 
lems. 

Thus  then  every  new  program  of  new  constructions  ought  of 
necessity  to  include  an  additional  section  devoted  to  all  the  works 
to  be  undertaken  in  the  ports  with  a  view  to  meeting  all  the  re- 
quirements, without  exception,  of  the  new  types.  This  imperious 
necessity  would  suffice  to  make  evident,  if  there  was  still  need  of 
it,  the  legitimacy  of  what  I  have  already  stated,  that  the  choice  of 
new  fighting  ships  plays,  in  preparation  for  war,  a  considerable 
part,  so  great  a  part  that  it  could  not  be  justified  if  it  were  not 
strictly  subordinate  to  a  military  idea  as  well  as  to  a  military 
objective. 

Nothing  could  excuse  carelessness  in  such  a  matter ;  fighting 
ships,  especially  in  the  last  ten  years,  in  all  navies,  have  obeyed  an 
irresistible  impulse  toward  increase  of  displacements,  owing  to  in- 
crease of  speed,  of  protection  and  of  armament.  At  this  very 
moment,  everywhere  alike,  there  is  preparing  a  new  jump  to  the 
extraordinary  displacements  of  18,000,  19,000  tons.  For  my  part, 
I  see  nothing  objectionable  in  this,  but  on  the  formal  condition 
that  all  the  consequences  of  the  notable  increase  of  dimensions  of 
our  ships  be  given  mature  consideration.  In  five  or  six  years 
from  the  time  when  the  first  keel  plates  of  the  new  ships  are  laid 
will  we  have  big  enough  dry  docks  for  them?  Will  the  inner 
channels  of  our  ports  be  large  enough  for  them  to  manceuver  and 
swing  in?  Will  we  have  tugs  in  sufficient  number  and  of  suffi- 
cient power  to  move  them  about?  Finally,  will  we  have  enough 
landing  stages,  lighters,  storehouses,  mooring  places  and  wharf 
room,  mooring  anchors,  etc.,  to  enable  this  new  naval  force  to  be 
outfitted  in  the  most  efficient  way  ? 

If  the  construction  of  new  types  is  a  military  necessity — and 
how  admit  of  such  expenditures  if  it  is  not — there  can  be  no  es- 
cape from  the  obligation  to  satisfy  all  these  demands  and  to  supply 
the  Navy  Yards  with  everything  which  they  need,  soon  enough 

306 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

for  the  new  fleet  to  be  provided  with  everything  on  the  day  of  its 
entry  into  service. 

It  may  be  seen  from  this  too  brief  enumeration  that  preparation 
for  war  cannot  be  unmindful  of  the  question  of  navy  yards. 

Here,  where  we  are  only  sketching  in  broad  outline  the  general 
view  of  the  problem  of  preparation  in  order  to  show  all  its  needs, 
I  shall  limit  myself  to  this  simple  observation.  It  is  even  more 
necessary  that  the  organization  for  furnishing  stores  and  supplies 
should  be  under  military  control.  The  benefit  that  is  derived,  in 
the  case  of  modern  armies,  from  the  direct  dependency  of  the 
commissariat  upon  the  commanding  officer  has  long  been  recog- 
nized. This  benefit  is  no  less  great  in  the  case  of  naval  opera- 
tions. To  assemble  at  a  certain  number  of  points,  judiciously 
chosen,  the  fuel,  the  oils,  the  provisions,  the  spare  articles,  the  am- 
munition, etc.,  in  a  word  the  enormously  complex  aggregate  of 
things  without  which  a  group  of  ships  cannot  subsist,  constitutes  a 
fundamental  work  of  war. 

Consequently  its  control  cannot  in  any  way  be  confided  to  others 
than  those  who  have  the  charge  of  preparing  for  war.  And  first 
of  all,  is  not  the  determination  of  the  points  at  which  the  said 
supplies  ought  to  be  concentrated  dependent  beyond  anything  else 
on  the  plan  of  war?  Is  it  not  equally  subordinated  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  operations?  To  cite  but  one  example  which  particu- 
larly concerns  us,  it  is  self  evident  that  in  the  case  of  a  naval  war 
against  a  power  of  the  north  of  Europe,  a  project  of  supply  that 
should  simply  provide  the  respective  allowances  of  the  Northern 
and  Mediterranean  squadrons,  one  at  Brest,  or  Cherbourg,  the 
other  at  Toulon,  would  be  far  from  meeting  the  requirements  of 
the  war. 

The  plan  of  operations  being  settled  in  its  main  features  and  in 
its  essential  details,  the  scheme  of  supply  and  its  execution  are  a 
faithful  copy  of  it.  If  we  select  Bizerta  as  principal  base  of  opera- 
tions to  satisfy  our  military  objective  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  is 
at  Bizerta  that  the  resources  of  our  naval  forces  must  be  concen- 
trated without  stripping  Toulon.  If  we  anticipate  a  strong  effort 
to  be  made  in  the  North,  necessitating  sending  there  our  Mediter- 
ranean squadron,  it  is  necessary,  without  losing  a  moment,  while 
the  new  fleet  is  building,  to  assemble  in  the  navy  yards  of  the  At- 
lantic and  the  North  Sea  the  supplies  needed  by  the  whole  fleet,  in 
order  that  that  fleet  may  find  them  at  the  hour  and  place  desired. 

307 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  set  the  problem  in  order  to  judge  how  in- 
competent the  administrative  service  is  to  solve  it ;  it  is  so  by  defi- 
nition, and  yet  it  is  too  often  upon  this  body  alone  that  the  crush- 
ing and  once  more  wholly  military  responsibility  of  this  division 
of  preparation  rests. 

And  here  again,  in  face  of  the  difficulties  of  the  task,  we  cannot 
but  profoundly  feel  the  importance  of  simplifying  the  material  on 
our  modern  ships  and  of  limiting  improvements  in  it  to  those  that 
are  strictly  legitimate. 

COAST  DEFENCE. 

This  accumulation  of  supplies  of  all  sorts,  at  various  places  on 
shore,  evidently  represents  a  considerable  financial  effort;  but  it 
above  all  symbolizes  a  military  effort,  since  it  forms  an  integral 
part  of  the  naval  force  it  feeds  and  keeps  alive.  On  this  account 
its  destruction  by  the  enemy  would  break  the  balance  of  forces 
in  his  favor  and  ought  to  be  guarded  against.  In  mentioning  such 
considerations,  I  am  entering  upon  the  subject,  so  important,  so 
little  understood,  and  yet  so  simple,  of  the  defence  of  the  coast. 

In  the  eyes  of  the  masses,  as  we  have  already  observed  in  the 
course  of  the  history  of  the  Spanish-American  war,  this  expres- 
sion defence  of  the  coast  awakens  the  idea  of  a  sort  of  gigantic 
coat-of-mail  covering  the  entire  shore  and  protecting  it  from  any 
wound.  Even  the  smallest  straggling  village  of  fishermen,  hidden 
at  the  back  of  a  bay,  dreams  of  and  demands  an  inviolable  cordon 
of  batteries,  forts,  guns,  mines,  torpedoes,  sub-marines,  etc.,  with- 
out counting  battleships  and  other  floating  forts.  No  conception 
of  the  defence  is  more  dangerous  and  more  false  besides  than  this 
one,  for  it  leads  to  nothing  else  but  a  scattering  of  efforts  instead 
of  their  concentration.  It  is  this  which  has  brought  about  the  con- 
struction of  battleships  called  coast-defence  ships,  the  inadequate 
realization  of  an  inexact  idea,  because  it  was  not  in  conformity 
with  military  principles.' 

As  always,  in  fact,  it  is  from  the  military  idea  and  from  it  alone 
that  guidance  must  be  sought  in  choosing  the  points  to  defend, 
that  is  the  bases  of  principal  and  secondary  operations  for  the  use 
of  the  military  force,  that  is  to  say  of  the  fleet,  and  only  of  the 
fleet,  and  also  in  properly  distributing,  at  different  points  of  the 
ports  to  be  defended,  the  various  means  of  defence  at  our  disposal. 

But  if  the  points  of  the  shore  to  be  defended  are  very  few  in 

308 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

numbers,  it  is  wholly  necessary  on  the  other  hand  that  their  de- 
fence be  extremely  strong,  the  strongest  possible.  The  fleets 
ought  to  find  there,  in  short,  an  absolutely  sure  shelter  and  an  in- 
vulnerable protection,  so  that  the  operations  of  supply  and  repair 
may  be  carried  on  in  the  perfect  peace  of  mind  that  is  inseparable 
from  the  thorough  and  rapid  execution  of  such  operations.  And 
furthermore  the  strength  of  this  defence  ought  to  be  such  as  to 
suffice  by  itself  surely  to  repel  any  attack  of  the  adversary,  so 
there  may  not  be  even  a  temptation  to  divert  the  fleet  from  its 
thoroughly  offensive  role  to  a  passive  employment  that  is  not 
proper  to  it. 

I  continue  to  dwell  upon  this  stfbject,  for  the  still  vibrating  echo 
of  the  lamentations  of  the  people  of  Cette,  on  the  occasion  of  an 
incident  of  the  quite  inoffensive  grand  manceuvers  of  fifteen  years 
ago,  is  an  indication  of  the  much  more  violent  outburst  that 
would  occur  in  case  of  war.  Public  opinion,  therefore,  must  be 
fully  educated  on  this  point;  it  is  urgent  to  engraft  upon  it  the 
very  clear  feeling  that  should  the  port  of  Cette  or  any  other  port 
be  destroyed,  that  event  would  have  at  most  the  scope  of  an  inci- 
dent without  any  influence  upon  the  final  result  of  the  war.  Let 
us  be  victors,  and  the  conquered  will  pay  a  high  price  for  the  slight 
damage  he  may  have  done  along  the  shore,  if  it  so  be  that  he  even 
had  the  time  to  waste  there. 

In  thus  disciplining  public  opinion  we  are  still  carrying  on  the 
work  of  preparation  for  war  and  consequently  are  practicing  the 
best  of  strategy. 

Among  the  factors  of  the  defence,  there  are  surely  none  more 
important  than  those  whose  mobility  gives  them  an  extended  field 
of  action,  that  is  torpedo-boats  and  sub-marines.  Few  of  the  ele- 
ments of  naval  material  in  all  its  complexity  have  been  the  sub- 
ject of  discussions  so  numerous  and  so  excited  as  these;  exalted 
by  some,  despised  by  others,  they  have  rarely  found  judges  im- 
partial and  calm  enough  to  define  without  prejudice  their  sphere 
of  influence.  One  who  reads  carefully  all  that  has  been  written 
during  the  last  twenty  years  upon  the  function  of  the  torpedo-boat 
and  the  sub-marine  in  future  wars  will  be  struck  with  the  chaotic 
state  of  ideas  on  the  subject.  This  observation  would  be  inexpli- 
cable if  it  were  not  at  the  same  time  stated  that  all  these  writings, 
with  a  few  rare  exceptions,  are  the  product  of  the  imagination 
alone ;  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  under  fancy's  guidance 

309 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

minds  wander.  It  is  still  the  thread  of  the  military  idea  which 
enables  one  not  to  go  astray  and  to  base  conceptions  regarding 
these  naval  instruments  upon  the  lessons  of  experience. 

It  is  not  enough  to  say:  torpedo-boats  and  sub-marines  are 
necessary ;  one  should  add  why,  should  specify  their  intended  use 
and  the  tactics  of  that  use.  When  the  military  problem  has  been 
thus  specified,  it  will  very  quickly  be  perceived  that  torpedo-boats 
and  sub-marines  are  the  embodiment,  in  a  very  remarkable  way, 
of  the  principle  of  the  defensive -offensive  defined  by  Jomini. 

The  focussing  of  these  two  weapons,  the  determination  of  the 
conditions  of  war  that  they  should  satisfy,  their  relative  value  in 
comparison  with  the  principal  forces,  the  conditions  of  their  utili- 
zation alone  or  in  combination,  are  so  many  very  important  prob- 
lems of  detail  in  the  prepartion  for  war.  Notably  as  far  as  the 
sub-marine  is  concerned,  the  unending  verbal  quarrels  of  these 
latter  years,  a  propos  of  the  different  types  under  trial,  would  have 
appeared  to  all  very  idle  if  the  determination  of  the  submarine 
had  only  been  recognized  to  be  an  exclusively  military  problem 
and  not  a  technical  problem  in  naval  architecture. 

h  ADVANCED  BASES. 

It  is  part  of  the  preparation  for  war  to  specify  and  enforce  in 
this  matter,  as  in  all  others,  the  conditions  to  be  fulfilled.  It  is 
not  merely  the  bases  of  operations  in  home  waters  that  need  to  be 
provided  with  a  seriously  organized  defence ;  the  advanced  bases 
of  the  fleet  must  also  be  put  out  of  reach  of  a  sudden  attack. 

The  principle  itself  of  these  advanced  bases  is  not  contestable ; 
no  fleet  operation  in  far  distant  seas  is  possible  without  a  port 
where  that  fleet  can  be  resupplied,  repaired  and  re-enforced  after 
previous  operations.  An  advanced  base  was  already  indispensable 
in  Suffren's  time,  and  it  was  for  that  reason  that  he  took  Trinco- 
malee ;  in  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  seen  the  English  policy, 
with  the  admirable  continuity  that  characterizes  it,  acquire  suc- 
cessively, in  every  corner  of  the  globe,  the  supports  indispensable 
to  her  naval  strength. 

It  is  to  the  highest  degree  an  essential  act  of  the  preparation  for 
war  to  select  the  advanced  bases,  to  defend  them,  and  to  equip 
them  with  a  vieiv  to  a  fixed  military  objective. 

In  this  way  the  preparation  is  so  tightly  bound  to  strategy  that 
it  is  so  to  speak  strategy  itself.  Outside  of  many  other  proofs, 

310 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

that  the  Russians  had  not  prepared  for  war  is  to  be  understood 
from  the  fact  that  Port  Arthur  was  very  badly  chosen  as  an  ad- 
vanced base  and  was  almost  destitute  of  everything. 

War  is  not  prepared  for,  in  fact,  if  all  the  contingencies  that  can 
arise  have  not  been .  envisaged,  and  especially  if  the  means  of 
maintaining  in  a  sure  manner,  at  the  advanced  base,  forces 
superior  to  those  of  the  adversary  have  not  been  arranged. 

It  is  indispensable  to  define  the  conditions  that  these  advanced 
bases  ought  to  satisfy  and  which  determine  their  choice ;  the  ap- 
plication to  the  concrete  case  of  our  Indo-Chinese  colony  might 
serve  as  an  actual  example,  and  there  again  it  will  readily  be  ad- 
mitted that  half  measures  are  the  worst  solutions.  War  does  not 
admit  of  half-measures ;  if  therefore  it  requires  an  advanced  base 
in  Indo-China,  all  the  consequences,  and  they  are  big,  very  big, 
of  this  decision  ought  to  be  faced  now,  in  order  to  satisfy  them  be- 
fore war  breaks  out. 

PLANS  OF  OPERATIONS. 

I  now  come  to  a  subject  whose  importance  will  be  clearly  ap- 
parent to  all  eyes  when  I  say  that  it  concerns  plans  of  operations. 
We  come,  in  fact,  to  a  class  of  cares  that  truly  includes  all  others, 
since  it  is  their  point  of  departure.  The  preparation  of  plans  of 
war  is  the  master  key  of  preparation  for  war ;  it  is  also  its  skeleton 
upon  which  all  the  matters  precedingly  enumerated  are  succes- 
sively built  up.  If  this  method  which  I  have  followed  had  not 
been  that  of  synthesis,  which  seems  to  me  best  adapted  for  the 
comprehension  of  strategical  ideas,  I  should  therefore  have  begun 
this  chapter  by  affirming  the  necessity  of  a  plan  of  campaign. 

It  is  only  reasonable  to  believe  that  a  planned  campaign  will  re- 
sult better  than  one  in  which  decisions  are  reached  under  the  spur 
of  events.  We  know,  moreover,  what  military  chiefs  and  writers 
thought  of  it,  and  we  will  say  with  Napoleon :  "  Nothing  succeeds 
in  'K'ar  except  in  consequence  of  a  well  arranged  plan." 

The  political  objectives  indicated  by  the  government  of  a  coun- 
try ought  to  give  birth  each  to  a  distinct  plan,  worked  out  in  all 
its  details.  For  this  very  reason  each  plan  involves  decisions  to 
be  taken  with  a  view  to  concentration  of  the  naval  forces.  And  it 
is  at  once  perceived  that  this  concentration  cannot  be  dictated  by 
mere  geographical  requirements,  but  that  it  depends  upon  the  ad- 
versary's own  forces. 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

A  new  idea  arises :  that  of  number.  We  know  already  that  the 
unit  force  is  a  squadron ;  there  remains  to  determine  the  number 
of  squadrons  that  the  country  should  possess.  This  figure  flows 
directly  from  three  data :  the  estimation  of  the  forces  of  the  proba- 
ble adversary  or  adversaries,  the  plan  of  operations  and  the  finan- 
cial resources.  The  total  naval  strength  of  a  great  nation  is  there- 
fore not  to  be  controlled  by  a  purely  arbitrary  decision ;  it  should 
depend  upon  considerations  than  which  none  are  more  weighty, 
and  no  figure  whatever  has  any  value  unless  it  is  thus  based.  Our 
most  recent  naval  program,  in  imitation  of  all  the  preceding  ones, 
limits  to  the  figure  of  five  squadrons  of  six  ships  the  total  of  our 
naval  forces  of  the  line.  It  neglects  to  explain  the  military  con- 
ception upon  which  this  figure  is  based,  and  this  is  the  more  regret- 
table because  it  would  very  quickly  be  perceived  that  it  is  quite 
insufficient. 

Concentration  ought  to  be  studied  with  a  view  to  securing  the 
possibility  of  making  the  greatest  possible  effort  against  the  weak 
point  of  the  enemy.  It  is  therefore  the  veritable  photograph  of 
the  plan  of  operations,  and  gives  a  view  of  the  thought  which  con- 
ceived it. 

It  is  thus  that  England,  with  the  calm  audacity  of  the  strong, 
has  distributed  her  squadrons  in  such  a  manner  that  her  concep- 
tion of  the  future  war  is  plainly  to  be  perceived. 

And  since  I  am  speaking  of  the  case  of  England,  I  find  in  it  the 
subject  of  an  interesting  remark  upon  the  infinity  of  the  resources 
and  objectives  of  strategy.  By  seizing  upon  Gibraltar,  the  naval 
policy  of  England  not  only  increased  her  military  strength  by  pos- 
session of  an  exceptionally  well  situated  base  of  operations ;  above 
all  she  took  possession  of  the  key  to  the  gate  of  the  Mediterranean 
and  put  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  all  our  future  attempts  at  con- 
centration of  our  forces. 

Already  we  must  recognize  that  the  navy  of  France  is  not  fav- 
ored by  her  geographical  position ;  the  distance  between  the  two 
seas  that  bathe  her  shores,  by  separating  her  bases  of  operations, 
is  a  serious  obstacle  to  the  junction  of  her  fleets.  This  was  clearly 
perceived  before  La  Hogue,  when  the  naval  forces  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, stopped  by  a  long  series  of  contrary  winds,  could  never 
join  Tourville  and  bring  to  him  re-enforcements  that  would  have 
sensibly  diminished  his  tremendous  inferiority. 

The  conquest  of  Gibraltar,  by  a  hostile  naval  power,  has  very 

312 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

considerably  aggravated  these  original  conditions  of  inferiority, 
and  it  can  be  said  that  the  history  of  the  unfortunate  wars  of 
France  against  England  is  also  that  of  the  vain  attempts  to  unite 
the  fleets  of  Toulon  with  those  of  the  Atlantic.  The  project  of 
invasion  of  England  in  1759  was  abandoned,  as  was  later  to  be 
that  of  1805,  for  the  same  causes. 

The  squadron  of  La  Clue,  set  out  from  Toulon  to  join  that  of 
Conflans,  not  having  got  by  Lagos,  where  it  was. annihilated  by  the 
English  fleet  of  Admiral  Boscawen,  the  strategic  plan  that  was 
wholly  based  upon  this  junction  crumbled  away  at  the  same  time, 
just  as  that  of  Napoleon's  was  to  do,  when  the  defeat  of  Ville- 
neuve  by  Nelson  destroyed  all  hope  of  uniting  the  Toulon  fleet 
with  those  of  Ganteaume  and  Missiessy. 

To-day  conditions  are  equally  unfavorable  to  us.  Our  political 
interests,  extending  over  two  seas  far  apart  and  separated  by  a 
narrow  passage  guarded  by  a  powerful  nation,  necessitate  the 
permanent  division  of  our  naval  forces ;  but,  for  that  very  reason, 
they  are  a  source  of  weakness. 

At  Gibraltar,  strong  base  of  operations,  English  naval  strategy 
unites  all  the  advantages  of  "  interior  lines,"  so  well  defined  by 
Jomini,  which  permit  meeting  our  Mediterranean  and  Atlantic 
fleets  separately  and  successively,  with  all  the  other  advantages 
that  an  immense  superiority  of  force  gives.  And  yet,  we  know  it 
from  the  history  of  the  campaigns  of  all  the  great  captains,  it  is 
the  relative  value  of  this  superiority  that  it  is  the  important  point 
to  seek  for  in  war ;  it  is  by  securing  it  at  a  decisive  point  that  we 
can  hope  to  fight  England  successively. 

To  suppress  Gibraltar  is  the  only  way  of  doing  this,  not  at  all 
by  forcibly  seizing  it,  for  it  would  be  necessary  first  to  overthrow 
the  English  naval  power,  and  that  is  the  very  problem  we  are  fac- 
ing, but  by  turning  its  flank.  The  Inter-Seas  canal,  by  furnishing 
a  permanent  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Med- 
iterranean, takes  on  the  character  of  an  exceptionally  great  strate- 
gical labor  for  France.  By  permitting  us  to  bring  about  at  will, 
under  conditions  of  perfect  safety,  the  junction  of  all  our  naval 
forces,  either  in  the  Atlantic  or  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  would  re- 
verse positions  and  give  to  the  French  navy,  over  the  British  navy, 
the  immense  advantage  of  ff  interior  lines/' 

I  shall  perhaps  have  occasion  to  return  some  day  to  this  very 
interesting  subject;  for  the  moment,  I  have  merely  wished  to  call 

313 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

attention  to  one  of  the  thousand  aspects  under  which  this  monu- 
mental task  of  preparing  for  war  presents  itself.  If  the  reasoning 
that  has  guided  me  has  been  attentively  followed,  there  should  be 
agreement  that  I  have  been  led  to  the  preceding  conclusion  by 
military  exigencies  of  the  most  pressing  character.  To  convince 
the  most  incredulous  it  will  be  enough,  I  think,  to  recall  that  the 
digging  of  the  Kiel  canal  is  due  to  motives  of  the  same  order  as 
those  we  have  just  noted.  Without  turning  up  their  noses  at  the 
economic  advantages  that  they  could  derive  from  it,  the  Germans 
have  above  all  wished  to  construct  a  strategical  passage  connect- 
ing the  North  Sea  with  the  Baltic  and  freeing  future  concentra- 
tions of  their  naval  forces  from  dangerous  dependence  upon  the 
narrow  passages  of  the  Jutland  peninsular.  This  project  of  an 
Inter-Seas  canal  has  for  many  years  been  the  object  of  the  most 
violent  attacks  and,  what  is  much  worse,  of  the  indifference  and 
apathy  of  the  majority  of  people.  But,  I  emphatically  declare, 
its  execution  is  a  strategic  necessity  of  the  first  order  that  has  not 
been  properly  weighed  in  the  criticisms  put  forth,  and  compared 
with  which  the  most  exaggerated  expenditures,  the  most  pessimis- 
tic estimates  regarding  its  construction,  should  they  reach  three 
milliards,  are  trifles. 

The  unfortunate  war  of  1870  cost  us  much  more  dear,  five  mil- 
liards of  ransom,  not  counting  milliards  for  military  expenses,  all 
absolutely  unproductive. 

Though  the  political  management  has  secured  alliances  in  pre- 
vision of  such  or  such  a  struggle,  it  would  be  an  error  to  believe 
that  it  is  enough  to  add  upon  paper  the  naval  forces  of  the  allied 
powers  to  obtain  the  value  of  the  total  military  strength.  History 
is  rich  in  facts  that  prove  the  want  of  cohesion  of  motley  fleets. 
The  influence  of  preparation  for  war  is  great  in  this  as  in  all  other 
matters,  distributing  objectives  among  the  allies  and  even  con- 
trolling and  regulating  their  actions  in  case  they  must  later  on  co- 
operate in  a  single  enterprise.  On  June  5,  1905,  the  English  ad- 
miral Lord  Charles  Beresford  wrote  the  following  lines  which  I 
submit  to  the  meditations  of  all :  "  I  hope  that  a  plan  will  be  ar- 
ranged for  the  meeting  at  sea  of  the  British  and  American  fleets 
with  a  view  to  joint  maneuvers.  Such  an  experience  would  be  of 
immense  interest  for  the  two  navies,  no  less  than  for  the  two  na- 
tions, and  possibly  the  world  would  pay  great  attention  to  such  a 
phenomenon." 

3H 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

In  all  that  precedes  I  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  choice 
of  the  system  of  warfare  was  made  from  the  beginning.  Arrived 
at  this  point  in  our  studies,  I  would  not  even  have  need  to  name  it, 
since  for  us  there  can  only  be  considered  that  single  one  from 
which  efficient  results  can  be  expected,  warfare  in  which  masses 
are  brought  into  play.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  necessary  to  reject 
without  consideration  other  secondary  systems,  powerless  no  doubt 
to  assure  by  themselves  alone  the  aims  of  the  conflict,  but  which, 
as  adjuncts  to  war  on  a  large  scale,  can  under  some  conditions, 
play  an  important  part.  I  refer  to  commerce  destroying  and  to 
industrial  warfare.  An  example  is  afforded  by  the  case  of  a  con- 
flict with  Germany. 

The  configuration  of  that  empire's  coasts  is  such  that  their 
blockade  by  a  naval  force,  were  it  as  formidable  as  that  of  Great 
Britain,  is  by  no  means  a  simple  operation.  The  German  ad- 
miral de  Stosch  said  in  1888 :  "  The  ports  of  the  North  Sea  defend 
themselves.  If  the  beacons  are  removed  from  the  endless  sand 
banks  that  change  form  every  year,  the  most  skilful  pilots  would 
not  dare  to  risk  a  ship  in  those  tortuous  passages." 

Admiral  Hollmann  expressed  the  same  opinion  in  1897 :  "  We 
have  no  need  of  a  navy  for  the  defence  of  our  coasts,  they  are 
their  own  defence.'' 

These  very  favorable  conditions  require  as  their  necessary  com- 
plement secondary  operations  of  such  a  nature  as  to  force  the 
German  fleet  to  the  necessity  of  leaving  its  refuges  and  itself  com- 
ing to  offer  battle. 

This  result  would  be  surely  obtained  by  closing  the  entrance  of 
the  North  Sea  to  the  commercial  fleet  of  Germany  by  a  sort  of 
industrial  war  made  at  the  opening  of  hostilities,  with  so  many  the 
more  chances  of  success  that  the  respective  geographical  situations 
of  the  countries  lend  themselves  to  it  very  well.  Under  penalty  of 
his  very  life,  the  Emperor  of  Germany  would  not  be  able  to  bear 
the  sudden  shutting  off  of  the  commercial  stream  that  daily  nour- 
ishes his  country ;  she  would  be  able  so  much  the  less  to  accept  it 
that,  an  agricultural  nation  prior  to  1870  and  consequently  self- 
supporting,  she  has  become  industrial  and  commercial  and  can  no 
longer  do  without  relations  with  the  outside  world.  Statistics 
furnish  on  this  subject  very  convincing  lessons.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  last  century,  the  agricultural  population  of  Germany 
formed  more  than  80  per  cent  of  the  total  population.  In  1870, 

3i5 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

the  proportion  was  still  greater  than  50  per  cent ;  but  in  1882  it 
had  already  fallen  off  to  42  per  cent,  and  was  no  greater  than  30 
per  cent  in  1898.  The  evolution  has  been  as  rapid  as  evident. 

The  German  war  fleet  would  therefore  necessarily  go  out  to 
join  battle,  and  moreover  it  is  to  prepare  for  this  that  the  Kaiser 
has  given  it  an  impulse  towards  the  offensive. 

And  there  once  more  we  see  an  aggregate  of  preparatory  opera- 
tions the  execution  of  which  evidently  cannot  be  left  to  chance ; 
all  their  details  are  settled  in  time  of  peace  so  that  on  the  outbreak 
of  war  the  cruisers  ^detailed  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  commerce 
know  the  movement  of  commercial  lines  and  their  stopping  points 
as  well  as  the  number  and  quality  of  the  ships  en  route. 

These  farsighted  arrangements  are  always  the  result  of  prepa- 
ration for  war. 

When  the  plans  of  operations  are  settled  in  all  their  details — 
and  when  I  say  details  I  am  evidently  referring  to  the  broad  prin- 
ciples of  strategy,  since  the  unexpected  of  the  battlefield  cannot  be 
prepared  for  in  advance — it  must  not  be  supposed  that  one  is 
ready  for  war.  The  chiefs  who  have  the  responsibility  of  leading 
to  battle  squadrons,  or  it  may  be  single  ships,  ought  to  be  pro- 
vided with  war  orders  indicating  to  them  in  the  most  precise 
manner  the  objective  of  the  mission  confided  to  them,  as  well  as 
the  underlying  idea  of  the  orders  that  are  given  to  them.  I  insist 
upon  the  preceding  expression,  for  too  often  instructions  are 
buried  in  interminable  phrases  relative  to  unimportant  details, 
without  the  motives  of  the  action  ordered  or  the  aim  that  is  pro- 
posed to  be  attained  being  clearly  indicated,  and  it  is  important 
that  the  chief  know  these  in  order  to  insure  their  good  execution. 

Above  all  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  the  vagueness  of  formulas 
which  envelope  with  an  impenetrable  fog  the  directing  idea.  I 
shall  never  forget,  in  this  connection,  the  impression  which  was 
made  upon  me  as  a  young  officer,  in  the  far  off  time  when  I  was 
on  night  guard  at  the  Mourillon  arsenal,  at  Toulon,  by  reading  on 
the  order  board  this  terse  phrase :  "  In  case  of  fire,  the  sentinels  re- 
double their  vigilance."  This  comes  into  my  mind  because,  at  a 
critical  period  of  our  contemporary  naval  history,  a  lucky  chance 
brought  to  light  the  fact  that  certain  instructions  of  war  time 
yield  nothing  in  the  matter  of  triviality  to  the  foregoing  instruc- 
tions in  case  of  fire.  The  wording  of  war  instructions  ought  to 
be  brief,  clear  and  precise. 

316 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

MOBILIZATION. 

I  have  made  the  most  of  the  important  place  that  concentra- 
tion of  the  forces  occupies  in  the  work  of  preparation  for  war ;  but 
I  have  assumed,  in  that  very  way,  that  all  those  forces  were  ready 
for  action.  Such  is  not  the  case ;  since,  for  financial,  economic 
and  even  military  reasons,  it  is  impossible  to  keep  the  forces  con- 
tinually on  a  war  footing.  An  important  fraction  finds  itself  in 
the  position  of  reserve  during  the  period  of  peace.  The  passage 
of  this  class  of  forces  from  the  position  of  reserve  to  that  of  com- 
plete armament  is  the  first  act  of  the  period  of  political  tension  im- 
mediately preceding  hostilities,  or  even  indistinguishable  from 
them.  The  powerful  interest  attached  to  "  mobilization  "  in  the 
case  of  land  forces  is  well  known.  It  is  no  less  great  in  the  case 
of  fleets,  and  the  mobilization  of  the  naval  reserves  is  still  more 
complicated  perhaps,  since  here  a  very  important  and  delicate 
material  is  concerned  besides  the  personnel. 

It  is  enough  to  observe,  as  evidenced  by  recent  occurences,  the 
suddenness  with  which  modern  wars  break  out  to  feel  with  what 
care  all  the  stages  of  this  mobilization,  as  regards  material  as  well 
as  personnel,  require  to  be  settled  during  peace  time,  so  that,  at 
the  first  signal,  the  units  in  reserve  may  be  armed  without  damage 
or  shock,  with  the  maximum  of  activity  in  the  minimum  of  time. 
It  is  easily  understood  that  the  unexpected  cannot  play  any  part 
in  this  operation ;  and,  in  fact,  naval  mobilization  is  one  of  the  most 
delicate  tasks,  if  not  the  most  delicate,  of  preparation  for  war. 

It  is  not  enough  that  measures  are  so  taken  that,  in  time  of 
peace,  the  modern  ships  in  reserve  are  kept  in  good  condition  and 
lose  not  the  least  part  of  their  military  value ;  that  they  have  ac- 
cordingly, always  in  full  complement,  the  personnel  of  all  the 
special  branches  required  for  their  proper  maintenance ;  that  this 
personnel  retains  all  its  military  training.  It  is  further  necessary 
that  the  rest  of  the  personnel,  required  to  put  the  crews  on  a  war 
footing,  join  their  respective  ships  rapidly  and  surely. 

The  prompt  mobilization  of  all  the  forces  available  for  fighting 
is,  it  cannot  be  too  often  repeated,  the  decisive  act  of  the  prepa- 
ration for  war.  On  no  account,  therefore  can  strategy  neglect  it, 
and  it  is  for  that  reason  also  that  ali  measures  regarding  the  or- 
ganization of  the  personnel  are  the  immediate  concern  of  strategy. 
This  essential  truth  once  recognized,  it  is  immediately  perceived 
that  all  the  much  discussed  and  often  vexatious  questions  con- 

317 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

earning  this  personnel  take  on  a  character  of  simplicity  and  at 
the  same  time  of  importance  which  enforces  reasonable  solutions. 
It  is  no  longer  asked,  in  short,  if  such  an  organization  of  mecha- 
nicians, of  gunners  or  of  torpedo  men,  considered  apart,  would  be 
superior  to  such  another,  if  the  school  of  gunners  is  better  placed 
on  an  old  hulk  than  on  a  modern  battleship,  or  whether  the  tor- 
pedo school  ought  to  profit  by  changing  from  a  battleship  to  a 
shore  station;  each  of  these  questions,  interesting  in  itself,  is  of 
very  little  importance  in  the  aggregate,  and  all  ought  to  be  re- 
garded from  the  view-point  of  preparation  for  war,  so  that  their 
solutions  may  form  a  homogeneous  structure  in  which  all  differ- 
ences are  merged. 

Henceforth,  when  the  constitution  and  organization  of  the 
naval  personnel  are  to  be  studied,  and  it  is  the  province  of  strategy 
alone  to  determine  them,  the  military  objective  must  be  taken  as 
the  sole  guide. 

COMBINED  OPERATIONS. 

Preparation  for  war  has  further  in  its  province  the  study,  in 
concert  with  the  military  authority,  of  combined  operations.  The 
transportation  by  sea  of  an  expeditionary  force  and  its  disem- 
barkation on  a  hostile  shore,  particularly  if  an  important  army  is 
concerned,  have  always  been  very  difficult  undertakings  which 
under  no  conditions  lend  themselves  to  improvisation.  The  navy 
plays  in  them  the  important  part,  first  through  the  preliminary 
task  that  it  ought  to  fulfil  of  suppressing  the  adverse  naval  forces 
and  assuring  freedom  of  the  sea,  then  through  its  responsibility 
of  guaranteeing  the  expedition  against  dangers  of  the  sea,  of  get- 
ting ready  to  land  the  troops  with  their  material,  and  finally  of 
maintaining  the  permanent  connection  of  the  army  with  the  bases 
of  operations  beyond  the  sea. 

So  vast  a  program  evidently  can  only  be  executed  by  means  of 
a  close  collaboration  of  all  the  services  concerned. 

The  two  General  Staffs,  army  and  navy,  should  in  advance, 
and  with  calm  reflection,  examine  and  solve  all  the  points  of  this 
immense  problem;  designation  of  the  objectives,  evaluation  of  the 
military  forces  necessary  to  .secure  at  a  given  point  the  desired 
military  effect,  determination  of  the  number  and  size  of  trans- 
ports, packets  or  freighters  that  are  to  serve  to  carry  the  expedi- 
tionary army,  choice  of  the  points  of  assembly  of  the  troops  for 

318 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

embarkation  and  of  the  port  of  concentration  where  the  convoy  is 
to  form,  discussion  of  the  point  or  points  favorable  for  disem- 
barkation and  choice  between  them,  orders  of  sailing  and  of  con- 
voy, reconnaissance  and  clearing  of  the  landing  places  by  the 
naval  forces,  preparation  of  the  special  material  for  the  disem- 
barkation, orders  for  that  disembarkation,  etc.  I  could  add  more, 
and  more  important  things. 

I  will  merely  mention  that. another  constant  care  among  the 
first  cares  in  war  ought  to  be  to  secure  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  material  and  moral  resources  of  the  adversary.  Force  in  war 
is  always  relative  and  grows  with  the  weakness  of  the  enemy  as 
well  as  with  its  own  strength.  If  the  General  Staff  endeavors  to 
discover  the  weak  points  of  every  nature  in  the  hostile  organiza- 
tion, it  is  also  the  imperious  duty  of  every  commander-in-chief 
to  inform  himself  in  regard  to  the  temperament,  character,  qual- 
ifications and  defects  of  the  chiefs  of  the  hostile  squadrons  that 
will  be  opposed  to  those  that  he  directs. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

I  wish  that  all  that  precedes  could  make  others  feel  as  strongly 
as  I  do  myself  what  a  gigantic  labor  preparation  for  war  really 
is ;  I  have  been  able  only  to  broadly  outline  the  rational  method 
outside  of  which  everything  is  but  fantasy  and  expedient.  But 
what  my  pen  has  been  powerless  to  express,  because  it  is  rather 
something  to  be  divined,  is  the  importance  of  time  in  this  labor 
as  patient  and  persevering  as  an  ant's,  and  the  great  value  of 
method  in  constructing  that  network  of  close  meshes  whose  every 
thread  is  renewed  in  proportion  as  it  wears  without  disturbing  the 
general  harmony. 

This  magnificent  work,  that  I  have  necessarily  had  to  present 
bit  by  bit,  appears  so  much  the  vaster  as  its  details  are  brought 
out,  it  cannot  therefore  be  the  work  of  a  day ;  it  requires  the  devo- 
tion of  a  man's  whole  life,  and  the  efforts  of  all  together  are  not 
too  much  to  bring  it  to  a  good  conclusion. 

The  task,  already  so  heavy,  is  complicated  by  a  financial  prob- 
lem conjoined  with  the  technical  problem.  In  short,  war  must 
always  be  prepared  for  with  limited  resources ;  strategy  finds  its 
true  justification  in  the  search  for  success  with  restricted  means. 
Were  it  only  from  the  financial  point  of  view,  the  method  of  hasty 
improvisation  and  of  trusting  to  luck  which  consists  of  procuring 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

things  of  prime  necessity  only  when  a  pressing  danger,  or  a  threat 
or  war,  arises,  is  absolutely  detestable.  The  millions  spent  in  a 
few  days,  as  too  often  we  have  had  to  do  in  the  purchase  of  mate- 
rials of  mobilization  and  of  service,  supplies,  etc.,  are  very  badly 
utilized,  for  one  is  obliged  to  take  whatever  is  for  sale.  Nothing, 
I  continue  to  repeat,  can  take  the  place  of  the  methodical,  labo- 
rious, slow  preparatory  work  of  the  time  of  peace ;  that  alone  can 
do  a  lasting  work.  It  is  not  merely  in  the  particular  case  just  con- 
sidered that  preparation  for  war  avoids  financial  waste ;  it  is  eco- 
nomical in  its  principle.  It  will  be  enough,  in  order  to  give  an 
irrefutable  proof  of  this,  to  recall  that  the  war  of  1898  cost  Spain 
300,000,000  pesetas  and  that  that  of  1904  cost  4,495,000,000 
francs  to  Russia,  not  including  the  expenditures  on  requisitions 
of  the  commanders-in-chief  that  are  not  yet  known.  These  sums 
are  out  of  all  proportion  with  those  that  a  sufficient  prior  military 
effort  would  have  required.  This  new  proof  would  suffice  by  it- 
self alone  to  demonstrate  that  good  strategy  demands  preparation 
for  war. 

And  the  same  thing  is  true  of  tactics.  Until  now  I  have  neg- 
lected to  mention  the  role  of  the  commander-in-chief ;  by  giving 
to  him  perfect  tools,  full  and  trained  crews,  clear  and  precise  in- 
structions and  a  clearly  designated  aim,  the  service  which  has  pre- 
pared for  war  has  done  its  work ;  his  own  then  begins.  More  ex- 
actly it  has  already  begun,  since  it  is  not  at  the  moment  when  the 
battle  opens  that  the  chief  ought  first  to  exhibit  his  personal  in- 
fluence. In  the  preparatory  exercises  of  peace  times  he  should 
have  endeavored  to  instil  into  the  very  souls  of  all  his  subordi- 
nates the  most  active  element  of  moral  force,  confidence;  by  his 
personal  action,  by  his  professional  ability,  above  all  by  his  char- 
acter, and  finally  by  his  activity,  he  should  have  inspired  the 
hearts  of  all  with  the  certainty  of  victory.  Finally  he  should  have 
made  his  military  plan  known  sufficiently  for  his  subordinates,  on 
the  field  of  action,  to  be  inspired  by  it,  and  to  all  act  together  to  a 
common  end.  And  all  this  is  still  preparation  for  war. 

That  is  not  yet  all.  From  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the  military 
hierarchy,  among  the  officers  as  well  as  among  the  men,  each  in 
his  own  sphere  ought  to  be  fully  conscious  of  the  greatness  of  his 
responsibility.  Of  all  moral  forces  the  most  effective  in  war 
comes  from  the  turning  of  all  individual  wills  towards  a  common 
ideal  of  national  glory  and  beauty. 

320 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Allow  me  in  this  connection,  to  recall  a  personal  memory  as 
lively  after  the  lapse  of  thirty-five  years  as  on  the  first  day.  I  was 
still  very  young  at  the  time  of  the  terrible  year,  but  yet  I  was  of 
the  age  when  strong  emotions  leave  an  ineffaceable  impression  on 
the  soul,  and  I  see  again  the  scene  as  if  it  were  of  yesterday.  In 
a  great  place,  before  the  town  hall,  is  packed  an  agonized  crowd 
of  old  men,  of  women  and  of  children,  listening  to  news  from  the 
theater  of  war  read  from  the  balcony  by  a  government  official. 

In  the  text  of  an  official  telegram,  whose  phrases  resemble  the 
dry  crackling  of  musketry,  three  words  sound  forth  like  a  knell 
of  death :  "  Metz  has  surrendered !  "  And  from  that  crowd,  over 
which  I  felt  pass  the  shiver  of  a  great  despair,  arises  a  long  cry, 
as  of  a  wounded  beast,  of  grief  and  rage  at  betrayal. 

And,  in  fact,  it  is  truly  a  whole  present  and  past  of  betrayals 
that  those  three  words  symbolize. 

By  this  I  do  not  merely  point  to  the  crime  of  treason  committed 
by  a  traitor  general,  delivering  over  to  the  enemy  a  formidable 
fortress,  and,  worse  still,  a  whole  active  army.  I  allude  especially 
to  that  immense  aggregate  of  betrayals  in  small  things,  conscious 
or  unconscious,  the  apathy  of  some,  the  carelessness  of  others, 
the  idleness  and  indifference  of  the  greater  number,  the  tendency 
of  many  to  put  off  till  tomorrow  what  can  be  done  to-day,  or  to 
deny  dangers  because  the  happiness  of  days  of  ease  would  be 
vexed  by  them,  to  all  those  passive  resistances,  so  much  the  more 
harmful  as  they  are  invisible  in  the  mass  and  which  reduce  to  a 
minimum  the  efficiency  of  the  machine.  But  the  machine  with 
which  we  are  busy  is  preparation  for  war,  that  is  to  say  strategy, 
that  is  to  say  tactics,  in  short,  war  and  the  country's  safety.  These 
accumulated .  partial  betrayals  were  the  real  cause  of  the  disaster 
of  1870. 

It  depends  therefore  upon  the  humblest  servants  of  the  country 
in  the  navy,  and  particularly  upon  the  officers,  whether  these  fric- 
tions are  to  be  suppressed ;  to  accomplish  it  needs  only  that  each 
person,  whatever  his  function,  have  his  mind  constantly  bent  upon 
the  object,  with  the  sentiment  that  even  the  apparently  most  in- 
significant gear  wheel  is  indispensable  to  the  efficient  working  of 
the  whole  machine.  And,  by  so  doing,  each  will  co-operate  in  the 
preparation  for  war. 

I  have  now  come  to  the  end  of  the  chapter  on  preparation,  and 
with  it  we  close  also  the  book  of  basic  principles. 

321 


WAR  ON  THE  SEA. 

Throughout  this  book  I  have  tried  to  bring  out  a  small  number 
of  fundamental  principles  without  which  victory  cannot  be  hoped 
for,  and  among  them  the  one  we  have  last  considered  dominates 
all  the  others  with  its  extraordinary  influence.  The  latin  proverb 
is  truer  now  than  ever  before!  Only  strong  nations  are  assured 
of  peace.  Thus,  in  seeking  to  sum  up  the  teaching  of  these  ten 
chapters  on  basic  principles  in  a  sort  of  brief  formula  like  a 
"  Garde  a  vous,"  which,  at  every  moment  of  our  career,  shall  im- 
periously declare  this  basic  principle,  I  find  no  better  one  than: 
"  Metz  has  surrendered."  Remember  it ! 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
BERKELEY 

Return  to  desk  from  which  borrowed. 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


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3   1947 


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